area handbook series 

Czechoslovakia 

a country study 




Czechoslovakia 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Ihor Gawdiak 
Research Completed 
August 1987 



On the cover: Judith Gate, Prague 



Third Edition; First Printing, 1989. 

Copyright ®1989 United States Government as represented by 
the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Czechoslovakia: a country study. 

(DA pam ; 550-158) 
"Research completed August 1987." 
Bibliography: pp. 363-391. 
Includes index. 

Supt. of Docs. no. : D 101.22:550-158/987 

1. Czechoslovakia. I. Gawdiak, Ihor Y., 1935- . II. Library of 
Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. 

DB2011.C93 1989 943.7 88-600487 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-155 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of numer- 
ous individuals to this edition of Czechoslovakia: A Country Study. They 
are particularly grateful to the writers of the 1982 edition: Rosalyn 
Unger, "Historical Setting"; Patricia A. Kluck, "The Society and 
Its Environment"; Darrel R. Elgin, "The Economy"; James D. 
Rudolph, "Government and Politics"; and Eugene K. Keefe, 
"National Security." This work provided the organization and 
structure for the present volume as well as a considerable portion 
of the text. 

The authors also express their gratitude to the individuals in 
government agencies and private institutions who graciously con- 
tributed their time, research materials, and extensive knowledge 
of Czechoslovak affairs. George J. Kovtun, Czechoslovak Specialist 
in the Library of Congress, provided valuable insight and sugges- 
tions for the "Historical Setting" chapter, as did Ellen Jones and 
Lyston Lea of the Defense Intelligence Agency for the "National 
Security" chapter. 

The authors are also indebted to many members of the staff of 
the Federal Research Divisions for their significant contributions 
to the production of this volume. They are particularly grateful 
to Richard F. Nyrop, who reviewed the drafts of the chapters and 
provided guidance in all aspects of the preparation of the book; 
Raymond E. Zickel, who provided substantive editing and valua- 
ble comments; Barbara Dash and Marilyn Majeska, who edited 
the manuscript; and editorial assistants Barbara Edgerton, Monica 
Shimmin, and Izella Watson, who helped prepare the manuscript. 

Special thanks are owed Teresa E. Kemp and David P. Cabitto, 
who designed the artwork on the cover and the title page of each 
chapter; Cabitto also oversaw the preparation and production of 
the graphic art, maps, and illustrations, which were prepared by 
Harriet R. Blood, Sandra K. Cotugno, Kimberly E. Lord, and 
Keith Bechard. Susan Lender and Carolina E. Forrester helped 
select and modify maps for the publication. Thanks also go to 
Sisto M. Flores, who provided information on ranks and insignia. 
Andrea T. Merrill performed the final editorial review, and Margo 
Varghese prepared the index. Marilyn Majeska managed book 
production. Malinda B. Neale, of the Library of Congress Com- 
posing Unit, prepared the camera-ready copy under the supervi- 
sion of Peggy Pixley. 



v 



Finally, the authors wish to note the generosity of individuals 
and private agencies who provided photographs for use in this book. 
The authors are especially grateful for original work not previously 
published. 



vi 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction xxi 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Zenon E. Kohut 

EARLY HISTORY 5 

First Political Units 5 

Magyar Invasion 7 

Bohemian Kingdom 7 

Hussite Movement 10 

HAPSBURG RULE, 1526-1867 14 

The Hapsburgs and the Czechoslovak Lands 14 

Hapsburg Absolutism and the Bohemian Estates .... 15 

Enlightened Absolutism 19 

National Revival 21 

Revolutions of 1848 23 

THE DUAL MONARCHY, 1867-1918 25 

Formation of the Dual System 25 

Austria and the Czechs 26 

Hungary and the Slovaks 27 

The Czechoslovak Idea 28 

World War I 28 

The Emergence of Subcarpathian Ruthenia 

(Carpatho-Ukraine) 29 

THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, 1918-39 31 

Features of the New State 31 

Czechoslovak Democracy 33 

Problem of Dissatisfied Nationalities 36 

Benes's Foreign Policy 41 

Munich 42 

The Second Republic, 1938-39 44 

THE WAR YEARS, 1939-45 45 

Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 45 

Government-in-Exile 48 



vii 



Czech Resistance 49 

Slovak Republic 50 

Slovak Resistance 51 

Soviet Annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine 

(Subcarpathian Ruthenia) 52 

Minorities and Population Transfers 54 

COMMUNIST CZECHOSLOVAKIA 54 

The Third Republic and the Communist Takeover . . 54 

Stalinization 57 

The Reform Movement 60 

The Prague Spring, 1968 62 

Intervention 63 

Normalization 66 

Preserving the Status Quo 67 

Dissent and Independent Activity 68 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 73 

Helen Fedor and Mark W. Gould 

GEOGRAPHY AND ENVIRONMENT .' 76 

Topography and Drainage 76 

Climate 79 

DEMOGRAPHY 80 

Population 80 

Urbanization and Migration 81 

Housing 83 

Emigration 85 

ETHNIC GROUPS 85 

Czechs 86 

Slovaks 90 

Others 93 

LANGUAGE 99 

SOCIAL GROUPS 101 

Workers 102 

Agricultural Workers 105 

Intelligentsia 107 

Associations 112 

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 113 

Trade Unions 115 

Youth Organizations 116 

The Family 117 

RELIGION 118 

HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE 123 

EDUCATION 126 



viii 



Chapter 3. The Economy 131 

Becky A. Gates 

RESOURCE BASE 133 

LABOR FORCE 134 

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND ITS CONTROL 

MECHANISMS 135 

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE 139 

ECONOMIC SECTORS 147 

Mining and Energy 147 

Industry 151 

Agriculture 153 

Transportation 157 

BANKING AND FINANCE 160 

FOREIGN TRADE 163 

THE EIGHTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN, 1986-90 167 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 1 7 1 

Cathleen A. Campbell 

POLITICAL SETTING 173 

Geopolitical Considerations 173 

Ethnic Considerations 174 

The 1968 Invasion 175 

The Policy of Normalization 177 

A Climate of Orthodoxy 178 

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 181 

National Organization 182 

Lower- Level Organization 186 

Membership and Training 187 

Auxiliary Parties, Mass Organizations, and 

Mass Media 189 

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 191 

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 194 

The Legislature 195 

The Executive Branch 196 

The Judiciary 198 

Republic and Lower Administrative Levels 199 

ELECTORAL SYSTEM 202 

POPULAR POLITICAL EXPRESSION 202 

Reaction to Normalization 203 

Charter 77 204 

Religious Activists 205 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 205 

Policy Making and Administration 206 



ix 



Relations with Communist Nations 208 

Relations with Noncommunist Nations and 

Multilateral Ties 211 

Chapter 5. National Security 215 

Kenneth E. Nyirady 

ARMED FORCES: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL 

SETTING 218 

Historical Background and Traditions 218 

Government and Party Control 228 

Soviet Influence 231 

External Threats to National Security 234 

ARMED FORCES 235 

Ground Forces 235 

Air Force , 238 

Manpower 239 

Education and Training 241 

Uniforms and Rank Insignia 246 

INTERNAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER 247 

The National Security Corps 249 

People's Militia 251 

Border Guard 252 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 252 

Incidence of Crime 252 

Penal Code 256 

Criminal Procedure Code 258 

Penal System 259 

Police Repression 261 

Appendix A. Tables 265 

Appendix B. The Council for Mutual Economic 

Assistance 273 

Malinda K. Goodrich 

MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE, NATURE, AND SCOPE . . 274 

Membership 274 

Structure 277 

Nature of Operation 281 

Comecon Versus the European Economic Community . . 282 

EVOLUTION 284 

Early Years 284 

Rediscovery of Comecon after Stalin's Death 285 

Rapid Growth in Comecon Activity, 1956-63 285 

A Lull and Subsequent Revitalization in the 

Late 1960s 286 



x 



The Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic 

Integration, 1971 287 

The 1980s 289 

COOPERATION UNDER THE 1971 COMPREHENSIVE 

PROGRAM 291 

Market Relations and Instruments 291 

Cooperation in Planning 294 

POWER CONFIGURATIONS WITHIN COMECON 299 

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 299 

Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam 300 

Support for Developing Countries 301 

TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 302 

Appendix C. The Warsaw Pact 307 

Karl Wheeler Soper 

THE SOVIET ALLIANCE SYSTEM, 1943-55 309 

The Organization of East European National 

Units, 1943-45 309 

The Development of Socialist Armies in Eastern 

Europe, 1945-55 310 

THE WARSAW PACT, 1955-70 313 

East-West Diplomacy and the Formation of the 

Warsaw Pact 313 

Early Organizational Structure and Activities 315 

De-Stalinization and National Communism 316 

The Post- 1956 Period 319 

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE 

WARSAW PACT 327 

Political Organization 327 

Military Organization 327 

THE WARSAW PACT, 1970-87 335 

Detente 336 

The Role of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries 

in the Third World 337 

The Solidarity Crisis 339 

The End of Detente 341 

The Problem of Romania in the 1970s and 1980s .... 343 

The Renewal of the Alliance 344 

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE WARSAW 

PACT 346 

Soviet Military Strategy 346 

The Role of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries 

in Soviet Military Strategy 348 



xi 



The Reliability of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact 

Armies 350 

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND THE WARSAW 

PACT 352 

The Weapons and Equipment of the Non-Soviet 

Warsaw Pact Armies 352 

Coordination of Arms Production 354 

Appendix D. Manifesto of Charter 77 357 

Bibliography 363 

Glossary 393 

Index 397 

List of Figures 

1 Czechoslavakia: Administrative Divisions, 1988 xx 

2 Central Europe circa 1097 8 

3 The Bohemian Kingdom and Its Extensions, 1378 12 

4 Central Europe, 1648 18 

5 Central Europe, 1815 22 

6 Distintegration of Austria-Hungary, 1918 30 

7 The Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-38 34 

8 Partitioning of Czechoslovakia, 1938-39 46 

9 Topography and Drainage 78 

10 Age-Sex Distribution, 1985 82 

11 Population Density, 1986 84 

12 Ethnic Minorities in Czechoslovakia 96 

13 Transportation System, 1987 158 

14 Organization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 

with Top Party Officials, 1987 184 

15 Government Organization, 1987 196 

16 Representative Motorized Rifle and Tank Divisions, 

1980 236 

17 Military and Reserve Military Airfields, 1987 240 

18 Rank Insignia, 1987 248 



xii 



Preface 



CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A COUNTRY STUDY replaces the 
edition of this work published in 1982. Several important develop- 
ments took place in Czechoslovakia in the period between the two 
publications. The dissident movement persisted in the face of un- 
relenting attempts by the government to crush it, and the number 
of Charter 77 signatories grew steadily. There also has been a 
revitalization of the Roman Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia. 
The church's rising popularity was underscored by the govern- 
ment's refusal to allow Pope John Paul II to participate in the fes- 
tivities celebrating the 1,100th anniversary of the death of Saint 
Methodius. Perhaps most significant, the aging and conservative 
Czechoslovak leadership has been confronted in the last years with 
the growing challenge of glasnost ' and perestroika, promoted by the 
general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
Mikhail Gorbachev. 

Like its predecessor, this edition attempts to deal with the 
dominant social, political, economic, and national security aspects 
of Czechoslovakia. Although the present volume incorporates con- 
siderable material from the 1982 edition, it is essentially a new book 
and contains statistical data and other relevant information from 
recently published sources. Sources of information included books 
and scholarly journals, officials reports of governments and inter- 
national organizations, foreign and domestic newspapers, and con- 
ference papers and proceedings. Chapter bibliographies appear at 
the end of the book, and brief comments on some of the more valu- 
able sources recommended for further reading appear at the end 
of each chapter. Measurements are given in the metric system; a 
conversion table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with met- 
ric measurements (see table 1, Appendix A). A Glossary is also 
included. 

The contemporary place-names used in this edition are gener- 
ally those approved by the United States Board on Geographic 
Names. The reader will find, for example, Prague rather than Praha 
and Danube rather than Dunaj. 

A certain amount of inconsistency seems unavoidable with respect 
to historical personages. The names of many of the important actors 
appear here in anglicized form. The reader will note the use of such 
English names as George, Charles, and Frederick. But the authors 
have decided to use Jan Hus rather than the anglicized John Huss. 



Xlll 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 
Short Form: Czechoslovakia. 
Term for Citizens: Czechoslovak(s). 
Capital: Prague. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 127,905 square kilometers. 

Topography: Generally irregular terrain. Western area, includ- 
ing natural basin centered on Prague, part of north-central Euro- 
pean uplands. Eastern region made up of northern reaches of 
Carpathian Mountains and Danube Basin lands. 



xv 



Climate: Predominantly continental but varies from moderate tem- 
peratures of Western Europe to more severe weather systems 
affecting Eastern Europe and the western Soviet Union. 

Society 

Population: Estimated at 15.6 million in July 1987. Population 
growth rate 0.3 percent in 1987. 

Education and Literacy: Education free at all levels and com- 
pulsory from age six to sixteen. Vast majority of population liter- 
ate. Highly developed system of apprenticeship training and 
vocational schools supplements general secondary schools and in- 
stitutions of higher education. 

Health: Free health care available to all citizens. National health 
planning emphasizes preventive medicine; factory and local health- 
care centers supplement hospitals and other inpatient institutions. 
Substantial improvement in rural health care in 1960s and 1970s. 

Language: Czech and Slovak recognized as official languages; they 
are mutually intelligible. 

Ethnic Groups: In 1987 Czechs represented roughly 63 percent 
of population and Slovaks 31 percent. Hungarians, Ukrainians, 
Poles, Germans, and Gypsies principal minority groups. 

Religion: Religious freedom constitutionally guaranteed but limited 
in practice. Major religious organizations operate under govern- 
ment restrictions. Reliable information on religious affiliation during 
post-World War II era lacking, but principal denominations Roman 
Catholic Church, Czechoslovak National Church, Slovak Evan- 
gelical Church, Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, and Uniate 
Church. 

Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): Estimated US$135.6 billion in 
1985. Per capita GNP US$8,700. Growth moderate in first half 
of 1980s. In 1985 real growth rate 1.6 percent. Economy centrally 
planned with command links controlled by communist party, similar 
to Soviet Union. 

Energy and Mining: Country energy short, relying on imported 
crude oil and natural gas from Soviet Union, domestic brown coal, 
and nuclear and hydroelectric energy. Energy constraints a major 
factor in 1980s. Large metallurgical industry but dependent on im- 
ports for iron and nonferrous ores. 



xvi 



Industry: Extractive and manufacturing industries dominate sec- 
tor. Major branches include machinery, chemicals, food process- 
ing, metallurgy, and textiles. In 1985 production of pig iron 9.6 
million tons, crude steel 15 million tons, and cement 10.3 million 
tons. Industry wasteful of energy, materials, and labor and slow 
to upgrade technology, but country source of high-quality 
machinery and arms for other communist countries. 

Agriculture: Minor sector but supplied bulk of food needs. 
Dependent on large imports of grains (mainly for livestock feed) 
in years of adverse weather. In 1980s good harvests resulted in 
decreased reliance on imports. Meat production constrained by 
shortage of feed, but high per capita consumption of meat. 

Foreign Trade: Exports estimated at US$17.8 billion in 1985, of 
which 55 percent machinery, 14 percent fuels and materials, 16 
percent manufactured consumer goods, 7 percent agricultural and 
forestry products and 8 percent other. Imports estimated at US$17.9 
billion in 1985, of which 41 percent fuels and materials, 33 per- 
cent machinery, 12 percent agricultural and forestry products, 6 
percent manufactured consumer goods and 8 percent other. In 
1986, about 80 percent of foreign trade with communist countries. 

Exchange Rate: Official, or commercial, rate Kcs 5.4 per US$1 
in 1987; tourist, or noncommercial, rate Kcs 10.5 per US$1. 
Neither rate reflected purchasing power. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: State almost exclusive owner of means of produc- 
tion. Revenues from state enterprises primary source of revenues 
followed by turnover tax. Large budget expenditures on social pro- 
grams, subsidies, and investments. Budget usually balanced or small 
surplus. 

Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: In 1985 total of 13,141 kilometers, of which 12,883 
kilometers standard gauge, 102 kilometers broad gauge, and 156 
kilometers narrow gauge; 2,866 kilometers double tracked and 3,221 
kilometers electrified. Track and beds suffered from inadequate 
maintenance. 

Roads: In 1983 total of 74,064 kilometers, of which 60,765 kilo- 
meters paved and 13,299 kilometers graveled. Roads poorly main- 
tained. 

Inland Waterways: About 475 kilometers in 1985. 



xvn 



Pipelines: In 1987 about 1,448 kilometers for crude oil, 1,500 
kilometers for refined products, and 8,000 kilometers for natural 
gas. Network linked domestic oil and gas fields to refineries. Pipe- 
lines also linked to large international lines bringing Soviet crude 
oil and gas to border. 

Freight: In 1985 about 81 percent of long-distance freight carried 
by rail. Truck transport accounted for 13 percent, inland water- 
ways for 5 percent, and civil aviation less than 1 percent of freight 
traffic. 

Ports: No seaports; used Gdynia, Gdansk, and Szczecin in Poland; 
Rijeka and Koper in Yugoslavia; Hamburg in Federal Republic 
of Germany; and Rostock in German Democratic Republic. 
Czechoslovakia had own fleet and chartered vessels for interna- 
tional cargo. Main river ports Prague, Bratislava, Deem, and 
Komarno. 

Telecommunications: Adequate, modern, automatic system with 
direct dial connections with many parts of country and most 
European countries. In 1985 about 23.2 per 100 inhabitants. In 
January 1987 fifty-four AM, and fourteen FM radio stations, forty- 
five televisions stations and eleven Soviet television relays. 

Government and Politics 

Politics: Monopoly on politics held by Communist Party of Czecho- 
slovakia (Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska — KSC). Gustav 
Husak elected first secretary of KSC in 1969 (changed to general 
secretary in 1971) and president of Czechoslovakia in 1975. Other 
parties and organizations exist but function in subordinate roles 
to KSC. All political parties, as well as numerous mass organiza- 
tions, grouped under umbrella of National Front of the Czecho- 
slovak Socialist Republic. Human rights activists and religious 
activists severely repressed. 

Government: Government functioned under 1960 Constitution, 
which was substantially amended in 1968 and to lesser extents in 
1971, 1975, and 1978. 1968 amendments created federal govern- 
ment structure, although subsequent amendments greatly limited 
authority of Czech Socialist Republic and Slovak Socialist Republic. 
Power of federal administration severely limited by "shadow 
government" within KSC, which made all important policy de- 
cisions. 

Foreign Relations: Formal diplomatic relations with 135 nations 
in 1987. Czechoslovakia considered strong ally of Soviet Union and 



xvi n 



closely followed Soviet lead in international affairs. Relations with 
United States poor in 1987. 

International Agreements and Memberships: Active participant 
in Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), Warsaw 
Pact, United Nations and its specialized agencies, and Movement 
of Nonaligned Nations; signatory of conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Czechoslovak People's Army comprised ground 
forces, numbering 145,000, and air forces, numbering 56,000, in 
1987. Conscripts made up slightly less than 70 percent of ground 
forces and about 32 percent of air force. 

Military Units: Five tank divisions and five motorized rifle divi- 
sions formed nucleus of ground forces in 1987. Combat support 
provided by one airborne regiment, two antitank regiments, three 
surface-to-surface missile brigades and two artillery brigades. Air 
force's 465 combat aircraft and 40 armed helicopters deployed in 
ground attack, interceptor, and reconnaissance squadrons. Five 
Soviet ground divisions stationed in Czechoslovakia; total strength 
about 85,000. 

Equipment: Thriving armaments industry produced small arms, 
heavy weapons, armored vehicles, tanks, and jet aircraft. Some 
also imported from Soviet Union. Tanks produced under Soviet 
license; most other armaments of Czechoslovak design. 

Police: National Security Corps included uniformed police (Pub- 
lic Security) and plainclothes police (State Security); both nation- 
wide and subordinate to Ministry of Interior. Border Guard, 1 1 ,000 
strong, deployed on country's frontiers trained and equipped like 
military force but subordinate to Ministry of Interior rather than 
to Ministry of National Defense. 

Paramilitary: Part-time People's Militia (about 120,000) received 
some military training and participated in civil defense. Associa- 
tion for Cooperation with the Army (about 1 million) popularized 
defense training mostly through sports. 

Foreign Military Treaties: Member of Warsaw Pact; also has 
bilateral defense treaty with Soviet Union. 



xix 




XX 



Introduction 



CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AS THE NAME IMPLIES, is a state 
uniting two separate nationalities, the Czechs and the Slovaks. 
Emerging as one of several multinational states in eastern and Cen- 
tral Europe after World War I, the Czechoslovak Republic of 1918 
was the fruition of an ideal espoused by both Czech and Slovak 
intellectuals since the late nineteenth century. This union had the 
blessing of the victorious Allies, who hoped that the democratic 
ideals and principles for which so many lives had been sacrificed 
would inspire the many nationalities inhabiting that region to over- 
come age-old animosities. President Woodrow Wilson, in partic- 
ular, viewed the newly established states as microcosms of the 
United States, where people of different backgrounds and creeds 
could live peacefully together. Of all the newly created multina- 
tional political entities, Czechoslovakia came the closest to fulfill- 
ing this dream. 

The ancestors of the Czechs and Slovaks were first noted in 
recorded history in the fifth century, when the ancient Czech tribes 
settled in Bohemia and Moravia and when Slovak tribes settled 
in what was to become Slovakia. In the ninth century, the two peo- 
ples were united for the first time in the Great Moravian Empire. 
Positioned between two great civilizations, the Germans in the West 
and the Byzantine Empire in the East, the Czechs and Slovaks 
henceforth would play a unique and important role in linking the 
two worlds. Although both peoples belong to the family of Slavs, 
they were drawn early in their history into the western European, 
Roman Catholic orbit (see First Political Units, ch. 1). The folk 
culture of the Czechs and Slovaks remained close to that of their 
fellow Slavs in the East, but their intellectual and political develop- 
ment was profoundly influenced by western Europe. Today, 
Czechoslovakia is firmly within the political and economic sphere 
of the Warsaw Pact alliance, but it still looks to the West for in- 
tellectual and spiritual nourishment (see Appendix C). 

The unity of the Czech and Slovak people in the Great Moravian 
Empire was brief. From the beginning of the tenth century and 
for almost a millennium, the two peoples followed separate courses. 
Although no independent Czech state existed prior to 1918, the 
Bohemian Kingdom that emerged in the tenth century and lasted 
well into the sixteenth century had many of the aspects of a national 
state. Early in its history, the Bohemian Kingdom became part 
of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Czech people were subjected 



xxi 



to strong German and Roman Catholic influence (see Bohemian 
Kingdom, ch. 1). Nevertheless, the Czechs, first under the Holy 
Roman Empire and later under Hapsburg rule, experienced a con- 
siderable degree of political, cultural, and religious autonomy. By 
the nineteenth century, the Czechs had developed a distinct na- 
tional identity and culture, as well as a differentiated society made 
up of a landowning nobility, an urban middle class, an intellectual 
elite, and workers and peasants (see Hapsburg Rule, 1526-1867, 
ch. 1). 

Unlike the Czechs, the Slovaks did not attain a high level of 
political, economic, and cultural development prior to the nine- 
teenth century; their Hungarian overlords proved to be far less 
enlightened masters than the Germans and Austrians. At the 
beginning of the century, the Slovaks remained, for the most part, 
an agrarian society, with only a small number of intellectuals. Only 
in the second half of the nineteenth century did Slovakia undergo 
large and rapid urbanization (see Urbanization and Migration, 
ch. 2). National consciousness among the Slovaks also lagged 
behind that of the Czechs and grew largely as a result of increased 
contacts with the politically and culturally more advanced Czechs. 

The Czechoslovak Republic formed in 1918 contained, in addi- 
tion to Czechs and Slovaks, numerous Hungarians, Germans, 
Ukrainians, and Poles. Each minority, however, was granted free- 
dom to develop its own culture and language. The republic also 
served as a haven for the minorities of the neighboring states flee- 
ing the oppression of the ruling majority (see Czechoslovak 
Democracy, ch. 1). In spite of the tolerant and libertarian policies 
of the Czechoslovak government toward the German and other 
minorities within the republic's borders, Hitler used the pretext 
of dissatisfied minorities to dismember Czechoslovakia in 1938 as 
a prelude to his attack on Poland (see Second Republic, 1938-39, 
ch. 1). 

The Third Republic, which was established after World War 
II, differs markedly from the First Republic of the interwar period. 
The Czechoslovakia of the 1980s was predominantly a nation of 
Czechs and Slovaks; ethnic communities of Hungarians, Germans, 
Ukrainians, Poles, Gypsies, and Jews made up only about 5 per- 
cent of the total population (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). The post- 
war nationalization of industry and collectivization of agriculture 
had also simplified the once complex and diverse Czechoslovak 
society. The Czechoslovak social structure in the 1980s consisted 
mainly of workers and collective farmers, a small class of intelli- 
gentsia, and, at the top of the hierarchy, the communist party elite 
(see Social Groups, ch. 2). In the 1980s, Czechoslovakia remained 



xxn 



one of the most highly industrialized and prosperous countries in 
Eastern Europe and had a comparatively high standard of living. 
Its citizens did not experience extreme poverty, nor was there a 
conspicuously wealthy elite. The country still possessed consider- 
able, if dwindling, coal deposits and relatively fertile soil (see Eco- 
nomic Sectors, ch. 3). 

According to the 1960 Constitution, the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic is a federative state composed of "two equal fraternal 
nations," the Czechs and the Slovaks. The Czech Socialist Republic 
and the Slovak Socialist Republic share with the federal govern- 
ment many of the functions and responsibilities of government; 
the federal government in Prague, however, has exclusive juris- 
diction for the most important responsibilities of state, such as for- 
eign affairs, defense, economic policy, and federal justice. As in 
all communist states, however, real power in Czechoslovakia rests 
with the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunisticka strana 
Ceskoslovenska — KSC). The government branches of the Czecho- 
slovak Socialist Republic, as well as those of the Czech and Slovak 
socialist republics, simply implement the policies and decisions of 
the party (see The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; Govern- 
ment Structure; ch. 4). 

The defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic rests with 
the Czechoslovak People's Army. Since 1968, however, five 
Soviet ground divisions have been stationed in Czechoslovakia as 
part of the Soviet Union's Central Group of Forces. The Ministry 
of National Defense, which supervises the Czechoslovak armed 
forces, has no control over the Soviet military presence on 
Czechoslovak soil. On the contrary, as part of the Warsaw Pact 
alliance, Czechoslovak armed forces are part of the Soviet bloc's 
military might. Czechoslovak soldiers are strongly influenced by 
fraternization with other "socialist" armies. In addition, they 
employ Soviet military training and political indoctrination 
procedures and are taught to adopt Soviet concepts of military 
doctrine, strategy and tactics, and command structure (see 
Armed Forces, ch. 5). Internal national security in Czecho- 
slovakia is maintained by the Border Guard, which is responsible 
for securing the country's frontiers; the National Security Corps, 
made up of uniformed police and the plainclothes State Security 
force; and a part-time People's Militia. The internal national 
security forces are under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Interior (see Internal Security and Public Order, ch. 5). 

The Third Republic was created as a result of a compromise 
between pre-war Czechoslovak Republic leaders and the KSC. Fol- 
lowing World War II, Czechoslovak nationalist leaders Eduard 



xxm 



Benes and Tomas Masaryk hoped to re-establish a republic with 
the liberal, democratic principles and institutions of gre-war Czecho- 
slovakia. Their hopes were subverted by the KSC, which at the 
time had considerable popular support and the backing of the Soviet 
Union. The KSC steadily expanded its influence over key minis- 
tries and in 1948 delivered the final blow to Czechoslovak democracy 
by seizing all power (see The Third Republic and the Communist 
Takeover, ch. 1). After 1948 Czechoslovakia moved completely 
into the Soviet sphere of influence and was transformed into a 
Stalinist state. The party became the only political force in the coun- 
try, the state apparatus became highly centralized, and cultural 
and intellectual life became pedestrian and dull in line with the 
tenets of socialist realism. All manifestations of dissidence, whether 
political, religious, or artistic, were repressed; elements within the 
Czechoslovak society found to be the least bit nonconformist were 
removed from important positions, arrested, and incarcerated; and 
workers and peasants, left without a voice, passively submitted to 
their lot. A widespread political, economic, and cultural malaise 
prevailed in Czechoslovakia well into the late 1960s (see Staliniza- 
tion, ch. 1). 

The Czechoslovak economy, which had been nationalized almost 
totally by 1952, began to stagnate in the late 1950s. The continued 
poor economic performance throughout the 1960s led to political 
instability and demands for reform (see Economic Policy and Per- 
formance, ch. 3). The period called the "Prague Spring" began 
as an attempt by party and government leaders to bolster the falter- 
ing economy and to overcome the increasingly evident constraints 
on economic growth. Reformers, both in the party in and the state 
bureaucracy, blamed in particular the central planning system and 
sought to replace it with a "market socialist" system. Initial calls 
for reforms, however, did not challenge the paramount role of the 
KSC, nor did they include any proposals for liberalizing Czecho- 
slovakia. Nevertheless, even the modest proposals for reform met 
with strong conservative opposition. In fact, the developing politi- 
cal crisis was the result of a broad conflict between the liberal eco- 
nomic and conservative elites in the party and the government (see 
The Reform Movement, ch. 1). 

In January 1968, Alexander Dubcek replaced Antonm Novotny 
as the first secretary of the KSC , and from that point the Prague 
Spring movement was transformed into a mass movement for po- 
litical reform, led by a coalition of intellectuals and party officials. 
The KSC itself became an agent of reform. A consensus on the 
need for reform seemed to have developed very quickly on the part 
of Czechoslovak citizens, who disagreed only on the reform's scope 



xxiv 



and pace. In April 1968, the KSC Presidium adopted the Action 
Program, calling for a federalized Czechoslovakia and a "demo- 
cratic" and "national" model of socialism. At the same time, 
however, the Presidium reaffirmed Czechoslovakia's allegiance to 
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact (see The Prague Spring, 
1968, ch. 1). 

The pace of reforms in Czechoslovakia — and particularly the 
degree of penetration of all levels of the KSC apparatus by the 
reformers — was a matter of increasing concern to the Soviet Union. 
The Soviets became especially alarmed when in June 1968 Ludvik 
Vaculik, a candidate member of the Central Committee of the KSC, 
issued a manifesto entitled "Two Thousand Words," calling for 
the immediate implementation of the reform program. The Soviet 
Union was confronted with the prospect of full-scale democratiza- 
tion and political alienation by an integral member of the Soviet 
bloc. The Soviet response at first consisted of a series of warnings. 
Warsaw Pact forces held military maneuvers on Czechoslovak soil 
in the summer of 1968, a letter of castigation signed by Warsaw 
Pact member states was sent to the KSC, and Soviet Politburo 
members met with KSC leadership in an attempt to push back the 
reform movement. When all these steps failed, the Warsaw Pact 
forces, with the exception of Romania, invaded Czechoslovakia. 
Remarkably, in spite of the exuberance of the spring and summer, 
Czechoslovak citizens heeded the call of the KSC Presidium not 
to shed blood and offered only passive resistance to the invaders. 
The reform movement collapsed overnight without a shot being 
fired (see Intervention, ch. 1). 

The refusal of Czechoslovak citizens to resist with arms the 
Warsaw Pact invasion of their country did not come as a total sur- 
prise. After all, Czechoslovaks had displayed similar behavior when 
Hitler dismantled their country in 1938 and when the communists 
forcibly imposed their rule in 1948. Passive resistance when con- 
fronted with overwhelming odds and pacifism in general are viewed 
by many observers as a long-standing Czech national characteris- 
tic. Such pacifism is exemplified, if not glorified, in the popular 
World War I novel The Good Soldier Svejk by the Czech writer 
Jaroslav Hasek. In the novel, the Czech soldier Svejk, a seemingly 
slow-witted and submissive provincial bumpkin, uses gile and 
obtuseness, disguised as passive compliance, to outwit the Austrian 
bureaucracy and military establishment (see Czechs, ch. 2). A more 
convincing explanation for the lack of armed resistance on the part 
of Czechoslovak citizens in times of grave crisis is perhaps the dualis- 
tic nature of their society. 



xxv 



Throughout its existence, Czechoslovakia has lacked the demo- 
graphic homogeneity of present-day Poland or Hungary. Despite 
the government's considerable success in the 1950s and 1960s in 
removing many of the most pronounced economic imbalances 
between the Czech lands and Slovakia, social and political tensions 
between the Czechs and the Slovaks persisted. The two peoples 
consistently pursued different concepts of a Czechoslovak state. The 
Czechs, who outnumbered the Slovaks two to one, wanted in 1968, 
as they had in the past, a single Czechoslovak state. The Slovaks, 
resentful of what they perceived as Czech domination of adminis- 
trative and educational posts in Slovakia, sought a federative po- 
litical system in which they would exercise greater political 
autonomy. Czechoslovakia lacked the kind of unifying forces that 
were present in Poland, for example. The Roman Catholic Church 
did not exert a powerful unifying influence, nor was there a strong 
labor union that represented the interests of all the Czechoslovak 
workers. The various nationalities and interest groups were united 
in 1968 only in their efforts to free themselves from the oppressive 
domination of the party and the state. The reformers themselves 
assumed that an essential ingredient of the reform movement was 
the right of the various nationalities and interest groups to pursue 
their own specific and different aims. These factors made Czecho- 
slovak society ready for democracy in 1968 but incapable of standing 
up to a totalitarian challenge. 

The process of "normalization" following the Warsaw Pact in- 
vasion of Czechoslovakia was carried out under the leadership of 
Gustav Husak, elected the new first secretary of the KSC in April 
1969. Husak had been purged in 1951 for "nationalist" tenden- 
cies and imprisoned until 1960. Rehabilitated in 1963, Husak occu- 
pied a centrist position in the debates over reforms during the 
Prague Spring. It was now his task to restore the country to the 
pre-reform period, to cleanse the party of reformist elements, and 
to reinstall ideological conformity. 

A sense of defeat and alienation permeated Czechoslovak soci- 
ety in the 1970s as hopes for political and economic reforms were 
dashed. Materialism and consumerism became the main pursuit 
of most citizens. At first, the country's economy was strong enough 
to allow for a rise in the standard of living and to satisfy the pub- 
lic's aroused passion for material goods. In the mid-1970s, however, 
the economy took another turn for the worse, and a prolonged eco- 
nomic decline followed. In response, antisocial behavior became 
more pronounced. Criminal activity, alcoholism, and absenteeism 
from work increased alarmingly; labor productivity declined; and 
more and more Czechoslovak citizens sought escape from their bleak 



xxvi 



lives through emigration (see Reaction to Normalization, ch. 4). 
A highly developed sense of humor, as manifested in popular po- 
litical satire, served as another avenue of escape from everyday dol- 
drums. In his book Rowboat to Prague, Alan Levy illustrates the 
cynical view of life under the socialist system by citing what the 
people of Czechoslovakia refer to as the "four paradoxes of ap- 
plied socialism": everybody works, but nothing gets produced; 
nothing gets produced, but quotas are met; production quotas are 
met, but stores have nothing to sell; stores have nothing to sell, 
but the standard of living continues to rise. 

Another aspect of normalization was Czechoslovakia's increased 
dependence on the Soviet Union. In the late 1960s, Moscow had 
initiated a process of integration to make countries like Czecho- 
slovakia increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union. Czecho- 
slovakia, in particular, acquiesced to Soviet pressure in Eastern 
Europe, almost totally submitting to Soviet control. Indeed, in its 
desire to preserve the status quo, at times it seemed a more ortho- 
dox communist state than the Soviet Union itself. Not surprisingly, 
Czechoslovakia was one of the staunchest opponents of the 1980-81 
reforms and the Solidarity movement in Poland. Since 1968 the 
ties between the armed forces of the Soviet Union and Czecho- 
slovakia have been especially strong (see Soviet Influence, ch. 5). 

The voices of dissent and reform were not completely stilled, 
however. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a few individuals con- 
tinued to call for greater personal freedom. The most prominent 
of these individual organized themselves around Charter 77, a 
manifesto issued in January 1977 and originally signed by 243 lead- 
ing Czechoslovak intellectuals. The manifesto called upon the 
government to respect the civil and human rights enumerated in 
the 1960 Constitution and in several international agreements, in 
particular the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooper- 
ation in Europe's Final Act (also known as the Helsinki Accords), 
signed by Czechoslovakia (see Charter 77, ch. 4). The response 
of the Husak regime to the Charter 77 movement was reminiscent 
of the Stalinist era in Czechoslovakia. The signatories of the charter 
were viciously attacked in the official press, fired from their jobs, 
arrested, and imprisoned. Nevertheless, the Charter 77 movement 
continued to grow. By the mid-1980s, the number of signatories 
had reached 12,000 and included representatives from almost every 
segment of society (see Police Repression, ch. 5). Another mani- 
festation of dissent in the 1980s was growing religious activism, 
especially among the young (see Religion, ch. 2). 

In late 1987, Czechoslovakia once again faced the challenge of 
reform. Paradoxically, the winds of change were blowing, this time 



xxvn 



not from the West but from the East, from the Soviet Union itself. 
Glasnost' and perestroika, the cornerstones of Mikhail Gorbachev's 
ambitious program to invigorate the moribund Soviet economy and 
society, caused the KSC considerable consternation. The KSC 
was under increasing pressure from the Soviet Union to follow its 
example and institute reforms in Czechoslovakia. Within the KSC, 
reformist elements, encouraged by the Gorbachev program and 
frustrated by the stagnation and inertia in their own country, also 
pressed for reform. 

Conservative opposition to reform remained strong, however. 
Under the leadership of Husak, the KSC seemed determined to 
avoid the excesses of the reform movement of 1968. Although in 
March 1987 Husak nominally committed Czechoslovakia to fol- 
low the program of perestroika, he nevertheless cautioned the party 
in October 1987 not to "hasten solutions too quickly" so as to 
"minimize the risks that could occur." 

December 1, 1987 

* # * 

On December 17, 1987, some two month after research and writ- 
ing of this book were completed, Prague announced that Husak, 
who was one month away from his seventieth birthday, had resigned 
as head of the KSC. He retained, however, his post of president 
of Czechoslovakia and his full membership on the Presidium of 
the KSC. Husak' s retention of these positions and the fact that 
the man who replaced him could hardly be called a reformer sug- 
gested to most observers that Husak' s resignation was caused by 
failing health rather than by any fundamental shift in the KSC poli- 
cies toward reform. 

Milos Jakes, who replaced Husak as first secretary of the KSC, 
was sixty-five years of age at the time of his assumption of the most 
powerful post in the country. Other than the age difference and 
the fact that Jakes is a Czech whereas Husak is a Slovak, there 
was little to distinguish the new leader from his predecessor, and 
most observers expected Jakes to continue Husak's policies. 

Jakes was born August 17, 1922, in Bohemia. He joined the KSC 
in 1945 and ten years later became the head of it's youth organi- 
zation, the Czechoslovak Union of Youth. Subsequently he spent 
some time in Moscow. Between 1968 and 1977, he served as the 
head of the KSC's Central Control and Auditing Commission and 
in this capacity supervised the purge of the KSC following the Soviet 
invasion of 1968. In 1977 he was elected to the party's Secretariat 
and assumed responsibilities for Czechoslovak agriculture. In 1981 



xxvin 



he was made a full member of the Presidium, overseeing the party's 
supervision of economic policy and management. Considered a firm 
supporter of Husak, Jakes was viewed as having neither strong 
reformist nor conservative tendencies. 

In his first pronouncements as the head of the KSC, Jakes as- 
sured the KSC's Central Committee that he would continue the 
cautious and moderate path of reform set forth by Husak. He called 
for a large-scale introduction of new technology as the means to 
"fundamentally increase the efficiency of the Czechoslovak econ- 
omy." But he also warned that there would be no "retreat from 
the fundamental principles of socialism," adding that the party had 
learned well the "lesson from 1968-69 and know[s] where such 
a retreat leads." At the same time, Jakes acknowledged Soviet pres- 
sure for reform by pledging to pursue economic restructuring, stat- 
ing that "just as Soviet Communists, we too must observe the 
principle that more democracy means more socialism." 

Taking the cue from its new leader, the Czechoslovak Central 
Committee in its plenary meeting of December 18, 1987, failed 
to make a decision on a very modest proposal for reform. The 
Czechoslovak version of perestroika, which had slowly taken shape 
during the last months of Husak's rule under the guidance of the 
reformist and pro-Gorbachev Czechoslovak leader Premier 
Lubomir Strougal, called for a modest decentralization of state eco- 
nomic administration but postponed any concrete action until the 
end of the decade. This reform proposal had been publicly debated 
and was expected to be approved. The Central Committee returned 
it to the government for "further work," however, an action which 
suggesting that committee members disagreed even on this minor 
reform. The only positive aspect of the whole affair was an un- 
precedented news conference held by the Central Committee to 
announce its failure to act. 

According to some Western observers, the slow pace of the 
Czechoslovak reform movement was an irritant to the Soviet leader- 
ship. In a congratulatory message to Jakes, Gorbachev urged the 
latter to "set forth restructuring of the Czechoslovak economy and 
democratization of public and political life." "We are confidant," 
Gorbachev added, that "the Central Committee under your leader- 
ship will ensure the fulfillment of extensive tasks facing the party. ' ' 
In late 1987, observers were reluctant to predict which course of 
action the KSC would follow under its new leader. 

January 18, 1988 Ihor Y. Gawdiak 



XXIX 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Orava Castle in Slovakia, dating from the third century A.D. 



Czechoslovakia was established in 1918 as a na- 
tional state of the Czechs and Slovaks. Although these two peoples 
were closely related, they had undergone different historical ex- 
periences. In the ninth century A.D., the ancestors of the Czechs 
and Slovaks were united in the Great Moravian Empire, but by 
the tenth century the Hungarians had conquered Slovakia, and 
for a millennium the Czechs and the Slovaks went their separate 
ways. The history of Czechoslovakia, therefore, is a story of two 
separate peoples whose fates sometimes have touched and some- 
times have intertwined. 

Despite their separate strands of development, both Czechs and 
Slovaks struggled against a powerful neighbor that threatened their 
very existence. Both nations showed resilience and perseverance 
in their search for national self-expression. The Czechs had a much 
richer tradition of self-rule. From the tenth to the fifteenth cen- 
tury, the Czech-inhabited Bohemian Kingdom was a powerful po- 
litical and military entity. The immigration into Bohemia of a large 
number of Germans, however, created tension between Czechs and 
Germans. 

Perhaps the greatest moment of Czech self-expression came with 
the Hussite movement in the fifteenth century. In 1403 the Czech 
reformist preacher Jan Hus challenged papal authority and precipi- 
tated a broadly based anti-German rebellion. The Hussite religious 
reform movement developed into a national struggle for autonomy 
in political and ecclesiastical affairs. For over two centuries the 
Czechs were able to maintain political self-rule, which was expressed 
by the Bohemian estates (an assembly of nobles, clergy, and towns- 
people representing the major social groups in the Bohemian King- 
dom) and the Czech Reformed Church. 

The failure to establish a native dynasty ultimately doomed the 
Bohemian Kingdom. In 1526 the Bohemian estates accepted a 
Hapsburg ruler as monarch. Soon this voluntary subordination was 
transformed into the hereditary rule of an alien absolutist dynasty. 
The Bohemian estates resisted, but their defeat by the Hapsburgs 
at the Battle of White Mountain in 1620 had dire consequences: 
the entire Czech leadership was either killed or went into exile, 
the reformed Czech religion was gradually eliminated, and even 
the Czech language went into decline. As the remnants of the Bohe- 
mian Kingdom were abolished, the Czech lands were incorporated 
into Austria. From self-rule, the Czechs were reduced to an op- 
pressed peasant nation. 



3 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

New forces at work in the nineteenth century dramatically 
changed the position of the Czechs. A vigorous industrial revolu- 
tion transformed a peasant nation into a differentiated society that 
included industrial workers, a middle class, and intellectuals. Under 
the influence of the Enlightenment and romanticism, the Czechs 
experienced a remarkable revival of Czech culture and national 
consciousness. By the mid-nineteenth century, the Czechs were 
making political demands, including the reconstitution of an au- 
tonomous Bohemian Kingdom. Because of Austria's parliamen- 
tary system, the Czechs were able to make significant cultural and 
political gains, but these were vigorously opposed by Bohemia's 
Germans, who feared losing their privileged position. On the eve 
of World War I, the Czech leader Tomas Masaryk began propagat- 
ing the Czechoslovak idea, i.e., the reunion of Czechs and Slovaks 
into one political entity. 

The Slovak road to nationhood was even more difficult than that 
of the Czechs. After incorporation into the Kingdom of Hungary 
in the tenth century, the Slovaks were reduced to being serfs of 
their Hungarian overlords. They had no forum for political ex- 
pression, but maintained their language and folk customs as an 
expression of their strong national consciousness. On occasion, the 
Slovaks were able to renew contact with the Czechs. In the fifteenth 
century, Czech Hussite armies had briefly occupied parts of 
Slovakia. In the sixteenth century, Czech Protestant literature was 
circulated in Slovakia, and the Czech language became the liter- 
ary language of educated Slovaks. 

National revival came late and more hesitantly to the Slovaks 
than to the Czechs. Slovakia was not industrialized until the end 
of the nineteenth century; therefore, the Slovaks remained primarily 
a rural people led by a small group of intellectuals. The Slovak 
leadership had first to decide on the nature of Slovak identity. Some 
outstanding Slovak scholars, e.g., Pavol Safarik and Jan Kollar, 
viewed Slovaks as merely a long-separated part of a single Czecho- 
slovak nation. By the 1840s, however, L'udovft Stur emphasized 
the distinctiveness of the Slovak language and people; subsequently, 
Slovaks viewed themselves as a separate Slovak nationality. As the 
Slovaks attempted to establish cultural institutions and make po- 
litical demands, they were blocked by the Hungarian ruling aris- 
tocracy. The Slovak national revival was severely repressed, and, 
on the eve of World War I, the Slovaks were struggling to preserve 
their newly found national identity. 

After a millennium of separation, the Czechs and Slovaks were 
politically reunited in 1918 in the Czechoslovak Republic. As a 
parliamentary democracy surrounded by hostile neighbors, the 



4 



Historical Setting 



Czechoslovak Republic not only survived for twenty years but also 
prospered. Yet the republic was not able to withstand the combined 
pressure of its dissatisfied minorities and the aggressive designs of 
its neighbors. Tension was most acute in the German-populated 
Sudetenland. The rise of Hitler, who became chancellor of Ger- 
many in 1933, led to mounting German nationalism in the Sudeten- 
land in Czechoslovakia and provided a pretext for Hitler's demand 
for annexation of this highly industrialized area. Czechoslovakia's 
major allies, Britain and France, were anxious to avoid a war with 
Germany. To appease Hitler, they signed the Munich Agreement 
on September 29, 1938, ceding the Sudetenland to the Third Reich. 
Bowing to the inevitable, Czechoslovak President Eduard Benes 
accepted the Munich decision. In March 1939, Nazi troops occupied 
all of Bohemia and Moravia, and the Slovaks declared indepen- 
dence. Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. 

After World War II, Czechoslovakia was reconstituted as an in- 
dependent state but again faced the threat of a powerful neighbor. 
President Benes had made major concessions to the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia, hoping to satisfy it and the Soviet Union 
while, at the same time, attempting to preserve Czechoslovakia's 
democratic, pluralistic political system. Benes 's hopes were not real- 
ized, and the communists overthrew his coalition government in 
1948. Czechoslovakia soon was placed firmly into the Soviet orbit, 
and Stalinization followed. 

Czechoslovakia's democratic tradition had been suppressed but 
not destroyed. In 1968 the struggle for democracy reemerged within 
the party itself. While remaining loyal to the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact, the leadership of the party under Alexander 
Dubcek attempted to introduce within Czechoslovakia a more 
democratic form of socialism. The ensuing Prague Spring of 1968 
was crushed by the Warsaw Pact invasion. Subsequently, the leader- 
ship of the party was purged, and Gustav Husak, the new general 
secretary (the title changed from first secretary in 1971), introduced 
a "normalization" program. Despite Czech and Slovak dissent, 
as of 1987 Husak continued to enforce an anti-reformist course. 

Early History 

First Political Units 

Although a Czechoslovak state did not emerge until 1918, its 
roots go back many centuries. The earliest records of Slavic 
inhabitants in present-day Czechoslovakia date from the fifth 
century A.D. The ancestors of the Czechs settled in present- 
day Bohemia and Moravia, and those of the Slovaks settled in 



5 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

present-day Slovakia. The settlers developed an agricultural econ- 
omy and built the characteristically circular Slavic villages, the 
okrouhlice. 

The peaceful life of the Slavic tribes was shattered in the sixth 
century by the invasion of the Avars, a people of undetermined 
origin and language who established a loosely connected empire 
between the Labe (Elbe) and Dnieper rivers. The Avars did not 
conquer all the Slavic tribes in the area, but they subjugated some 
of them and conducted raids on others. It was in response to the 
Avars that Samo — a foreigner thought to be a Frankish merchant — 
unified some of the Slavic tribes and in A.D. 625 established the 
empire of Samo. Although the territorial extent of the empire is 
not known, it was centered in Bohemia and is considered the first 
coherent Slavic political unit. The empire disintegrated when Samo 
died in 658. 

A more stable polity emerged in Moravia. The Czech tribes of 
Moravia helped Charlemagne destroy the Avar Empire (ca. 796) 
and were rewarded by receiving part of it as a fief. Although the 
Moravians paid tribute to Charlemagne, they did enjoy consider- 
able independence. Early in the ninth century, Mojmir — a Slavic 
chief — formed the Moravian Kingdom. His two successors ex- 
panded its domains to include Bohemia, Slovakia, southern Poland, 
and western Hungary. The expanded kingdom became known as 
the Great Moravian Empire. Its importance to Czechoslovak his- 
tory is that it united in a single state the ancestors of the Czechs 
and Slovaks. 

The Great Moravian Empire was located at the crossroads of 
two civilizations: the German lands in the West and Byzantium in 
the East. From the West the Franks (a Germanic people) conducted 
destructive raids into Moravian territory, and German priests 
and monks came to spread Christianity in its Roman form among 
the Slavs. Mojmir and his fellow chiefs were baptized at Regens- 
burg in modern-day Germany. Rastislav (850-70), Mojmir' s suc- 
cessor, feared the German influence as a threat to his personal 
rule, however, and turned to Byzantium. At Rastislav's request, 
Emperor Michael of Byzantium dispatched the monks Cyril and 
Methodius to the Great Moravian Empire to introduce Eastern 
Christian rites and liturgy in the Slavic language. A new Slavonic 
script, the Cyrillic alphabet, was devised. Methodius was invested 
by the pope as archbishop of Moravia. But Svatopluk (871-94), 
Rastislav's successor, chose to ally himself with the German clerics. 
After the death of Methodius in 885, the Great Moravian Empire 
was drawn into the sphere of influence of the Roman Catholic 
Church. As a result, the Czechs and Slovaks adopted the Latin 



6 



Historical Setting 



alphabet and became further differentiated from the Eastern Slavs, 
who continued to use the Cyrillic alphabet and adhered to Eastern 
Orthodoxy. 

Magyar Invasion 

The unification of Czech and Slovak tribes in a single state was 
shattered by the Magyar invasion in 907. The Magyars, who en- 
tered the region as seminomadic pastoralists, soon developed set- 
tled agricultural communities; they held the territory until the 
Ottoman conquest in the sixteenth century. With the arrival of the 
Magyars, the Great Moravian Empire disintegrated. The chiefs 
of the Czech tribes in Bohemia broke from the tribes in Moravia 
and swore allegiance instead to the Frankish emperor Arnulf. The 
political center of gravity for the Czechs shifted to Bohemia, where 
a new political unit, the Bohemian Kingdom, would develop. The 
Magyars established the Kingdom of Hungary, which included a 
good part of the Great Moravian Empire, primarily all of modern- 
day Slovakia. As it turned out, the Magyar invasion had profound 
long-term consequences, for it meant that the Slavic people of the 
Kingdom of Hungary — the ancestors of the Slovaks — would be 
separated politically from the western areas, inhabited by the an- 
cestors of the Czechs for virtually a millennium. This separation 
was a major factor in the development of distinct Czech and Slovak 
nationalities. 

Bohemian Kingdom 

Foundation 

When the Great Moravian Empire disintegrated, a new politi- 
cal entity, the Bohemian Kingdom, emerged. It would play an im- 
portant role in the development of the Czech nation. The Bohemian 
Kingdom was a major medieval and early modern political, eco- 
nomic, and cultural entity and subsequently was viewed by many 
Czechs as one of the brightest periods of Czech history. But 
whatever its long-range implications for Czech history, it is im- 
portant to remember that the Bohemian Kingdom was a medieval 
state in which ethnic or national questions were far overshadowed 
by dynastic politics. 

The Bohemian Kingdom emerged in the tenth century when the 
Pfemyslid chiefs — members of the Cechove, a tribe from which 
the Czechs derive their name — unified neighboring Czech tribes 
and established a form of centralized rule. Cut off from Byzantium 
by the Hungarian presence, the Bohemian Kingdom existed in the 
shadow of the Holy Roman Empire. In 950 the powerful emperor 



7 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 




HOLY 
ROMAN 
EMPIRE 



1 
# 

RUSSIANS 
POMERANIA/ I 

-4. 



f 





1 — 1- 


00 200 Kilometers 





100 200 Miles 


1 1 


Present-day 


Czechoslovakia 




Source: Based on information from William R. Shepherd, Shepherd's Historical Atlas, New 
York, 1980, and J. F. N. Bradley, Czechoslovakia: A Short History, Edinburgh, 1971. 



Figure 2. Central Europe circa 1097 



Otto I, a Saxon, led an expedition to Bohemia demanding trib- 
ute; the Bohemian Kingdom thus became a fief of the Holy Roman 
Empire and its king one of the seven electors of the emperor. The 
German emperors continued the practice of using the Roman 
Catholic clergy to extend German influence into Czech territory. 
Significantly, the bishopric of Prague, founded in 973 during the 
reign of Boleslav II (967-99), was subordinated to the German arch- 
bishopric of Mainz. Thus, at the same time that Pfemyslid rulers 
utilized the German alliance to consolidate their rule against a per- 
petually rebellious regional nobility, they struggled to retain their 
autonomy in relation to the empire. 

After a struggle with Poland and Hungary, the Bohemian King- 
dom acquired Moravia in 1029. Moravia, however, continued to 
be a separate margravate, usually ruled by a younger son of the 
Bohemian king. Because of complex dynastic arrangements, 
Moravia's link with the Bohemian Kingdom between the eleventh 
and sixteenth centuries was occasionally severed; during such 
interludes Moravia was subordinated directly to the Holy Roman 
Empire or to Hungary (see fig. 2). Although Moravia's fate was 
intertwined with Bohemia's, in general it did not participate in 



8 



Historical Setting 



Bohemia's civil and religious struggles. The main course of Czech 
history evolved in Bohemia proper. 

Growth 

The thirteenth century was the most dynamic period of Pf emyslid 
reign over Bohemia. Emperor Frederick IPs preoccupation with 
Mediterranean affairs and the dynastic struggles known as the Great 
Interregnum (1254-73) weakened imperial authority in Central 
Europe, thus providing opportunities for Pf emyslid assertiveness. 
At the same time, the Mongol invasions (1220-42) absorbed the 
attention of the Bohemian Kingdom's eastern neighbors, the Hun- 
garians and the Poles. 

In 1212 King Pfemysl Otakar I (1 198-1230) extracted a Gold- 
en Bull (a formal edict) from the emperor confirming the royal title 
for Otakar and his descendants. The imperial prerogative to ratify 
each Bohemian king and to appoint the bishop of Prague was re- 
voked. The king's successor, Pfemysl Otakar II (1253-78), mar- 
ried a German princess, Margaret of Babenberg, and became duke 
of Austria, thereby acquiring upper and lower Austria and part 
of Styria. He conquered the rest of Styria, most of Carinthia, and 
parts of Carniola. From 1273, however, Hapsburg emperor Rudolf 
began to reassert imperial authority. All of Pfemysl Otakar' s 
German possessions were lost in 1276, and in 1278 Pfemysl Otakar 
II died in battle against Rudolf. 

The thirteenth century was also a period of large-scale German 
immigration, often encouraged by Pfemyslid kings hoping to 
weaken the influence of their own Czech nobility. The Germans 
populated towns and mining districts on the Bohemian periphery 
and in some cases formed German colonies in the interior of the 
Czech lands. Stnbro, Kutna Hora, Nemecky Brod (present-day 
Havlickuv Brod) and Jihlava were important German settlements. 
The Germans brought their own code of law — the jus teutonicum — 
which formed the basis of the later commercial law of Bohemia 
and Moravia. Marriages between Germans and Czech nobles soon 
became commonplace. 

Golden Age 

The fourteenth century, particularly the reign of Charles IV 
(1342-78), is considered the Golden Age of Czech history. By that 
time the Pfemyslid line had died out, and, after a series of dynas- 
tic wars, a new Luxemburg dynasty captured the Bohemian crown. 
Charles, the second Luxemburg king, was raised at the French court 
and was cosmopolitan in attitude. He strengthened the power and 
prestige of the Bohemian Kingdom. In 1344 Charles elevated the 



9 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

bishopric of Prague, making it an archbishopric and freeing it from 
the jurisdiction of Mainz and the Holy Roman Empire. The arch- 
bishop was given the right to crown Bohemian kings. Charles curbed 
the Czech nobility, rationalized the provincial administration of 
Bohemia and Moravia, and made Brandenburg, Lusatia, and Sile- 
sia into fiefs of the Czech crown (see fig. 3). In 1355 Charles was 
crowned Holy Roman Emperor. In 1356 he issued a Golden Bull 
defining and systematizing the process of election to the imperial 
throne and making the Czech king foremost among the seven elec- 
tors. The Bohemian Kingdom ceased to be a fief of the emperor. 

Charles made Prague into an imperial city. Extensive building 
projects undertaken by the king included the founding of the New 
Town southeast of the old city. The royal castle, Hradcany, was 
rebuilt. Of particular significance was the founding of Charles 
University in Prague in 1348. Charles's intention was to make 
Prague into an international center of learning, and the university 
was divided into Czech, Polish, Saxon, and Bavarian "nations," 
each with one controlling vote. Charles University, however, would 
become the nucleus of intense Czech particularism. Charles died 
in 1378, and the Bohemian crown went to his son, Wenceslas IV. 

Hussite Movement 

The Hussite movement was a national, as well as a religious, 
manifestation. As a religious reform movement, it represented a 
challenge to papal authority and an assertion of national autono- 
my in ecclesiastical affairs. As a Czech national movement, it 
acquired anti-imperial and anti-German implications and thus can 
be considered a manifestation of a long-term Czech-German con- 
flict. The Hussite movement is also viewed by many Czechs as a 
precursor to the Protestant Reformation. 

Hussitism began during the long reign of Wenceslas IV 
(1378-1419), a period of papal schism and concomitant anarchy 
in the Holy Roman Empire, and was precipitated by a controversy 
at Charles University. In 1403 Jan Hus became rector of the univer- 
sity. A reformist preacher, Hus espoused the antipapal and anti- 
hierarchical teachings of John Wyclif of England, often referred 
to as the "Morning Star of the Reformation." Hussitism — as Hus's 
teaching became known — was distinguished by its rejection of the 
wealth, corruption, and hierarchical tendencies of the Roman 
Catholic Church. It advocated the Wycliffite doctrine of clerical 
purity and poverty and insisted on communion under both kinds, 
bread and wine, for the laity. (The Roman Catholic Church 
reserved the cup — wine — for the clergy.) The more moderate fol- 
lowers of Hus, the Utraquists, took their name from the Latin 



10 



Historical Setting 



sub utraque specie, meaning "under each kind." A more radical sect 
soon formed — the Taborite sect. The Taborites, who took their 
name from the city of Tabor, their stronghold in southern Bohemia, 
rejected church doctrine and upheld the Bible as the sole authority 
in all matters of belief. 

Soon after Hus assumed office, German professors of theology 
demanded the condemnation of Wyclif's writings. Hus protested 
and received the support of the Czech element at the university. 
Having only one vote in policy decisions against three for the Ger- 
mans, the Czechs were outvoted, and the orthodox position was 
maintained. In subsequent years the Czechs demanded a revision 
of the university charter, granting more adequate representation 
to the native, i.e., Czech, faculty. 

The university controversy was intensified by the vacillating po- 
sition of the Bohemian king. His insistence at first on favoring Ger- 
mans in appointments to councillor and other administrative 
positions had aroused the national sentiments of the Czech nobil- 
ity and rallied them to Hus's defense. The German faculties had 
the support of Archbishop Zbynek of Prague and the German 
clergy. Wenceslas, for political reasons, switched his support from 
the Germans to Hus and allied with the reformers. On January 18, 
1409, Wenceslas issued the Kutna Hora Decree: the Czechs would 
have three votes; the foreigners, a single vote. Germans were ex- 
pelled from administrative positions at the university, and Czechs 
were appointed. In consequence, Germans left Charles University 
en masse. 

Hus's victory was short lived, however. He preached against the 
sale of indulgences, which lost him the support of the king, who 
received a percentage of the sales. In 1412 Hus and his followers 
were suspended from the university and expelled from Prague. For 
two years the reformers served as itinerant preachers throughout 
Bohemia. In 1414 Hus was summoned to the Council of Constance 
to defend his views. The council condemned him as a heretic and 
burned him at the stake in 1415. 

Hus's death sparked decades of religious warfare. Sigismund, 
the pro-papal king of Hungary and successor to the Bohemian 
throne after the death of Wenceslas in 1419, failed repeatedly in 
attempts to gain control of the kingdom despite aid by Hungarian 
and German armies. Riots broke out in Prague. Led by a Czech 
yeoman, Jan Zizka, the Taborites streamed into the capital. Reli- 
gious strife pervaded the entire kingdom and was particularly in- 
tense in the German-dominated towns. Czech burghers turned 
against the Roman Catholic Germans; many were massacred, 
and most survivors fled to the Holy Roman Empire. In the 



11 




Source: Based on information from William R. Shepherd, Shepherd's Historical Atlas, New 
York, 1980, and A. H. Hermann, A History of the Czechs, London, 1975. 



Figure 3. The Bohemian Kingdom and Its Extensions, 1378 



12 



Old Town Hall, Zizka Square, Tabor 

V 

countryside Zizka' s armies stormed monasteries, churches, and vil- 
lages, expelling the Catholic clergy and expropriating ecclesiastical 
lands. 

During the struggle against Sigismund, Taborite armies pene- 
trated into Slovakia as well. Czech refugees from the religious wars 
in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia settled there, and from 1438 to 
1453 a Czech noble, Jan Jiskra of Brandys, controlled most of 
southern Slovakia from the centers of Zvolen and Kosice. Thus 
Hussite doctrine and the Czech Bible were disseminated among 
the Slovaks, providing the basis for a future link between the Czechs 
and their Slovak neighbors. 

When Sigismund died in 1437, the Bohemian estates elected 
Albert of Austria as his successor. Albert died, however, and his 
son, Ladislas the Posthumous — so called because he was born after 
his father's death — was acknowledged as king. During Ladislas 's 
minority, Bohemia was ruled by a regency composed of moderate 
reform nobles who were Utraquists. Internal dissension among the 
Czechs provided the primary challenge to the regency. A part of 
the Czech nobility remained Catholic and loyal to the pope. A Utra- 
quist delegation to the Council of Basel in 1433 had negotiated a 
seeming reconciliation with the Catholic Church. The Council's 
Compact of Basel accepted the basic tenets of Hussitism expressed 
in the Four Articles of Prague: communion under both kinds; free 
preaching of the Gospels; expropriation of church land; and 



13 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

exposure and punishment of public sinners. The pope, however, 
rejected the compact, thus preventing the reconciliation of Czech 
Catholics with the Utraquists. 

George of Podebrady, later to become the "national" king of 
Bohemia, emerged as leader of the Utraquist regency. George in- 
stalled a Utraquist, John of Rokycany, as archbishop of Prague 
and succeeded in uniting the more radical Taborites with the Czech 
Reformed Church. The Catholic party was driven out of Prague. 
Ladislas died of the plague in 1457, and in 1458 the Bohemian 
estates elected George of Podebrady king of Bohemia. The pope, 
however, refused to recognize the election. Czech Catholic nobles, 
joined in the League of Zelena Hora, continued to challenge the 
authority of George of Podebrady until his death in 1471. 

Upon the death of the Hussite king, the Bohemian estates elected 
a Polish prince, Vladislav II, as king. In 1490 Vladislav also be- 
came king of Hungary, and the Polish Jagellonian line ruled both 
Bohemia and Hungary. The Jagellonians governed Bohemia as 
absentee monarchs; their influence in the kingdom was minimal, 
and effective government fell to the regional nobility. Czech Catho- 
lics accepted the Compact of Basel in 1485 and were reconciled 
with the Utraquists. 

In 1526 Vladislav's son, King Louis, was decisively defeated by 
the Ottomans at Mohacs and subsequently died. As a result, the 
Turks conquered part of the Kingdom of Hungary; the rest (in- 
cluding Slovakia) came under Hapsburg rule. The Bohemian es- 
tates elected Archduke Ferdinand, younger brother of Emperor 
Charles V, to succeed Louis as king of Bohemia. Thus began almost 
three centuries of Hapsburg rule for both Bohemia and Slovakia. 

In several instances, the Bohemian Kingdom had the possibil- 
ity of becoming a Czech national monarchy. The failure to estab- 
lish a native dynasty, however, prevented such an outcome and 
left the fate of the Bohemian Kingdom to dynastic politics and for- 
eign rulers. Although the Bohemian Kingdom evolved neither into 
a national monarchy nor into a Czech nation-state, the memory 
of it served as a source of inspiration and pride for modern Czech 
nationalists. 

Hapsburg Rule, 1526-1867 

The Hapsburgs and the Czechoslovak Lands 

Although the Bohemian Kingdom, the Margravate of Moravia, 
and Slovakia were all under Hapsburg rule, they followed differ- 
ent paths of development. The defeat at Mohacs in 1526 meant 
that most of Hungary proper was taken by the Turks; until Hun- 
gary's reconquest by the Hapsburgs in the second half of the 



14 



Historical Setting 



seventeenth century, Slovakia became the center of Hungarian po- 
litical, cultural, and economic life. The Hapsburg kings of Hun- 
gary were crowned in Bratislava, the present-day capital of Slovakia, 
and the Hungarian estates met there. Slovakia's importance in 
Hungarian life proved of no benefit, however, to the Slovaks. In 
essence, the Hungarian political nation consisted of an association 
of estates (primarily the nobility). Because Slovaks were primarily 
serfs, they were not considered members of a political nation and 
had no influence on politics in their own land. The Slovak peasant 
had only to perform duties: work for a landlord, pay taxes, and 
provide recruits for military service. Even under such hostile con- 
ditions, there were a few positive developments. The Protestant 
Reformation brought to Slovakia literature written in Czech, and 
Czech replaced Latin as the literary language of a small, educated 
Slovak elite. But on the whole, the Slovaks languished for centu- 
ries in a state of political, economic, and cultural deprivation. 

Moravia had accepted the hereditary right of the Austrian Haps- 
burgs to rule it and thus escaped the intense struggle between na- 
tive estates and the Hapsburg monarchy that was to characterize 
Bohemian history. The Moravians had a poorly developed histor- 
ical or national consciousness, made few demands on the Haps- 
burgs, and were permitted to live in tranquillity. Late in the 
eighteenth century, the Margravate of Moravia was abolished and 
merged with Austrian Silesia. 

In contrast to Moravia, the Bohemian Kingdom had entrenched 
estates that were ready to defend what they considered their rights 
and liberties. Because the Hapsburgs pursued a policy of centrali- 
zation, conflict was inevitable. The conflict was further complicated 
by ethnic and religious issues and was subsequently seen by some 
as a struggle for the preservation of Czech institutions and the Czech 
nation. 

Hapsburg Absolutism and the Bohemian Estates 

Initial Clash 

Hapsburg rule brought two centuries of conflict between the 
Bohemian estates and the monarchy. As a result of this struggle, 
the Czechs lost a major portion of their native aristocracy, their 
particular form of religion, and even the widespread use of the 
Czech language. The Hapsburg policy of centralization began with 
its first ruler, King Ferdinand (1526-64). His efforts to eliminate 
the influence of the Bohemian estates were met with stubborn 
resistance. But the Bohemian estates were themselves divided, 
primarily on religious lines. By several adroit political maneuvers, 



15 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Ferdinand was able to establish hereditary succession to the Bohe- 
mian crown for the Hapsburgs. The estates' inability to establish 
the principle of electing or even confirming a monarch made their 
position considerably weaker. 

The conflict in Bohemia was complicated further by the Refor- 
mation and the subsequent wars of religion in Central Europe. 
Adherents of the Czech Reformed Church (the Hussites) opposed 
the Roman Catholic Hapsburgs, who were in turn supported by 
the Czech and German Catholics. The Lutheran Reformation of 
1517 introduced an added dimension to the struggle: much of the 
German burgher population of Bohemia adopted the Reformed 
Creed (both Lutheran and Calvinist); the Hussites split, and one 
faction allied with the German Protestants. In 1537 Ferdinand con- 
ceded to the Czechs, recognized the Compact of Basel, and accepted 
moderate Utraquism. The reconciliation, however, was of brief 
duration. 

In 1546 German Protestants united in the Schmalkaldic League 
to wage war against the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V. Whereas 
Ferdinand wanted to aid his brother, the Hussite and pro-Protestant 
Czech nobility sympathized with the German Protestant princes. 
Armed conflict between Ferdinand and the Bohemian estates broke 
out in 1547. But the Bohemians were not unified; victory went 
to Ferdinand, and reprisals against the Czech rebels followed. The 
property of Czech Utraquist nobility was confiscated and their 
privileges abrogated. Four rebels (two lesser nobles and two 
burghers) were executed in the square before the royal palace. 
Members of the Unity of Czech Brethren, a Hussite sect that had 
figured prominently in the rebellion, were bitterly persecuted. Their 
leader, Bishop John Augusta, was sentenced to sixteen years' 
imprisonment. Ferdinand, now Holy Roman Emperor (1556-64), 
attempted to extend the influence of Catholicism in Bohemia by 
forming the Jesuit Academy in Prague and by bringing Jesuit mis- 
sionaries into Bohemia. 

Decisive Battle 

Discord between Hapsburgs and Czechs and between Catho- 
lics and the followers of the reformed creeds erupted again into 
an open clash in the early seventeenth century. At that time, the 
Czechs were able to take advantage of the struggle between two 
contenders to the imperial throne, and in 1609 they extracted a 
Letter of Majesty from Emperor Rudolf II (1576-1612) that 
promised toleration of the Czech Reformed Church, gave control 
of Charles University to the Czech estates, and made other con- 
cessions. Rudolf's successor, Matthias (1612-17), proved to be 



16 



Historical Setting 



an ardent Catholic and quickly moved against the estates. Viola- 
tion of promises contained in the Letter of Majesty regarding royal 
and church domains and Matthias's reliance on a council composed 
of ardent Catholics further increased tensions. 

In 1618 two Catholic imperial councillors were thrown out of 
a window of a Prague castle, signaling an open revolt by the 
Bohemian estates against the Hapsburgs. The Bohemian estates 
decided to levy an army, decreed the expulsion of the Jesuits, and 
proclaimed the Bohemian throne to be elective. They elected a 
Calvinist, Frederick of the Palatinate, to the Bohemian throne. The 
Bohemian troops confronted the imperial forces. On November 8, 
1620, the Czech estates were decisively defeated at the famous Battle 
of White Mountain. 

Consequences of Czech Defeat 

The Czech defeat at the Battle of White Mountain was followed 
by measures that effectively secured Hapsburg authority and the 
dominance of the Roman Catholic Church. Many Czech nobles 
were executed; most others were forced to flee the kingdom. An 
estimated five-sixths of the Czech nobility went into exile soon after 
the Battle of White Mountain, and their properties were confis- 
cated. Large numbers of Czech and German Protestant burghers 
emigrated. In 1622 Charles University was merged with the Jesuit 
Academy, and the entire education system of the Bohemian King- 
dom was placed under Jesuit control. In 1624 all non-Catholic 
priests were expelled by royal decree. 

The Revised Ordinance of the Land (1627) established a legal 
basis for Hapsburg absolutism. All Czech lands were declared 
hereditary property of the Hapsburg family. The legislative func- 
tion of the diets of both Bohemia and Moravia was revoked; all 
subsequent legislation was to be by royal decree, receiving only 
formal approval from the diets. The highest officials of the king- 
dom, to be chosen from among the local nobility, would be strictly 
subordinate to the king. Thus, little remained of an autonomous 
and distinct Bohemian Kingdom. 

Hapsburg rule was further buttressed by the large-scale immigra- 
tion into Bohemia of Catholic Germans from south German terri- 
tories. The Germans received most of the land confiscated from 
Czech owners and came to constitute the new Bohemian nobility. 
The remaining Czech Catholic nobles gradually abandoned Czech 
particularism and became loyal servants of the imperial system. 
German Catholic immigrants took over commerce and industry 
as well. 



17 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 





100 200 Kilometers 



100 



200 Miles 



LITHUANIA 




POLAND 



r — 



Ho'y Roman Empire 




Source: Based on information from "European Diplomacy and Wars (c. 1500-1914)," Britan- 
mca, VI, 1975, 1091. 

Figure 4. Central Europe, 1648 

The religious wars continued after the Czech defeat. The Thirty 
Years' War (1618-48) of the German Protestant princes against 
the Holy Roman Emperor involved foreign powers and extended 
beyond German territory. Czechs fought on all sides: most of the 
rebellious Czech generals joined Protestant armies; Albrecht of 
Wallenstein was the most prominent Czech defector to the imperial 
cause. Bohemia served as a battlefield throughout the war. Prince 
Bethlen Gabor's Hungarian forces, reinforced by Turkish merce- 
naries, fought against the emperor and periodically devastated 
Slovakia and Moravia. Protestant German armies and, later, 
Danish and Swedish armies, laid waste the Czech provinces. Cities, 
villages, and castle fortresses were destroyed. Lusatia was incor- 
porated into Saxony in 1635. 

The Thirty Years' War ended during the reign of Ferdinand 
III (1637-56). In 1648 the Treaty of Westphalia confirmed the in- 
corporation of the Bohemian Kingdom into the Hapsburg impe- 
rial system, which established its seat in Vienna (see fig. 4). 
Leopold I (1656-1705) defeated the Turks and paved the way for 
the restoration of the Kingdom of Hungary to its previous territorial 
dimensions. The brief reign of Joseph I (1705-11) was followed 



18 



Historical Setting 



by that of Charles VI (1711-40). Between 1720 and 1725, Charles 
concluded a series of treaties by which the various estates of the 
Hapsburg lands recognized the unity of the territory under Haps- 
burg rule and accepted hereditary Hapsburg succession, includ- 
ing the female line. 

The struggle between the Bohemian estates and Hapsburg abso- 
lutism resulted in the complete subordination of the Bohemian 
estates to Hapsburg interests. In the aftermath of the defeat at White 
Mountain, the Czechs lost their native noble class, their reformed 
religion, and a vibrant Czech Protestant culture. With the influx 
of foreigners, primarily Germans, the German language became 
more prominent in government and polite society. It seemed that 
Bohemia was destined to become a mere province of the Haps- 
burg realm. 

Enlightened Absolutism 

The reigns of Maria-Theresa (1740-80) and her son Joseph II 
(1780-90), Holy Roman Emperor and coregent from 1765, were 
characterized by enlightened rule. Influenced by the ideas of 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers, Maria-Theresa 
and Joseph worked toward rational and efficient administration 
of the Bohemian Kingdom. In this respect, they opposed regional 
privilege and the rights of the estates and preferred to rule through 
a centrally controlled imperial bureaucracy. At the same time, they 
instituted reforms to eliminate the repressive features of the 
Counter-Reformation and to permit secular social progress. 

Maria- Theresa's accession to the Hapsburg lands was challenged 
by the territorial aspirations of the increasingly powerful Hohen- 
zollern dynasty. The Prussian king, Frederick II, joined by the 
dukes of Bavaria and Saxony, invaded the Bohemian Kingdom 
in 1741. The duke of Bavaria, Charles Albert, was proclaimed king 
by the Czech nobility. Although Maria-Theresa regained most of 
the Bohemian Kingdom and was crowned queen in Prague in 1743, 
all of the highly industrialized territory of Silesia except for Tesm, 
Opava, and Krnov was ceded to Prussia. 

In attempting to make administration more rational, Maria- 
Theresa embarked on a policy of centralization and bureaucrati- 
zation. What remained of the Bohemian Kingdom was now merged 
into the Austrian provinces of the Hapsburg realm. The two 
separate chancelleries were abolished and replaced by a joint Austro- 
Bohemian chancellery. The Czech estates were stripped of the last 
remnants of their political power, and their functions were assumed 
by imperial civil servants appointed by the queen. The prov- 
inces of the Czech and Austrian territories were subdivided into 
administrative districts. German became the official language. 



19 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Further reforms introduced by Maria-Theresa and Joseph II 
reflected such Enlightenment principles as the dissolution of feu- 
dal social structures and the curtailment of power of the Catholic 
Church. Maria-Theresa nationalized and Germanized the educa- 
tion system, eliminated Jesuit control, and shifted educational em- 
phasis from theology to the sciences. Serfdom was modified: robota 
(forced labor on the lord's land) was reduced, and serfs could marry 
and change domiciles without the lord's consent. Joseph II abolished 
serfdom altogether. In 1781 Joseph's Edict of Toleration extended 
freedom of worship to Lutherans and Calvinists. 

The enlightened rule of Maria-Theresa and Joseph II played a 
leading role in the development of a modern Czech nation, but 
one that was full of contradictions. On the one hand, the policy 
of centralization whittled down further any vestiges of a separate 
Bohemian Kingdom and resulted in the Germanization of the im- 
perial administration and nobility. On the other hand, by remov- 
ing the worst features of the Counter-Reformation and by 
introducing social and educational reforms, these rulers provided 
the basis for economic progress and the opportunity for social mobil- 
ity. The consequences for Bohemia were of widespread significance. 
The nobility turned its attention to industrial enterprise. Many of 
the nobles sublet their lands and invested their profits in the devel- 
opment of textile, coal, and glass manufacture. Czech peasants, 
free to leave the land, moved to cities and manufacturing centers. 
Urban areas, formerly populated by Germans, became increasingly 
Czech in character. The sons of Czech peasants were sent to school; 
some attended the university, and a new Czech intellectual elite 
emerged. During this same period the population of Bohemia nearly 
quadrupled, and a similar increase occurred in Moravia. 

But in response to pressures from the nobility, Joseph's succes- 
sor, Leopold II (1790-92), abrogated many of Joseph's edicts and 
restored certain feudal obligations. (Serfdom was not completely 
abolished until 1848.) Under Francis II (1792-1835), the aristocratic 
and clerical reaction gathered strength. The war against revolu- 
tionary France and the subsequent Napoleonic wars caused a tem- 
porary interruption of the reactionary movement. In 1804 Francis II 
transferred his imperial title to the Austrian domains (Austria, 
Bohemian Kingdom, Hungary, Galicia, and parts of Italy), and 
two years later the Holy Roman Empire was formally dissolved. 
The Austrian Empire came into existence and was to play a lead- 
ing role in the newly established German Confederation (see fig. 5). 
From 1815, after the conclusive defeat of Napoleon, the policy of 
reaction devised by Austria's foreign minister, Prince Metternich, 
dominated European affairs. 



20 



Historical Setting 



Enlightened rule destroyed the few remaining vestiges of the 
Bohemian Kingdom. The dismantling of Bohemian institutions and 
the dominance of the German language seemed to threaten the very 
existence of the Czech nation. Yet, enlightened rule also provided 
new educational and economic opportunities for the Czech peo- 
ple. Inadvertently, the enlightened monarchs helped set the stage 
for a Czech national revival. 

National Revival 

The first half of the nineteenth century was a period of national 
awakening in Central Europe. German nationalism — sparked by 
confrontation with the armies of the French revolutionaries — and 
Napoleonic expansionism inspired corresponding efforts toward na- 
tional revival among the subject Slavic peoples. The concept of the 
"nation," defined as a people united by linguistic and cultural affin- 
ities, produced an intellectual revival that laid the foundation for 
a subsequent struggle for political autonomy. 

In Bohemia, where the nobility was largely German or Ger- 
manized, the leaders of the Czech revival were members of the new 
intelligentsia, which had its origin in peasant stock. Only a small 
part of the nobility lent the revival support. 

The earliest phase of the national movement was philological. 
Scholars attempted to record and codify native languages. A chair 
for Czech language and literature was established at Charles- 
Ferdinand University in 1791. The Czech language, however, had 
survived only as a peasant patois. The tasks of molding the Czech 
language into a literary medium and introducing the study of Czech 
in state schools were accomplished by Josef Dobrovsky and Josef 
Jungmann. Their efforts were rewarded by an efflorescence of 
Czech literature and the growth of a Czech reading public. Promi- 
nent among the original Czech literary elite were poets Jan Kollar 
(a Slovak), F.L. Celakovsky, Karel J. Erben, and Karel H. Macha; 
dramatists V.K. Klicpera andJ.K. Tyl; and journalist-politicians 
F.A. Brauner and Karel Havlfcek-Borovsky. 

The Czech revival acquired an institutional foundation with the 
establishment of the Museum of the Bohemian Kingdom (1818) 
as a center for Czech scholarship. In 1827 the museum began pub- 
lication of a journal that became the first continuous voice of Czech 
nationalism. In 1830 the museum absorbed the Matice ceska, a 
society of Czech intellectuals devoted to the publication of scho- 
larly and popular books. The museum membership, composed of 
patriotic scholars and nobles, worked to establish contacts with other 
Slavic peoples and to make Prague the intellectual and scholarly 
capital of the Slavs. 



21 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 




,J f ^BOHEMIA ^-""V } 

V> CONFEDE RATIO 

«ak.X^ N MORAVIA / 

FRANCE/ A ^^~-._- / 

r r J | SLOVAKIA 

^M\UE*^^ AUSTRIA A U Sf T R I A N EMPIRE 



RUSSIAN 
EMPIRE 

\ 
( 



N 





HUNGARY n, 

Vx J 

OTTOMAN EMPIRE 




Source: Based on information from William R. Shepherd, Shepherd's Historical Atlas, New 
York, 1980, 157. 



Figure 5. Central Europe, 1815 

The major figure of the Czech revival was Frantisek Palacky. 
Of Moravian Protestant descent and attracted by the nationalist 
spirit of the Hussite tradition, Palacky became the great historian 
of the Czech nation. His monumental, five- volume History of the 
Czech People focused on the struggle of the Czech nation for politi- 
cal freedom and became one of the pillars of modern Czech life 
and thought. Palacky— who fancied himself the heir and succes- 
sor to the great educator and leader of the Unity of Czech Brethren, 
Jan Amos Komensky (Comenius) — became the political leader of 
the Czech nation during the revolutionary struggles of 1848. In 
the tradition of Komensky, Palacky developed a political platform 
based on cultural renaissance. 

The Slovaks experienced an analogous national revival. The 
Kingdom of Hungary, restored to its original territorial dimen- 
sions in 1711, was ruled by a Hungarian aristocracy that was ex- 
periencing its own national awakening. In 1 792 Hungarian replaced 
Latin as the official state language. In contrast to the more secular 
Czech nation, among the subject peoples of Hungary both the 
Catholic and the Protestant religions retained a solid hold. The 
Slovak clergy constituted the intellectual elite of the predominantly 
peasant Slovaks, and the Slovak revival occurred under its 
leadership. 



22 



Historical Setting 



The initial attempt to develop a Slovak literary language was 
made by a Jesuit priest, Anton Bernolak. The language he deve- 
loped in the 1780s was subsequently called bernoldkovcina and was 
based primarily on western Slovak dialects. The language was 
adopted by the Catholic clergy and disseminated in religious liter- 
ature. Bernolak and his followers, however, remained loyal to the 
Kingdom of Hungary, and their movement never developed na- 
tionalist political implications. 

The Protestant revival was more limited in scope, confined largely 
to the Slovak minority settled in urban centers. Slovak Protestan- 
tism was characterized by an attachment to Czech culture. The 
artificial and archaic language of the Czech Bible, known as biblic- 
tina, had served as the literary vehicle of the Protestant clergy since 
the sixteenth century. In the early nineteenth century, two German- 
educated Protestant theologians, the poet Jan Kollar and Pavol 
Safarik, endeavored to create a literary language that would com- 
bine Czech with elements of the central Slovak dialect. They pub- 
lished a reader, Citanka, in 1825, and beginning in the 1830s they 
gained a following among the younger generation of students at 
Protestant secondary schools. 

At this time, the Slovak national awakening split into two fac- 
tions. Kollar and Safarik were adherents of pan-Slavic concepts 
that stressed the unity of all Slavic peoples. They continued to view 
Czechs and Slovaks as members of a single nation, and they at- 
tempted to draw the languages closer together. Other Slovaks broke 
with the Czechs and proclaimed the separate identity of the Slovak 
nation. L'udovft Stur, a student at the Bratislava secondary school, 
developed sturovcina, which was based on the central Slovak dialect. 
In 1843 Stur advocated that sturovcina be made the Slovak literary 
language, and it spread rapidly in the Protestant community and 
beyond. Beginning in the 1840s, Slovak literary development took 
a separate path from that followed by Czech literature. 

Revolutions of 1848 

The Paris revolution of February 1848 precipitated a succession 
of liberal and national revolts against autocratic governments. 
Revolutionary disturbances pervaded the territories of the Austrian 
Empire, and Emperor Ferdinand I (1835-48) promised to reor- 
ganize the empire on a constitutional, parliamentary basis. 

In the Bohemian Kingdom, a national committee was formed 
that included Germans and Czechs. But Bohemian Germans 
favored creating a Greater Germany out of various German- 
speaking territories. The Bohemian Germans soon withdrew from 
the committee, signaling the Czech-German conflict that would 



23 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

characterize subsequent history. Palacky proposed Austro-Slavism 
as the creed of the Czech national movement. He advocated the 
preservation of the Austrian Empire as a buffer against both Ger- 
man and Russian expansionism. He also proposed the federaliza- 
tion of the empire on an ethnographic basis to unite the Bohemian 
Germans with Austria in one province and Czechs and Slovaks 
in another. Palacky further suggested that the various Slavic peo- 
ples of the empire, together constituting a majority, should form 
a political unit to defend their common interests. In June 1848 the 
Czechs convened the first Slavic Congress to discuss the possibil- 
ity of political consolidation of Austrian Slavs, including Czechs, 
Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians (Ukrainians), Slovenes, Croats, and 
Serbs. 

In the Kingdom of Hungary, the 1848 revolution temporarily 
toppled Hapsburg absolutism, and there was an attempt at estab- 
lishing a liberal constitutional government. Conflict soon ensued 
between the Hungarians and several other nationalities as to how 
Hungary was to be restructured. Hungarian liberals like Louis 
Kossuth, who favored the overthrow of the Hapsburgs and an inde- 
pendent Hungary, were at the same time opposed to the aspira- 
tions of the non-Hungarian nationalities. The liberals sought to 
create a national state solely for the Hungarians. 

It was within this struggle that the Slovak National Council, 
under Stur's leadership, drafted the "Demands of the Slovak Na- 
tion." These included the establishment of separate national legis- 
lative assemblies and the right of each national group to employ 
its own language in the Hungarian Diet, in administration, and 
in the education system. The petition was presented to the Hun- 
garian Diet in May 1848. When it was rejected, armed conflict 
broke out, and the Slovaks were crushed by Hungarian troops. Dis- 
appointed by the Hungarians and hoping to take advantage of the 
conflict between the imperial government and the Hungarians, 
Slovak patriots turned to the imperial government, requesting 
recognition of Slovakia as an independent crown land within the 
Austrian Empire. But after the Hungarian revolt was suppressed 
with the aid of Russian troops, Vienna lost interest in the demands 
of the Slovak and other non-Hungarian nationalities. 

National revival for both Czechs and Slovaks had been begun 
by small groups of intellectuals. At first, the national movements 
were confined to discussion of language, literature, and culture. 
But during the revolutions of 1848, the Czechs and Slovaks made 
bold political demands. The revolutions of 1848 also revealed that 
the German and Hungarian liberals, who were opposed to Haps- 
burg absolutism, were equally hostile to Czech and Slovak 



24 



Charles Bridge, Prague 



aspirations. It had become clear that the Czech and Slovak national 
movements had to contend not only with Hapsburg absolutism but 
also with increasingly virulent German and Hungarian nationalism. 

The Dual Monarchy, 1867-1918 

Formation of the Dual System 

After the revolutions of 1848, Francis Joseph attempted to rule 
as an absolute monarch, keeping all the nationalities in check. But 
the Hapsburgs suffered a series of defeats. In 1859 they were driven 
out of Italy, and in 1866 they were defeated by Prussia and ex- 
pelled from the German Confederation. To strengthen his posi- 
tion, Francis Joseph was ready to improve his relations with the 
Hungarians. At first it seemed that some concessions would be made 
to Bohemia, but in the end the crown effected a compromise with 
the Hungarian gentry. The Compromise of 1867 established the 
Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary (also known as the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire). The two parts of the empire were united by 
a common ruler, by a joint foreign policy, and, to some extent, 
by shared finances. Otherwise, Austria and Hungary were virtu- 
ally independent states, each having its own parliament, govern- 
ment, administration, and judicial system. 

Despite a series of crises, this dual system survived until 1918. 
It made permanent the dominant position of the Hungarians in 



25 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Hungary and of the Germans in the Austrian parts of the monar- 
chy. While Czechs, Poles, and other nationalities had some in- 
fluence in government, they were never permitted to share political 
power. This inability to come to terms with its nationalities con- 
tributed to the ultimate collapse of the Dual Monarchy. 

As a result of the dual system, the Czechs and Slovaks continued 
to go their separate ways. The Slovaks chafed under the Hungar- 
ians, and the Czechs were ruled by Vienna. The Austrian and Hun- 
garian parts of the empire had different political systems. Austria 
had a parliamentary government, and a gradual enlargement of 
the franchise culminated in universal male suffrage in 1907. The 
Czechs, therefore, were able to take a greater and greater part in 
the political life of Austria. In Hungary the franchise continued 
to be fairly restricted and pretty much controlled by the Hungar- 
ian aristocracy. Because of this, very few Slovaks gained positions 
of importance in Hungary. 

Austria and the Czechs 

In Austria, German liberals held political power in parliament 
from 1867 to 1879. They were determined to maintain German 
dominance in the Austrian part of the empire. The Czech leaders, 
subsequently labeled Old Czechs, favored alliance with the con- 
servative and largely Germanized Bohemian nobility and advo- 
cated the restoration of traditional Bohemian autonomy. In essence, 
they wanted a reconstituted Bohemian Kingdom (including Mora- 
via and Silesia) with a constitutional arrangement similar to 
Hungary's. In 1871 the Old Czechs seemed successful, for the gov- 
ernment agreed to the Fundamental Articles, which would have 
reinstated the historic rights of the Bohemian Kingdom. Violent 
protest from both German and Hungarian liberals ensued, however, 
and the articles were never adopted. 

Objecting to an increase of Slavs in the empire, the German liber- 
als opposed the 1878 Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
The emperor, stung by the rejection of his foreign policy, dismissed 
the liberal government and turned to Count Eduard Taafe's con- 
servative "Iron Ring" cabinet (1879-83). The Taafe government 
took the Slavic element into greater account than the liberals had 
and, in turn, was supported by the Old Czechs. Czechs made ap- 
preciable gains. A language decree promulgated in 1880 put Czech 
on an equal footing with German in Bohemian administration and 
law. In 1882 Charles-Ferdinand University in Prague was divided 
into two separate institutions: one Czech and the other German. 
These concessions, however, seemed insufficient to a newly develop- 
ing Czech commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. Intense conflict 



26 



Historical Setting 



ensued as Czechs and Germans attempted to control administra- 
tion and education. When some of the Old Czechs attempted to 
work out a compromise with the Bohemian Germans in 1890, they 
were denounced by a younger and more radical intelligentsia. The 
next year the Old Czechs were soundly defeated by the Young 
Czechs, ending a period of attempted compromises. 

While relations between Czechs and Germans worsened in 
Bohemia, they remained relatively tranquil in Moravia. Although 
the separate administrative status of Moravia had been abolished 
in the eighteenth century, the area was reconstituted as a separate 
crown land in 1849. In Moravia, unlike in Bohemia, a compromise 
was reached, in 1905, between the Czech majority and the Ger- 
man minority. Although the German language retained a slight 
predominance, the preservation of Czech language and culture was 
legally guaranteed. The compromise seemed to work reasonably 
well until the end of Hapsburg rule in 1918. 

During the final decade of the empire, obstructionism by both 
Czechs and Germans rendered parliamentary politics ineffectual, 
and governments rose and fell with great frequency. The impor- 
tance of the Young Czech Party waned as Czech politics changed 
orientation. Political parties advocating democracy and socialism 
emerged. In 1900 Tomas Masaryk, a university professor and 
former Young Czech deputy who was to become president of the 
Czechoslovak Republic, founded the Czech Progressive Party. Bas- 
ing its struggle for national autonomy on the principle of popular 
sovereignty, the Czech Progressive Party supported parliamentary 
politics, advocated universal suffrage, and rejected radicalism. 

Hungary and the Slovaks 

In Hungary the government gave full sway to Hungarian na- 
tionalism. Only a year after the Compromise of 1867, the Nation- 
alities Act established Hungarian as the exclusive official language. 
Slovak was relegated to private use and was regarded by the authori- 
ties as a peasant dialect. Franchise laws restricted the right to vote 
to large property holders (approximately 6 percent of the total popu- 
lation), thus favoring the Hungarian aristocracy. As a result, 
Slovaks rarely elected parliamentary representatives. The Slovaks, 
nevertheless, formed the Slovak National Party. Supported by 
Catholics and Protestants, the Slovak National Party was conser- 
vative and pan-Slavic in orientation and looked to autocratic Rus- 
sia for national liberation. It remained the center of Slovak national 
life until the twentieth century. 

Fearing the evolution of a full-fledged Slovak national movement, 
the Hungarian government attempted to do away with various 



27 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



aspects of organized Slovak life. In the 1860s, the Slovaks had 
founded a private cultural foundation, the Matica slovenska, which 
fostered education and encouraged literature and the arts. At its 
founding, even the Austrian emperor donated 1,000 florins for the 
Matica slovenska. In 1875 the Hungarian government dissolved 
the Matica slovenska and confiscated its assets. Similar attacks were 
made against Slovak education. In 1874 all three Slovak secon- 
dary schools were closed, and in 1879 a law made Hungarian man- 
datory even in church-sponsored village schools. The Hungarian 
government attempted to prevent the formation of an educated, 
nationally conscious, Slovak elite. 

It is remarkable that the Slovak national movement was able to 
survive. Most Slovaks continued to live as peasants or industrial 
laborers. Poverty prevailed, and on the eve of World War I about 
20 percent of the population of Slovakia had emigrated to other 
lands. This emigration aided the national movement, for it received 
both moral and financial support from Slovaks living abroad, par- 
ticularly in the United States. The Slovak national movement was 
aided also by the example of other nationalities struggling against 
the Hungarians (particularly the Romanians) and by contacts with 
the Czechs. 

The Czechoslovak Idea 

At the turn of the century, the idea of a "Czechoslovak" entity 
began to be advocated by some Czech and Slovak leaders. The 
concept that Czechs and Slovaks shared a common heritage was 
hardly new. But as the two nations developed, the Slovaks had been 
intent on demonstrating the legitimacy of Slovak as a language 
separate from Czech. In the 1890s, contacts between Czech and 
Slovak intellectuals intensified. The Czech leader Masaryk was a 
keen advocate of Czech-Slovak cooperation. Some of his students 
formed the Czechoslovak Union and in 1898 published the jour- 
nal Hlas (The Voice). In Slovakia, young Slovak intellectuals began 
to challenge the old Slovak National Party. But although the Czech 
and Slovak national movements began drawing closer together, their 
ultimate goals remained unclear. At least until World War I, the 
Czech and Slovak national movements struggled for autonomy 
within Austria and Hungary, respectively. Only during the war 
did the idea of an independent Czechoslovakia emerge. 

World War I 

At the outbreak of World War I, the Czechs and Slovaks showed 
little enthusiasm for fighting for their respective enemies, the Ger- 
mans and the Hungarians, against fellow Slavs, the Russians and 



28 



Historical Setting 



the Serbs. Large numbers of Czechs and Slovaks defected on the 
Russian front and formed the Czechoslovak Legion. Masaryk went 
to western Europe and began propagating the idea that the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire should be dismembered and that Czechoslovakia 
should be an independent state. In 1916, together with Eduard Benes 
and Milan Stefanik (a Slovak war hero), Masaryk created the 
Czechoslovak National Council. Masaryk in the United States and 
Benes in France and Britain worked tirelessly to gain Allied recog- 
nition. When secret talks between the Allies and Austrian emperor 
Charles I (1916-18) collapsed, the Allies recognized, in the sum- 
mer of 1918, the Czechoslovak National Council as the supreme 
organ of a future Czechoslovak government. 

In early October 1918, Germany and Austria proposed peace 
negotiations. On October 18, while in the United States, Masaryk 
issued a declaration of Czechoslovak independence. Masaryk in- 
sisted that the new Czechoslovak state include the historic Bohe- 
mian Kingdom, containing the German-populated Sudetenland. 
On October 21 , however, German deputies from the Sudetenland 
joined other German and Austrian deputies in the Austrian parlia- 
ment in declaring an independent German- Austrian state. Follow- 
ing the abdication of Emperor Charles on November 11, Czech 
troops occupied the Sudetenland. 

Hungary withdrew from the Hapsburg Empire on November 1 . 
The new liberal-democratic government of Hungary under Count 
Michael Karolyi attempted to retain Slovakia. With Allied approval, 
the Czechs occupied Slovakia, and the Hungarians were forced to 
withdraw. The Czechs and Allies agreed on the Danube and Ipel' 
rivers as the boundary between Hungary and Slovakia; a large Hun- 
garian minority, occupying the fertile plain of the Danube, would 
be included in the new state (see fig. 6). 

The Emergence of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) 

The Ruthenians (from the Ukrainian Rusyn — a name used for 
Ukrainians in the Hapsburg monarchy) were Ukrainian-speaking 
mountain people who lived in the deep, narrow valleys of the Car- 
pathian Mountains. In the eleventh century, Ruthenia (also known 
as Subcarpathian Ruthenia) came under the Hungarian crown. 
Poor peasants, grazers, and lumbermen, the Ruthenians were vas- 
sals and serfs of the Hungarian magnates dominating the plains 
of the Tisza River. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
Ruthenia lay within the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. Begin- 
ning in the mid-seventeenth century, most Ruthenians were 
converted from Eastern Orthodoxy to the Uniate Church (see Glos- 
sary). Combining spiritual allegiance to Rome with Orthodox 



29 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



rites, the Uniate Church enabled the Hungarian clergy to win the 
loyalty of their Eastern-oriented subjects. 

The Ruthenians remained a poor, agrarian, and politically inert 
people. Ruthenian delegates did, however, attend the Slavic Con- 
gress in 1848 and later appealed to Vienna for autonomy and the 
right of cultural development. The great awakener of Subcarpathian 
Ruthenia was Oleksander Dukhnovych, a Uniate priest, who 
through his pedagogical, literary, and publishing activities attempted 
to save the Ruthenians from Hungarianization. The Ruthenian 
revival was fueled further by a vigorous movement in Galicia (under 
Austrian administration). But the Compromise of 1867 virtually 
eliminated the possibility of educational progress; Hungarianiza- 
tion affected all secondary schools and most elementary schools in 
Ruthenia. Many Ruthenians emigrated (over 50,000 before World 
War I). Russian pan-Slavic propaganda had an impact beginning 
in the late nineteenth century, and many Ruthenians became con- 
verts to Eastern Orthodoxy. 

Political activity on behalf of Ruthenia during World War I was 
conducted by Ruthenian emigrants in the United States. They 
formed groups with varying political objectives: semiautonomy 
within Hungary, complete independence, federation in a Ukrain- 
ian state, inclusion in a Soviet federation, or union with the Czechs. 
The American Ruthenian leader, Gregory Zatkovic, negotiated 
with Masaryk to make Subcarpathian Ruthenia part of the Czecho- 
slovak Republic. This decision received international sanction in 
the Treaty of Saint-Germain (September 10, 1919), which guaran- 
teed Subcarpathian Ruthenia autonomy within the Czechoslovak 
Republic. 

The Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-39 

Features of the New State 

The independence of Czechoslovakia was proclaimed on Oc- 
tober 28, 1918, by the Czechoslovak National Council in Prague. 
Only several years before, an independent Czechoslovakia had been 
a dream of a small number of intellectuals. The transformation 
of the dream into reality was a formidable task. While the crea- 
tion of Czechoslovakia was based on certain historical precedents, 
it was, nevertheless, a new country carved out of disparate parts 
of the old Hapsburg Empire. Several ethnic groups and territories 
with different historical, political, and economic traditions had to 
be blended into a new state structure. In the face of such obsta- 
cles, the creation of Czechoslovak democracy was indeed a triumph. 
But the Czechoslovak Republic (which also came to be known as 



31 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



the First Republic) suffered internal constrictions, which, when cou- 
pled with foreign aggression, destroyed it. 

Initial authority within Czechoslovakia was assumed by the newly 
created National Assembly on November 14, 1918. Because ter- 
ritorial demarcations were uncertain and elections impossible, the 
provisional National Assembly was constituted on the basis of the 
1911 elections to the Austrian parliament with the addition of fifty- 
four representatives from Slovakia. National minorities were not 
represented; Sudeten Germans harbored secessionist aspirations, 
and Hungarians remained loyal to Hungary. The National As- 
sembly elected Masaryk as its first president, chose a provisional 
government headed by Karel Kramaf , and drafted a provisional 
constitution. 

The Paris Peace Conference convened in January 1919. The 
Czech delegation was led by Kramaf and Benes, premier and 
foreign minister respectively, of the Czechoslovak provisional 
government. The conference approved the establishment of the 
Czechoslovak Republic, to encompass the historic Bohemian King- 
dom (including Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), Slovakia, and 
Ruthenia. The Czechs requested the inclusion of Ruthenia to pro- 
vide a common frontier with Romania. Tesm, an industrial area 
also claimed by Poland, was divided between Czechoslovakia (Cesky 
Tesin) and Poland (Cieszyn). The Czech claim to Lusatia, which 
had been part of the Bohemian Kingdom until the Thirty Years' 
War, was rejected. On September 10, 1919, Czechoslovakia signed 
a "minorities" treaty, placing its ethnic minorities under the pro- 
tection of the League of Nations (see fig. 7). 

The new nation had a population of over 13.5 million. It had 
inherited 70 to 80 percent of all the industry of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire, including the china and glass industries and 
the sugar refineries; more than 40 percent of all its distilleries and 
breweries; the Skoda works of Plzen (Pilsen), which produced 
armaments, locomotives, automobiles, and machinery; and the 
chemical industry of northern Bohemia. The 17 percent of all Hun- 
garian industry that had developed in Slovakia during the late 
nineteenth century also fell to the republic. Czechoslovakia was 
one of the world's ten most industrialized states. 

The Czech lands were far more industrialized than Slovakia. In 
Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, 39 percent of the population was 
employed in industry and 31 percent in agriculture and forestry. 
Most light and heavy industry was located in the Sudetenland and 
was owned by Germans and controlled by German-owned banks. 
Czechs controlled only 20 to 30 percent of all industry. In Slovakia 
17.1 percent of the population was employed in industry, and 60.4 



32 



Historical Setting 



percent worked in agriculture and forestry. Only 5 percent of all 
industry in Slovakia was in Slovak hands. Subcarpathian Ruthe- 
nia was essentially without industry. 

In the agricultural sector, a program of reform introduced soon 
after the establishment of the republic was intended to rectify the 
unequal distribution of land. One-third of all agricultural land and 
forests belonged to a few aristocratic landowners — mostly Germans 
and Hungarians — and the Roman Catholic Church. Half of all 
holdings were under two hectares. The Land Control Act of April 
1919 called for the expropriation of all estates exceeding 150 hec- 
tares of arable land or 250 hectares of land in general (500 hec- 
tares to be the absolute maximum). Redistribution was to proceed 
on a gradual basis; owners would continue in possession in the in- 
terim, and compensation was offered. 

Czechoslovak Democracy 

The Constitution of 1920 

The constitution of 1920 approved the provisional constitution 
in its basic features. The Czechoslovak state was conceived as a 
parliamentary democracy, guided primarily by the National As- 
sembly, consisting of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, 
whose members were to be elected on the basis of universal suffrage. 
The National Assembly was responsible for legislative initiative and 
was given supervisory control over the executive and judiciary as 
well. Every seven years it elected the president and confirmed the 
cabinet appointed by him. Executive power was to be shared by 
the president and the cabinet; the latter, responsible to the Na- 
tional Assembly, was to prevail. The reality differed somewhat from 
this ideal, however, during the strong presidencies of Masaryk and 
his successor, Benes. 

To a large extent, Czechoslovak democracy was held together 
by the country's first president, Masaryk. As the principal found- 
ing father of the republic, Masaryk was regarded in the same way 
that George Washington is regarded in the United States. Such 
universal respect enabled Masaryk to overcome seemingly irresolv- 
able political problems. Even to this day, Masaryk is regarded as 
the symbol of Czechoslovak democracy. 

The constitution of 1920 provided for the central government 
to have a high degree of control over local government. Czecho- 
slovakia was divided into zeme (lands), such as Czechia, Moravia, 
and Ruthenia. Although in 1927 assemblies were provided for 
Czechia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia, their jurisdiction was limited to 



33 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 




34 



Historical Setting 



adjusting laws and regulations of the central government to local 
needs. The central government appointed one-third of the mem- 
bers of these assemblies. Centralization prevailed on the next two 
levels (zupa and okres). Only on the lowest levels, in local commu- 
nities (mesto and obec) was government completely in the hands of 
and elected by the local population. 

The constitution identified the "Czechoslovak nation" as the 
creator and principal constituent of the Czechoslovak state and es- 
tablished Czech and Slovak as official languages. National minori- 
ties, however, were assured special protection; in districts where 
they constituted 20 percent of the population, members of minor- 
ity groups were granted full freedom to use their language in every- 
day life, in schools, and in dealings with authorities. 

Political Parties 

The operation of the new Czechoslovak government was distin- 
guished by stability. Largely responsible for this were the well- 
organized political parties that emerged as the real centers of power. 
Excluding the period from March 1926 to November 1929, when 
the coalition did not hold, a coalition of five Czechoslovak parties 
constituted the backbone of the government: Republican Party of 
Farmers and Peasants, Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, 
Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, Czechoslovak Populist 
Party, and Czechoslovak National Democratic Party. The leaders 
of these parties became known as the Petka (The Five). The Petka 
was headed by Antonm Svehla, who held the office of prime minister 
for most of the 1920s and designed a pattern of coalition politics 
that survived to 1938. The coalition's policy was expressed in the 
slogan "We have agreed that we will agree." German parties par- 
ticipated in the government beginning in 1926. Hungarian par- 
ties, influenced by irredentist propaganda from Hungary, never 
joined the Czechoslovak government but were not openly hostile. 

The Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants was formed in 
1922 from a merger of the Czech Agrarian Party and the Slovak 
Agrarian Party. Led by Svehla, the new party became the prin- 
cipal voice for the agrarian population, representing mainly peasants 
with small and medium-sized farms. Svehla combined support for 
progressive social legislation with a democratic outlook. His party 
was the core of all government coalitions between 1922 and 1938. 

The Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party was considerably 
weakened when the communists seceded in 1921 to form the Com- 
munist Party of Czechoslovakia, but by 1929 it had begun to regain 
its strength. A party of moderation, the Czechoslovak Social 
Democratic Party declared in favor of parliamentary democracy 



35 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

in 1930. Antomn Hampl was chairman of the party, and Ivan Derer 
was the leader of its Slovak branch. The Czechoslovak National 
Socialist Party (called the Czech Socialist Party until 1926) was 
created before World War I when the socialists split from the So- 
cial Democratic Party. It rejected class struggle and promoted na- 
tionalism. Led by Vaclav Klofac, its membership derived primarily 
from the lower middle class, civil servants, and the intelligentsia 
(including Benes). 

The Czechoslovak Populist Party — a fusion of several Catholic 
parties, groups, and labor unions — developed separately in Bohe- 
mia in 1918 and in the more strongly Catholic Moravia in 1919. 
In 1922 a common executive committee was formed, headed by 
Jan Sramek. The Czechoslovak Populists espoused Christian moral 
principles and the social encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII. 

The Czechoslovak National Democratic Party developed from 
a post-World War I merger of the Young Czech Party with other 
right and center parties. Ideologically, it was characterized by na- 
tional radicalism and economic liberalism. Led by Kramaf and 
Alois Rasfn, the National Democrats became the party of big bus- 
iness, banking, and industry. The party declined in influence after 
1920, however. 

Problem of Dissatisfied Nationalities 

Slovak Autonomy 

Czechoslovakia's centralized political structure might have been 
well suited to a single-nation state, but it proved inadequate for 
a multinational state. Constitutional protection of minority lan- 
guages and culture notwithstanding, the major non-Czech nation- 
alities demanded broader political autonomy. Political autonomy 
was a particularly grave issue for the Czechs' partners, the Slovaks. 
In 1918 Masaryk signed an agreement with American Slovaks and 
Czechs in Pittsburgh, promising Slovak autonomy. The provisional 
National Assembly, however, agreed on the temporary need for 
centralized government to secure the stability of the new state. The 
Hlasists, centered on the journal Hlas, continued to favor the draw- 
ing together of Czechs and Slovaks. Although the Hlasists did not 
form a separate political party, they dominated Slovak politics in 
the early stages of the republic. The Hlasists' support of Prague's 
centralization policy was bitterly challenged by the Slovak Populist 
Party. The party had been founded by a Catholic priest, Andrej 
Hlinka, in December 1918. Hlinka argued for Slovak autonomy 
both in the National Assembly and at the Paris Peace Conference. 
He made Slovak autonomy the cornerstone of his policy until his 
death in August 1938. 



36 



The Roland Fountain, 
Bratislava 
Courtesy Helen Fedor 



The Slovak Populist Party was Catholic in orientation and found 
its support among Slovak Catholics, many of whom objected to 
the secularist tendencies of the Czechs. Religious differences com- 
pounded secular problems. The Slovak peasantry had suffered hard- 
ships during the period of economic readjustment after the 
disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire. Moreover, the supposed 
lack of qualified Slovaks had led to the importation of Czechs into 
Slovakia to fill jobs (formerly held by Hungarians) in administra- 
tion, education, and the judiciary. Nevertheless, at the height of 
its popularity in 1925, the Slovak Populist Party polled only 32 
percent of the Slovak vote, although Catholics constituted approx- 
imately 80 percent of the population. Then, in 1927, a modest con- 
cession by Prague granted Slovakia the status of a separate province, 
and Slovak Populists joined the central government. Monsignor 
Jozef Tiso and Marek Gazfk from Slovakia were appointed to the 
cabinet. 

Although Hlinka's objective was Slovak autonomy within a 
democratic Czechoslovak state, his party contained a more radi- 
cal wing, led by Vojtech Tuka. From the early 1920s, Tuka main- 
tained secret contacts with Austria, Hungary, and Hitler's National 
Socialists (Nazis). He set up the Rodobrana (semimilitary units) 
and published subversive literature. Tuka gained the support of 
the younger members of the Slovak Populist Party, who called them- 
selves Nastupists, after the journal Ndstup. 



37 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Tuka's arrest and trial in 1929 precipitated the reorientation of 
Hlinka's party in a totalitarian direction. The Nastupists gained 
control of the party; Slovak Populists resigned from the govern- 
ment. In subsequent years the party's popularity dropped slightly. 
In 1935 it polled 30 percent of the vote and again refused to join 
the government. In 1936 Slovak Populists demanded a Czecho- 
slovak alliance with Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. In 
September 1938, the Slovak Populist Party received instructions 
from Hitler to press its demands for Slovak autonomy. 

Conflict in Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) 

During World War I, emigre Ruthenian leaders had reached 
an agreement with Masaryk to include an autonomous Ruthenia 
in a future Czechoslovak state (see The Emergence of Subcarpathian 
Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine), this ch.). The agreement received 
international sanction in the 1919 Treaty of Saint-Germain. The 
Paris Peace Conference had also stipulated earlier that year that 
Subcarpathian Ruthenia be granted full autonomy and promised 
the territory a diet having legislative power in all matters of local 
administration. But the constitution of 1920 limited the provision 
on autonomy, making reference to the requirements of the unity 
of the state. All Ruthenian legislation was made subject to approval 
by the president of the republic, and the governor of Ruthenia was 
to be nominated by the president. As a result, even the constitu- 
tional provision for Ruthenian autonomy was never implemented; 
the Ruthenian diet was never convened. The issue of autonomy 
became a major source of discontent. Other grievances included 
the placement of the western boundary — which left 150,000 Ruthe- 
nians in Slovakia — and the large numbers of Czechs brought to 
Ruthenia as administrators and educators. 

Post-World War I Ruthenia was characterized by a prolifera- 
tion of political parties and a diversity of cultural tendencies. All 
Czechoslovak political parties were represented, and a number of 
indigenous parties emerged as well. Of particular significance were 
the Ukrainophiles, Russophiles, Hungarians, and communists. 

Ukrainophile and Russophile tendencies were strengthened by 
the large influx of emigres following the war. The Ukrainophiles 
were largely Uniates and espoused autonomy within Czechoslo- 
vakia. Some favored union with Ukraine. The Ukrainophiles 
were represented by the Ruthenian National Christian Party led 
by Augustin Volosin (see Second Republic, 1938-39, this ch.). 
Russophile Ruthenians were largely Orthodox and also espoused 
Ruthenian autonomy. They were organized politically in the 
Agricultural Federation, led by Andrej Brody, and the fascist- style 
Fencik Party. 



38 



Historical Setting 



Hungarians populated a compact area in southern Ruthenia. 
They were represented by the Unified Magyar Party, which con- 
sistently received 10 percent of the vote in Subcarpathian Ruthe- 
nia and was in permanent opposition to the government. 

The communists, strong in backward Ruthenia, attempted to 
appeal to the Ukrainian element by espousing union with the Soviet 
Ukraine. In 1935 the communists polled 25 percent of the Ruthe- 
nian vote. The elections of 1935 gave only 37 percent of the Ruthe- 
nian vote to political parties supporting the Czechoslovak 
government. The communists, Unified Magyars, and autonomist 
groups polled 63 percent. 

Sudetenland 

The most intractable nationality problem in the interwar 
period — one that played a major role in the destruction of demo- 
cratic Czechoslovakia — was that of the Sudeten Germans. The 
Sudetenland was inhabited by over 3 million Germans, compris- 
ing about 23 percent of the population of the republic. It possessed 
huge chemical works and lignite mines, as well as textile, china, 
and glass factories. To the west, a solid German triangle surrounded 
Cheb (Eger) and included the highly nationalistic Egerland. The 
Cesky les (Bohemian Forest) extended along the Bavarian fron- 
tier to the poor agricultural areas of southern Bohemia. 

Moravia contained patches of ' 'locked' ' German territory to the 
north and south. More characteristic were the German "language 
islands" — towns inhabited by important German minorities and 
surrounded by Czechs. Extreme German nationalism was never 
typical of this area. The German nationalism of the coal-mining 
region of southern Silesia, 40.5 percent German, was restrained 
by fear of competition from industry in Germany. Early policies 
of the Czechoslovak government, intended to correct social injustice 
and effect a moderate redistribution of wealth, had fallen more heav- 
ily on the German population than on other citizens. In 1919 the 
government confiscated one-fifth of each individual's holdings in 
paper currency. Germans, constituting the wealthiest element in 
the Czech lands, were most affected. The Land Control Act brought 
the expropriation of vast estates belonging to Germans. Land was 
allotted primarily to Czech peasants, often landless, who constituted 
the majority of the agricultural population. Only 4.5 percent of 
all land allotted by January 1937 was received by Sudeten Ger- 
mans, whose protests were expressed in countless petitions. 

According to the 1920 constitution, German minority rights were 
carefully protected; their educational and cultural institutions were 
preserved in proportion to the population. Local hostilities were 



39 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

engendered, however, by policies intended to protect the security 
of the Czechoslovak state and the rights of Czechs. Border for- 
estland, considered the most ancient Sudeten German national ter- 
ritory, was expropriated for security reasons. The Czechoslovak 
government settled Czechs in areas of German concentration in 
an effort to mitigate German nationalism; the policy, however, often 
produced the opposite effect. Minority laws were most often ap- 
plied to create new Czech schools in German districts. Sudeten Ger- 
mans, in possession of a large number of subsidized local theaters, 
were required to put these at the disposal of the Czech minority 
one night a week. 

Sudeten German industry, highly dependent on foreign trade 
and having close financial links with Germany, suffered badly dur- 
ing the depression, particularly when banks in Germany failed in 
1931. Czechs, whose industry was concentrated on the production 
of essential domestic items, suffered less. Tensions between the two 
groups resulted. Relations between Czechs and Germans were fur- 
ther envenomed when Sudeten Germans were forced to turn to 
the Czechoslovak government and the Central Bank (Zivnostenska 
banka) for assistance. These authorities often made the hiring of 
Czechs in proportion to their numbers in the population a condi- 
tion for aid. Czech workmen, dispatched by the government to en- 
gage in public works projects in Sudeten German territories, were 
also resented. 

Sudeten German nationalist sentiment ran high during the early 
years of the republic. The constitution of 1920 was drafted without 
Sudeten German representation, and the group declined to par- 
ticipate in the election of the president. Sudeten German political 
parties pursued an "obstructionist," or negativist, policy in parlia- 
ment. In 1926, however, Chancellor Gustav Stresemann of Ger- 
many, adopting a policy of rapprochement with the West, advised 
Sudeten Germans to cooperate actively with the Czechoslovak 
government. In consequence, most Sudeten German parties (includ- 
ing the German Agrarian Party, the German Social Democratic 
Party, and the German Christian Socialist Party) changed from 
negativism to activism, and Sudeten Germans accepted cabinet posts. 

By 1929 only a small number of Sudeten German deputies — 
most of them members of the German National Party (propertied 
classes) and the Sudeten Nazi Party (Deutsche Nationalsozialistische 
Arbeiterpartei) — remained in opposition. Nationalist sentiment 
flourished, however, among Sudeten German youth, who belonged 
to a variety of organizations. These included the older Turnver- 
band and Schutzvereine, the newly formed Kameradschaftsbund, 
the Nazi Volkssport (1929), and the Bereitschaft. 



40 



Historical Setting 



Sudeten German nationalists, particularly the Nazis, expanded 
their activities during the depression years. On January 30, 1933, 
Hitler was elected chancellor of Germany. The Czechoslovak 
government prepared to suppress the Sudeten Nazi Party. In the 
fall of 1933 the Sudeten Nazis dissolved their organization, and 
the German Nationals were pressured to do likewise. German Na- 
tionals and Sudeten Nazis were expelled from local government 
positions. The Sudeten German population was indignant, espe- 
cially in nationalist strongholds like Egerland. 

On October 1 , 1933, Konrad Henlein, aided by other members 
of the Kameradschaftsbund, a youth organization of romantic mys- 
tical orientation, created a new political organization. The Sudeten 
German Home Front (Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront) professed 
loyalty to the Czechoslovak state but championed decentralization. 
It absorbed most former German Nationals and Sudeten Nazis. 
In 1935 the Sudeten German Home Front became the Sudeten 
German Party (Sudetendeutsche Partei — SdP) and embarked on 
an active propaganda campaign. In the May election the SdP won 
more than 60 percent of the Sudeten German vote. The German 
Agrarians, Christian Socialists, and Social Democrats each lost 
approximately one-half of their following. The SdP became the ful- 
crum of German nationalist forces. The party represented itself 
as striving for a just settlement of Sudeten German claims within 
the framework of Czechoslovak democracy. Henlein, however, 
maintained secret contact with Nazi Germany and received material 
aid from Berlin. The SdP endorsed the idea of a fuhrer and mim- 
icked Nazi methods with banners, slogans, and uniformed troops. 
Concessions offered by the Czechoslovak government, including 
the transfer of Sudeten German officials to Sudeten German areas 
and possible participation of the SdP in the cabinet, were rejected. 
By 1937 most SdP leaders supported Hitler's pan-German ob- 
jectives. 

On March 13, 1938, Austria was annexed by the Third Reich, 
a union known as Anschluss. Immediately thereafter almost the 
entire Sudeten German bourgeois activist movement threw its sup- 
port to Henlein. On March 22, the German Agrarian Party, led 
by Gustav Hacker, fused with the SdP. German Christian Socialists 
suspended their activities on March 24; their deputies and sena- 
tors entered the SdP parliamentary club. Only the Social Democrats 
continued to champion democratic freedom. The masses, however, 
gave overwhelmingsupport to the SdP. 

BeneS's Foreign Policy 

Eduard Benes, Czechoslovak foreign minister from 1918 to 1935, 
created the system of alliances that determined the republic's 



41 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

international stance in 1938. A democratic statesman of Western 
orientation, Benes relied heavily on the League of Nations as 
guarantor of the postwar status quo and the security of newly formed 
states. He negotiated the Little Entente (an alliance with Yugosla- 
via and Romania) in 1921 to counter Hungarian revanchism and 
Hapsburg restoration. He attempted further to negotiate treaties 
with Britain and France, seeking their promises of assistance in 
the event of aggression against the small, democratic Czechoslo- 
vak Republic. Britain remained intransigent in its isolationist policy, 
and in 1924 Benes concluded a separate alliance with France. 

Benes 's Western policy received a serious blow as early as 1925. 
The Locarno Pact, which paved the way for Germany's admis- 
sion to the League of Nations, guaranteed Germany's western 
border. French troops were thus left immobilized on the Rhine, 
making French assistance to Czechoslovakia difficult. In addition, 
the treaty stipulated that Germany's eastern frontier would remain 
subject to negotiation. 

When Hitler secured power in 1933, fear of German aggression 
became generalized in eastern Central Europe. Benes ignored the 
possibility of a stronger Central European alliance system, remain- 
ing faithful to his Western policy. He did, however, seek the par- 
ticipation of the Soviet Union in an alliance to include France. 
(Benes' s earlier attitude toward the Soviet regime had been one 
of caution.) In 1935 the Soviet Union signed treaties with France 
and Czechoslovakia. In essence, the treaties provided that the Soviet 
Union would come to Czechoslovakia's aid only if French assistance 
came first. 

In 1935 Benes succeeded Masaryk as president, and Prime 
Minister Milan Hodza took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Hodza's efforts to strengthen alliances in Central Europe came too 
late. In February 1936 the foreign ministry came under the direc- 
tion of Kamil Krofta, an adherent of Benes's line. 

Munich 

After the Austrian Anschluss, Czechoslovakia was to become 
Hitler's next target. Hitler's strategy was to exploit the existing 
Sudeten German minority problem as a pretext for German 
penetration into eastern Central Europe. Sudeten German leader 
Henlein offered the SdP as the agent for Hitler's campaign. Henlein 
met with Hitler in Berlin on March 28, 1938, and was instructed 
to raise demands unacceptable to the Czechoslovak government. 
In the Carlsbad Decrees, issued on April 24, the SdP demanded 
complete autonomy for the Sudetenland and freedom to profess 
Nazi ideology. If Henlein 's demands were granted, the Sudeten- 
land would be in a position to align itself with Nazi Germany. 



42 



Historical Setting 



In 1938 neither Britain nor France desired war. France, not want- 
ing to face Germany alone, subordinated itself to Britain. British 
prime minister Neville Chamberlain became the major spokesman 
for the West. Chamberlain believed that Sudeten German griev- 
ances were just and Hitler's intention limited. Both Britain and 
France advised Czechoslovakia to concede. Benes, however, resisted 
pressure to move toward autonomy or federalism for the Sudeten- 
land. On May 20, Czechoslovakia initiated a partial mobilization 
in response to rumors of German troop movements. On May 30, 
Hitler signed a secret directive for war against Czechoslovakia to 
begin no later than October 1 . The British government demanded 
that Benes request a mediator. Not wishing to sever his ties with 
the West, Benes reluctantly accepted mediation. The British ap- 
pointed Walter Runciman as mediator and instructed him to force 
a solution on Benes that would be acceptable to the Sudeten Ger- 
mans. On September 2, Benes submitted the Fourth Plan, which 
granted nearly all the demands of the Carlsbad Decrees. Intent 
on obstructing conciliation, the SdP held a demonstration that pro- 
voked police action at the town of Ostrava on September 7. On 
September 13, the Sudeten Germans broke off negotiations. Vio- 
lence and disruption ensued. Czechoslovak troops attempted to 
restore order. Henlein flew to Germany and on September 15 issued 
a proclamation demanding the return of the Sudetenland to 
Germany. 

On September 15, Hitler met with Chamberlain at Berchtes- 
gaden and demanded the swift return of the Sudetenland to the 
Third Reich under threat of war. Czechoslovakia, Hitler claimed, 
was slaughtering the Sudeten Germans. Chamberlain referred the 
demand to the British and French governments; both accepted. 
The Czechoslovak government resisted, arguing that Hitler's 
proposal would ruin the nation's economy and lead ultimately to 
German control of all of Czechoslovakia. Britain and France issued 
an ultimatum, making the French commitment to Czechoslovakia 
contingent upon acceptance. On September 21, Czechoslovakia 
capitulated. The next day, however, Hitler added new demands, 
insisting that the claims of Poland and Hungary for their minori- 
ties also be satisfied. 

The Czechoslovak capitulation precipitated an outburst of na- 
tional indignation. In demonstrations and rallies, there were calls 
for a strong military government to defend the integrity of the state. 
A new cabinet, under General Jan Syrovy, was installed, and on 
September 23 a decree of general mobilization was issued. The 
Czechoslovak army, highly modernized and possessing an excel- 
lent system of frontier fortifications, was prepared to fight. The 



43 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Soviet Union announced its willingness to come to Czechoslovakia's 
assistance. Benes, however, refused to go to war without the sup- 
port of the Western powers. War, he believed, would come soon 
enough. 

On September 28, Chamberlain appealed to Hitler for a con- 
ference. Hitler met the next day, at Munich, with the chiefs of 
government of France, Italy, and Britain. The Czechoslovak 
government was neither invited nor consulted. On September 29, 
the Munich Agreement was signed by Germany, Italy, France, 
and Britain. The Czechoslovak government capitulated Septem- 
ber 30 and agreed to abide by the agreement. 

The Munich Agreement stipulated that Czechoslovakia must 
cede Sudeten territory to Germany. German occupation of the 
Sudetenland would be completed by October 10. An international 
commission (representing Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and 
Czechoslovakia) would supervise a plebiscite to determine the final 
frontier. Britain and France promised to join in an international 
guarantee of the new frontiers against unprovoked aggression. Ger- 
many and Italy, however, would not join in the guarantee until 
the Polish and Hungarian minority problems were settled. 

After Munich, Bohemia and Moravia lost about 38 percent of 
their combined area, as well as about 2.8 million Germans and 
approximately 750,000 Czechs to Germany. Hungary received 
11,882 square kilometers in southern Slovakia and southern 
Ruthenia; only 53 percent of the population in this territory was 
Hungarian. Poland acquired Tesm and two minor border areas 
in northern Slovakia (see fig. 8). 

The Second Republic, 1938-39 

As a result of the Munich Agreement, the greatly weakened 
Czechoslovak Republic was forced to grant major concessions to 
the non-Czechs. The executive committee of the Slovak Populist 
Party met at Zilina on October 5, 1938, and with the acquiescence 
of all Slovak parties except the Social Democrats formed an au- 
tonomous Slovak government under Tiso. Similarly, the two major 
factions in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, the Russophiles and 
Ukrainophiles, agreed on the establishment of an autonomous 
government, which was constituted on October 8, 1938. Reflect- 
ing the spread of modern Ukrainian national consciousness, the 
pro-Ukrainian faction, led by Volosin, gained control of the local 
government, and Subcarpathian Ruthenia was renamed Carpatho- 
Ukraine (see Problems of Dissatisfied Nationalities, this ch.). 

In November 1938, Emil Hacha, succeeding Benes, was elected 
president of the federated Second Republic (now called 



44 



Historical Setting 



Czecho- Slovakia), consisting of three parts: Bohemia and Moravia, 
Slovakia, and Carpatho-Ukraine. Lacking its natural frontier and 
having lost its costly system of border fortification, the new state 
was militarily indefensible. In January 1939, negotiations between 
Germany and Poland broke down. Hitler, intent on war against 
Poland, needed to eliminate Czecho- Slovakia first. He scheduled 
a German invasion of Bohemia and Moravia for the morning of 
March 15. In the interim, he negotiated with Slovak Populists and 
with Hungary to prepare the dismemberment of the republic before 
the invasion. On March 14, the Slovak Diet convened and unani- 
mously declared Slovak independence. Carpatho-Ukraine also 
declared independence, but Hungarian troops occupied it and eastern 
Slovakia. Hitler summoned President Hacha to Berlin. 

During the early hours of March 15, Hitler informed Hacha of 
the imminent German invasion. Threatening a Luftwaffe attack 
on Prague, Hitler persuaded Hacha to order the capitulation of 
the Czechoslovak army. On the morning of March 15, German 
troops entered Bohemia and Moravia, meeting no resistance. The 
Hungarian invasion of Carpatho-Ukraine did encounter resistance, 
but the Hungarian army quickly crushed it. On March 16, Hitler 
went to Czecho- Slovakia and from Prague's Hradcany Castle 
proclaimed Bohemia and Moravia a German protectorate. 

Independent Czecho-Slovakia collapsed in the wake of foreign 
aggression and internal tensions. Subsequently, interwar Czecho- 
slovakia has been idealized by its proponents as the only bastion 
of democracy surrounded by authoritarian and fascist regimes. It 
has also been condemned by its detractors as an artificial and un- 
workable creation of intellectuals supported by the great powers. 
Both views have some validity. Interwar Czechoslovakia was com- 
prised of lands and peoples that were far from being integrated into 
a modern nation-state. Moreover, the dominant Czechs, who had 
suffered political discrimination under the Hapsburgs, were not 
able to cope with the demands of other nationalities. In fairness 
to the Czechs, it should be acknowledged that some of the minor- 
ity demands served as mere pretexts to justify intervention by Nazi 
Germany. That Czechoslovakia was able under such circumstances 
to maintain a viable economy and a democratic political system 
was indeed a remarkable achievement of the interwar period. 

The War Years, 1939-45 

Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 

For the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia, German occupation 
was a period of brutal oppression, made even more painful by the 
memory of independence and democracy. Legally, Bohemia and 



45 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



Moravia were declared a protectorate of the Third Reich and were 
placed under the supervision of the Reich protector, Baron Kon- 
stantin von Neurath. German officials manned departments analo- 
gous to cabinet ministries. Small German control offices were 
established locally. The Gestapo assumed police authority. Jews 
were dismissed from the civil service and placed in an extralegal 
position. Communism was banned, and many Czech communists 
fled. 

The population of the protectorate was mobilized for labor that 
would aid the German war effort, and special offices were organized 
to supervise the management of industries important to that effort. 
Czechs were drafted to work in coal mines, the iron and steel indus- 
try, and armaments production; some were sent to Germany. Con- 
sumer goods production, much diminished, was largely directed 
toward supplying the German armed forces. The protectorate's 
population was subjected to strict rationing. 

German rule was moderate during the first months of the occu- 
pation. The Czech government and political system, reorganized 
by Hacha, continued in existence. Gestapo activities were directed 
mainly against Czech politicians and the intelligentsia. Neverthe- 
less, the Czechs demonstrated against the occupation on Oc- 
tober 28, the anniversary of Czechoslovak independence. The death 
on November 15 of a medical student, Jan Opletal, who had been 
wounded in the October violence, precipitated widespread student 
demonstrations, and the Reich retaliated. Politicians were arrested 
en masse, as were an estimated 1,800 students and teachers. On 
November 17, all universities and colleges in the protectorate were 
closed, and students were sent to work. 

In the fall of 1941, the Reich adopted a more radical policy in 
the protectorate. Reinhard Heydrich was appointed Reich protector 
of Bohemia and Moravia. Under his authority Prime Minister Alois 
Elias was arrested, the Czech government was reorganized, and 
all Czech cultural organizations were closed. The Gestapo indulged 
in arrests and executions. The deportation of Jews to concentra- 
tion camps was organized, and the fortress town of Terezm was 
made into a ghetto way station for Jewish families. On June 4, 
1942, Heydrich died after being wounded by an assassin. 
Heydrich' s successor, Colonel-General Kurt Daluege, ordered mass 
arrests and executions and the destruction of the village of Lidice. 
In 1943 the German war effort was accelerated. Under the authority 
of Karl Hermann Frank, German minister of state for Bohemia 
and Moravia, some 30,000 Czech laborers were dispatched to the 
Reich. Within the protectorate, all non-war-related industry was 



47 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

prohibited. The Czech population obeyed quiescently up until the 
final months preceding the liberation. 

Czech losses resulting from political persecution and deaths in 
concentration camps totaled between 36,000 and 55,000, relatively 
minor losses compared with those of other nations. But the Jewish 
population of Bohemia and Moravia (1 18,000 according to the 1930 
census) was virtually annihilated. Many Jews emigrated after 1939; 
more than 70,000 were killed; 8,000 survived at Terezm. Several 
thousand Jews managed to live in freedom or in hiding through- 
out the occupation. 

Government-in-Exile 

Benes had resigned as president of the Czechoslovak Republic 
on October 5, 1938. In London he and other Czechoslovak exiles 
organized a Czechoslovak government-in-exile and negotiated to 
obtain international recognition for the government and a renun- 
ciation of the Munich Agreement and its consequences. Benes 
hoped for a restoration of the Czechoslovak state in its pre-Munich 
form after the anticipated Allied victory. In the summer of 1941, 
the Allies recognized the exiled government. In 1942 Allied repu- 
diation of the Munich Agreement established the political and legal 
continuity of the First Republic and Benes' s presidency. 

The Munich Agreement had been precipitated by the subver- 
sive activities of the Sudeten Germans. During the latter years of 
the war, Benes worked toward resolving the German minority 
problem and received consent from the Allies for a solution based 
on a postwar transfer of the Sudeten German population. 

The First Republic had been committed to a Western policy in 
foreign affairs. The Munich Agreement was the outcome. Benes 
determined to strengthen Czechoslovak security against future Ger- 
man aggression through alliances with Poland and the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union, however, objected to a tripartite Czechoslovak- 
Polish-Soviet commitment. In December 1943, Benes 's govern- 
ment concluded a treaty with the Soviets. 

Benes 's interest in maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet 
Union was motivated also by his desire to avoid Soviet encourage- 
ment of a postwar communist coup in Czechoslovakia. Benes 
worked to bring Czechoslovak communist exiles in Britain into 
active cooperation with his government, offering far-reaching con- 
cessions, including nationalization of heavy industry and the cre- 
ation of local people's committees at the war's end. In March 1945, 
he gave key cabinet positions to Czechoslovak communist exiles 
in Moscow. 



48 



Historical Setting 



Czech Resistance 

In exile, Benes organized a resistance network. Hacha, Prime 
Minister Elias, and the Czech resistance acknowledged Benes' s 
leadership. Active collaboration between London and the Czecho- 
slovak home front was maintained throughout the war years. The 
Czech resistance comprised four main groups. The army command 
coordinated with a multitude of spontaneous groupings to form 
the Defense of the Nation (Obrana naroda — ON) with branches 
in Britain and France. Benes 's collaborators, led by Prokop Drtina, 
created the Political Center (Politicke ustfedi — PU). The PU was 
nearly destroyed by arrests in November 1939, after which younger 
politicians took control. Social democrats and leftist intellectuals, 
in association with such groups as trade-unions and educational 
institutions, constituted the Committee of the Petition We Remain 
Faithful (Peticni vybor Verm zustanme — PVVZ). 

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunisticka strana 
Ceskoslovenska — KSC) was the fourth resistance group. The KSC 
had been one of over twenty political parties in the democratic First 
Republic, but it had never gained sufficient votes to unsettle the 
democratic government. After the Munich Agreement the leader- 
ship of the KSC moved to Moscow and the party went under- 
ground. Until 1943, however, KSC resistance was weak. The 
Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact in 1939 had left the KSC in dis- 
array. But ever faithful to the Soviet line, the KSC began a more 
active struggle against the Nazis after Germany's attack on the 
Soviet Union in June 1941 (see The Communist Party of Czecho- 
slovakia, ch. 4). 

The democratic groups — ON, PU, and PVVZ — united in early 
1940 and formed the Central Committee of the Home Resistance 
(Ustfedni vybor odboje domaciho — UVOD). Involved primarily 
in intelligence gathering, the UVOD cooperated with a Soviet intel- 
ligence organization in Prague. Following the Nazi invasion of the 
Soviet Union in June 1941, the democratic groups attempted to 
create a united front that would include the KSC. Heydrich's ap- 
pointment in the fall thwarted these efforts. By mid- 1942 the Nazis 
had succeeded in exterminating the most experienced elements of 
the Czech resistance forces. 

Czech forces regrouped in 1942 and 1943. The Council of the 
Three (R3), in which the communist underground was strongly 
represented, emerged as the focal point of the resistance. The R3 
prepared to assist the liberating armies of the United States and 
the Soviet Union. In cooperation with Red Army partisan units, 
the R3 developed a guerrilla structure. 



49 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Guerrilla activity intensified after the formation of a provisional 
Czechoslovak government in Kosice on April 4, 1945. "National 
committees" took over the administration of towns as the Germans 
were expelled. Under the supervision of the Red Army, more than 
4,850 such committees were formed between 1944 and the end of 
the war. On May 5 a national uprising began spontaneously in 
Prague, and the newly formed Czech National Council (Ceska 
narodm rada) almost immediately assumed leadership of the revolt. 
Over 1,600 barricades were erected throughout the city, and some 
30,000 Czech men and women battled for three days against 37,000 
to 40,000 German troops backed by tanks and artillery. On May 
8 the German Wehrmacht capitulated; Soviet troops arrived on 
May 9. 

Slovak Republic 

On March 14, 1939, Slovakia declared its independence, call- 
ing itself the Slovak Republic. Monsignor Tiso was elected presi- 
dent of this new republic. A clerical nationalist, Tiso opposed the 
Nazification of Slovak society and hoped instead to establish 
Slovakia as a nationalist, Christian, corporative state. His plan con- 
flicted with that of Slovak radicals who were organized into the 
paramilitary Hlinka Guards. The latter cooperated closely with the 
Nazi-oriented German minority led by Franz Karmasin. Radicals 
dominated the Slovak government. Vojtech Tuka, recentiy released 
from prison, became prime minister; his associate, Ferdinand 
Durcansky, was named foreign minister. Alexander Mach, head 
of the Hlinka Guards, was propaganda minister. German "advi- 
sory missions" were appointed to all Slovak ministries, and Ger- 
man troops were stationed in Slovakia beginning March 15, 1939. 

The conflict between Tiso and the radicals resulted in the 
Salzburg Compromise, concluded between Slovakia and the Reich 
in July 1940. The compromise called for dual command by the 
Slovak Populist Party and the Hlinka Guards. The Reich appointed 
storm trooper leader Manfred von Killinger as the German 
representative in Slovakia. While Tiso successfully restructured the 
Slovak Populist Party in harmony with Christian corporative prin- 
ciples, Tuka and Mach radicalized Slovak policy toward the Jews 
(130,000 in the 1930 census). In September 1941, the Slovak 
government enacted a "Jewish code," providing a legal founda- 
tion for property expropriation, internment, and deportation. In 
1942 the Slovak government reached an agreement with Germany 
on the deportation of Jews. The same year, when most of the depor- 
tations occurred, approximately 68,000 Slovak Jews were sent out 
of Slovakia to German-run concentration camps. Many Jews 



50 



Historical Setting 



escaped deportation under a provision that allowed Tiso to exempt 
Jews whose services were considered an economic necessity. 

Tiso's power was strengthened in October 1942, when the Slovak 
Diet proclaimed him leader of the state and Slovak Populist Party, 
giving him rights of intervention in all affairs of state. The Hlinka 
Guards were effectively subordinated to party control. The new 
German representative, Hans Elard Ludin, concentrated his ener- 
gies on war production. German banks acquired a controlling in- 
terest in all Slovak industries. With the aid of German investments 
and technical advice, Slovakia experienced a considerable economic 
boom, especially in the armaments industry, which had been con- 
trolled by the German government since December 1939. To some 
extent, Slovakia served as a showcase for Hitler's new order. 

Slovak Resistance 

In the aftermath of Munich, Slovak politicians from the demo- 
cratic parties (Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants, Czecho- 
slovak Social Democratic Party, and Czechoslovak National So- 
cialist Party) organized a resistance movement. Individual under- 
ground cells sprang up in towns and villages throughout Slovakia. 
A campaign of "whispering" propaganda was initiated to alert the 
acquiescent Slovak population to the true nature of the Tiso regime. 
The goal of the democratic resistance was the restoration of the 
Czechoslovak Republic, but with greater participation for Slovakia. 
In the spring of 1939, the "Zeta" headquarters was established 
in Bratislava to coordinate with the Czech resistance and to trans- 
mit intelligence information to the liberation movement abroad. 
Communists remaining in Slovakia formed the underground Com- 
munist Party of Slovakia (Komunisticka strana Slovenska — KSS) 
and until 1943 favored the creation of an independent "Soviet 
Slovakia." 

The shortage of qualified personnel enabled resistance members 
to infiltrate all levels of the Tiso administration, where they pro- 
moted economic sabotage. Mutiny within the Slovak army (mar- 
shaled by the Axis powers for combat against Poland and, later, 
the Soviet Union) was encouraged and became commonplace. At 
Kremnica, on September 15, 1939, approximately 3,500 Slovak 
soldiers abandoned their transport train and marched into the city. 
Members of the underground Slovak Revolutionary Youth set fire 
to machinery in factories, emptied the fuel tanks of locomotives, 
and exploded munitions in warehouses. Slovak youth turned in- 
creasingly against the Tiso regime. 

In his Christmas broadcast of 1942, Benes called for resistance 
groups in Slovakia to increase their activity in preparation for a 



51 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

seizure of power. The groups worked to unify their efforts. The 
following November, negotiations between democratic and com- 
munist resistance leaders culminated in the signing of the Christ- 
mas Agreement of 1943. The agreement called for the creation of 
the Slovak National Council to represent the political will of the 
Slovak nation. The Slovak National Council would act in concert 
with the Czechoslovak government and liberation movement 
abroad. The postwar Czechoslovak state would be democratic and 
organized on the basis of national equality. The Christmas Agree- 
ment provided also for a close association with the Soviet Union 
in foreign policy and military affairs. Benes endorsed the agree- 
ment on March 27, 1944. 

The Allied powers agreed that Slovakia would be liberated by 
Soviet armies. In March 1944, with Benes's approval, the Slovak 
National Council authorized Lieutenant-Colonel Jan Golian to pre- 
pare for a national coup to be coordinated with the arrival of Soviet 
troops. Golian organized a secret military center at Banska Bystrica 
and created Slovak partisan units composed of escaped prisoners 
of war and army deserters. The Slovak National Uprising of Au- 
gust 29, however, was premature. The Soviet government, regard- 
ing the Slovak resistance as politically suspect, failed to inform the 
Slovaks of a change in Soviet strategy. Despite American efforts 
to assist the uprising, the German Wehrmacht occupied Slovakia, 
and Banska Bystrica fell on October 27. Nonetheless, local parti- 
san warfare continued up to the liberation. 

Soviet Annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine (Subcarpathian Ruthenia) 

On May 8, 1944, Benes signed an agreement with Soviet leaders 
stipulating that Czechoslovak territory liberated by Soviet armies 
would be placed under Czechoslovak civilian control. Subcarpathian 
Ruthenia had been reconstituted into the autonomous Carpatho- 
Ukraine during the Second Republic. When the Second Republic 
collapsed, Carpatho-Ukraine declared its independence but was 
occupied by the Hungarians (see Second Republic, 1938-39, this 
ch.). In October 1944, Carpatho-Ukraine was taken by the Soviets. 
A Czechoslovak delegation under Frantisek Nemec was dispatched 
to the area. The delegation was to mobilize the liberated local popu- 
lation to form a Czechoslovak army and to prepare for elections 
in cooperation with recently established national committees. 
Loyalty to a Czechoslovak state was tenuous in Carpatho-Ukraine. 
Benes's proclamation of April 1944 excluded former collaborationist 
Hungarians, Germans, and the Russophile Ruthenian followers 
of Andrej Brody and the Fencik Party (who had collaborated with 
the Hungarians) from political participation. This amounted to 



52 



Slovak National Uprising Memorial, Banska Bystrica 

Courtesy Helen Fedor 

approximately one-third of the population. Another one-third was 
communist, leaving one- third of the population presumably sym- 
pathetic to the Czechoslovak Republic. 

Upon arrival in Carpatho-Ukraine, the Czechoslovak delega- 
tion set up headquarters in Khust and on October 30 issued a 
mobilization proclamation. Soviet military forces prevented both 
the printing and the posting of the Czechoslovak proclamation 
and proceeded instead to organize the local population. Protests 
from Benes's government went unheeded. Soviet activities led 
much of the local population to believe that Soviet annexation was 
imminent. 

The Czechoslovak delegation was also prevented from establish- 
ing a cooperative relationship with the local national committees 
promoted by the Soviets. On November 19, the communists, meet- 
ing in Mukachevo, issued a resolution requesting separation of 
Carpatho-Ukraine from Czechoslovakia and incorporation into the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. On November 26, the Con- 
gress of National Committees unanimously accepted the resolu- 
tion of the communists. The congress elected the National Council 
and instructed that a delegation be sent to Moscow to discuss union. 
The Czechoslovak delegation was asked to leave Carpatho-Ukraine. 

Negotiations between the Czechoslovak government and Moscow 
ensued. Both Czech and Slovak communists encouraged Benes to 
cede Carpatho-Ukraine. The Soviet Union agreed to postpone 
annexation until the postwar period to avoid compromising Benes's 
policy based on the pre-Munich frontiers. The treaty ceding 
Carpatho-Ukraine to the Soviet Union was signed in June 1945. 
Czechs and Slovaks living in Carpatho-Ukraine and Ukrainians 
(Ruthenians) living in Czechoslovakia were given the choice of 
Czechoslovak or Soviet citizenship. 



53 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Minorities and Population Transfers 

The Czechoslovak National Front coalition government, formed 
at Kosice in April 1945, issued decrees providing for the expulsion 
of all Sudeten Germans with the exception of those who had demon- 
strated loyalty to the republic. German property would be confis- 
cated without compensation. All officials of the SdP, or the Sudeten 
Nazis, and all members of the Nazi Security Police would be 
prosecuted. 

In May 1945, Czechoslovak troops took possession of the Sudeten- 
land. A Czechoslovak administrative commission composed exclu- 
sively of Czechs was established. Sudeten Germans were 
subjected to restrictive measures and conscripted for compulsory labor 
to repair war damages. Individual acts of retaliation against Ger- 
mans and precipitous expulsion under harsh conditions character- 
ized the immediate aftermath of the occupation. On June 15, 
however, Benes called Czechoslovak authorities to order. In July 
Czechoslovak representatives addressed the Potsdam Conference (the 
United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union) and presented plans 
for a humane and orderly transfer of the Sudeten German population. 

The Potsdam Agreement provided for the resettlement of Sudeten 
Germans in Germany under the supervision of the Allied Control 
Council. The transfer began in January 1946. By December 31, 
1946, some 1.7 million Germans had been resettled in the Ameri- 
can Zone and 750,000 in the Soviet Zone. Approximately 225,000 
Germans remained in Czechoslovakia, of whom 50,000 emigrated 
or were expelled soon after. 

The Potsdam Agreement pertained to Germans only. Decisions 
regarding the Hungarian minority reverted to the Czechoslovak 
government. The resettlement of about 700,000 Hungarians was 
envisaged at Kosice and subsequently reaffirmed by the National 
Front. Budapest, however, opposed a unilateral transfer. In Febru- 
ary 1946, the Hungarian government agreed that Czechoslovakia 
could expatriate as many Hungarians as there were Slovaks in Hun- 
gary wishing to return to Czechoslovakia. By the spring of 1948 
only 160,000 Hungarians had been resettled. 

Territory ceded to Poland in 1938 and restored to Slovakia after 
the Nazi invasion of Poland, in accordance with the terms of the 
German-Slovak agreement of November 21, 1939, became part 
of the restored Czechoslovak state in 1945. The Polish minority 
(100,000) enjoyed full civil liberties. 

Communist Czechoslovakia 

Third Republic and the Communist Takeover 

During World War II, Czechoslovakia disappeared from the map 
of Europe. The re-emergence of Czechoslovakia as a sovereign state 



54 



Historical Setting 



was not only the result of Allied policies but also an indication of 
the strength of the Czechoslovak idea, particularly as embodied 
in the First Republic. But Czechoslovakia now found itself within 
the Soviet sphere of influence — a fact that had to be taken into 
account in any postwar reconstruction. Thus the political and eco- 
nomic organization of postwar Czechoslovakia was largely the result 
of negotiations between Benes and KSC exiles in Moscow. 

The Third Republic came into being in April 1945. Its govern- 
ment, installed at Kosice on April 4 and moved to Prague in May, 
was a National Front coalition in which three socialist parties — 
KSC, Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, and Czechoslovak 
National Socialist Party — predominated. The Slovak Populist Party 
was banned as collaborationist with the Nazis. Other conservative 
yet democratic parties, such as the Republican Party of Farmers 
and Peasants, were prevented from resuming activities in the post- 
war period. Certain acceptable nonsocialist parties were included 
in the coalition; among them were the Catholic People's Party (in 
Moravia) and the Slovak Democratic Party. All property belong- 
ing to Nazi collaborators was confiscated without compensation. 
Their land was distributed among the peasants, and their 
industries — amounting to 16.4 percent of all Czechoslovak indus- 
try, employing 61.2 percent of the industrial labor force — were na- 
tionalized. 

Benes had compromised with the KSC to avoid a postwar coup; 
he anticipated that the democratic process would restore a more 
equitable distribution of power. Benes had negotiated the Soviet 
alliance, but at the same time he hoped to establish Czechoslovakia 
as a "bridge" between East and West, capable of maintaining con- 
tacts with both sides. KSC leader Klement Gottwald, however, 
professed commitment to a "gradualist" approach, that is, to a 
KSC assumption of power by democratic means. 

The popular enthusiasm evoked by the Soviet armies of libera- 
tion benefited the KSC. Czechoslovaks, bitterly disappointed by 
the West at Munich, responded favorably to both the KSC and 
the Soviet alliance. Communists secured strong representation in 
the popularly elected national committees, the new organs of local 
administration. The KSC organized and centralized the trade union 
movement; of 120 representatives to the Central Council of Trade 
Unions, 94 were communists. The party worked to acquire a mass 
membership, including peasants and the petite bourgeoisie, as well 
as the proletariat. Between May 1945 and May 1946, KSC mem- 
bership grew from 27,000 to over 1.1 million. 

In the May 1946 election, the KSC won a plurality of 38 per- 
cent of the vote. Benes continued as president of the republic, and 



55 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Jan Masaryk, son of the revered founding father, continued as for- 
eign minister. Gottwald became prime minister. Most important, 
although the communists held only a minority of portfolios, they 
were able to gain control over such key ministries as information, 
internal trade, finance, and interior (including the police appara- 
tus). Through these ministries, the communists were able to sup- 
press noncommunist opposition, place party members in positions 
of power, and create a solid basis for a takeover attempt. 

The year that followed was uneventful. The KSC continued to 
proclaim its "national" and "democratic" orientation. The turning 
point came in the summer of 1947. In July the Czechoslovak 
government, with KSC approval, accepted an Anglo-French invi- 
tation to attend preliminary discussions of the Marshall Plan. The 
Soviet Union responded immediately to the Czechoslovak move 
to continue the Western alliance. Stalin summoned Gottwald to 
Moscow; upon his return to Prague, the KSC reversed its deci- 
sion. In subsequent months, the party demonstrated a significant 
radicalization of its tactics. 

The KSC raised the specter of an impending counterrevolution- 
ary coup as a pretext for intensified activity. Originally announced 
by Gottwald at the KSC Central Committee meeting in Novem- 
ber 1947, news of the "reactionary plot" was disseminated through- 
out the country by communist agents-provocateurs and by the com- 
munist press. In January 1948, the communist-controlled Minis- 
try of Interior proceeded to purge the Czechoslovak security forces, 
substituting communists for noncommunists. Simultaneously, the 
KSC began agitating for increased nationalization and for a new 
land reform limiting landholdings to fifty hectares. 

A cabinet crisis precipitated the February coup. National So- 
cialist ministers, backed by all noncommunist parties, demanded 
a halt to the communists' blatant use of the Ministry of Interior's 
police and security forces to suppress noncommunists. Prime 
Minister Gottwald, however, repeatedly forestalled discussion of 
the police issue. On February 20, National Socialists resigned from 
the cabinet in protest. The Catholic People's Party and the Slovak 
Democratic Party followed suit. 

The twelve noncommunist ministers resigned, in part, to induce 
Benes to call for early elections: Communist losses were anticipated 
owing to popular disapproval of recent KSC tactics. A January 
poll indicated a 10-percent decline in communist electoral support. 
The Czechoslovak National Socialists made their move, however, 
without adequate coordination with Benes. The democratic par- 
ties, in addition, made no effort to rally popular support. 



56 



Historical Setting 



Benes refused to accept the cabinet resignations and did not call 
for elections. In the days that followed, he shunned democratic 
ministers to avoid accusation of collusion. The Czechoslovak army 
remained neutral. 

In the meantime, the KSC garnered its forces. The communist- 
controlled Ministry of Interior deployed police regiments to sensi- 
tive areas and equipped a workers' militia. The communist- 
controlled Ministry of Information refused broadcasting time to 
noncommunist officials. Ministries held by democratic parties were 
"secured" by communist "action committees." The action com- 
mittees also purged all governmental and political party organs of 
unreliable elements. 

On February 25, Benes, perhaps fearing Soviet intervention, 
capitulated. He accepted the resignations of the dissident ministers 
and received a new cabinet list from Gottwald, thus completing 
the communist takeover. 

Stabilization 

In February 1948, Czechoslovakia became a "people's demo- 
cracy" — a preliminary step toward socialism and, ultimately, com- 
munism. Bureaucratic centralism under the direction of KSC 
leadership was introduced. Dissident elements were purged from 
all levels of society, including the Catholic Church. The ideologi- 
cal principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist realism pervaded 
cultural and intellectual life. The entire education system was sub- 
mitted to state control. The economy was committed to compre- 
hensive central planning and the elimination of private ownership. 
Czechoslovakia became a satellite of the Soviet Union; it was a 
founding member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon) in 1949 and of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 (see Appen- 
dix B; Appendix C). The attainment of Soviet-style "socialism" 
became the government's avowed policy. 

A new constitution was passed by the National Assembly on 
May 9, 1948. Because it was prepared by a special committee in 
the 1945-48 period, it contained many liberal and democratic 
provisions. It reflected, however, the reality of Communist power 
through an addition that discussed the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and the leadership role of the Communist party. Benes refused to 
sign the Ninth-of-May Constitution, as it was called, and resigned 
from the presidency; he was succeeded by Gottwald. 

Although in theory Czechoslovakia remained a multiparty state, 
in actuality the Communists were in complete control. Political 
participation became subject to KSC approval. The KSC also 
prescribed percentage representation for non-Marxist parties. The 



57 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

National Assembly, purged of dissidents, became a mere rubber 
stamp for KSC programs. In 1953 an inner cabinet of the National 
Assembly, the Presidium, was created. Composed of KSC leaders, 
the Presidium served to convey party policies through government 
channels. Regional, district, and local committees were subordi- 
nated to the Ministry of Interior. Slovak autonomy was constrained; 
the KSS was reunited with the KSC but retained its own identity 
(see The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, ch. 4). 

Gottwald died in 1953. He was succeeded by Antonin Zapotocky 
as president and by Antonin Novotny as head of the KSC . Novotny 
became president in 1957 when Zapotocky died. 

Czechoslovak interests were subordinated to the interests of the 
Soviet Union. Stalin became particularly concerned about control- 
ling and integrating the socialist bloc in the wake of Tito's challenge 
to his authority. Stalin's paranoia resulted in sweeping political 
changes in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries. In Czecho- 
slovakia the Stalinists accused their opponents of "conspiracy 
against the people's democratic order" and "high treason" in order 
to oust them from positions of power. Large-scale arrests of Com- 
munists with an "international" background, i.e., those with a 
wartime connection with the West, veterans of the Spanish Civil 
War, Jews, and Slovak "bourgeois nationalists," were followed 
by show trials. The most spectacular of these was the trial of KSC 
first secretary Rudolf Slansky and thirteen other prominent Com- 
munist personalities in November and December 1952. Slansky 
was executed, and many others were sentenced to death or to forced 
labor in prison camps. The KSC rank-and-file membership, ap- 
proximately 2.5 million in March 1948, began to be subjected to 
careful scrutiny. By 1960 KSC membership had been reduced to 
1.4 million. 

The Ninth-of-May Constitution provided for the nationalization 
of all commercial and industrial enterprises having more than fifty 
employees. The nonagricultural private sector was nearly elimi- 
nated. Private ownership of land was limited to fifty hectares. The 
remnants of private enterprise and independent farming were 
permitted to carry on only as a temporary concession to the petite 
bourgeoisie and the peasantry. The Czechoslovak economy was 
subjected to a succession of five-year plans (see Economic Struc- 
ture and Its Control Mechanisms, ch. 3). 

Following the Soviet example, Czechoslovakia began emphasiz- 
ing the rapid development of heavy industry. The industrial sec- 
tor was reorganized with an emphasis on metallurgy, heavy 
machinery, and coal mining. Production was concentrated in larger 
units; the more than 350,000 units of the prewar period were 



58 



Historical Setting 



reduced to about 1 ,700 units by 1958. Industrial output reportedly 
increased 233 percent between 1948 and 1959; employment in 
industry, 44 percent. The speed of industrialization was particu- 
larly accelerated in Slovakia, where production increased 347 per- 
cent and employment, 70 percent. Although Czechoslovakia's 
industrial growth of 170 percent between 1948 and 1957 was im- 
pressive, it was far exceeded by that of Japan (300 percent) and 
the Federal Republic of Germany (almost 300 percent) and more 
than equaled by Austria and Greece. For the 1954-59 period, 
Czechoslovak industrial growth was equaled by France and Italy. 

Industrial growth in Czechoslovakia required substantial addi- 
tional labor. Czechoslovaks were subjected to long hours and long 
workweeks to meet production quotas. Part-time, volunteer labor — 
students and white-collar workers — was drafted in massive num- 
bers. Labor productivity, however, was not significantly increased, 
nor were production costs reduced. Czechoslovak products were 
characterized by poor quality. 

The Ninth-of-May Constitution declared the government's 
intention to collectivize agriculture. In February 1949, the National 
Assembly adopted the Unified Agricultural Cooperatives Act. 
Cooperatives were to be founded on a voluntary basis; formal title 
to land was left vested in the original owners. The imposition of 
high compulsory quotas, however, forced peasants to collectivize 
in order to increase efficiency and facilitate mechanization. Dis- 
criminatory policies were employed to bring about the ruin of recal- 
citrant peasants. Collectivization was near completion by 1960. 
Sixteen percent of all farmland (obtained from collaborators and 
peasants) had been turned into state farms (see Agriculture, ch. 3). 

Despite the elimination of poor land from cultivation and a 
tremendous increase in the use of fertilizers and tractors, agricul- 
tural production declined seriously. By 1959 prewar production 
levels still had not been met. Major causes of the decline were the 
diversion of labor from agriculture to industry (in 1948 an esti- 
mated 2.2 million workers were employed in agriculture; by 1960, 
only 1.5 million); the suppression of the "kulak," the most ex- 
perienced and productive farmer; and the peasantry's opposition 
to collectivization, which resulted in sabotage. 

The 1960 Constitution declared the victory of "socialism" and 
proclaimed the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The ambiguous 
precept of "democratic centralism" — power emanating from the 
people but bound by the authority of higher organs — was made 
a formal part of constitutional law. The president, the cabinet, the 
Slovak National Council, and the local governments were made 
responsible to the National Assembly. The National Assembly, 



59 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

V 

however, continued its rubber-stamp approval of KSC policies. All 
private enterprises using hired labor were abolished. Comprehen- 
sive economic planning was reaffirmed. The Bill of Rights empha- 
sized economic and social rights, e.g., the right to work, leisure, 
health care, and education. Civil rights, however, were deempha- 
sized. The judiciary was combined with the prosecuting branch; 
all judges were committed to the protection of the socialist state 
and the education of citizens in loyalty to the cause of socialism 
(see Constitutional Development, ch. 4). 

The Reform Movement 

De-Stalinization had a late start in Czechoslovakia. The KSC 
leadership virtually ignored the Soviet thaw announced by Nikita 
Khrushchev in 1956 at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union. In Czechoslovakia that April, at the 
Second Writers' Congress, several authors criticized acts of politi- 
cal repression and attempted to gain control of the writers' con- 
gress. The writers' rebellion was suppressed, however, and the 
conservatives retained control. Students in Prague and Bratislava 
demonstrated on May Day of 1956, demanding freedom of speech 
and access to the Western press. The Novotny regime condemned 
these activities and introduced a policy of neo-Stalinism. The 1958 
KSC Party congress formalized the continuation of Stalinism. 

In the early 1960s, the Czechoslovak economy became severely 
stagnated. The industrial growth rate was the lowest in Eastern 
Europe. Food imports strained the balance of payments. Pressures 
both from Moscow and from within the party precipitated a reform 
movement. In 1963 reform-minded Communist intellectuals 
produced a proliferation of critical articles. Criticism of economic 
planning merged with more generalized protests against KSC 
bureaucratic control and ideological conformity. The KSC leader- 
ship responded. The purge trials of 1949-54 were reviewed, for 
example, and some of those purged were rehabilitated. Some hard- 
liners were removed from top levels of government and replaced 
by younger, more liberal communists. Jozef Lenart replaced Prime 
Minister Vilam Siroky. The KSC organized committees to review 
economic policy. 

In 1965 the party approved the New Economic Model, which 
had been drafted under the direction of economist and theoreti- 
cian Ota Sik. The program called for a second, intensive stage of 
economic development, emphasizing technological and managerial 
improvements. Central planning would be limited to overall produc- 
tion and investment indexes as well as price and wage guidelines. 
Management personnel would be involved in decision making. 



60 



Old Town Square, Prague 
Courtesy Eugene C. Robertson 

Production would be market oriented and geared toward profita- 
bility. Prices would respond to supply and demand. Wage differen- 
tials would be introduced. 

The KSC "Theses" of December 1965 presented the party 
response to the call for political reform. Democratic centralism was 
redefined, placing a stronger emphasis on democracy. The lead- 
ing role of the KSC was reaffirmed but limited. In consequence, 
the National Assembly was promised increased legislative respon- 
sibility. The Slovak executive (Board of Commissioners) and legis- 
lature (Slovak National Council) were assured that they could assist 
the central government in program planning and assume respon- 
sibility for program implementation in Slovakia. The regional, dis- 
trict, and local national committees were to be permitted a degree 
of autonomy. The KSC agreed to refrain from superseding the 
authority of economic and social organizations. Party control in 
cultural policy, however, was reaffirmed. 

January 1967 was the date for full implementation of the reform 
program. Novotny and his supporters hesitated, introducing 
amendments to reinforce central control. Pressure from the refor- 
mists was stepped up. Slovaks pressed for federalization. Economists 
called for complete enterprise autonomy and economic responsive- 
ness to the market mechanism. The Fourth Writers' Congress 



61 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

adopted a resolution calling for rehabilitation of the Czechoslovak 
literary tradition and the establishment of free contact with Western 
culture. The Novotny regime responded with repressive measures. 

At the October 30-31 meeting of the KSC Central Committee, 
Alexander Dubcek, a moderate reformer, challenged Novotny. As 
university students in Prague demonstrated in support of the lib- 
erals, Novotny appealed to Moscow for assistance. On December 8, 
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev arrived in Prague but did not sup- 
port Novotny. On January 5, 1968, the Central Committee elected 
Dubcek to replace Novotny as first secretary of the KSC. Novotny' s 
fall from KSC leadership precipitated initiatives to oust Stalinists 
from all levels of government, from mass associations, e.g., the 
Revolutionary Trade Union Movement and the Czechoslovak 
Union of Youth, and from local party organs. On March 22, 1968, 
Novotny resigned from the presidency and was succeeded by 
General Ludvik Svoboda. 

The Prague Spring, 1968 

Dubcek carried the reform movement a step further in the direc- 
tion of liberalism. After Novotny 's fall, censorship was lifted. The 
media — press, radio, and television — were mobilized for reformist 
propaganda purposes. The movement to democratize socialism in 
Czechoslovakia, formerly confined largely to the party intelligentsia, 
acquired a new, popular dynamism in the spring of 1968. In April 
the KSC Presidium adopted the Action Program that had been 
drafted by a coalition headed by Dubcek and made up of reformers, 
moderates, centrists, and conservatives. The program proposed a 
"new model of socialism," profoundly "democratic" and "na- 
tional," that is, adapted to Czechoslovak conditions. The National 
Front and the electoral system were to be democratized, and 
Czechoslovakia was to be federalized. Freedom of assembly and 
expression would be guaranteed in constitutional law. The New 
Economic Model was to be implemented. The Action Program also 
reaffirmed the Czechoslovak alliance with the Soviet Union and 
other socialist states. The reform movement, which rejected 
Stalinism as the road to communism, remained committed to com- 
munism as a goal. 

The Action Program stipulated that reform must proceed under 
KSC direction. In subsequent months, however, popular pressure 
mounted to implement reforms forthwith. Radical elements found 
expression: anti-Soviet polemics appeared in the press; the Social 
Democrats began to form a separate party; new unaffiliated polit- 
ical clubs were created. Party conservatives urged the implemen- 
tation of repressive measures, but Dubcek counseled moderation 



62 



Historical Setting 



and reemphasized KSC leadership. In May he announced that the 
Fourteenth Party Congress would convene in an early session on 
September 9. The congress would incorporate the Action Program 
into the party statutes, draft a federalization law, and elect a new 
(presumably more liberal) Central Committee. 

On June 27, Ludvfk Vaculik, a lifelong communist and a can- 
didate member of the Central Committee, published a manifesto 
entitled "Two Thousand Words." The manifesto expressed con- 
cern about conservative elements within the KSC and "foreign" 
forces as well. (Warsaw Pact maneuvers were held in Czechoslo- 
vakia in late June.) It called on the "people" to take the initiative 
in implementing the reform program. Dubcek, the party Presidium, 
the National Front, and the cabinet sharply denounced the 
manifesto. 

The Soviet leadership was alarmed. In mid-July a Warsaw Pact 
conference was held without Czechoslovak participation. The 
Warsaw Pact nations drafted a letter to the KSC leadership refer- 
ring to the manifesto as an "organizational and political platform 
of counterrevolution." Pact members demanded the reimposition 
of censorship, the banning of new political parties and clubs, and 
the repression of "rightist" forces within the party. The Warsaw 
Pact nations declared the defense of Czechoslovakia's socialist gains 
to be not only the task of Czechoslovakia but also the mutual task 
of all Warsaw Pact countries. The KSC rejected the Warsaw Pact 
ultimatum, and Dubcek requested bilateral talks with the Soviet 
Union. 

Intervention 

Soviet leader Brezhnev hesitated to intervene militarily in 
Czechoslovakia. Dubcek's Action Program proposed a "new model 
of socialism" — "democratic" and "national." Significantly, how- 
ever, Dubcek did not challenge Czechoslovak commitment to the 
Warsaw Pact. In the early spring of 1968, the Soviet leadership 
adopted a wait-and-see attitude. By midsummer, however, two 
camps had formed: advocates and opponents of military inter- 
vention. 

The pro-interventionist coalition viewed the situation in Czecho- 
slovakia as "counterrevolutionary" and favored the defeat of 
Dubcek and his supporters. This coalition was headed by the 
Ukrainian party leader Pyotr Shelest and included communist 
bureaucrats from Belorussia and from the non-Russian national 
republics of the western part of the Soviet Union (the Baltic repub- 
lics). The coalition members feared the awakening of nationalism 
within their respective republics and the influence of the Ukrainian 



63 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



minority in Czechoslovakia on Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. 
Bureaucrats responsible for political stability in Soviet cities and 
for the ideological supervision of the intellectual community also 
favored a military solution. Within the Warsaw Pact, only the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic (East Germany) and Poland were strong- 
ly interventionist. Walter Ulbricht and Wladyslaw Gomulka — party 
leaders of East Germany and Poland, respectively — viewed liber- 
alism as threatening to their own positions. 

The Soviet Union agreed to bilateral talks with Czechoslovakia 
to be held in July at Cierna nad Tisou, Slovakia. At the meeting 
Dubcek defended the program of the reformist wing of the KSC 
while pledging commitment to the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. 
The KSC leadership, however, was divided. Vigorous reformers — 
Josef Smrkovsky, Oldfich Cernfk, and Frantisek Kriegel — 
supported Dubcek. Conservatives — Vasil Bil'ak, Drahomfr Kolder, 
and Oldfich Svestka — adopted an anti-reformist stance. Brezhnev 
decided on compromise. The KSC delegates reaffirmed their loyalty 
to the Warsaw Pact and promised to curb "antisocialist" tenden- 
cies, prevent the revival of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic 
Party, and control the press more effectively. The Soviets agreed 
to withdraw their troops (stationed in Czechoslovakia since the June 
maneuvers) and permit the September 9 party congress. 

On August 3, representatives from the Soviet Union, East Ger- 
many, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia met in 
Bratislava and signed the Bratislava Declaration. The declaration 
affirmed unshakable fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and proletari- 
an internationalism and declared an implacable struggle against 
"bourgeois" ideology and all "antisocialist" forces. The Soviet 
Union expressed its intention to intervene in a Warsaw Pact country 
if a "bourgeois" system — a pluralist system of several political 
parties — was ever established. After the Bratislava conference, 
Soviet troops left Czechoslovak territory but remained along 
Czechoslovak borders. Dubcek made no attempt to mobilize the 
Czechoslovak army to resist an invasion. 

The KSC party congress remained scheduled for September 9. 
In the week following the Bratislava conference, it became an open 
secret in Prague that most of Dubcek' s opponents would be re- 
moved from the Central Committee. The Prague municipal party 
organization prepared and circulated a blacklist. The anti-reformist 
coalition could hope to stay in power only with Soviet assistance. 

KSC anti-reformists, therefore, made efforts to convince the 
Soviets that the danger of political instability and "counterrevolu- 
tion" did indeed exist. They used the Kaspar Report, prepared 
by the Central Committee's Information Department, headed by 



64 



Historical Setting 



Jan Kaspar, to achieve this end. The report provided an extensive 
review of the general political situation in Czechoslovakia as it might 
relate to the forthcoming party congress. It predicted that a stable 
Central Committee and a firm leadership could not necessarily be 
expected as the outcome of the congress. The report was received 
by the party Presidium on August 12. Two Presidium members, 
Kolder and Alois Indra, were instructed to evaluate the report for 
the August 20 meeting of the Presidium. 

Kolder and Indra viewed the Kaspar Report with alarm and, 
some observers think, communicated their conclusions to the Soviet 
ambassador, Stepan V. Chervonenko. These actions are thought 
to have precipitated the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
As the KSC Presidium convened on August 20, the anti-reformists 
planned to make a bid for power, pointing to the imminent danger 
of counterrevolution. Kolder and Indra presented a resolution 
declaring a state of emergency and calling for "fraternal assistance." 
The resolution was never voted on: Warsaw Pact troops entered 
Czechoslovakia that same day. 

KSC conservatives had misinformed Moscow regarding the 
strength of the reform movement. The KSC Presidium met dur- 
ing the night of August 20-21; it rejected the option of armed 
resistance but condemned the invasion. Two- thirds of the KSC Cen- 
tral Committee opposed the Soviet intervention. A KSC party con- 
gress, convened secretly on August 22, passed a resolution affirming 
its loyalty to Dubcek' s Action Program and denouncing the Soviet 
aggression. President Svoboda repeatedly resisted Soviet pressure 
to form a new government under Indra. The Czechoslovak popu- 
lation was virtually unanimous in its repudiation of the Soviet 
action. In compliance with Svoboda' s caution against acts that might 
provoke violence, they avoided mass demonstrations and strikes 
but observed a symbolic one-hour general work stoppage on 
August 23. Popular opposition was expressed in numerous spon- 
taneous acts of nonviolent resistance. In Prague and other cities 
throughout the republic, Czechs and Slovaks greeted Warsaw Pact 
soldiers with arguments and reproaches. Every form of assistance, 
including the provision of food and water, was denied the invaders. 
Signs, placards, and graffiti drawn on walls and pavements 
denounced the invaders, the Soviet leaders, and suspected collabo- 
rators. Pictures of Dubcek and Svoboda appeared everywhere. 

The generalized resistance caused the Soviet Union to abandon 
its original plan to oust Dubcek. The KSC leader, who had been 
arrested on the night of August 20, was taken to Moscow for negoti- 
ations. The outcome was the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited 
sovereignty, which provided for the strengthening of the KSC, strict 



65 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

party control of the media, and the suppression of the Czechoslo- 
vak Social Democratic Party. It was agreed that Dubcek would re- 
main in office and that a program of moderate reform would 
continue. 

Normalization 

Dubcek remained in office only until April 1969. Anti-Soviet 
demonstrations, following Czechoslovakia's victory over the Soviet 
team in the World Ice Hockey Championships in March, precipi- 
tated Soviet pressures for a KSC Presidium reorganization. Gustav 
Husak (a centrist) was named first secretary (title changed to general 
secretary in 1971). Only centrists and the conservatives led by Bil'ak 
continued in the Presidium. A program of "normalization" — the 
restoration of continuity with the pre-reform period — was initiated. 
Normalization entailed thoroughgoing political repression and the 
return to ideological conformity. A new purge cleansed the Czecho- 
slovak leadership of all reformist elements. Of the 115 members 
of the KSC Central Committee, 54 were replaced. 

Reformists were removed from regional, district, and local party 
branches in the Czech lands and, to a lesser extent, in Slovakia. 
KSC party membership, which had been close to 1.7 million in 
January 1968, was reduced by about 500,000. Top levels of govern- 
ment and the leadership of social organizations were purged. Pub- 
lishing houses and film studios were placed under new direction. 
Censorship was strictiy imposed, and a campaign of militant atheism 
was organized. 

Czechoslovakia had been federalized under the Constitutional 
Law of Federation of October 27, 1968. The newly created Fed- 
eral Assembly, which replaced the National Assembly, was to work 
in close cooperation with the Czech National Council and the Slovak 
National Council. The Husak regime amended the law in Janu- 
ary 1971 . Although federalism was retained in form, central author- 
ity was effectively restored (see Constitutional Development, ch. 4). 

In May 1970, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union signed the 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which 
incorporated the principle of limited sovereignty. Soviet troops re- 
mained stationed in Czechoslovakia, and the Czechoslovak armed 
forces worked in close cooperation with the Warsaw Pact command 
(see Soviet Influence, ch. 5). Soviet advisers supervised the func- 
tioning of the Ministry of Interior and the security apparatus (see 
Interior Security and Public Order, ch. 5). Czechoslovak leaders 
and propagandists, led by Bil'ak, became the most ardent advo- 
cates of proletarian internationalism. 

The purges of the first half of 1970 eliminated the reformists 



66 



Historical Setting 



within the party organization. In the fall of 1970, the ex-communist 
intelligentsia organized the Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak 
Citizens, a protest movement dedicated to the goals of 1968. Forty- 
seven leaders of the movement were arrested and tried in the sum- 
mer of 1972. Organized protest was effectively stilled. 

Preserving the Status Quo 

In May 1971, party chief Husak announced at the official 
Fourteenth Party Congress — the 1968 Fourteenth Party Congress 
had been abrogated — that "normalization" had been completed 
and that all that remained was for the party to consolidate its 
gains. Husak' s policy was to maintain a rigid status quo; for the 
next fifteen years key personnel of the party and government 
remained the same. In 1975 Husak added the position of presi- 
dent to his post as party chief. He and other party leaders faced 
the task of rebuilding general party membership after the purges 
of 1969-71. By 1983 membership had returned to 1.6 million, 
about the same as in 1960. 

In preserving the status quo, the Husak regime required con- 
formity and obedience in all aspects of life. Culture suffered greatly 
from this straitjacket on independent thought, as did the humani- 
ties, social sciences, and ultimately the pure sciences. Art had to 
adhere to a rigid socialist realist formula. Soviet examples were 
held up for emulation. During the 1970s and 1980s, many of 
Czechoslovakia's most creative individuals were silenced, impri- 
soned, or sent into exile. Some found expression for their art 
through samizdat (see Glossary; Dissent and Independent Activ- 
ity, this ch.). Those artists, poets, and writers who were officially 
sanctioned were, for the most part, undistinguished. The award 
of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1984 to Jaroslav Seifert — a poet 
identified with reformism and not favored by the Husak regime — 
was a bright spot in an otherwise bleak cultural scene. 

In addition to applying repression, Husak also tried to obtain 
acquiescence to his rule by providing an improved standard of liv- 
ing. He returned Czechoslovakia to an orthodox command econ- 
omy with a heavy emphasis on central planning and continued to 
extend industrialization. For a while the policy seemed successful 
because, despite the lack of investment in new technologies, there 
was an increase in industrial output. The government encouraged 
consumerism and materialism and took a tolerant attitude toward 
a slack work ethic and a growing black-market second economy. 
In the early 1970s, there was a steady increase in the standard of 
living; it seemed that the improved economy might mitigate polit- 
ical and cultural oppression and give the government a modicum 
of legitimacy. 



67 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

By the mid-1970s, consumerism failed as a palliative for politi- 
cal oppression. The government could not sustain an indefinite ex- 
pansion without coming to grips with limitations inherent in a com- 
mand economy. The oil crisis of 1973-74 further exacerbated the 
economic decline. Materialism, encouraged by a corrupt regime, 
also produced cynicism, greed, nepotism, corruption, and a lack 
of work discipline. Whatever elements of a social contract the 
government tried to establish with Czechoslovak society crumbled 
with the decline in living standards of the mid-1970s. Czechoslo- 
vakia was to have neither freedom nor prosperity. 

Another feature of Husak' s rule was a continued dependence 
on the Soviet Union. As of the mid-1980s, Husak had not yet 
achieved a balance between what could be perceived as Czecho- 
slovak national interest and Soviet dictate. In foreign policy, 
Czechoslovakia parroted every utterance of the Soviet position. Fre- 
quent contacts between the Soviet and Czechoslovak communist 
parties and governments made certain that the Soviet position on 
any issue was both understood and followed. The Soviets continued 
to exert control over Czechoslovak internal affairs, including over- 
sight of the police and security apparatus. Five Soviet ground divi- 
sions and two air divisions had become a permanent fixture, while 
the Czechoslovak military was further integrated into the Warsaw 
Pact. In the 1980s, approximately 50 percent of Czechoslovakia's 
foreign trade was with the Soviet Union, and almost 80 percent 
was with communist countries. There were constant exhortations 
about further cooperation and integration between the Soviet Union 
and Czechoslovakia in industry, science, technology, consumer 
goods, and agriculture. Deriving its legitimacy from Moscow, the 
Husak regime remained a slavish imitator of political, cultural, and 
economic trends emanating from Moscow. 

Dissent and Independent Activity 

Through the 1970s and 1980s, the regime's emphasis on obe- 
dience, conformity, and the preservation of the status quo was 
challenged by individuals and organized groups aspiring to indepen- 
dent thinking and activity. Although only a few such activities could 
be deemed political by Western standards, the regime viewed any 
independent action, no matter how innocuous, as a defiance of the 
party's control over all aspects of Czechoslovak life. The regime's 
response to such activity was harassment, persecution, and, in some 
instances, imprisonment. 

The first organized opposition emerged under the umbrella 
of Charter 77. On January 6, 1977, a manifesto called Charter 
77 appeared in West German newspapers. The document was 



68 



Historical Setting 



immediately translated and reprinted throughout the world (see 
Appendix D). The original manifesto reportedly was signed by 243 
persons; among them were artists, former public officials, and other 
prominent figures, such as Zdenek Mlynaf , secretary of the KSC 
Central Committee in 1968; Vaclav Slavik, a Central Committee 
member in 1968; and Vaculfk, author of "Two Thousand Words. ' ' 
Charter 77 defined itself as "a loose, informal, and open commu- 
nity of people" concerned with the protection of civil and human 
rights. It denied oppositional intent and based its defense of rights 
on legally binding international documents signed by the Czechoslo- 
vak government and on guarantees of civil rights contained in the 
Czechoslovak Constitution. 

In the context of international detente, Czechoslovakia had signed 
the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1968. 
In 1975 these were ratified by the Federal Assembly, which, ac- 
cording to the Constitution of 1960, is the highest legislative or- 
ganization. The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe's Final Act (also known as the Helsinki Accords), signed 
by Czechoslovakia in 1975, also included guarantees of human 
rights (see Popular Political Expression, ch. 4). 

The Charter 77 group declared its objectives to be the follow- 
ing: to draw attention to individual cases of human rights infringe- 
ments; to suggest remedies; to make general proposals to strengthen 
rights and freedoms and the mechanisms designed to protect them; 
and to act as intermediary in situations of conflict. The Charter 
had over 800 signatures by the end of 1977, including workers and 
youth; by 1985 nearly 1,200 Czechoslovaks had signed the Charter. 

The Husak regime, which claimed that all rights derive from 
the state and that international covenants are subject to the inter- 
nal jurisdiction of the state, responded with fury to the Charter. 
The text was never published in the official media. Signatories were 
arrested and interrogated; dismissal from employment often fol- 
lowed. The Czechoslovak press launched vicious attacks against 
the Charter. The public was mobilized to sign either individual 
condemnations or various forms of "anti-Charters." 

Closely associated with Charter 77, the Committee for the 
Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (Vybor na obranu nespraved- 
live stfhanych — VONS) was formed in 1978 with the specific goal 
of documenting individual cases of government persecution and 
human rights violations. Between 1978 and 1984, VONS issued 
409 communiques concerning individuals persecuted or harassed. 

On a larger scale, independent activity was expressed through 
underground writing and publishing. Because of the decentralized 



69 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

nature of underground writing, it is difficult to estimate its extent 
or impact. Some observers state that hundreds of books, journals, 
essays, and short stories were published and distributed. In the 
mid-1980s, several samizdat publishing houses were in operation. 
The best known was Edice petlice (Padlock Editions), which had 
published more than 250 volumes. There were a number of clan- 
destine religious publishing houses that published journals in pho- 
tocopy or printed form. 

The production and distribution of underground literature was 
difficult. In most cases, manuscripts had to be typed and retyped 
without the aid of modern publishing equipment. Publication and 
distribution were also dangerous. Mere possession of samizdat 
materials could be the basis for harassment, loss of employment, 
and arrest and imprisonment. 

Independent activity also extended to music. The regime was 
particularly concerned about the impact of Western popular music 
on Czechoslovak youth. The persecution of rock musicians and 
their fans led a number of musicians to sign Charter 77. In the 
forefront of the struggle for independent music was the Jazz Sec- 
tion of the Union of Musicians. Initially organized to promote jazz, 
in the late 1970s it became a protector of various kinds of noncon- 
formist music. The widely popular Jazz Section had a member- 
ship of approximately 7,000 and received no official funds. It pub- 
lished music and promoted concerts and festivals. The regime con- 
demned the Jazz Section for spreading "unacceptable views" 
among the youth and moved against its leadership. In March 1985, 
the Jazz Section was dissolved under a 1968 statute banning "coun- 
terrevolutionary activities." The Jazz Section continued to oper- 
ate, however, and in 1986 the government arrested the members 
of its steering committee. 

Because religion offered possibilities for thought and activities 
independent of the state, it too was severely restricted and con- 
trolled. Clergymen were required to be licensed. In attempting to 
manipulate the number and kind of clergy, the state even spon- 
sored a pro-regime organization of Catholic priests, the Czecho- 
slovak Association of Catholic Clergy (more commonly known as 
Pacem in Terris). Nevertheless, there was religious opposition, in- 
cluding a lively Catholic samizdat. In the 1980s, Frantisek Cardinal 
Tomasek, Czechoslovakia's primate, adopted a more independent 
stand. In 1984 he invited the pope to come to Czechoslovakia for 
the 1,100th anniversary of the death of Methodius, the mission- 
ary to the Slavs. The pope accepted, but the trip was blocked by 
the government. The cardinal's invitation and the pope's accep- 
tance were widely circulated in samizdat. A petition requesting the 



70 



Historical Setting 



government to permit the papal visit had 17,000 signatories. The 
Catholic Church did have a massive commemoration of the 1,100th 
anniversary in 1985. At Velehrad (the site of Methodius' s tomb) 
more than 150,000 pilgrims attended a commemorative mass, and 
another 100,000 came to a ceremony at Levoca (in eastern 
Slovakia). 

Unlike in Poland, dissent, opposition to the government, and 
independent activity were limited in Czechoslovakia to a fairly small 
segment of the populace. Even the dissenters saw scant prospect 
for fundamental reforms. In this sense, the Husak regime was suc- 
cessful in preserving the status quo in "normalized" Czecho- 
slovakia. 

The selection of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 11, 1985, pre- 
sented the Husak regime with a new and unexpected challenge to 
the status quo. Soon after assuming office, Gorbachev began a pol- 
icy of "restructuring" (perestroika) the Soviet economy and advo- 
cated "openness" (glasnost') in the discussion of economic, social, 
and, to some extent, political questions. Up to this time, the Husak 
regime had dutifully adopted the programs and slogans that had 
emanated from Moscow. But, for a government wholly dedicated 
to the preservation of the status quo, subjects such as "openness," 
economic "restructuring," and "reform" had been taboo. Czecho- 
slovakia's future course would depend, to a large extent, on the 
Husak regime's response to the Gorbachev program (see A Cli- 
mate of Orthodoxy, ch. 4). 

Concise and readable accounts of the history of the Czech and 
Slovak lands through World War I may be found in Kamil Krofta's 
A Short History of Czechoslovakia, Harrison S. Thomson's Czechoslovakia 
in European History, and J.F.N. Bradley's Czechoslovakia: A Short His- 
tory. A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948, edited by 
Victor S. Mamatey and Radomfr Luza, is a collection of excel- 
lent essays treating the First Republic, Munich, and the German 
occupation. The Sudeten German minority problem is more fully 
discussed by Radomfr Luza in The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans. 
The Slovaks are discussed by Jozef Lettrich in History of Modern 
Slovakia, Eugen Steiner in The Slovak Dilemma, and Owen V. Johnson 
in Slovakia, 1918-1938. The Ruthenians (Ukranians) are covered by 
Paul R. Magocsi in The Shaping of a National Identity. The his- 
tory of the KSC up to the February 1948 coup is elaborated in 
Paul E. Zinner's Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 



71 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



1918-48. In Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960, Edward 
Taborsky discusses political and economic integration into the Soviet 
system. H. Gordon Skilling's Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution 
and Galia Golan 's The Czechoslovak Reform Movement offer expan- 
sive analysis of the Prague Spring, which is also treated with un- 
derstandable passion in Zdenek Mlynaf 's Nightfrost in Prague. The 
reform movement of the late 1950s and the 1960s and the Soviet 
intervention are also amply treated in Golan 's and Mlynaf 's studies. 
Vladimir V. Kusin's From Dubcek to Charter 77 sets the scene for 
contemporary Czechoslovakia. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



72 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Modern housing in Czechoslovakia 



THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC of the 1980s 
provided any number of contrasts with the Czechoslovak Repub- 
lic (the First Republic), the multinational Central European state 
formed in 1918 from the dismantled Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Large communities of ethnic minorities, some with strong irredentist 
leanings (like the Sudeten Germans), were a major force in the 
First Republic's social and political life. As a result of the expul- 
sion of most of the Germans after World War II and the ceding 
of Carpatho-Ukraine to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia had be- 
come predominantly a nation of Czechs and Slovaks, with small 
minorities of Germans, Hungarians, Poles, and Ukrainians. Even 
though Czechoslovakia's ethnic makeup was simplified, the divi- 
sion between Czechs and Slovaks remained a potent social and 
political force. During the 1950s and 1960s, planners made inten- 
sive efforts to redress the economic imbalance between the Czech 
lands and Slovakia. Although many of the glaring economic dis- 
parities between the two were gone by the 1970s, social and politi- 
cal differences persisted. 

Interwar society in Czechoslovakia was a complex amalgam of 
large landholders, farmers, tenants, landless laborers, and specialists 
(herders, smiths, teachers, clerics, and local officials) in the coun- 
tryside and of many major entrepreneurs, a large industrial 
proletariat, hundreds of thousands of small-scale manufacturers, 
a diverse intelligentsia, shopkeepers, tradesmen, and craftsmen in 
the city. Nevertheless, extremes of wealth and poverty then typi- 
cal in so much of Eastern Europe were largely absent. 

Because of the post-World War II nationalization of industry 
(affecting not only large enterprises but nearly half a million han- 
dicraft and small-scale industries as well) and collectivization of 
agriculture, private ownership virtually became a thing of the past 
in communist Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia's much-simplified 
contemporary social spectrum is made up of collective farmers, 
workers, the intelligentsia, the communist party elite, and a few 
private farmers and tradesmen. 

The reform movement of the late 1960s, popularly dubbed the 
"Prague Spring," was an effort mainly by the Czechs (with some 
Slovak support) to restructure Marxist-Leninist socialism in a 
way more suitable to their respective historical, cultural, and 
economic circumstances. "Normalization," the official label 
for the government's efforts to stamp out the remnants of this 



75 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

' 'counterrevolutionary" movement, was essentially a series of 
carrot-and-stick measures: far-reaching purges of those who might 
have been active in the reform era or remotely dissident in the 1970s, 
coupled with a concerted effort to placate the majority of the 
populace with relative material prosperity. In the 1980s, the em- 
phasis remained on stifling dissent while trying to prevent further 
economic deterioration. 

Geography and Environment 
Topography and Drainage 

The country's 127,905 square kilometers divide topographically 
as well as historically into three major areas: Bohemia, Moravia, 
and Slovakia. Bohemia consists of the five western political divi- 
sions, or kraje (sing., kraj)\ Zapadocesky (West Bohemia), Severo- 
cesky (North Bohemia), Jihocesky (South Bohemia), Vychodocesky 
(East Bohemia), and Stfedocesky (Central Bohemia). Moravia con- 
sists of the two central political divisions: Severomoravsky (North 
Moravia) and Jihomoravsky (South Moravia). Slovakia consists 
of the three eastern political divisions: Zapadoslovensky (West 
Slovakia), Stredoslovensky (Central Slovakia), and Vychodo- 
slovensky (East Slovakia). The three Slovak kraje constitute the 
Slovak Socialist Republic; the other seven kraje constitute the Czech 
Socialist Republic. Kraje are further subdivided into okresy (sing., 
okres), roughly equivalent to counties in the United States. 

The areas of western Bohemia and eastern Slovakia belong to 
different mountain and drainage systems. All but a minute frac- 
tion of the Bohemian region drains into the North Sea by way of 
the Vltava (Moldau) and Labe (Elbe) rivers. The hills and low 
mountains that encircle this area are part of the north-central 
European uplands that extend from southern Belgium, through the 
central German lands, and into Moravia. These uplands, which 
are distinct from the Alps to the south and the Carpathian Moun- 
tains to the east, are known geologically as the Hercynian Massif. 
Most of Slovakia drains into the Danube (Dunaj) River, and its 
mountains are part of the Carpathians, which continue eastward 
and southward into Romania. 

The uplands of Moravia are a transition between the Hercynian 
Massif and the Carpathians and are in contrast with them by hav- 
ing more nearly north-south ridge lines. Most of Moravia drains 
southward to the Danube, but the Odra (Oder) River rises in the 
northeast and drains a sizable portion of the northern region (see 
fig. 9). 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



Bohemia 

Bohemia's topography has fostered local solidarity and a com- 
mon set of economic interests. The area is ringed with low moun- 
tains or high hills that effectively serve as a watershed along most 
of its periphery (although they do not lie along the border to the 
south and southeast). Streams flow from all directions through the 
Bohemian Basin toward Prague (Praha). 

In the northwest, the Krusne hory (Ore Mountains) border on 
the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and are known 
to the Germans as the Erzgebirge; the Sudeten Mountains in the 
northeast border on Poland in an area that was part of Germany 
before World War II. The Cesky les, bordering on the Federal 
Republic of Germany (West Germany), and the Sumava Moun- 
tains, bordering on West Germany and Austria, are mountain 
ranges that form the western and southwestern portions of the ring 
around the Bohemian Basin. Both are approximately as high as 
the Krusne hory. Bohemia's mountainous areas differ greatly in 
population. The northern regions are densely populated, whereas 
the less hospitable Cesky les and Sumava Mountains are among 
the most sparsely populated areas in the country. 

The central lands of the Bohemian Basin are lower in elevation, 
but their features vary widely. There are small lakes in the central 
southern region and in the Vltava Basin north of Prague. Some 
of the western grain lands are gently rolling, while other places have 
deep gorges cut by streams (such as the Vltava River). A large area 
southwest of Prague has a broken relief pattern that is typical of 
several other areas. 

Moravia 

Moravia is a topographic borderland situated between Bohemia 
and Slovakia. Its southwest-to-northeast ridge lines and lower ele- 
vations made it useful as a route for communications and com- 
merce from Vienna to the north and northeast during the period 
of Austrian domination of Central Europe. 

The central and southern Moravian lowlands are part of the 
Danube Basin and are similar to the lowlands they adjoin in 
southern Slovakia. The upland areas are smaller and more broken 
than those of Bohemia and Slovakia. The northwest hills are soft 
sandstone and are cut by deep gorges. South of them, but north 
of Brno, is a karst limestone area with' underground streams and 
caves. These and the other uplands west of the Morava River are 
associated with the Hercynian Massif. The land to the east of the 
Morava is called Carpathian Moravia. 



77 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 




78 



The Society and Its Environment 



Slovakia 

Slovakia's landforms do not make it as distinctive a geographic 
unit as Bohemia. Its mountain ranges generally run east-west and 
tend to segregate groups of people; population clusters are most 
dense in river valleys. The highest elevations are rugged, have the 
most severe weather, and are the most sparsely settled. Some of 
the flatlands in southwestern Slovakia are poorly drained and sup- 
port only a few people. 

The main mountain ranges are the Vysoke Tatry (High Tatras) 
and the Slovenske rudohorie (Slovak Ore Mountains), both of which 
are part of the Carpathians. The Vysoke Tatry extend in a nar- 
row ridge along the Polish border and are attractive as both a sum- 
mer and a winter resort area. The highest peak in the country, 
Gerlachovsky stit (also known as Gerlachovka), with an elevation 
of about 2,655 meters, is in this ridge. Snow persists at the higher 
elevations well into the summer months and all year long in some 
sheltered pockets. The tree line is at about 1,500 meters. An ice 
cap extended into this area during glacial times, leaving pockets 
that became mountain lakes. 

The Slovak lowlands in the south and southeast, bordering on 
Hungary, are part of the greater Danube Basin. From a point 
slightly south of the Slovak capital of Bratislava, the main channel 
of the Danube River demarcates the border between Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary for about 175 kilometers. As it leaves Bratislava, the 
Danube divides into two channels: the main channel is the Danube 
proper, and the northern channel is the Little Danube (Maly 
Dunaj). The Little Danube flows eastward into the Vah River, 
which converges with the main Danube at Komarno. The land be- 
tween the Little Danube and the Danube is known as the Zitny 
ostrov (Rye Island), a marshland maintained for centuries as a hunt- 
ing preserve for the nobility. Dikes and artificial drainage have made 
it possible to cultivate the land for grain production, but it is still 
sparsely settled. 

Climate 

Czechoslovakia's central European location influences its climate. 
Although the continental weather systems that dominate Eastern 
Europe prevail throughout the country, western regions are fre- 
quently influenced by the maritime weather prevalent in Western 
Europe. When the systems to the north are weak, Mediterranean 
weather may occasionally brush southern parts of the country. 

Winters are fairly cold, cloudy, and humid, although high hu- 
midity and cloud cover tend to be more prevalent in valleys and 



79 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

lower areas. Light rain or snow is frequent. The mountains are 
covered with snow from early November through April, and ac- 
cumulations are deep in some places. Lower elevations rarely have 
more than fifteen centimeters of snow cover at a time. 

Summers are usually pleasant. There is heavy rainfall, but it 
comes in sporadic showers, making for many warm, dry days with 
scattered cumulus clouds. Prevailing winds are westerly; they are 
usually light in summer (except during thunderstorms) and some- 
what stronger in winter. 

Average temperatures in Prague, which is representative of 
lowland cities in Bohemia and Moravia, range between about 1°C 
in January and about 19°C in July. Winters are chilly; summers 
have warm afternoons and cool evenings. In the eastern parts of 
the country, the temperature extremes are greater. Higher eleva- 
tions, especially those with western exposures, usually have a nar- 
rower temperature range but on the average are considerably cooler. 
December, January, and February are the coldest months; June, 
July, and August are the warmest. Spring tends to start late, and 
autumn may come abruptly in middle or late September. At lower 
elevations, frosts are rare between the end of April and the begin- 
ning of October. 

Rainfall varies widely between the plains and the upland areas. 
Parts of western Bohemia receive only forty centimeters of rainfall 
per year; some areas in the Vysoke Tatry average two meters. The 
average rainfall in the vicinity of Prague is forty-eight centimeters. 
Precipitation varies more than in other areas of Europe, which are 
often dominated by maritime weather systems; consequently, 
droughts and floods sometimes occur. 

Despite the greater frequency of precipitation during the winter, 
more than twice as much precipitation, or about 38 percent, falls 
in the summer. The spring and autumn figures are about equal. 

Demography 
Population 

Data published by the Czechoslovak government in 1986 showed 
a January 1, 1986, population of 15,520,839 and a 1985 popula- 
tion growth rate of 0.3 percent a year. The annual rate of growth 
in the Czech Socialist Republic, which contained about two-thirds 
of the population, was 0.05 percent, and in the Slovak Socialist 
Republic, 0.73 percent. In 1984 life expectancy was sixty-seven 
years for men and seventy-four years for women. About 26 per- 
cent of the population was under the age of 15, and 17 percent 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



was over the age of 60. There were 104 females for each 100 males 
among the population as a whole (see fig. 10). 

At the start of 1986, the population density was approximately 
121 persons per square kilometer. The most densely settled geo- 
graphic region was Moravia, which had about 154 persons per 
square kilometer. The figure for Bohemia was about 120, and for 
Slovakia, about 106 (see fig. 11). The major cities and their esti- 
mated populations in January 1986 were as follows: Prague, 1.2 
million; Bratislava, 417,103; Brno, 385,684; Ostrava, 327,791; 
Kosice, 222,175; and Plzen, 175,244 (see table 2, Appendix A). 
Czechoslovakia remains essentially a society of small cities and 
towns, in which about 65 percent of the population are classified 
as urban dwellers. 

Urbanization and Migration 

The urban tradition in the Czech lands dates from approximately 
the ninth century A.D., and the growth of towns centered on 
princely castles and bishops' seats. Artisan and trading activities 
were a subsidiary part of these urban settlements. Trading, in fact, 
defined the spread of secondary towns across the countryside, each 
roughly a day's journey from the next along major trade routes. 
Prague grew up around Hradcany Castle, having the dual advan- 
tage of being both bishopric and princely seat from about the ninth 
century. By the fourteenth century, it was a major continental city 
with 40,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, a university (Charles Univer- 
sity, one of Europe's first), and an administrative seat of the Holy 
Roman Empire. After the defeat of the Bohemian nobles in the 
Battle of White Mountain in 1620, Prague and the other cities of 
the Czech lands languished until the nineteenth century. Slovakia, 
as a result of its agrarian nature and Hungarian rule, remained 
a region of small towns scattered amid farming villages and Hun- 
garian estates. 

During the nineteenth century, there was a surge of migration 
and urbanization in both the Czech lands and Slovakia. Much of 
this was linked to nineteenth-century Europe's tremendous popu- 
lation increase and the spread of the railroads. Czech and Slovak 
urbanization proceeded apace; the proportion of the population 
living in towns of more than 2,000 grew from 18 percent to 45 per- 
cent between 1843 and 1910. The rate of increase in major indus- 
trial centers was spectacular: between 1828 and 1910, Prague's 
population grew by a factor of nearly seven, Plzefi's by over thir- 
teen. In 1910 Ostrava had 167 times the population it had a cen- 
tury before. This pattern of urbanization persisted through the First 
Republic, although at a lower rate. 



81 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 
85 and over 

80-84 

75-79 

70-74 

65-69 

60-64 

55-59 

50-54 

45-49 

40-44 

35-39 

30-34 

25-29 

20-24 

1 5-1 9 

1 0-1 4 
5-9 
0-4 

600 400 200 200 400 600 

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



Source: Based on information from Statistickd rocenka, Prague, 1986, 96. 



Figure 10. Age-Sex Distribution, 1985 



Urbanization and migration patterns have altered significantly 
in the socialist era. A desire to balance population and industrial 
distribution dictated urban policy from the 1950s through the 1980s. 
Since World War II, such historically predominant urban centers 
as Prague and Brno have not been the official, preferred choices 
for continued growth. Despite consistent efforts to relocate 
citybound workers away from the traditional destinations of rural 
emigrants, in the 1980s the six largest cities (all major urban centers 
in the early twentieth century) nevertheless accounted for over 40 
percent of the population living in cities of over 20,000. Beyond 
this, however, there was relatively little concentration; 50 percent 
of the population lived in settlements of fewer than 10,000. The 
landscape was one of small, dispersed settiements, small cities, scat- 
tered towns, and cooperative farm centers (see table 3, Appendix A). 

Rural-urban migration decreased in the 1970s, apparently less 
because of balanced population distribution than because commut- 
ing matched workers with industrial employment. Excluding in- 
tracity commuting, between one-third and one-half of all workers 
commuted during the 1980s. A substantial portion of these were 
long-distance, weekly, or monthly commuters. In the planner's 
view, commuting had replaced migration; it had the considerable 
advantage of lessening the burdens of expanding industrialization 




82 



The Society and Its Environment 



on urban services. From the worker's perspective, however, com- 
muting was most often a matter of involuntarily deferred migra- 
tion. Scarce urban housing was the principal constraint on the 
potential migrant, though one year's rural commuter could still 
become the next year's city dweller. Commuting has placed heavy 
demands on the commuter's time and on public transit, which has 
meant a substantial outlay for both railroad and roadway passenger 
service. One can gauge the effect of commuting on the work- 
ing populace by considering that most Czechoslovak factories 
begin operation at 6:00 A.M. and most offices between 7:00 and 
8:00 A.M. 

Housing 

Planners continued to make efforts to remedy the longstanding 
housing shortage in rural and urban regions alike. Since statistics 
did not always provide a comparison between the numbers of house- 
holds and existing housing units, the housing deficit remained 
difficult to gauge. A comparison of the number of marriages an- 
nually and construction of new housing units between 1960 and 
1975 shows that construction exceeded marriages only in 1975. The 
deficit was most acute in the 1960s, when an average of 7 housing 
units was built for every 10 marriages; in 1985 the ratio rose to 
an average of 8.8 units per 10 marriages. 

This approximation underestimated the housing deficit: it ignored 
divorces, the number of extended families living together who would 
have preferred separate housing, and the decay of old housing (see 
The Family, this ch.). Even waiting lists underestimated how in- 
adequate housing was in the 1980s. Separate housing for single 
adults had such a low priority with planners that single adults found 
it difficult even to get on a housing list. 

One of the factors contributing to the housing shortage was the 
low construction rate of rental housing. Major reasons for this were 
high inflation, high construction costs, and low (heavily subsidized) 
rents. In 1985 the average building cost for apartments rose to 
Kcs2,523 per square meter, and the average monthly rent — for the 
seventh consecutive year — was Kcs358 (for value of the koruna — see 
Glossary). Construction of individual homes peaked in 1977 at 
40,107 and decreased to 29,608 in 1985. Building a home privately 
was possible, but acquiring labor and materials was difficult and 
sometimes risky; it often meant borrowing machinery illegally or 
paying bribes for materials. 

Despite substantial gains in the 1970s, Czechoslovakia entered 
the 1980s with a housing shortage that was likely to take years to 
remedy. In 1986 the government announced a slight cutback in 



83 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 




84 



The Society and Its Environment 



new housing construction for the 1986-90 housing plan, further 
aggravating the situation. 

Emigration 

Historically, emigration has always been an option for Czechs 
and Slovaks dissatisfied with the situation at home. Each wave of 
emigration had its own impetus. In the nineteenth century, the 
reasons were primarily economic. In the twentieth century, emigra- 
tion has largely been prompted by political turmoil, though eco- 
nomic factors still play a role. The first major wave of emigration 
in this century came after the communists came to power, and the 
next wave began after the Prague Spring movement was crushed. 

In the 1980s the most popular way to emigrate to the West was 
to travel to Yugoslavia by automobile and, once there, take a detour 
to Greece, Austria, or Italy (Yugoslav border restrictions were not 
as strict as those of the Warsaw Pact nations). Only a small per- 
centage of those who applied to emigrate legally could do so. The 
exact details of the process have never been published, but a 
reasonably clear picture can be gleaned from those who have suc- 
ceeded. It is a lengthy and costly process. Those applicants allowed 
to even consider emigration have been required to repay the state 
for their education, depending on their level of education and salary, 
at a rate ranging from Kcs4,000 to Kcsl 0,000. (The average yearly 
wage was about Kcs33,600 in 1984.) The applicant was likely to 
lose his job and be socially ostracized. Technically, at least, such 
emigres would be allowed to return for visits. Those who had been 
politically active, such as Charter 77 signatories found it somewhat 
easier to emigrate, but they have not been allowed to return and 
reportedly have had to pay the state exhorbitant fees — Kcs23,000 
to as much as Kcs80,000 — if they had graduated from a university 
(see Popular Political Expression, ch. 4). 

Old-age pensioners had no problem visiting or emigrating to the 
West. The reasons for this were purely economic; if they decided 
to stay in the West, the state no longer had to pay their pension. 

Official statistics for the early 1980s show that, on the average, 
3,500 people emigrated legally each year. From 1965 to 1983, a 
total of 33,000 people emigrated legally. This figure undoubtedly 
included a large number of ethnic Germans resettled in East Ger- 
many. The largest emigre communities are located in Austria, West 
Germany, the United States, Canada, and Australia. 

Ethnic Groups 

Czechoslovakia's ethnic composition in 1987 offered a stark con- 
trast to that of the First Republic. No large secessionist German 



85 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

community troubled the society, and Carpatho-Ukraine (poor and 
overwhelmingly Ukrainian and Hungarian) had been ceded to the 
Soviet Union following World War II. Czechs and Slovaks, about 
two-thirds of the First Republic's populace in 1930, represented 
about 94 percent of the population by 1950. The aspirations of 
ethnic minorities had been the pivot on which the First Republic's 
politics turned. This was no longer the case in the 1980s. Neverthe- 
less, ethnicity continued to be a pervasive issue and an integral 
part of Czechoslovak life. Although the country's ethnic composi- 
tion had been simplified, the division between Czechs and Slovaks 
remained; each group had a distinct history and divergent aspi- 
rations. 

From 1950 through 1983, the Slovak share of the total popula- 
tion increased steadily. The Czech population as a portion of the 
total declined by about 4 percent, while the Slovak population in- 
creased by slightly more than that. The actual numbers were hardly 
such as to imperil a Czech majority; in 1983 there were still more 
than two Czechs for every Slovak. In the mid-1980s, the respec- 
tive fertility rates were fairly close, but the Slovak fertility rate was 
declining more slowly. 

Czechs 

A glance at a map of Central Europe provides one key to un- 
derstanding Czech culture: the Czech lands — Bohemia and 
Moravia — are surrounded by Germanic peoples on three sides. The 
fear of being engulfed by expansionist Germanic hordes remains 
a traditional and deep-seated one among the Czechs. The Germans 
prompted Czech concern for their cultural and political survival 
long before the Munich Agreement of 1938, when Czechoslovakia 
lost the Sudetenland, and World War II. Czech-German relations 
were the backdrop against which the controversies of the Hussite 
period were played out. The Hussite movement focused on Ger- 
man hegemony in university and ecclesiastical offices as much as 
theological doctrine (see Hussite Movement, ch. 1). The linguis- 
tic border between Czechs and Germans in the mountains sur- 
rounding Bohemia tells something of the determination with which 
Czechs have resisted German expansion; since the ninth century, 
that boundary has remained fixed within fifty kilometers of its 
present location, irrespective of the political fortunes of the two 
groups. 

The Czechs have been part of the major intellectual and artis- 
tic traditions of western Europe since the Middle Ages. Czech in- 
fluence has been formative in movements as diverse as Renaissance 
music, the Protestant Reformation, structural linguistics, and 



86 



Hus Memorial and Kinsky Palace in Old Town Square, Prague 

twentieth-century European literature. A cultural tradition clearly 
rationalistic, secular, and anticlerical permeates Czech life; this is 
partly a consequence of the Hussite period and subsequent Aus- 
trian efforts to force Roman Catholicism on a reluctant populace. 
Part of Czech self-identity focuses on maintaining the unique blend 
of Slavic and Western elements that make up the Czech heritage. 

Czechs seem to possess a predilection for political pluralism and 
a distinctly antiauthoritarian bent. Czechoslovakia was the one 
eastern European country to maintain a functioning democracy 
for the entire interwar period and the only one in which the com- 
munist party was never outlawed. In the party's analysis of the 
errors of the 1960s' "counterrevolution," party ideologues espe- 
cially decried the prevalence of "social democraticism," which 
despite more than twenty years of socialist development remained 
deeply rooted in Czech society. 

Austrian rule was relatively benign toward the Czechs. The 
Hapsburg Empire was more cosmopolitan than aggressively Ger- 
man, consisting of a hodgepodge of central and eastern European 
ethnic groups. German was the lingua franca, but beyond that, 
German speakers were not necessarily the only beneficiaries of 
Hapsburg policies. If, as Tomas Masaryk put it, the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire was a "prison of nations," it was equally clear 
that some parts of the prison were distinctly better than others (see 
Hapsburg Rule, 1526-1867, ch. 1). 



87 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

In comparison with Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, both under 
Hungarian domination for centuries, the Czech lands were remark- 
ably favored. The Austrians lacked the overweening chauvinism 
of their Hungarian counterparts. On the eve of World War I, Ger- 
man was mandatory neither as the language of instruction nor as 
a second language. Censorship of the Czech press was limited. 
Czech associations (the basis of the political parties of the First 
Republic) flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen- 
turies. Cultural organizations, newspapers, and theaters were all 
commonplace parts of Czech life (see Associations, this ch.). 

Czechs were overwhelmingly literate; in 1930 some 97 percent 
of the population over 10 years of age could read and write. There 
was a substantial middle class that was highly educated and well 
trained. Czechs had extensive experience in the Austrian bureau- 
cracy and the legislative processes. Their wealth of experience in 
government contrasted starkly with that of the Slovaks, whom 
Czechs found backward. A certain degree of animosity has always 
persisted and continues to persist between the Czechs and Slovaks 
today (see Slovaks, this ch.). 

The Czech region was economically favored as well. The Treaty 
of Versailles gave the Czechs substantial arable land and two-thirds 
of the former empire's industry. In the late 1930s, after other powers 
had spent a decade of frenzied effort developing heavy industry 
for rearmament, the Czech lands still produced half of Central 
Europe's pig iron and steel. The Czech consumer goods industry 
was also well developed. However, Bohemia's economic advan- 
tages proved to be a two-edged sword. Much industry was owned 
by a substantial German minority of dubious loyalty, and this 
figured in Nazi Germany's designs on the republic (see The 
Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-38, ch. 1). Nonetheless, the Czech 
lands emerged from World War II as virtually the only European 
region with a reasonably developed industrial structure unscathed 
by the conflict. 

One characterization of the Czech national character is that it 
is Svejkian, a term based on the Czech protagonist in Jaroslav 
Hasek's famous (and still popular) World War I novel, The Good 
Soldier Svejk. Svejk' s adventures in the Great War begin with his 
arrest by the Austrian police in connection with the assassination 
of Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg throne. In the con- 
flict between the staid Austrian bureaucracy and the military estab- 
lishment, on the one hand, and the seemingly slow-witted, 
literal-minded, provincial Svejk, on the other, the Czech consis- 
tently gets the better. 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 

In terms of Czech values and behavior, the term Svejkian sug- 
gests passive acquiescence to whatever regime holds power and 
recommends a sort of pervasive obtuseness as the safest strategy 
for political survival. The Svejkian means of dealing with those in 
power, whether Austrian bureaucrats, Czechoslovak communist 
officials, or Warsaw Pact forces, is the antithesis of armed resistance 
(see Popular Political Expression, ch. 4). In the midst of massive 
labor unrest in Poland in late 1980, the Soviets hesitated to use 
armed intervention. Polish workers indicated their readiness to resist 
in terms unmistakable to an East European: "We are not the 
Czechs." The Czechs are often criticized for their reluctance to 
go to the barricades, but the Svejkian strategy is less a matter of 
capitulation than a peculiarly Czech mix of resistance and survival. 
Hitler is reputed to have said that he never trusted the Czechs less 
than when they were making concessions. 

The principal elements of the Czech ethos were played out in 
the Czech reaction to events of the Prague Spring of 1968 (see In- 
tervertion, ch. 1). Both the Czechs' orientation to the West and 
their Svejkism were apparent, in different ways, during the Prague 
Spring and the Soviet intervention and its aftermath. The late- 1960s 
reform movement had begun as an attempt to remedy the econ- 
omy's rather dismal performance with as little change as possible 
but grew into a full-fledged effort to restructure Marxist socialism. 
The call to redress the wrongs of the Stalinist era led to a full-scale 
reevaluation of the appropriateness of that model in Czechoslovakia. 
Czechs called for some measure of political pluralism, for greater 
autonomy for the myriad associations and unions formerly cen- 
tral to Czech society and now under control of the Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia (Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska — KSC), 
and for genuine freedom of expression — "socialism with a human 
face." 

It was clear that for a people with a pronounced egalitarian bent, 
Russian socialism was less than congenial. An anonymous Czech 
KSC official related an incident that illustrates the gulf between 
the Soviets and the Czechs. During the 1968 invasion, a Soviet 
military commander asked a Czech official to tell him who had 
ordered the road signs and street names removed (to slow the 
advance of the invading troops). The official explained that the peo- 
ple themselves had done it without instructions from anyone. It 
was an explanation the Soviet officer simply could not understand: 
independent action by the citizenry without orders from someone 
in authority was beyond his experience. 

Czech reformers sought explicitly political changes: greater scope 
for democratic processes, freedom of expression, and more represen- 
tative organizations. The Soviet response is, of course, a matter 



89 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

of history. Because 1968 was, after all, a Prague Spring, normali- 
zation took a greater toll among Czechs than Slovaks. KSC mem- 
bership purges, changes in the managerial personnel of factories, 
and retributions against writers and artists all fell more heavily on 
the Czechs. 

Slovaks 

While Bohemia and Moravia were among the more favored na- 
tions in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Slovakia's position was far 
less enviable. Hungarian rule systematically excluded Slovaks from 
the political arena. They were consistently gerrymandered out of 
parliamentary seats and administrative posts, even in local govern- 
ment. In 1910, when Czechs could be found throughout the Aus- 
trian bureaucracy, Slovaks held only 5 percent of the judicial offices 
and 3 percent of the civil service positions in Slovakia. Electoral 
laws reinforced this inequity: Austrian-dominated lands had univer- 
sal adult male suffrage, while lands under Hungarian rule had lim- 
ited suffrage and significant educational and age restrictions. 
Hungarians were far more aggressively assimilationist than their 
Austrian counterparts following the establishment of the Dual 
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary (also known as the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire) in 1867 (see The Dual Monarchy, 1867-1918, 
ch. 1). Whereas Czech institutions and fraternal associations thrived 
under the relatively benign tolerance of Austrian rule, the Hun- 
garians closed Slovak secondary schools, repressed Slovak cultural 
organizations, made Hungarian the official language in 1868, and 
pursued a course of thoroughgoing Magyarization. 

The contrast between the economy of the Czech lands and that 
of Slovakia was as dramatic as their differing political heritages. 
Slovakia was agrarian, while the Czech lands were among the most 
industrialized regions in Europe. But the contrast went beyond that: 
Czech farmers represented a relatively prosperous, literate, and 
politically articulate group of middle-income agriculturalists; Slovak 
farmers were peasant farmers in tenancy on Hungarian estates. 

Whereas Czechs wished to create a Czechoslovak nation, Slovaks 
sought a federation. The First Republic, with its predominantly 
Czech administrative apparatus, hardly responded to Slovak aspi- 
rations for autonomy. In the Slovak view, Czech domination had 
simply replaced Hungarian, since Czechs who were unable to find 
positions in Bohemia or Moravia took over local administrative 
and educational posts in Slovakia. 

Linguistic similarity and geographic proximity proved to be an 
inadequate basis for a nation-state. A Lutheran minority of Slovaks 
(educated and influential in government) was generally sympathetic 



90 



Michalskd Tower, 
Bratislava 




to the republic, but the Slovak Catholic clergy, the rural bourgeoisie, 
and the peasantry wanted autonomy. The Slovak Republic 
(1939-45) was, among other things, the culmination of Slovak dis- 
content with Czech hegemony in the country's affairs (see Slovak 
Republic, ch. 1). Perhaps one measure of how profoundly impor- 
tant ethnicity and autonomy are to Slovaks was a Slovak writer's 
1968 call for a more positive reappraisal of the Slovak Republic. 
Although as a Marxist he found Monsignor Jozef Tiso's "clerico- 
fascist state" politically abhorrent, he acknowledged that "the 
Slovak Republic existed as the national state of the Slovaks, the 
only one in our history. . . ." Comparable sentiments surfaced peri- 
odically throughout the 1970s in letters to Bratislava's Pravda, even 
though the newspaper's editors tried to inculcate in their reader- 
ship a "class and concretely historical approach" to the national- 
ity question. 

The division between Czechs and Slovaks persisted as a key ele- 
ment in the reform movement of the 1960s and the retrenchment 
of the 1970s, a decade that dealt harshly with the aspirations of 
both Czechs and Slovaks. Ethnicity still remains integral to the 
social, political, and economic affairs of the country. It is not merely 
a matter of individual identity, folklore, or tradition. 

The post- 1948 government has put a high priority on redress- 
ing the socioeconomic imbalance between the highly industrialized 
Czech lands and underdeveloped Slovakia. Slovakia made major 



91 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

gains in industrial production in the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1970s, 
its industrial production was near parity with that of the Czech 
lands. Although Slovak planners were quick to note that capital 
investment continued to lag, it was clear that Slovakia's share of 
industrial production had grown tremendously. Slovakia's portion 
of per capita national income rose from slightly more than 60 per- 
cent of that of Bohemia and Moravia in 1948 to nearly 80 percent 
in 1968, and Slovak per capita earning power equaled that of the 
Czechs in 1971. 

A general improvement in services, especially in health and edu- 
cation, accompanied Slovakia's industrial growth. In the mid-1980s, 
the number of physicians per capita slightly exceeded that for the 
Czech lands, whereas in 1948 it had been two-thirds the Czech 
figure. From 1948 to 1983, the number of students in higher edu- 
cation in Slovakia per 1,000 inhabitants increased from 47 per- 
cent of the Czech figure to 119 percent (see Health and Social 
Welfare, this ch.). 

Postwar political developments affected Slovaks less favorably. 
Party rule in Czechoslovakia took a turn that quashed Slovak hopes 
for federation and national autonomy. In the 1950s purges, promi- 
nent Slovak communists who had played major roles in the 1944 
Slovak National Uprising were tried and sentenced as "bourgeois 
nationalists" (see Stalinization, ch. 1). Eventually, Czechs also fell 
victim to the purges, but Slovaks remained convinced that Prague 
Stalinists were responsible for the trials. Neither the 1948 nor the 
1960 constitution offered much scope for Slovak autonomy. In the 
1960s, Laco (Ladislav) Novomesky echoed the feelings and frus- 
trations of many Slovaks when he commented that they had be- 
come "a tolerated race of vice-chairmen and deputy ministers, a 
second-class minority generously accorded a one-third quota in 
everything. ..." 

The regime of Antonm Novotny (first secretary of the KSC from 
1953 to 1968) was frequently less than enlightened in its treatment 
of Slovakia. Novotny himself demanded "intolerant struggle against 
any nationalism" and suggested that the real solution to Czech- 
Slovak relations would be mass intermarriage between the two 
groups. The Slovaks found this recommendation — to deal with eth- 
nic differences by eliminating them — all too typical of Prague's atti- 
tude toward them. 

Political developments in the late 1960s and 1970s provided a 
portrait of Czech and Slovak differences. Slovak demands for re- 
form in the 1960s reflected dissatisfaction with Czech hegemony 
in government and policy making. Whereas Czechs wanted some 
measure of political pluralism, the Slovak rallying cry was "No 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



democratization without federation." It was less a difference in em- 
phasis than a study in contrasts, and the Slovak focus was institu- 
tional change — "federalizing" the government apparatus with 
largely autonomous Czech and Slovak structures. Slovaks called 
for the full rehabilitation of the "bourgeois nationalists" and a reap- 
praisal of the 1944 uprising (see Slovak Resistance, ch. 1). 

Even economic demands split along ethnic lines, although there 
was considerable variation within both republics in response to calls 
for economic reform. Czech KSC planners called for implement- 
ing the New Economic Model, an integrated economic system 
allowing substantial autonomy for individual enterprises and in- 
tended to promote a general increase in efficiency (see The Reform 
Movement, ch. 1). Slovaks wished economic reform to be adapted 
to their particular needs. Rather than a single, integrated economic 
system, they had in mind parallel Czech and Slovak national eco- 
nomic organizations. 

Czech reaction to these concerns annoyed Slovaks further. In 
the Czech view, their own focus on the rehumanization of Marxism 
was universalistic, whereas the Slovak preoccupation with national 
autonomy was provincial and anachronistic — certainly too trivial 
for those whose concern was "socialism with a human face." 

The Constitutional Law of Federation of October 27, 1968, 
responded to the Slovak desire for autonomy. Significantly, how- 
ever, the KSC remained strongly centralized. Developments in the 
1970s further weakened the two republics' newly established govern- 
ment structures. KSC efforts, although not necessarily motivated 
by anti-Slovak feelings, were heavily weighted in favor of centrali- 
zation (see Political Setting, ch. 4). A thoroughgoing adherence 
to Soviet dictates undermined autonomy as effectively as any overtly 
anti- Slovak sentiment might have. 

Whatever the ultimate fate of federalization, its prominence as 
an issue among Slovaks — the general populace as well as party 
members — gave an indication of how important the Czech-Slovak 
division remained. A 1960s survey found that 73 percent of Slovak 
respondents supported federalism; 94 percent wished that Czech- 
Slovak relations might be restructured. A subsequent survey in the 
mid-1970s, when the new federal structures were in place, found 
that Slovaks thought the new government organization, in con- 
trast to much of their historical experience, treated Czechs and 
Slovaks equally. 

Others 

The roughly 6 percent of the population who are neither Czech 
nor Slovak have had an uneven history in the postwar era (see 



93 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

fig. 12). The highly centralized rule of the KSC undermined the 
political leverage that the First Republic's multiparty politics had 
permitted to ethnic minorities. Beyond this, however, the sheer 
decrease in the German and Ukrainian populations of Czecho- 
slovakia would have limited their influence in any event. 

The events of the late 1960s brought calls for reform from ethnic 
minorities. The government's response was Constitutional Act No. 
144 (October 1968), which defined the status of ethnic groups in 
Czechoslovakia and acknowledged the full political and cultural 
rights of legally recognized minorities. Minorities were granted the 
right, with state approval, to their own cultural organizations. The 
emphasis has been on cultural activities; minority organizations 
have had no right to represent their members in political affairs. 

In the 1980s, Hungarians were the largest enumerated minor- 
ity ethnic group. In 1984 approximately 590,000 Hungarians (con- 
centrated in southern Slovakia) made up 11 percent of Slovakia's 
population. Despite significant anti-Hungarian sentiment in 
Slovakia, the postwar exchange of Slovaks in Hungary for Hun- 
garians in Slovakia met with only limited success; the proportion 
of Hungarians in the population has changed little since 1930 (see 
table 4, Appendix A). 

Although Hungarians were a distinct minority of the total popu- 
lation, they were highly visible in the border regions of Slovakia. 
There, Hungarians constituted nearly half the population of some 
districts. Furthermore, 20 percent lived in exclusively Hungarian 
settlements. Given Hungary's long domination of Slovakia, 
Hungarian-Slovak relations have not been easy; the two groups 
are separated by substantial linguistic and cultural differences. In 
1968 some Hungarians in Slovakia called for reincorporation into 
Hungary. This was apparently a minority view; Hungarian Warsaw 
Pact troops entering Czechoslovakia in 1968 encountered as much 
hostility from Hungarians in Slovakia as they did from the rest of 
the population. 

Before their relocation in 1945, Germans outnumbered Czechs 
in both the Krusne hory and the Sudeten Mountains. Over 3 mil- 
lion Germans were included in the First Republic, constituting the 
largest German community in a non-German state. They were in- 
tensely pan-German and aggressively nationalistic. Their inclusion 
in the First Republic precipitated massive protests. Throughout 
the interwar period, Sudeten Germans were acutely aware of their 
minority status within Czechoslovakia; they found the contrast with 
their former preeminence galling. 

The large, often unabashedly secessionist German minority 
ultimately proved to be the undoing of the First Republic (see 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



Munich, ch. 1). With their expulsion, Czechoslovakia lost over one- 
fifth of its population. Some 165,000 Germans escaped deporta- 
tion and remained scattered along the country's western border 
in the former Sudetenland. Through the mid-1970s, Germans 
represented a declining proportion of the population; younger Ger- 
mans increasingly were assimilated into Czech society or emigrated 
to the West. Even those Germans who were not expelled after World 
War II were not permitted to hold Czechoslovak citizenship until 
1953. 

In 1968-69 Germans demanded more German-language publi- 
cations and mandatory German-language instruction in areas hav- 
ing a substantial German minority. The 1968 Constitutional Act 
No. 144 recognized the Germans' legal status as an ethnic minority 
for the first time since World War II. 

Poles (approximately 71,000 in 1984) were concentrated in the 
Ostrava mining region on the northern border. In addition to a 
large community of resident Poles, a substantial number commuted 
across the border from Poland to work or to take advantage of the 
relative abundance of Czechoslovak consumer goods. Official poli- 
cies toward the Poles (resident or not) have attempted to limit their 
influence both in and out of the workplace. In 1969, for example, 
a Czech journal reported that a primarily Polish-speaking district 
in the Ostrava area had been gerrymandered to create two districts, 
each with a Czech majority. 

Czechoslovak officialdom considered Polish influence in the work- 
place an insidious danger. The "seepage" from more liberal Pol- 
ish regimes has concerned Czechoslovak communists since the 
1950s, when Poles led the way in resisting increased work demands. 
The 1980-81 unrest in Poland exacerbated the situation (see Re- 
lations with Communist Nations, ch. 4). There were reports of 
strikes among the workers in the Ostrava area in late 1980. 

Before World War II, Gypsies in Czechoslovakia were consid- 
ered Czechoslovak citizens of Gypsy nationality. After the war, since 
they did not possess the properties of a nationality according to 
communist criteria, they were regarded by the communist regime 
as merely a special ethnic group. Based on this, the regime ap- 
proached the matter not as a question of nationality but as a social 
and political question. 

Eastern Slovakia had a sizable Gypsy minority. About 66 per- 
cent of the country's Gypsies lived in Slovakia in the 1980s, where 
they constituted about 4 percent of the population. Estimates of 
their exact numbers vary, but observers agree that their postwar 
birthrate has been phenomenal. In the early 1970s, there were 



95 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 




The Society and Its Environment 

approximately 200,000 to 300,000 Gypsies in the country. In 1980 
estimates ranged from 250,000 to 400,000. 

Gypsy intelligentsia agitated unsuccessfully for inclusion of Gyp- 
sies in the 1968 Constitutional Act No. 144, and they remained 
the largest unrecognized minority in Czechoslovakia. Policy makers 
have found them a conundrum. The Gypsy population combines 
continued high rates of crime and illiteracy with a cultural system 
that places low value on regular employment. According to Czecho- 
slovak Life, in 1986, "the customs and thinking of the Gypsy popu- 
lation are somewhat different." A 1979 article in Bratislava's Pravda 
asserted that the crime rate among Gypsies was four times the 
national average. The author went on to call for "the incorpora- 
tion of all Gypsy citizens of productive age to [sic] the working 
process" and to decry the number of Gypsies "who constantly refuse 
to work." A large number of Gypsies were involved in the black 
market. 

Official policy has vacillated between forced assimilation and 
enforced isolation in carefully controlled settlements. The nomadic 
wandering integral to Gypsy culture has been illegal since 1958. 
Laws passed in 1965 and 1969 provided for "dispersion" of Gyp- 
sies, i.e., transferring them from areas where they were concen- 
trated to other areas. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, assimi- 
lationist policies held clear sway. There were efforts to increase the 
participation of Gypsy children in preschool, kindergarten, secon- 
dary school, apprenticeship programs, and summer recreational 
and educational camps. There were also concerted government at- 
tempts to integrate Gypsies into the national labor force; in the 
early 1980s, some 90 percent of adult Gypsy males below retire- 
ment age were employed. In 1979 about 50 percent of working- 
age Gypsy women were employed; by 1981 this figure had risen 
to 74 percent. 

Critics have contended that government policies verge on "geno- 
cide." They have charged that the government was taking chil- 
dren away from Gypsy parents and pressuring Gypsy women to 
undergo sterilization. The Gypsy birthrate was reportedly two and 
one-half to three times the national average; in the mid-1980s, it 
was 2.6 percent per year as opposed to 0.7 percent per year for 
the population as a whole. 

Czechoslovakia lost most of its Ukrainian population when 
Carpatho-Ukraine was ceded to the Soviet Union after World War 
II. This had been the First Republic's poorest region, and, if 
Slovakia had fared badly under Hungarian domination, Carpatho- 
Ukraine's situation had been far worse. In the words of one his- 
torian, in 1914 the region was "little more than a Magyar deer 



97 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

park. ' ' Its people were wretchedly poor, having for centuries sup- 
plemented the meager living the mountainous area afforded with 
seasonal agricultural labor and service in the Hungarian infantry. 
Because of its strong cultural and linguistic links with the Ukrainians 
of the Soviet Union and interwar Poland, the region was a hotbed 
of secessionist sentiment throughout the interwar period. There 
were also calls for Ukrainian autonomy within the Czechoslovak 
Republic (see Problems of Dissatisfied Nationalities, ch. 1). 

In 1983 the remaining 48,000 or so Ukrainians were clustered 
in northeastern Slovakia. They remained overwhelmingly agricul- 
tural; often they were private farmers scattered on small, im- 
poverished holdings in mountainous terrain. They were generally 
Uniates and suffered in the 1950s and 1960s from the government's 
repression of that group in favor of the Orthodox Church (see 
Religion, this ch.). 

A very small fraction of Czechoslovakia's pre- World War II 
Jewish community remained in the 1980s. Estimates of both the 
prewar and the postwar Jewish population are imprecise. Calcu- 
lations based on either religious preference or the number of Yiddish 
speakers ignored the large numbers of assimilated Jews in Bohemia 
and Slovakia. Most estimates put the pre-World War II popula- 
tion in the neighborhood of 250,000. In 1975 Malcom Browne 
stated that there were some 5,000 practicing Jews remaining in 
Czechoslovakia, including about 1,200 in Prague, which once had 
a large, vibrant Jewish community dating back to the Middle Ages. 

In the Czech lands, Nazi efforts to encourage anti-Semitic legis- 
lation had met with limited success until the establishment of the 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (see Protectorate of Bohemia 
and Moravia, ch. 1). Bohemian Jews had been prominent mem- 
bers of the Czech elite, and anti-Semitism in the Czech lands had 
more often been directed toward Jews of the Sudetenland, who were 
condemned both as Germans and as "capitalist exploiters." Rein- 
hard Heydrich, named Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia 
in 1941, vowed to make the region judenrein (free of Jews) within 
two months. Heydrich pursued the deportation and extermination 
of the Jewish population with a passion rare even among those most 
dedicated to the "final solution." On June 6, 1943, Hitler declared 
Germany, Austria, and the Protectorate to he judenrein. Most Czech 
Jews perished, along with sizable numbers of Jewish refugees from 
Germany, Austria, and Slovakia. 

In Slovakia many Jews were Hungarian speakers; they identi- 
fied and were identified with Hungarian domination. It mattered 
little that Slovak Catholic and nationalistic anti-Semitism had social 
and intellectual roots different from Nazi racism. Monsignor 



98 



The Old Jewish 
Cemetery in Prague 
(State Jewish Museum) 



Tiso's government complied with Nazi deportation orders with little 
reluctance; even baptized Jews were not exempt. Eventually, in 
1943, the Vatican intervened, informing Tiso in no uncertain terms 
that deporting Jews meant sending them to their deaths. After the 
Slovak National Uprising in 1944 and the Nazi occupation of 
Slovakia, more Jews were deported. At the time of the Soviet 
"liberation" of Bratislava, only about 20,000 survived. 

Some anti-Jewish sentiment still existed in the 1980s. The govern- 
ment's vehemently anti-Israeli stance, coupled with a persistent 
failure to distinguish between Israelis and Jews, gave anti-Semitic 
attitudes continued prominence. Official denunciations of dissidents 
having purportedly Jewish names added a distinctly anti-Semitic 
flavor. One Charter 77 signer was condemned as "an international 
adventurer" and another, more pointedly, as "a foreigner without 
a fatherland, who was never integrated into the Czech com- 
munity" — notorious euphemisms long used in anti-Jewish rhetoric. 
Officials alleged that the signers were under orders from "anticom- 
munist and Zionist centers." 

Language 

The correct American English adjective for the language, peo- 
ple, and culture of Slovakia is Slovak; Slovak belongs to the Slavic 
group of languages. British usage employs Slovakian for the Ameri- 
can Slovak and uses Slavonic where the American usage is Slavic. 



99 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

The adjective for the Czech people, language, and culture is Czech. 
The form Czechoslovak is used when referring to the government 
or a person's or thing's official function, e.g., Czechoslovak citi- 
zenship. 

Czech and Slovak, the two official languages of Czechoslovakia 
(as of 1918), are similar but separate languages. They are actually 
so close as to be mutually intelligible, and Czechoslovak media use 
both languages, knowing that they will be understood by both 
Czechs and Slovaks. Czech is spoken by approximately 10 million 
people, primarily in the Czech Socialist Republic (Bohemia and 
Moravia); about 5 million people, primarily in Slovakia, speak 
Slovak. Both are West Slavic languages and are closely related to 
Polish (also a West Slavic language). Czech and Slovak are more 
distantly related to Russian (an East Slavic language), with which 
they share a number of features, although they are not mutually 
intelligible. Despite the similarities between Czech and Slovak, their 
literary languages emerged at different times. Both languages use 
the Roman alphabet, but the alphabets differ slightly. 

In addition to the two literary languages, a number of dialects 
are spoken throughout the country. Everyday speech among vil- 
lagers (especially older people), for example, will usually be in 
dialect, whereas in urban areas the dialects are losing their foothold, 
especially among the educated. 

The Slovak literary language as it is known today was not es- 
tablished until the nineteenth century, although Slovak in its differ- 
ent dialects had been spoken for many centuries. At various times, 
Latin (the official language of Hungary for a time), Hungarian, 
and Czech had been used as the literary language of the Slovaks. 
As with Czech, it was the mid-nineteenth century surge of nation- 
alism that finally saw the widespread adoption (earlier efforts had 
limited success) of what is today's literary language, based on the 
central dialects. 

Change in Slovak, as in all other languages, is an ongoing 
process. Words, phrases, and idioms fall out of use, while others 
come in to replace them. Some of today's new words are formed 
from Slovak elements, but many are borrowed, primarily from En- 
glish and Russian. The Russian words are part and parcel of the 
political and economic systems and serve to reinforce connections 
between the two government systems. English words come into the 
language mostly in the fields of science and technology {display for 
a computer display), but also in everyday speech (sexbomba for 
sex symbol). These are most often words for which there are no 
terms in Slovak. What worries some purists is that foreign words 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



are replacing some perfectly good Slovak words, e.g., generdcia 
(generation) for pokolenie. 

The oldest written records of the Czech language are found in 
eleventh-century texts. After the tumultuous historical events of 
the early seventeenth century and the resulting Counter- 
Reformation, German took precedence over Czech as Prague be- 
came a provincial capital. It was only with the upsurge of nation- 
alism throughout Europe in the nineteenth century that Czech came 
back into its own. 

It is often said that the "best" Czech is spoken in Moravia. Var- 
ious dialects exist, but the most prestigious is that of Prague. As 
is the case with German in German-speaking countries, there are 
actually several versions of Czech. This presents difficulties for 
foreigners wishing to learn to speak Czech. The standard written 
literary language, spisovnd cestina, carries the greatest prestige. It 
is based on the Czech spoken in fourteenth-century Prague dur- 
ing the days of the Czech Golden Age. Today, the written lan- 
guage is the language used in education, the government, the press, 
most literature, television and radio, industry, and science. It is 
also the language that foreigners learn. However, outside of univer- 
sity lectures, television and radio, and official meetings, no one 
really speaks it. Most people, even those who are highly educated, 
speak a colloquial version of Czech among themselves known var- 
iously as obecnd, hovorovd, or bezne mluvend cestina. Although local di- 
alects produce variations from place to place, this living language 
is characterized by certain simplifications of the archaic, written 
literary language. Many modern writers have experimented with 
it in their writings, and not only in dialogue. Some members of 
the KSC have proposed dropping the established literary form of 
the language in favor of a simplified written version of the spoken 
language, as it is "the language of the masses." But this idea has 
met with strong opposition, especially in academia. One peculiar- 
ity of the spoken language is that it often retains German words 
that have been purged from the written language. 

Today, because of close ties with the Soviet Union, Russian has 
become the major influence on modern Czech. Many English words 
have also made headway, including vikend (weekend), kempink 
(camping, campground), and diskzokej (disc jockey). Articles occa- 
sionally appear in the press criticizing such "foreignisms. " In an 
attempt to avoid foreign vocabulary, many old Czech words have 
been revived or new Czech words formed from old roots. 

Social Groups 

Czechoslovakia, of all the East European countries, entered 
the postwar era with a relatively balanced social structure and 



101 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

an equitable distribution of resources. Despite some poverty, overall 
it was a country of relatively well-off workers, small-scale producers, 
farmers, and a substantial middle class. Nearly half the populace 
was in the middle-income bracket. Ironically, perhaps, it was bal- 
anced and relatively prosperous Czechoslovakia that carried na- 
tionalization and income redistribution further than any other East 
European country. By the mid-1960s, the complaint was that level- 
ing had gone too far. The lowest-paid 40 percent of the population 
accounted for 60 percent of national income. Earning differentials 
between blue-collar and white-collar workers were lower than in 
any other country in Eastern Europe. Further, equitable income 
distribution was combined in the late 1970s with relative prosper- 
ity. Along with East Germany and Hungary, Czechoslovakia en- 
joyed one of the highest standards of living of any of the Warsaw 
Pact countries through the 1980s. 

The matter of social groups and the differences among them has 
been a delicate one for those in power in Czechoslovakia. In the 
Marxist scheme, classes are defined in terms of their relation to 
the means of production. Industrial production has demanded a 
more differentiated labor force than the Marxist notion of "one 
class owning and working the means of production" foresaw. 
"From each according to his abilities, to each according to his 
needs" proved an inadequate principle for distributing socialist 
wealth. Even in Czechoslovakia, where the party's pursuit of so- 
cialist equality was thorough, the "classless" society turned out 
to be highly diverse. 

In the mid-1980s, Czechoslovak censuses divided the popula- 
tion into several occupational groups: workers, other employees, 
members of various cooperatives (principally agricultural cooper- 
atives), small farmers, self-employed tradesmen and professionals, 
and capitalists (see table 5, Appendix A). Of these categories, "other 
employees" was the most diverse, encompassing everyone from 
low-level clerical workers to cabinet ministers. "Workers" were 
those whose jobs were primarily manual and industrial. There was 
the time-hallowed distinction between workers (manual or low-level 
clerical employees), agricultural employees, and the intelligentsia 
(whose work is primarily mental and requires more education). 

Workers 

In 1984 workers made up about one-half of the economically 
active population and were beneficiaries of policies geared toward 
maintaining the people's standard of living. According to many 
observers, Czechoslovakia's internal stability rested on an unspoken 
bargain between workers and the ruling KSC: relative material 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



security in return for acquiescence to continued Soviet domina- 
tion. Given the persistent economic problems the regime faced, 
it was a delicate balance. Much of working-class life reflected the 
regime's efforts to increase labor productivity without precipitat- 
ing major labor unrest. 

Virtually full employment did not make the task easier. In 1984 
nearly half the population worked. Some 85 percent of working- 
age women were employed (not including those on maternity leave), 
and there were almost 141,000 full-time university students. Work- 
ing age for women was from fifteen through fifty-four, and for men 
it was from fifteen through fifty-nine. The proportion of pensioners 
who had returned to work rose from 12 percent in 1966 to 23 per- 
cent in 1983. By the end of the 1970s, the labor shortage was ex- 
treme enough for officials to call for greater efforts to employ 
"internal reserves" of labor, i.e., the partially disabled (of whom 
nearly one- third were already employed), full-time students, and 
farmers (during agricultural off-seasons). "Voluntary" brigades 
of students and apprentices supplied agricultural (harvest) and other 
labor during summer months. 

In Czechoslovakia, as in other socialist countries, virtually full 
employment often disguises underemployment. Large numbers of 
people work in positions below their qualifications. This is the result 
of different factors: some people are reluctant to move to other parts 
of the country to find work; politically and ideologically "objec- 
tionable" people must often turn to menial work; and politically 
"correct" people hold jobs for which they are not fully qualified. 
At many enterprises, instead of streamlining operations and dis- 
missing employees whose job performance is unsatisfactory, 
managers merely shift workers to other positions or juggle employ- 
ment statistics. 

The party's compulsion to avoid labor unrest, enterprise 
managers' need to meet (or at least approach) production quotas, 
and a pervasive shortage of labor define the social dynamics of the 
workplace. Workers have relatively secure employment and income 
but lack sufficient consumer goods to absorb their income (the rate 
of saving is extremely high). Nor do workers have a substantive 
role in organizing work; Ota Sik, noted economic reformer dur- 
ing the 1960s, characterized the Czechoslovak worker as "alienated 
from the production process, from the fruits of labor, and from 
the management of industrial enterprises." 

Workers' complaints have changed over the years as labor has 
become more scarce. In the 1950s real wages declined, resulting 
in periodic work stoppages. The 1953 currency reform sparked pro- 
tests and demonstrations in major industrial centers that were 



103 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

little short of riots. Throughout the decade, party leaders com- 
plained about workers' "trade unionist" and "anarcho-syndicalist" 
attitudes and their "take what you can" mentality. Those arrested 
in the 1953 demonstrations were denounced as "bourgeois elements 
dressed up in overalls." During the Prague Spring, workers orga- 
nized to support demands for political liberalization and more 
representative trade unions. 

By the late 1970s, forced overtime had become the workers' most 
insistent complaint, followed by poor working conditions. These 
complaints were coupled with steadfast opposition to linking wages 
with gains in productivity. Workers most frequently called for com- 
pliance with the labor code, which limited compulsory overtime 
(the maximum workweek was supposed to be forty-six hours) and 
provided for work safety regulations. 

One solution to the labor shortage was foreign manpower. For 
a long time, Poles provided the largest percentage of foreign man- 
power. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the proportion 
of Vietnamese workers grew rapidly. By the end of 1982, there 
were approximately 26,000 Vietnamese workers in Czechoslovakia, 
about 0.3 percent of the total manual work force, including appren- 
tices. Reasons given for the rapid expansion of the Vietnamese con- 
tingent ranged from the Czechoslovak government's interest in 
training qualified labor for a friendly socialist country, to repay- 
ment of Vietnamese war debt, to the labor surplus in Vietnam. 
Problems arose as the number of Vietnamese increased drastically 
and as a program of merely hard work replaced what was to have 
been a program for training the Vietnamese in work skills. 

Other foreigners who worked in Czechoslovakia came from 
Cuba, Laos, the Mongolian People's Republic, and Hungary. Poles 
and Hungarians generally worked in their respective border areas. 

Most women in Czechoslovakia work, a reflection in part of the 
labor shortage and in part of the socialist belief that employment 
for women is the answer to inequality between the sexes. Although 
women in Czechoslovakia have had a long history of employment 
(they were over one-third of the labor force in 1930), the postwar 
surge in female employment has been truly dramatic. Four-fifths 
of the workers who entered the labor force from 1948 through 1975 
were women. By the end of 1976, about 87 percent of working- 
age women had jobs; in 1984 about 90 percent of women in their 
reproductive years were in the labor force. 

In 1983 women remained concentrated in the traditional fields 
of female employment. In retail sales they represented 75 percent 
of all employees; in mass communications, 65 percent; in health 
care, 80 percent; and in social work, 87 percent. These differences 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



persisted despite concerted efforts to improve women's educational 
status and in spite of the wide range of protective legislation covering 
women workers (see Health and Social Welfare, this ch.). 

Women's salaries have lagged behind those of men throughout 
the socialist era. As late as 1986, women's earnings averaged two- 
thirds of those of men. In December 1986, one-fifth of all employed 
mothers earned less than Kcs 1,500 per month, while the average 
salary for all workers at that time was given as Kcs2,800 per month. 
Only 6 to 7 percent of middle and upper management positions 
were held by women. 

A number of factors account for this continuing inequality. Tradi- 
tional sexual stereotypes have persisted, socialist rhetoric notwith- 
standing. Women faced handicaps in the workplace because of their 
traditional role in child rearing (what regime apologists have dubbed 
"woman's triple role" of mother- worker-citizen). Czechoslovakia 
offered ample maternity leave, and women did not lose job seniority 
by taking it. Nonetheless, employers anticipated that women not 
only would be absent from work to have children but also would 
bear the primary responsibility for child care within their families. 
(In contrast, officialdom has made no mention of man's triple role 
of father- worker-citizen.) Women's anticipated but unpredictable 
absence from the workplace influenced employers' allocation of jobs. 
Women themselves frequently complained about the dual demands 
of home and work forced upon them. Czechoslovakia's underdevel- 
oped service sector, the general lack of convenience items, limited 
child-care facilities, and the traditional division of labor within the 
family all complicated working women's lives in the 1980s. (Men 
maintained the traditional view that housework and child rearing 
are "women's work" and often refused to help.) Employed women 
spent four to eight hours each day on household duties, above and 
beyond their time at work. 

Agricultural Workers 

Rural society in the 1980s was a combination of cooperatives 
(approximately 73 percent of the agricultural labor force), state 
farms (18 percent), and private farms (9 percent). This represented 
a dramatic change from the First Republic with its politically active 
middle-sized farmers, small landholders, and differentiated labor 
force. Collectivized agriculture has not lacked occupational 
specialists, but there is no doubt that the socialist regime has stream- 
lined rural society. Differences have persisted, but a dramatic level- 
ing has taken place. Workers on state farms were salaried. 
Cooperative members' earnings reflected their cooperatives' 
production, and they supplemented these with sales from small 



105 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

family garden plots. Private farmers, a declining portion of the 
agricultural population, augmented their limited agricultural earn- 
ings with off-farm employment. The dichotomy between relatively 
prosperous Bohemia and Moravia and less-developed Slovakia has 
added to the complexity of contemporary rural society. 

Collectivization began in 1949 with the Unified Agricultural 
Cooperatives Act. The KSC pushed collectivization efforts early 
in the 1950s and again later in the decade. Large landholders 
unwilling to join cooperatives and unwise enough to demur were 
condemned as "kulaks" (see Glossary) and evicted without com- 
pensation. Subsequent criticism was muted. By 1960, when col- 
lectivization was essentially complete, 90 percent of all agricultural 
land was in the state sector — a proportion that slowly increased 
to 95 percent in 1985. During the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, 
the number of cooperatives declined. Land was not returned to 
private cultivation, but rather the cooperative enterprises them- 
selves were consolidated. 

Farmers suffered through the 1950s: compulsory collectivization 
took their property, and the 1953 currency reform eradicated their 
savings. By the early 1960s, farm laborers worked longer than their 
nonagricultural counterparts and earned an average of 1 5 percent 
less. Not surprisingly, those who had other alternatives took them. 
Young men found work in the expanding industrial sector; women 
and the elderly remained. The proportion of the agricultural labor 
force over 60 years of age rose from 14 percent in 1955 to 20 per- 
cent in 1969 and then fell to 11 percent in 1983. By 1960 women 
accounted for nearly 60 percent of agricultural labor; that figure 
declined to 42 percent in 1983, many women having found work 
in industry or the service sector. 

During the late 1960s and 1970s, agricultural earnings rose 
rapidly. Since the mid-1970s, the incomes of cooperative farm mem- 
bers and industrial workers have been comparable. So dramatic 
was the improvement that in a 1968 poll more than two-thirds of 
cooperative farm members preferred collectivized agricultural 
production to private farming. Their consensus was that coopera- 
tive farming reduced not only the work burden but also the risks 
that small to medium-sized landholders faced. Farmers' grievances 
during the reform era focused on the injustices suffered during col- 
lectivization. They wanted those who had been victimized during 
the 1950s to be rehabilitated and compensated. 

The disparity between urban and rural living conditions nar- 
rowed in the 1970s. Government planners focused on improving 
rural day-care facilities; bringing cooperative and state-farm pen- 
sions to parity with those of other workers; and increasing the 



106 



Hk 

Slovak National Theater on Hvizdoslav Square, Bratislava 

Courtesy Helen Fedor 

medical, educational, and shopping facilities available to rural 
dwellers. There was significant construction, and renovation of rural 
housing. The number of new housing units available to coopera- 
tive members rose dramatically in the 1960s and then leveled off, 
although the number fluctuated from year to year. The general 
improvement in the amenities did not benefit agricultural workers 
alone; in the early 1970s, over 40 percent of all industrial workers 
lived in the countryside (see Urbanization and Migration, this ch.). 

One result of increased incomes and improved rural living con- 
ditions was a rise in the educational level of the agricultural labor 
force. The percentage of cooperative members with a secondary- 
school education increased eleven fold from 1960 to the end of 1978, 
and that of members with a university degree increased thirteen fold. 

Intelligentsia 

By convention, Marxist theorists subdivide the intelligentsia into 
the creative (writers, artists, and journalists), the professional (law- 
yers, educators, physicians, civil servants, and party bureaucrats), 
and the technical (engineers). Insofar as one might speak of the 
intelligentsia as an elite, they are the group that has under- 
gone the most drastic change since 1945. Capitalist entrepre- 
neurs and the clergy were obvious and early victims of shifts in 
the political spectrum. Although their individual fates varied, party 



107 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

membership was a prerequisite for civil servants, the police, mili- 
tary officers, and educators who wished to continue in their chosen 
fields. 

The typical professional career under party rule has turned out 
to be anything but secure. The year 1948 saw a turnover in civil 
service personnel (especially the police) and a substantial influx of 
workers into political and managerial positions. The 1950s purges 
struck hardest at the party faithful, i.e., the most direct beneficiaries 
of the 1948 takeover. The upheaval of nationalization and collec- 
tivization efforts that went further than anywhere else in Eastern 
Europe, coupled with two currency reforms, signaled a flux in eco- 
nomic fortunes during the first decade of communist rule. A Czech, 
for example, who was a chief executive in industry in 1948, worked 
as a carpenter for several years thereafter, served a number of years 
in prison, and then retrained for a career in law was not exceptional. 

Change continued to be a defining characteristic of many profes- 
sional occupations through the 1970s: in 1968 about 60 percent 
of all army officers under thirty years of age had resigned; by 1971 
half of all school supervisors had been replaced; and by 1972 
approximately 40 percent of all journalists had been purged. The 
magnitudes involved were simply staggering, the more so because 
the victims of the 1970s purges were overwhelmingly Czech (see 
Ethnic Groups, this ch.). During normalization, over 25,000 
government and trade union officials were replaced. All told, 
perhaps 150,000 professionals were unable to work in their fields 
by the end of the decade. The purges included technical and 
managerial personnel, as well as writers, artists, and KSC mem- 
bers active in the reform movement. Estimates at the high end sug- 
gested that, from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, some 400,000 
members of the intelligentsia joined the ranks of manual laborers. 

In the mid-1980s, the technical intelligentsia — directors and 
deputy directors of socialist enterprises, chairmen of agricultural 
cooperatives, and managers of retail shops, hotels, restaurants, ser- 
vices, and housing — occupied an ambiguous position in the 
decision-making hierarchy. On the one hand, their jobs often 
demanded considerable technical expertise; on the other hand, 
decision making in all sectors had a political component under com- 
munist rule. The technical intelligentsia had to reconcile the re- 
quirements of technical efficiency with those of political orthodoxy. 
From the KSC's perspective, the problem was to ensure a politi- 
cally reliable corps of technical experts. Throughout the 1970s, those 
selected for political compliance (versus training or expertise) 
predominated among the technical intelligentsia. When a party 
functionary was unable to meet the demands of his or her 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



position, the custom was to call in a technical expert (even if not 
a party member) for assistance. KSC hard-liners consistently 
blocked efforts to reinstate reformist managers deposed after 1968. 

Calls for more efficient management and periodic "reassess- 
ments" of managerial personnel accompanied changes in the ranks 
of the technical intelligentsia. In 1980 Federal Finance Minister 
Leopold Ler suggested that failure to meet production goals would 
be reflected in bonuses given to management and went so far as 
to intimate that managers might be dismissed for ineptitude. There 
was a concerted effort on the part of officialdom to make clear to 
managers that simple political compliance — adequate to ensure 
one's employment in the early 1970s — would have to be accom- 
panied by efficiency in production in the 1980s. 

Czechoslovak party officials have had a long history of suspi- 
cion of higher education, blaming it for ills as diverse as labor unrest 
and youth's lack of socialist idealism. Research scientists, to judge 
from the remarks of D.R. Prochazka, director of the Czechoslovak 
Academy of Sciences in the early 1970s ("I would purge even 
Einstein if he were a reformist"), have not fared much better. 

Writers and Artists 

The country's creative intelligentsia played a pivotal role in the 
nationalist movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen- 
turies; their manifestos spoke for the aspirations of Czechs and 
Slovaks within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Their opposition 
to foreign domination was almost a defining feature of the litera- 
ture of the period, just as Soviet hegemony and the paralyzing 
rigidity of party rule have fueled a growing body of dissident litera- 
ture in recent times. 

Intellectual and artistic endeavor flourished during the First 
Republic. There was, of course, The Good Soldier Svejk, published 
at the end of World War I. The presence of Czech Karel Capek, 
Slovak Laco Novomesky, and German Franz Kafka, Rainer Maria 
Rilke, and Edmund Husserl, to name only the most prominent 
writers, gives some sense of how prolific the era was. Sigmund Freud 
came from the Czech lands, as did Gustav Mahler. Ernst Mach 
and Albert Einstein taught at Charles-Ferdinand University in 
Prague. 

The KSC takeover ushered in the era of Stalinist socialist real- 
ism in Czechoslovakia's arts. It was a movement with strong over- 
tones of Russian chauvinism and a deep anti-Western bias evident 
in a readiness to denounce anything remotely cosmopolitan as bour- 
geois, decadent, or both. One suspects that the country that had 
given world literature Svejk was particularly unpromising ground 



109 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

for Socialist Realism. A blind optimism coupled with revolution- 
ary fervor are the key components of this aesthetic, portraying life 
as it should be according to Marxist theory, rather than as it actu- 
ally is. 

Soon after taking power, the the KSC at its Ninth Party Con- 
gress issued "directives for new socialist culture." The congress 
declared that "literary and artistic production is an important agent 
of the ideological and cultural rebirth in our country, and it is des- 
tined to play a great role in the socialist education of the masses." 
Some arts maintained their tradition of excellence throughout the 
era. Theater productions relied on the classics for their repertoire. 
Czech filmmakers relied on anti-Nazi, World War II plots to 
produce works of world renown in the 1960s. This was and has 
continued to be a safe topic. But writers were a perennial source 
of consternation for the authorities. Officials of the Novotny regime 
periodically denounced them for "unprincipled liberalism." Those 
placed under interdict wrote, as the phrase went, "for the drawer"; 
some, like Novomesky, were sentenced to long prison terms. 

In the 1970s, the regime's policies toward the creative intelligent- 
sia were characterized by a compulsion to control creative activity, 
coupled with an active paranoia. These policies continued into the 
1980s. What motivated censors in ferreting out antisocialist senti- 
ments was sometimes difficult to fathom. Karel Gott, a popular 
male singer, recorded a song portraying a conversation between 
a casual lover and his sweetheart that was banned from radio and 
television. Officialdom found the lyrics "I'll flip a coin when you 
ask if I'm sincere or not when I say I love you" to be insulting 
to Czechoslovak currency. 

Artists and writers belonged to their own professional organiza- 
tions. Nonmembers could practice their art as long as they were 
loyal to the regime, although earning a living outside the major 
organizations was easier in some fields than others. Actors, as long 
as they did not aspire to major roles, did not need to join. Artists 
who were nonmembers effectively limited themselves to ornamental 
or industrial art. Musicians and singers faced further constraints. 
In particular, the regime found the personal habits of many mem- 
bers of popular musical groups too divergent from socialist ideals 
and subjected them to considerable harassment. In fact, it was the 
arrest and trial of The Plastic People of the Universe, a group active 
in the musical underground in the 1970s, that precipitated the draft- 
ing and signing of Charter 77 (see Popular Political Expression, 
ch. 4). 

Writers endured the greatest repression. For the purged, with 
limited exceptions, official publishing outlets were closed. In the 



110 



Slovak folk art 
painting on glass 
Courtesy 
Czechoslovak Life 




meantime, the three writers' unions (Czechoslovak, Czech, and 
Slovak), and especially the Czech Writers' Union, set about groom- 
ing a younger generation of writers who, if not overwhelmingly 
devoted to socialism, were at least assiduously apolitical. In the 
middle to late 1970s, there was a semithaw: the authorities per- 
mitted purged writers to recant and, after a proper measure of self- 
criticism, publish again. For those who did not avail themselves 
of this chance, options were indeed limited. By the end of the de- 
cade, the government had stepped up efforts to keep Czechoslovak 
authors from publishing abroad. Those writers who wished to pub- 
lish successfully at home kept to safe territory — science fiction, 
World War II novels, fantasy, and children's literature — all non- 
controversial, basically apolitical genres that dominated literary out- 
put in the 1980s. 

A complicated bureaucratic apparatus governed censorship at 
home. The most critical variable was whether a writer had been 
expelled from the KSC or simply dropped from its membership 
lists (see The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, ch. 4). There 
were various kinds and degrees of interdiction: some writers could 
translate but not write, others could write plays but nothing else, 
and so forth. Banned writers could sometimes publish their work 
if a "cover person" assumed authorship. The author might lose 
from one-third to one-half of the contract fee for the work and might 
have to permit the cover person to make substantial (and often 



111 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

unacceptable) changes in the work. The cover person faced stiff 
penalties if discovered by the authorities. Because normalization 
was characteristically milder in Slovakia, writers were sometimes 
able to publish works in Bratislava that the Prague censors found 
unacceptable. This was also partly due to the fact that the Slovak 
minister of culture was himself a writer. 

Associations 

In 1948 there were 6,000 to 7,000 clubs and societies in Czecho- 
slovakia; these had long been integral to social life and national 
aspirations. The right to form associations was first won in 1848, 
although the Hapsburgs, realizing that they had opened a Pandora's 
box in their ethnically diverse empire, revoked it soon thereafter. 
The Czech lands regained this freedom in 1867. Sokol clubs (gym- 
nastic organizations), cultural groups, savings and loan coopera- 
tives, and a host of other clubs proliferated in the Czech lands and 
anywhere Czech emigrants clustered. Turn-of-the-century Vienna 
(with more than 100,000 Czechs) had Czech theaters, clubs, 
newspapers, and banks. The Hungarians, however, offered more 
concerted opposition to Slovak efforts to organize. Slovak emigres 
formed organizations wherever they went, and these associations 
agitated for Slovakia's inclusion in the First Republic. 

A 1951 law gave the Ministry of Interior jurisdiction over asso- 
ciations, and in the 1960s there were only a few hundred societies 
still in existence. The right to form associations was limited, and 
the associations themselves were under strict KSC control. Cul- 
tural organizations operated under official auspices. Friendship 
leagues were particularly encouraged: Bulgarian-, Polish-, or 
Hungarian-Czechoslovak friendship societies could easily receive 
official approval. The regime particularly favored the Czechoslovak- 
Soviet Friendship League, though its rank-and-file membership 
declined as a result of a surge of anti-Soviet sentiment after the 
1968 invasion. There was official sponsorship for "Circles of 
Creativity" and "Houses of Enlightenment. " Cultural societies 
for German or Hungarian minorities were acceptable, but religious 
organizations faced significantly greater restrictions. Any associa- 
tion that might play a role in politics or the economy (that could 
however remotely or tenuously be construed to threaten KSC domi- 
nation) was out of the question. 

The Prague Spring reinforced this mania for control over asso- 
ciations. The reform movement's potential was nowhere more 
threatening to the hegemony of the party than in the population's 
persistent demands for more truly representative organizations in 
every area of life. That the KSC membership was underrepresented 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



in the popularly elected leadership of such organizations confirmed 
the conservatives' worst suspicions: this was a reform movement 
whose popular manifestations would prove difficult to control. The 
regime's response was to restrict associations still more. 

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 

According to Marxist-Leninist theory, the communist party 
represents the working class — the revolutionary proletariat — whose 
interests it champions against those of the capitalist bourgeoisie. 
The period between the fall of a bourgeois state and the attain- 
ment of communism is a subject on which Marx was reticent, be- 
lieving that the state would "wither away" once the workers took 
power. Lenin, facing a real revolution and the possibility that the 
communist party might be able to seize power, put theoretical 
subtleties to the side. He suggested that the fall of the bourgeois 
state (a label of questionable accuracy when applied to tsarist Russia) 
would be followed by a transitional state characterized by socialism 
and communist party rule — the "dictatorship of the proletariat." 
In practice, the transition from this phase to true communism has 
proved to be a good deal lengthier than Lenin anticipated. His sug- 
gestion that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" should last until 
1923 in the Soviet Union serves as a general commentary on the 
disparity between theory and practice. Once in power, the com- 
munist party has behaved very much like other entrenched 
bureaucracies, and its revolutionary mandate has been lost in the 
tendency of those in power to wish to remain so. 

The Communist Party of Czechoslovak (Komunisticka strana 
Ceskoslovenska — KSC), which was founded in 1921 , came to power 
in 1948 (see Communist Czechoslovakia, ch. 1). Because of the 
KSC's mandate to be the workers' party, questions about the social 
backgound of party members took on a particular salience. The 
KSC was often reticent with precise details about its members, and 
the question of how many in the party actually belonged to the 
revolutionary proletariat became a delicate one. Official statements 
appeared to overstate the percentage of workers within the party's 
ranks. Nonetheless, a number of trends were clear. The propor- 
tion of workers in the KSC was at its highest (approximately 60 
percent of the total membership) after World War II but before 
the party took power in 1948. After that time, the percentage of 
workers in the party fell steadily to a low of an estimated one-quarter 
of the membership in 1970. In the early 1970s, the official media 
decried the "grave imbalance," noting that "the present class and 
social structure of the party membership is not in conformity with 
the party's role as the vanguard of the working class." In highly 



113 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

industrialized central Bohemia, to cite one example, only one in 
every thirty-five workers was a party member, while one in every 
five administrators was. In 1976, after intensive efforts to recruit 
workers, the number of workers rose to one-third of the KSC mem- 
bership, i.e., approximately its 1962 level. In the 1980s, driven 
by the need for intensive economic development, the party relaxed 
its rigid rule about young workers' priority in admissions and 
allowed district and regional committees to be flexible in their 
recruitment policy, as long as the overall proportion of workers 
did not decrease. 

The average age of party members has shown a comparable 
trend. In the late 1960s, fewer than 30 percent of party members 
were under thirty-five years of age, nearly 20 percent were over 
sixty, and roughly half were forty-six or older. The quip in 1971, 
a half-century after the party's founding in Czechoslovakia, was 
"After fifty years, a party of fifty-year-olds." There was a deter- 
mined effort to attract younger members to the party in the middle 
to late 1970s; one strategy was to recruit children of parents who 
were KSC members. The party sent letters to the youngsters' 
schools and their parents' employers, encouraging the children 
to join. By early 1980 approximately one-third of KSC members 
were thirty-five years of age or younger. In 1983 the average age 
of the "leading cadre" was still estimated at fifty. 

Whatever the social composition of the party, it effectively func- 
tions as a ruling elite — a group not known for self-abnegation. As 
an elite, it allows the talented and/or politically agile significant 
mobility. Workers might have made up a minority of the party's 
membership, but many members (estimates vary from one-half to 
two-thirds) began their careers as workers. Although they tend to 
exaggerate their humble origins, many functionaries have clearly 
come from the working class. 

Several policies have increased the social mobility of party mem- 
bers. Foremost was doubtless the process of nationalization, started 
after World War II, when scores of politically active workers 
assumed managerial-level positions. Periodic purges have played 
a role as well, permitting the politically compliar^ to replace those 
less so (see Intelligentsia, this ch.). The numerous education pro- 
grams offered by the KSC for its members also represented a sig- 
nificant avenue of mobility, as did policies of preferential admissions 
to secondary schools and universities; these policies favored the chil- 
dren of workers and agricultural cooperative members especially 
(see Education, this ch.). 

It is hardly surprising that the KSC membership has guarded 
its perquisites. Aside from special shops, hotels, hospitals, and better 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



housing for members, KSC members stood a better chance of 
obtaining visas for study or travel abroad (especially to the West). 
Nonmembers realized that their possibilities for advancement in 
the workplace were severely limited. For anyone in a professional 
position, KSC membership was a sine qua non for promotion. Part 
of the decline in workers as a proportion of total membership 
resulted from the rapid increase in the number of intelligentsia join- 
ing the party soon after the communists took power. In the 1980s 
most economic managers, executives in public administration, and 
university professors were KSC members. 

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the official media have 
denounced party members' lack of devotion to the pursuit of KSC 
policies and goals. Complaints have ranged from members' refusal 
to display flags from their apartment windows on festive occasions 
to their failure to show up for party work brigades, attend meet- 
ings, or pay dues; a significant minority of members have tended 
to underreport their incomes (the basis for assessing dues). In 1970, 
after a purge of approximately one-third of the membership, an 
average of less than one-half the remaining members attended meet- 
ings. Perhaps one-third of the members were consistently recal- 
citrant in participating in KSC activities. In 1983 one primary party 
branch in the Prague-West district was so unmoved by admonish- 
ments that it had to be disbanded and its members dispersed among 
other organizations. In part, this was a measure of disaffection with 
Czechoslovakia's thoroughgoing subservience to Soviet hegemony, 
a Svejkian response to the lack of political economic autonomy. It 
was also a reflection of the purge's targets. Those expelled were 
often the ideologically motivated, the ones for whom developing 
socialism with a human face represented a significant goal; those 
who were simply opportunistic survived the purges more easily. 

Trade Unions 

In the 1980s, trade unions were the largest of all the organiza- 
tions. A single large federation, the Revolutionary Trade Union 
Movement, represented most wage earners (80 percent in 1983); 
to deny someone trade union membership was to imply extreme 
censure. The role of trade unions under communism is distinctly 
different from the role they play in Western society. Under capital- 
ism, unions represent the interests of workers against their em- 
ployers. When the state owns the means of production, there is, 
theoretically, no such conflict; the unions serve as a "school of so- 
cialism" for the membership, the goal being to mobilize workers 
in pursuit of socialist production goals. 



115 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

During the reform era before 1968, party reformers and 
workers alike criticized the Revolutionary Trade Movement as a 
bureaucratically unwieldy organization that was dominated by con- 
servative party functionaries and served as a "conveyor belt" for 
official labor policy. Workers typically wanted smaller, more 
representative unions and a variety of economic benefits. More 
disturbing to the authorities was workers' propensity to vote party 
members out of union office and to demand a range of reforms. 
These reforms were^not calculated to allay the fears of those who 
thought that the KSC's leading role was critical to socialist develop- 
ment. Among the demands were the elimination of party and police 
files on workers (workers often achieved this end by simply burn- 
ing the files) and the right of union and management representa- 
tives (not party officials) to decide personnel matters. 

Even more disturbing to the authorities was the tendency for 
workers' demands to be explicitly and unequivocally political. In 
major industrial centers, workers called for political pluralism, 
organized committees to defend freedom of the press, and voiced 
their support for the "Two Thousand Words" manifesto (see The 
Prague Spring, 1968, ch. 1). The Writers' Union went so far as 
to suggest that they would field a slate of candidates for the National 
Assembly elections. It was not a turn of events congenial to those 
who preferred Soviet-style socialism. Not surprisingly, the unions 
were an early target of normalization efforts. An estimated 20 to 
50 percent of the leadership was purged, and by the early 1970s 
the status quo had been effectively restored. 

Youth Organizations 

Because the creation of the "new socialist man" is an impor- 
tant part of communist ideology, youth organizations have always 
played an important role in communist regimes. After the 1948 
takeover, the KSC formed two Soviet-style youth organizations: 
the Pioneers (for youngsters eight to fifteen years old) and the 
Czechoslovak Union of Youth (ages fifteen to twenty-five). Both 
organizations were geared toward grooming their members (or a 
fortunate fraction of them) for KSC membership. 

By the late 1960s, some 70 percent of all those eligible were mem- 
bers of the Pioneers; the reform movement revealed, however, a 
number of points of dissatisfaction. Czechoslovak adherence to the 
Soviet model extended to uniform dress (white shirts and red ker- 
chiefs) and salutes, neither of which was popular among Czechs 
and Slovaks. In addition, Pioneers leadership was often less than 
devoted. In 1968, when the organization became voluntary, the 
number of leaders dropped precipitously; the resulting shortage 
persisted through the 1980s. 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Czechoslovak Union of Youth had a tumultuous history dur- 
ing the late 1960s and 1970s. As a feeder organization for the KSC, 
it faced many of the same problems the party faced in recruiting 
members. In the mid-1960s, less than half of all fifteen to twenty- 
five year olds were members; in the mid-1970s, fewer than one- 
third had joined. As in the case of the KSC, those who joined tended 
to do so with their future careers in mind; secondary school and 
university students were overrepresented, while only a fraction of 
the eligible industrial and agricultural workers belonged. Further- 
more, a single, centralized organization was simply an inadequate 
vehicle for the interests of such a diverse group. During the re- 
form era, the Czechoslovak Union of Youth split into a number 
of independent associations, including the Union of High School 
Students and Apprentices, the Union of Working Youth, and the 
Union of University Students. It was not a development the party 
found suitable, and beginning in 1969 party leaders set about recon- 
stituting a unified movement. During the same era, the 1968 
invasion spawned a number of dissident youth organizations. In 
the early 1970s, these were all infiltrated and repressed by the KSC, 
a policy that has continued through the 1980s. 

In 1970 the party organized the Czechoslovak Socialist Union 
of Youth, and by mid-decade the skewed recruitment pattern of 
its predecessor, the Czechoslovak Union of Youth, which had 
recruited more students than workers, had reappeared. The recruit- 
ment effort had been more intense than ever. "I know of only two 
types of students at this institution," commented one teacher, 
"those who will not graduate and those who are members of the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Union of Youth." The nets had been cast 
so widely that, not surprisingly, some members were unenthusiastic. 
Throughout the 1970s, there were complaints about the organiza- 
tion's propensity to take any and all joiners (even "beatniks," one 
writer complained), the association's apolitical and recreational 
focus, and a membership bent more on securing admission to a 
university than learning "the principles of socialist patriotism." 

In 1983 the Czechoslovak Socialist Union of Youth had a total 
membership of over 1.5 million. Twenty-five percent of the mem- 
bers were listed as workers, 3 percent as agricultural workers, and 
72 percent as "others." 

The Family 

In the mid-1980s, the family remained a significant force in 
Czechoslovak society, despite more than thirty-five years of KSC 
rule. Families played a pivotal role, according to many observers, 
in transmitting just those characteristic Czech and Slovak values 



117 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

that have often been criticized by the regime, e.g. , the Czech pen- 
chant for political pluralism and the Slovak devotion to Roman 
Catholicism. Nevertheless, socialism has had a distinctive if often 
unpredictable effect on family life. The employment of the vast 
majority of married women of child-bearing age has favored three- 
generation extended families, in which grandparents (especially 
grandmothers) have helped women deal with the often conflicting 
demands of work and child rearing (see Workers, this ch.). Fam- 
ily cooperation remained important because child-care centers could 
not accommodate all children of working mothers, nor would the 
centers accept children who were ill. 

Extended families in which a relative played a significant role 
in child rearing were more common in households where women 
had a secondary school or university education. Presumably the 
presence of a grandparent permitted these women to continue an 
education or assume work responsibilities that might have been 
precluded if they bore the major share of child care. Among urban 
households in which the woman had completed only elementary 
school or vocational training, relatives rarely played a role in child 
rearing (in less than 5 percent of those households surveyed, 
according to a 1970s report). In agricultural regions, where women 
often worked at home on family garden plots or worked only 
seasonally, the role of the extended family has been even more 
limited. 

Another factor encouraging extended family households has been 
Czechoslovakia's endemic housing shortage. Although the govern- 
ment's pronatalist policies favored married couples (especially those 
with children) in housing allocation, many young families (perhaps 
one-third) waited up to five years for their first separate apartment. 
Most of these families shared an apartment with a mother or 
mother-in-law. Divorced couples sometimes continued living 
together simply for want of other housing alternatives. For the 
elderly, who were expected to trade their apartments for smaller 
ones as spouses died and children left home, the situation was often 
difficult. 

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the number of marriages in 
Czechoslovakia declined while the number of divorces increased. 
Although marriages began to increase in 1982, the rate of divorce 
continued to climb; it rose from 14 percent in 1970 to 32 percent 
in 1985. 

Religion 

Czechoslovakia entered the socialist era with a varied religious 
heritage. There were nine major creeds listed in its censuses: 



118 



Old church in 
outdoor museum 
in Roznov pod 
Radhostem, Moravia 




Roman Catholic, Uniate (see Glossary), the Evangelical Church 
of Czech Brethren, Lutheran, Calvinist, Orthodox, the Czech 
Reformed Church (the Hussites), the Old Catholic Church, and 
Judaism. Nearly 6 percent of the population was without religious 
preference. At the time of the communist takeover, two of every 
three citizens were Roman Catholics, but within each major eth- 
nic group there was a sizable minority of Protestants: Czech 
Brethren in the Czech lands, Lutherans in Slovakia, and Calvinists 
among the Hungarians. 

In Bohemia and Moravia, the Roman Catholics' numerical 
preponderance was further tempered by a tradition of religious dis- 
sent and tolerance dating from the Hussite era. The Old Catho- 
lics split with Rome over the issue of papal infallibility in 1870, 
and the Czechoslovak National Church (an explicitly antipapal, 
nationalistic sect with Hussite and Unitarian overtones) followed 
suit in 1919-20. As the Vatican was amply aware, Czechoslovakia 
was hardly Rome's docile follower, and relations between the 
Vatican and the First Republic were often stormy. Twice, in 1925 
and 1933, the papal nuncio left in protest over what he perceived 
to be antipapal manifestations on the part of high-ranking govern- 
ment officials. Czechs had associated Roman Catholicism with for- 
eign domination since the forcible suppression of the Hussite 
movement. They viewed Catholicism as pro-Hapsburg and pro- 
German. 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

As of 1987, there had been no reliable national figures on reli- 
gious affiliation since before World War II. Estimates based on 
limited surveys indicated that Roman Catholics continued to 
predominate, accounting for nearly one-half the total population. 
Not surprisingly, those who did not profess a religious faith in- 
creased dramatically in the socialist era. The most provocative 
information on religious sentiments came from a series of surveys 
during the 1960s. In northern Moravia, survey results showed that 
30 percent of the respondents were atheists, another 30 percent were 
religious believers, and 40 percent were undecided. Presumably, 
there were fewer believers in more secular Bohemia and a greater 
number of believers in traditionally devout Slovakia. A late- 1960s 
survey in Slovakia found that "scientific atheism" had not caught 
on quite as much as the KSC might have hoped after twenty years 
of party rule. Only 14 percent were atheists and 15 percent un- 
decided; atheism was highest among people between the ages of 
25 and 39. Religious sentiment reflected social background: nine- 
tenths of all farmers were believers, as were three-fourths of all blue- 
collar workers and slightly more than one-half of all white-collar 
employees (see Social Groups, this ch.). Perhaps most disconcert- 
ing for the party was the realization that after two decades of 
denouncing clerics and clerical meddling in politics ("clerico- 
fascism"), 28 percent of those surveyed thought the clergy should 
have a public and political role. 

The relationship between the advocates of scientific atheism and 
various religious groups has been uneasy at best. The Czechoslovak 
Constitution permits freedom of religion and expression, but in 
the 1980s citizens were well advised not to take these guarantees 
too literally. Government-controlled organizations existed for most 
religious creeds except Jehovah's Witnesses, who were prohibited. 
The most prominent was the Roman Catholic Church. There were 
also a variety of Protestant sects, including the Czechoslovak Bap- 
tist Church, the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, the Slovak 
Evangelical Church, the Church of the Seventh-Day Adventists, 
and the Methodist Church of Czechoslovakia. Also represented were 
the Czechoslovak National Church, the Uniate Church, and Jewish 
communities. In 1981 a number of church dignitaries stood before 
the Czechoslovak minister of culture to take a vow of loyalty to 
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 

Official policy toward religious groups in the 1980s was consis- 
tent with that of the early socialist era, when a series of measures 
sought to bring organized religion to heel. The state exercised sub- 
stantial control over clerical appointments, religious instruction, 
preaching, and proselytization. Roman Catholics and Uniates were 



120 



The Society and Its Environment 



the major targets. The government closed convents and monasteries 
and strictly limited admissions to the two remaining seminaries. 
During the Stalinist trials of the 1950s, more than 6,000 religious 
people (some old and sick) received prison sentences averaging more 
than five years apiece. Between 1948 and 1968, the number of 
priests declined by half, and half the remaining clergy were over 
sixty years of age. The Catholic Church had already lost a sub- 
stantial number of clergy with the expulsion of the Sudeten Ger- 
mans; it faced significant problems with understaffed parishes and 
an aging clergy. Protestant sects, less dependent on a centralized 
hierarchy in the running of ecclesiastical affairs and less promi- 
nent because of their minority status, fared better. 

Uniates had close historic ties to both the Roman Catholic Church 
and the Eastern Orthodox churches. The communist regime sought 
to Russify whatever it could and followed a longstanding Russian 
policy of opposing the Uniate Church. Soon after coming to power, 
the party forcibly repressed the Uniate Church (following the earlier 
example of the Soviet Union) in favor of the Russian Orthodox 
Church. The Orthodox had been a distinct minority in Czecho- 
slovakia, but Orthodox priests took over parishes as the Uniate 
clergy were imprisoned or sent to work on farms in the Czech lands. 
The shortage of priests was so extreme that the party gave a crash 
course in Orthodox doctrine to "politically mature" teachers in 
the region and sent them into Uniate churches as replacements. 
Uniates responded with various forms of resistance, ranging from 
simply leaving church whenever an Orthodox priest arrived to hold- 
ing services among themselves. 

The situation for the churches brightened only briefly during 
the Prague Spring. The regime of Alexander Dubcek allowed the 
most closely controlled of the government-sponsored religious 
organizations (the Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy and its 
Protestant counterpart) to lapse into inactivity. In 1968 the govern- 
ment also promised a prompt and humane solution to the Uniates' 
predicament (induced in part by the Uniates seizing "Orthodox" 
churches and demanding their own clergy and rites) and officially 
recognized the Uniate Church. 

This was an ephemeral thaw in the party's hard-line approach 
to religion. In the 1970s, the situation of religious groups in 
Czechoslovakia again deteriorated. The Roman Catholic Church, 
under the spiritual leadership of Frantisek Cardinal Tomasek, arch- 
bishop of Prague, was once more the principal target. Through- 
out the 1970s, the regime arrested clergy and lay people for 
distributing religious samizdat literature. Protestant and Jewish 
groups were also harassed, but the Orthodox churches and the 



121 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Czechoslovak National Church were generally spared. In an effort 
to ensure a group of compliant and loyal clergy, the regime of 
Gustav Husak organized a number of state-controlled associations, 
including the Ecumenical Council of the Churches of the Czecho- 
slovak Socialist Republic and the Czechoslovak Association of 
Catholic Clergy (more commonly known as Pacem in Terris), with 
Czech and Slovak branches. 

The regime showed a willingness to permit religous groups to 
practice their creeds as long as the clergy and the faithful did not 
bring religion into public life. The complication was that the re- 
gime counted almost anything as public life and so, for example, 
disallowed sermons on the high divorce rate or neglected children. 
Because the state licensed all clergy, it could weed out anyone 
deemed unresponsive to state requirements. Thus the clergy, who 
needed state approval to minister at all, were in a vulnerable posi- 
tion. By mid- 1986 the regime had prohibited some 400 (of an 
approximate 3,200) Roman Catholic priests from ministering. 

Theology departments continued to operate under strict admis- 
sion quotas, and staffing problems grew throughout the decade. 
Chief Rabbi Richard Feder died in 1970, leaving the Czech Jewish 
communities without rabbinical direction until 1984. (Slovakia's 
rabbi was Samuel Grossman.) The new chief rabbi for the coun- 
try, Daniel Mayer, studied for the rabbinate in Budapest. In 1972 
the death of three Roman Catholic bishops and the revocation of 
state approval of a fourth exacerbated the already acute shortage 
of Roman Catholic leaders. Talks between the Vatican and the 
regime were sporadic through the 1970s and produced few material 
gains for Czechoslovak Roman Catholics. The perennial conflict 
remained: the appointment of regime loyalists in opposition to 
choices for parish and diocesan posts. In 1986, out of thirteen church 
offices, nine bishoprics were vacant and two archbishoprics 
(Olomouc and Trnava) had only bishops holding office. 

In late 1980, there were signs of worsening church-state rela- 
tions. In October a number of students at the Cyril and Methodius 
Faculty of Divinity in Bratislava began a hunger strike in protest 
against Pacem in Terris. The state-controlled movement, they said, 
tried to undermine unity between priests and bishops. In an appa- 
rent reply to the incident, Bratislava's Pravda took the opportunity 
to denounce the resurgence of "clerico-fascist ideology," which, 
given the growth of socialism (commentators were quick to note), 
lacked a constituency in Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless, clericalism 
acted on "instructions of the church and clerical centers in the 
capitalist world." The official media were particularly critical of 
the "secret church," which the Vatican described as " not only 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



the secretly ordained priests and bishops, secret convents and secret 
printing establishments in the country, but also the existing Catholic 
organizations and spiritual underground movements, as well as all 
priests and believers who are working illegally in the sphere of the 
church." These, however, were not organized into a single net- 
work. The underground church was believed to be particularly 
strong in Slovakia. 

If normalization after 1968 took a higher toll on the Czechs, the 
Slovaks have more recently borne the brunt of religious persecu- 
tion. Slovakia's traditional adherence to religion and an upsurge 
in belief and practices in the mid-1980s brought on sustained harass- 
ment and atheistic propaganda in Slovakia to a greater degree than 
in the Czech lands. Although methods differed, religious persecu- 
tion in Slovakia equaled that suffered by the Charter 77 human 
rights activists and proscribed writers in the Czech lands (see Popu- 
lar Political Expression, ch. 4). 

A development that was particularly distressing to the authori- 
ties was the growing interest in religion on the part of young peo- 
ple in Czechoslovakia. Of the more than 100,000 people who took 
part in celebrations relating to the 1 , 100th anniversary of the death 
of Saint Methodius, Cardinal Tomasek noted that " two-thirds 
of the pilgrims were young people. ..." One culprit was seen to 
be the education system, which did not sufficiently stress a scientific- 
atheistic education (see Education, this ch.). 

A number of policies were aimed at curtailing public religious 
observance. Known adherence to a religious sect meant limited 
opportunity for advancement in the workplace. Parents had the 
right to religious instruction for their primary- school children, but 
to ask for it was to seriously hamper a child's chances for admis- 
sion to secondary school and the university. The Ministry of Edu- 
cation issued a series of directives for teachers elaborating the errors 
of religion (among which were idealism and an inadequate set of 
ethical directives) and calling it an ideological weapon of the bour- 
geoisie. 

Health and Social Welfare 

In the 1980s, Czechoslovakia had a comprehensive and univer- 
sal system of social security under which everyone was entitled to 
free medical care and medicine, in theory at least. National health 
planning emphasized preventive medicine. Factory and local health 
care centers, first aid stations, and a variety of medical clinics sup- 
plemented hospitals and other inpatient institutions. The ratio of 
physicians to inhabitants has improved steadily, climbing from 
1 per 745 in 1954 to 1 per 278 in 1985, although there were 



123 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

shortages of doctors in rural areas. The shift in the distribution 
of health resources in the 1960s and 1970s was dramatic; facilities 
were improved, and the number of health care personnel in Slovakia 
and rural areas increased in general. Despite the improvements, 
there still remained serious problems in the health-care sector. About 
40 percent of all the medical equipment was obsolete, facilities were 
outdated and in short supply, the bureaucracy was excessive, 
bribery was widespread (if not the rule), and many urgently needed 
medications were available only on the black market. 

Spas in Czechoslovakia were part of the health care system. In 
1985 more than 460,000 people (5 percent of whom were children) 
stayed at the 35 spas in the Czech lands and 23 spas in Slovakia. 
Many spas had been in existence for centuries, such as Bardejov 
(since the thirteenth century) in Slovakia and Karlovy Vary 
(Karlsbad) in the Czech lands. Many of them specialized in the 
care and treatment of particular kinds of ailments. All had either 
mineral or hot springs, and some also offered mud treatments. In 
bygone days, the spas were frequented by European royalty and 
the wealthy, but now they are open to all, including foreign tourists 
(who made up 10 percent of the patients in 1985). A number of 
people visited spas on vouchers provided by their trade unions. 

In 1984 life expectancy in Czechoslovakia was sixty-seven years 
for men and seventy-five years for women. In 1950 women's life 
expectancy was approximately 4.6 years longer than men's; by 1983 
this difference had increased to nearly 7.5 years. Infant mortality 
stood at 10.5 per 1,000 live births in 1984, down from 15.6 per 
1,000 in 1975. As with medical care, the gap in life expectancy 
between the Czech lands and Slovakia was narrowed during this 
period. 

In 1985 slightly more than one-quarter of the Czechoslovak popu- 
lation received some kind of pension; the elderly, the disabled, 
widows, and orphans were all entitled to assistance. Social secur- 
ity benefits (primarily retirement and disability) were equal for all 
wage earners. The average pension was less than Kcs 1,000 per 
month (workers received an average pension of about Kcs 1,130, 
cooperative farmers about Kcs880, and independent farmers about 
Kcs720); this put pensioners among the lowest income earners. A 
substantial minority of the retired (23 percent) again took up em- 
ployment to supplement their pensions. 

Women workers had a full complement of maternity and child- 
care benefits. Maternity leave (at 90 percent of full pay) was twenty- 
six weeks in the 1980s; an additional nine weeks were available 
for single mothers or for months having multiple births. Employers 
could not deny a woman's request for an additional year of 



124 



Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad) 
Courtesy Eugene C. Robertson 



unpaid leave for child rearing (without loss of job seniority). A sys- 
tem of child allowances and maternity grants also assisted women 
who took unpaid leave. Women were allowed three days of annual 
leave in case of illness within the family. There were substantial 
family allowances, in addition to direct grants, to single parents 
or families with handicapped children. An unmarried mother, 
widow, or divorced mother could not be fired if she had a child 
under three years of age; if she had children between three and 
fifteen years of age, her employer had to find her another job before 
dismissing her. 

Nursery facilities for younger children were in very short sup- 
ply; in 1984 they could accommodate less than 10 percent of chil- 
dren under five years of age. Beyond the sheer lack of space, 
nurseries were poorly distributed and were often concentrated in 
older centers rather than in new housing developments where young 
families were likely to reside. Kindergartens were in better sup- 
ply, and a much higher percentage of children between the ages 
of three and six years attended these schools. High employment 
of women and inadequate services contributed to the decline in 
Czechoslovakia's birthrate in the 1960s. Live births during the 
decade averaged 16 per 1,000 inhabitants, a significant drop from 
the 1950s. By 1968 the fertility rate was 2 percent (in comparison 
with 3 percent in the 1950s); at this rate the population would not 



125 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

replace itself. In the Czech lands, the population growth rate stood 
at its 1930s low; in Catholic Slovakia, it was the lowest on record. 

The government adopted a variety of explicitly pronatalist poli- 
cies in the 1970s. Family allowances increased, especially for second 
and third children. By 1973 a family with three children received 
roughly one-third the average worker's salary in allowances. Birth 
grants doubled so that they were the equivalent of two to four weeks 
of family income. Low-interest loans to newlyweds were designed 
so that a portion of the principal was canceled with the birth of 
each child (Kcsl ,000 for the first and Kcs4,000 for each subsequent 
child). All told, the financial incentives were substantial. In addi- 
tion, couples with children had priority on apartment waiting lists 
and were entitled to larger living quarters, no small inducement 
in the face of Czechoslovakia's chronic housing shortage. 

Pronatalist policies appear to have had a strong influence on 
population growth during the 1970s. The birthrate climbed from 
its 1968 low (14.9 per 1 ,000 inhabitants) to a peak of 19.9 per 1 ,000 
inhabitants in 1974 — one of the highest rates among industrial 
nations. Perhaps a quarter of this increase reflected the increase 
in the number of women of child-bearing age in the 1970s. After 
1974, however, the birthrate steadily declined, falling to 14.5 by 
1985. Figures indicated that a trend toward one-child families was 
emerging. The message seemed to be that after one decade the 
government's aid program was ineffective. 

A major factor influencing the birthrate was the abortion rate. 
The number of abortions fluctuated between the 1950s and 1980s, 
dropping in the early 1960s and the early 1970s. In 1985 there were 
reportedly 144,712 abortions, or 39 abortions per 100 pregnan- 
cies (33.5 per 100 in the Slovak Socialist Republic and 42.1 per 
100 in the Czech Socialist Republic). It has been suggested that 
abortion has remained one of the most favored means of birth con- 
trol, despite the risks involved. A 1986 change in the abortion law 
(eliminating the panel needed to approve a request for an abor- 
tion) suggested that the regime was giving up in its efforts to reverse 
at least this aspect of the adverse demographic trends. 

Education 

Czechoslovakia has a tradition of academic and scholarly en- 
deavor in the mainstream of European thought and a history of 
higher education dating from the Middle Ages. Charles University 
was founded in Prague in 1348, and the Academia Istropolitana 
was founded in Bratislava in 1465. In the First Republic, educa- 
tion was the chief instrument for dealing with ethnic diversity. 
Perhaps in no other aspect of public life did Czechoslovakia more 



126 



The Society and Its Environment 



effectively address the disparities among Czechs, Slovaks, Hun- 
garians, Ukrainians, and Germans. Eight years of compulsory edu- 
cation in the native language of each ethnic minority did much 
to raise literacy rates, particularly among Slovaks and Ukrainians. 
An expanded program of vocational education increased the tech- 
nical skills of the country's growing industrial labor force. Some 
disparities remained, however. Germans and Czechs predominated 
disproportionately in secondary schools and universities. In the 
Czech lands compulsory education, even in rural areas, had begun 
nearly half a century before the advent of the republic. Prosper- 
ous farmers and even cottagers and tenants had a long history of 
boarding their children in towns or cities for secondary, vocational, 
and higher education. Despite regional and ethnic imbalances, 
Czechoslovakia entered the socialist era with a literate, even highly 
educated, populace. 

Education under KSC rule has a history of periodic reforms (often 
attempting to fit the Soviet model) and efforts to maintain ideo- 
logical purity within schools. At the same time, higher education 
has been a reward for political compliance. By the mid-1970s, the 
historical disparity in educational resources between the Czech lands 
and Slovakia had been largely redressed. A certain equity in educa- 
tional opportunity was achieved, partly through the concerted efforts 
of policy makers and partly through the vicissitudes of normali- 
zation. 

The Czechoslovak education system has four basic levels: nurs- 
ery and kindergarten; a compulsory, nine-year primary cycle; var- 
ious kinds of secondary schools; and a variety of institutions of 
higher education. Education is compulsory between the ages of six 
and sixteen. In 1974-75 planners began an education reform, short- 
ening the primary cycle from nine to eight years and standardiz- 
ing curricula within the secondary- school system. The state financed 
education, and all textbooks and instructional material below the 
university level were free. 

Secondary schools included gymnasiums, stressing general edu- 
cation and preparation for higher education, and vocational schools, 
which emphasized technical training; both were four-year programs. 
A highly developed apprenticeship program and a system of secon- 
dary vocational/professional programs were attached to specific 
industries or industrial plants. In both secondary and higher edu- 
cation, provision was made for workers to attend evening study 
in combination with work-release time. 

In 1985 there were 36 universities or university-level institutions 
of higher education, comprising 110 faculties; 23 were located in 
the Czech Socialist Republic, and 13 were located in the Slovak 



127 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Socialist Republic. The mid-1970s reform shortened the course of 
study in most fields from five to four years. A 1980 law on higher 
education increased the control of the Czech and Slovak ministries 
of education over universities and technical colleges. Postgradu- 
ate study involved three to six years of study. Faculties could exist 
within a university system or as independent entities (as in the case 
of the six theological faculties under the direction of both repub- 
lics' ministries of culture, or educational faculties sometimes 
administered directly by the republics' ministries of education). 

Educational enrollment and admissions have been delicate mat- 
ters during the socialist era. Virtually everyone attended primary 
school, and a majority of those of secondary-school age attended 
some kind of specialized training or a gymnasium (see table 6, 
Appendix A). Beyond this, however, the questions surrounding 
university admissions (and who attends secondary schools and who 
becomes an apprentice) took on political overtones. In the 1950s 
the children of political prisoners, well-to-do farmers, or known 
adherents of one or another religion were victims of the party's 
discriminatory admissions policies. 

Youngsters of working-class or peasant background ostensibly 
had preference over those of other socioeconomic groups. However, 
a look at students' backgrounds during the 1950s and 1960s reveals 
that in no year did children of workers or peasants constitute a 
majority of those in institutions of higher education. Precise esti- 
mates vary, but through the mid-1960s workers' families gained 
an average of one-third of the admission slots, peasants a mere 10 
percent, and "others" nearly 60 percent. The proletariat fared bet- 
ter in Slovakia, where nearly half of those with secondary school 
or university degrees came from workers' or peasants' families. 

The regime made intensive efforts to improve the educational 
status of women in the 1970s. The number of women who com- 
pleted a course of higher education jumped by 93 percent between 
1970 and 1980 (for men the increase was 48 percent). Although 
women continued to cluster in such traditionally female areas of 
employment as health and teaching, their enrollment in many secon- 
dary schools outstripped that of men. Women have accounted for 
40 percent of university enrollment since the mid-1960s. In the 
1985-86 school year, this figure was 43 percent. 

In 1971 the regime announced that "The selection of applicants 
must clearly be political in character. . . . We make no secret of 
the fact that we want to do this at the schools in a manner that 
will guarantee that future graduates will be supporters of social- 
ism and that they will place their knowledge at the service of socialist 
society." This was the "principled class approach," a complex set 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



of criteria that purportedly refected a student's "talent, interest 
in the chosen field, class origins, civic and moral considerations, 
social and political activism of the parents, and the result of the 
admission examination." In practice, class background and par- 
ents' political activities outweighed all other factors. Children of 
dissidents, of those in political disfavor, or of open adherents of 
a religious sect were denied admission to higher education in favor 
of children whose parents were party members or who were of 
proletarian origin. 

Amnesty International reported in 1980 that institutions ranked 
applicants according to the following criteria: students whose par- 
ents were both KSC members, children of farmers or workers, and 
those with one parent a KSC member. Students who failed to meet 
any of these conditions were considered last. Children of dissidents 
were effectively disqualified. The system allowed for some manipu- 
lation; a member of the intelligentsia without a political blot on 
his or her record might have taken a job as a worker temporarily 
to permit his child a claim to proletarian status. There were charges 
as well of bribes and corruption surrounding university admissions. 
Whatever the mechanism involved, the social composition of the 
student body shifted in the mid-1970s; roughly half of all students 
in higher education were from workers' or farmers' families. 

Charter 77 protested discrimination in educational admissions 
based on parents' political activity; there was some indication by 
the late 1970s that, if parental sins could still be visited on the chil- 
dren, at least questions concerning their parents' past and present 
political affiliations would be less blatant. Whether or not politicizing 
university admissions ensured that graduates would be "supporters 
of socialism" could be debated. However, it is evident that in con- 
trolling university admissions the regime knew how to ensure 
acquiescence on the part of most Czechoslovak citizens. If a moder- 
ately secure livelihood and a reasonable standard of living were 
the regime's "carrots," excluding children of dissidents from higher 
education was one of its more formidable "sticks." 

* * * 

English-language material on contemporary Czechoslovak society 
is limited. The Czechoslovak government periodically publishes 
the Statistical Survey of Czechoslovakia, a summary of the annual 
Statistickd rocenka CSSR, which contains a wide variety of statistical 
information. It also publishes a glossy monthly, Czechoslovak Life, 
available in several languages, which offers a view of life in the 
republic, albeit through rose-colored glasses. 



129 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Roy E.H. Mellor's Eastern Europe provides good background 
information, as does Joseph Rothschild's East Central Europe Between 
the Two World Wars. Robert W. Dean's Nationalism and Political 
Change in Eastern Europe and Stanislav J. Kirschbaum's "Slovak 
Nationalism in Socialist Czechoslovakia" both provide insight into 
Czech-Slovak relations in the 1970s. Jaroslav Krejci's Social Change 
and Stratification in Postwar Czechoslovakia assesses socioeconomic 
relations between the two republics from early in the post-World 
War II era until the mid-1970s. 

The eventful late 1960s and the 1970s are reviewed by Vladimir 
V. Kusin in Political Groupings in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement, 
From Dubcek to Charter 77, and "Challenge to Normalcy: Political 
Opposition in Czechoslovakia, 1968-77," and also by Otto Ulc, 
in Politics in Czechoslovakia and "Some Aspects of Czechoslovak 
Society since 1968." Ota Sik's Czechoslovakia: The Bureaucratic Econ- 
omy and Radoslav Selucky's Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe: 
Political Background and Economic Significance, both works by former 
Czechoslovak officials purged during normalization, offer analyses 
of the problems that gave impetus to the reform movement. Women 
under Communism, by Barbara Wolfe Jancar, "Women in East 
European Socialist Countries" by Jarmila L.A. Horna, and 
"Women's Labour Participation in Czechoslovakia since World 
War II" by Alena Heitlinger describe the role of women in Czecho- 
slovak society. 

Developments affecting Czechoslovakia's dissidents in the late 
1970s and early 1980s are reviewed by O. Sojka in "The Bounds 
of Silence," H. Gordon Skilling in "Charter 77 and the Musical 
Underground," and Charles Sawyer in "Writing on the Party's 
Terms." Jiff Otava's "Religious Freedom in Czechoslovakia" and 
Peter A. Toma and Milan J. Reban's "Church-State Schism in 
Czechoslovakia," review church-state relations and detail some of 
the difficulties that believers face in communist Czechoslovakia. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



130 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




Facets of the Czechoslovak economy 



IN THE MID-1980S, Czechoslovakia was one of Eastern Europe's 
most industrialized and prosperous countries. Although levels of 
consumption were well below those common in Western Europe, 
inhabitants of Czechoslovakia enjoyed a standard of living gener- 
ally higher than that found in most other East European countries. 
Heavily dependent on foreign trade, the country nevertheless had 
one of Eastern Europe's smallest international debts to noncom- 
munist countries. 

The Czechoslovak economy had serious problems, however. In- 
vestments made in industry during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
had not yielded the results expected. Consumption of energy and 
raw materials was excessive. Czechoslovak leaders themselves 
decried the economy's failure to modernize with sufficient speed. 
According to many Western analysts, other constraints were in- 
herent in the communist system imposed in the late 1940s; yet the 
cautious Czechoslovak leadership of the 1980s appeared reluctant 
to make major changes. 

The differing statistical concepts and procedures used by com- 
munist and noncommunist economists make assessment of the status 
of the Czechoslovak economy complicated. In recent years, some 
Western economists have been especially vexed by what they con- 
sider to be official Czechoslovak manipulation of economic statis- 
tics. Various studies of the official industrial production index have 
suggested several biases, the most important of which appeared 
to be the inclusion of new products at increased prices, although 
a given product may have been almost unchanged from one 
manufactured a year earlier. This kind of bias could accentuate 
the growth rates of fast-growing industrial branches and sectors 
as opposed to slower-growing ones or those that produced a stan- 
dardized product, and thus the statistics could lead to a skewed 
picture of overall industrial growth. Foreign trade statistics are par- 
ticularly difficult to assess because a variety of currency conver- 
sion methods are employed to calculate trade turnover value. Data 
calculated on the basis of noncommunist concepts will be identi- 
fied here by the use of such Western terms as gross national product; 
Czechoslovak statistics will be called official data or identified by 
such terms as net material product or national income. 

Resource Base 

Czechoslovakia has significant quantities of coal. Hard coal 
suitable for extraction is found in the Ostrava coalfields and 



133 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

near Kladno, Plzeri (Pilsen), Kosice, and Trutnov. Brown coal and 
lignite deposits are located around Chomutov and Most, in the 
Sokolov field near Karlovy Vary, at Teplice, at Ceske Budejovice, 
and near Modry Kamen and Handlova in Slovakia. Reserves of 
oil and natural gas are rather small. 

Iron ore continues to be mined in the Slovenske rudohorie (Slovak 
Ore Mountains) and near Prague and Plzen, but reserves have 
nearly been exhausted. There are also deposits of copper and man- 
ganese ores in the Slovenske rudohorie. Lead and zinc ores are 
found at Kutna Hora and Pribram in central Bohemia, but in 
insignificant quantities. There are small amounts of mercury, 
antimony, and tin in the Krusne hory (Ore Mountains), which 
also contain substantial uranium deposits. Additional mineral 
resources include salt in Slovakia, graphite near Ceske Budejovice, 
and kaolin near Plzen and Karlovy Vary. 

In the 1980s, agricultural land constituted just under 55 percent 
of the country's total land area, and most of this land was suitable 
for tillage. The soil is relatively fertile in the lowlands but less 
productive in the mountainous regions. About one-third of the 
country's territory is forested. Czechoslovakia's forests have been 
seriously affected by environmental problems, primarily "acid rain" 
pollution from coal-fired power stations. In the 1980s, the authorities 
acknowledged the seriousness of the problem, and the Eighth Five- 
Year Plan (1986-90) allocated funding to combat the pollution. 

Labor Force 

In 1985 Czechoslovakia's total labor force amounted to about 
7.6 million persons. Of these, 46.1 percent were women, giving 
Czechoslovakia one of the highest female labor rates in the world. 
Almost 88 percent of the population of working age (between 15 
and 59 years of age for men and between 15 and 54 for women) 
was employed in 1985. About 37.4 percent of the work force was 
in industry, 13.7 percent in agriculture and forestry, 24.3 percent 
in other productive sectors, and 24.6 percent in the so-called non- 
productive (mainly services) sectors (see table 7, Appendix A). 

During the first two decades following World War II, redistri- 
bution of the work force, especially movement from agriculture 
to industry, had provided an influx of workers for the government's 
program emphasizing heavy industry. Women also had entered 
the work force in record numbers. But falling birthrates in the 1960s, 
noticeable first in the Czech lands but subsequently occurring in 
Slovakia as well, gave reason for concern. During the 1970s, the 
government introduced various measures to encourage workers to 
continue working after reaching retirement age, with modest 



134 



The Economy 



success. In addition, the large number of women already participat- 
ing in the work force precluded significant increases from this 
source. 

By the mid-1980s, the labor supply was a serious problem for 
Czechoslovakia. During the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1981-85), 
the work force increased by less than 3 percent. Because Czecho- 
slovakia's service sectors were less developed than those of the in- 
dustrialized countries of Western Europe, during the 1980s 
employment in services continued to expand faster than employ- 
ment in the productive sectors. The expansion placed additional 
constraints on industrial enterprises seeking to fill positions. Some 
Western observers suggested that the labor shortage resulted in part 
from the tendency of many industrial enterprises to overstaff their 
operations. 

Party and government officials set wage scales and work norms. 
As part of reform measures effective after 1980, incentive rewards 
represented a larger share of total pay than had previously been 
the case. Work norms also increased. Officials were clearly solicit- 
ing a greater effort from workers, in terms of both quantity and 
quality (see Workers, ch. 2). 

In the mid-1980s, most of the labor force was organized and was 
represented, at least in theory, by unions (see Auxiliary Parties, 
Mass Organizations, and Mass Media, ch. 4). The party controlled 
the unions, and a major task of the unions was to motivate workers 
to work harder and fulfill the plan goals. The unions served as 
vehicles for disseminating desired views among the workers. The 
principal activity of the trade unions was the administration of health 
insurance, social welfare, and workers' recreation programs. 

Economic Structure and Its Control Mechanisms 

In the mid-1980s, Czechoslovakia had a highly industrialized 
economy, a fact reflected in the 1985 official statistics concerning 
production of the net material product of the country (the official 
measure of aggregate production). The industrial sector accounted 
for 59.7 percent of the value of the net material product; construc- 
tion, 11.2 percent; agriculture and forestry, 7.5 percent; and vari- 
ous other productive services (including transport, catering, and 
retailing, among other activities), 21.6 percent. As of 1980 the so- 
cialist sector (state enterprises or cooperatives) generated 97.4 per- 
cent of the national income. Of the total work force, almost 99.8 
percent was employed in the socialist sector. 

The Czechoslovak economy, like most economies in communist 
countries, differs markedly from market or mixed economies. The 
most notable feature common to nearly all communist economies, 



135 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

including Czechoslovakia, is the deliberate and almost complete 
severance between market forces and the allocation and use of 
resources. In market economies, decisions by individual consumers 
and producers tend automatically to regulate supply and demand, 
consumption and investment, and other economic variables. In 
most communist economies, these variables are determined by a 
small governing group and are incorporated in a national plan 
that has the force of law. The leaders and planners make most 
economic decisions: setting quotas for production units that are 
almost completely state owned; directing the flow of materials 
through the economy; establishing prices for nearly everything, 
including labor and capital; and controlling investment and con- 
sumption. Most communist economies are organized vertically in 
a command structure radiating from the central authorities down 
to the individual production units. This is the case in Czecho- 
slovakia, where the centralized economic structure parallels that 
of the government and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
(Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska — KSC). This structure gives 
the party firm control over the government and the economy. It 
is generally referred to as the Soviet model and was first applied 
in the Soviet Union, which was initially an agrarian nation with 
extensive natural resources, a large internal market, and relatively 
little dependence on foreign trade; the goal was to quickly develop 
heavy industry and defense production. Czechoslovakia, by con- 
trast, was a small country that had already reached a high level 
of industrialization and was rather heavily dependent on foreign 
trade when the Soviet system was first imposed after World War II. 

Government ministries prepare general directives concerning the 
desired development of the economy (see Government Structure, 
ch. 4). They pass these along to the economic advisory body, the 
Central Planning Commission, which in turn prepares the long- 
term targets of the economy. These are expressed in extensive eco- 
nomic plans — in general plans covering periods fifteen to twenty 
years into the future and in the well-known five-year plans. Since 
1969, economic plans for the Czech Socialist Republic and the 
Slovak Socialist Republic have been produced by their own plan- 
ning commissions, although the central plan remains the most im- 
portant. Most significant on a daily operational basis, however, 
are the short-term annual production objectives. In their final form, 
these more detailed annual plans have the force of law, no longer 
being merely guides or recommendations. 

In formulating the various plans, the Central Planning Com- 
mission converts the directives of the ministries into physical units, 
devises assignments for key sectors of the economy, and then 



136 



The Economy 



delivers this information to the appropriate ministries, which oversee 
various functional branches of the economy. The production plans 
are made more specific and concrete through implementation of 
the system of "material balances," an accounting system that 
allocates available materials and equipment in an effort to make 
plan fulfillment possible for all sectors in the economy. 

Upon receiving their assignments, the various ministries further 
subdivide the plan into tasks for the industrial enterprises and trusts 
or groups of enterprises under their supervision. (A parallel process 
takes place for agriculture, in which the federal Ministry of Agricul- 
ture and Food supervises the planning procedures for the collec- 
tives and state farms.) The ministries provide more detailed 
instructions concerning fulfillment of the assignments and pass them 
along to the trusts and enterprises. Upon receipt of their proposed 
tasks, individual enterprises draw up a draft plan with the assistance 
of their parent trust or ministry. As noted by economist John 
Stevens, during this phase of planning an important reverse flow 
of information occurs, from the actual producers at the bottom of 
the hierarchy to the authorities at the top. Bargaining may take 
place among the various levels. After receiving feedback concern- 
ing the plan, the ministries consult again with the Central Plan- 
ning Commission and, assembling all the draft plans, formulate 
an operational plan that can achieve the central directives. The 
appropriate parts of the assignments are then dispatched once again 
to the trusts and enterprises. This time, their acceptance by the 
enterprises and trusts is mandatory. 

The norms included in the instructions to the enterprises usually 
specify the volume and kinds of production required, inputs avail- 
able, a production schedule, job categories and wage rates, and 
a description of the centrally funded investment planned. National 
and republic budget levies and subsidies, profit targets and limita- 
tions, and plans for the introduction of new products and technol- 
ogy are also set forth in the instructions. 

Evaluation of enterprise performance occurs on several levels. 
The planning authorities assess plan fulfillment, but there are 
additional control devices internal and external to the enterprise. 
Among the duties of KSC members and trade union leaders within 
the enterprise is monitoring plan fulfillment. The federal Minis- 
try of Finance also sends representatives into the enterprise to in- 
vestigate accounts. In addition, the State Bank of Czechoslovakia 
can exert influence on enterprise activities by monitoring enter- 
prise bank accounts (see Banking and Finance, this ch.). Neverthe- 
less, the main source of information for the planners is the 
enterprises themselves. 



137 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Under the Czechoslovak system, foreign trade is a state monop- 
oly, supervised by the central Ministry of Foreign Trade. The minis- 
try oversees the operation of about thirty foreign trade enterprises. 
As intermediaries between the domestic export producers or im- 
port purchasers and the external market, the enterprises are respon- 
sible for arranging contracts as well as for financing and generally 
supervising Czechoslovak foreign trade, usually setting prices that 
have little connection with domestic production factors. 

Advocates of this centralized system of managing the economy 
contend that it has a number of advantages. In a centrally planned 
system, authorities can distribute resources and production targets 
as they choose, balancing the needs of consumption and invest- 
ment on the basis of long-range goals. Planners in postwar Czecho- 
slovakia, for example, were thus able to expand the country's heavy 
industrial base as they wished. In turn, research efforts, being cen- 
trally directed, can focus on areas deemed vital to the economy's 
goals. In general, central planning can make it possible for pro- 
ducers to take advantage of economies of scale, eliminating super- 
fluous and wasteful activities. If planning is really effective, the 
system should result in virtually full employment of resources. 

As critics have pointed out, however, certain aspects of the sys- 
tem interfere with its effective functioning. One problem is the 
assignment of production quotas. Planners generally must base these 
assignments on the past performance of enterprises. Enterprise 
managers, knowing that planners tend to assess enterprise perfor- 
mance according to completion or noncompletion of assigned tasks, 
may be tempted to understate and misrepresent the production 
potential of their organizations in order to obtain an assignment 
they can easily handle. Also, they may have little incentive to over- 
fulfill aspects of the current plan; such achievements might lead 
planners to assign a substantially more difficult or even unachiev- 
able task during the next planning period, resulting in a poor per- 
formance evaluation for the enterprise. Such a disparity might call 
into question the validity of the information previously furnished 
to the planners by the enterprise managers. To ensure plan fulfill- 
ment, managers tend to exaggerate their material and labor re- 
quirements and then to hoard these inputs, especially if there is 
reason to worry about punctual delivery of supplies. Furthermore, 
since planning under the Soviet model aims at full utilization of 
resources, plans are typically "taut," and an ambitious manager 
who seeks to obtain resources beyond those needed to achieve the 
plan norms may find the process difficult and discouraging, if not 
impossible. Given the emphasis on fulfillment of the plan, managers 
may also hesitate to adopt new technology, since introduction of 



138 



The Economy 



a new procedure might impede operations and even jeopardize plan 
fulfillment. Critics have also noted that central planning of produc- 
tion can result in an inappropriate assortment of goods from the 
consumers' point of view or in low-quality production. 

The Czechoslovak leadership, aware of these criticisms and also 
of the deteriorating performance of the national economy in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, undertook a series of modest reforms, 
the "Set of Measures to Improve the System of Planned National 
Economic Management after 1980" for industry in 1981 and a simi- 
lar program for agriculture in 1982 (see Economic Policy and Per- 
formance, this ch.). These measures focused on monetary reform, 
decentralizing somewhat the management of investment funds by 
giving more authority to enterprises or, more often, the trusts that 
supervised groups of enterprises. The reforms left the centralized 
system fundamentally unchanged, however. 

Economic Policy and Performance 

The Czechoslovak economy emerged from World War II rela- 
tively undamaged. Industry, which was the largest sector of the 
economy, included large firms in light and heavy industry. Dur- 
ing the war, the German occupation authorities had taken over 
all major industrial plants. After the war, the reconstituted Czecho- 
slovak government took control of these plants. Foreign trade was 
still in private hands, however, and remained important in the econ- 
omy. Exports of machinery and consumer goods paid for imports 
of materials for processing. The quality of Czechoslovak export 
products was comparable to that of products produced in other 
industrialized countries. Agriculture also remained in private hands, 
and farming was still largely a family affair. The labor force as a 
whole was skilled and productive, and management was compe- 
tent. This mixed system, containing elements of socialism and pri- 
vate enterprise, operated efficiently in 1947 and 1948 under a 
two-year plan in which goals were general and indicative rather 
than mandatory. The country received considerable assistance from 
the West through the United Nations, and most of its trade was 
with the West. Until prohibited by Stalin in 1947, Czechoslovakia 
intended to participate in the United States Marshall Plan to rebuild 
Europe. By 1948 Czechoslovak production approximated prewar 
levels, agricultural output being somewhat lower and industrial out- 
put somewhat higher than earlier levels. When the KSC assumed 
complete political and economic control in February 1948, it began 
immediately to transform the Czechoslovak economy into a minia- 
ture version of that of the Soviet Union (see Stalinization, ch. 1). 
By 1952 the government had nationalized nearly all sectors; many 



139 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

experienced managers had been replaced by politically reliable 
individuals, some of them with few technical qualifications. Cen- 
tral planning provided a mandatory guide for institutions and 
managers to follow in nearly all economic activity. 

The targets of the First Five-Year Plan (1949-53) reflected the 
government's commitment to expansion of the producer goods sec- 
tor of the economy. The goals were dramatically revised upwards 
after 1949, partly in response to the Korean War, to build up metal- 
lurgy and heavy industry. The country became an important sup- 
plier of machinery and arms to other communist countries. Foreign 
trade with noncommunist countries dropped sharply (in part 
because of trade controls imposed in those countries); trade with 
communist countries increased from 40 percent of the country's 
total in 1948 to 70 percent a decade later. The economy failed to 
reach the ambitious goals of the first plan, although investment 
and growth were high. By the end of the plan period, serious 
inflationary pressures and other imbalances had developed, requir- 
ing a currency conversion in 1953 that wiped out many people's 
savings and provoked outbreaks of civil disorder. 

The years 1954 and 1955 were covered by yearly plans only; 
the scheduling change was part of an effort by the members of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) to correlate 
and integrate their planning by using common planning periods 
(see Appendix B). The Second Five-Year Plan then encompassed 
the years 1956-60. During that period, investment continued at 
a high rate, although real wages and the supply of consumer goods 
also increased substantially, and national income grew by 6.9 per- 
cent. In the late 1950s, however, economic leaders noted that 
investment efforts were yielding diminishing returns. Large invest- 
ments were required to sustain economic growth. In 1958 and 1959, 
in response to this troubling situation, the government made several 
relatively minor adjustments in the functioning of organizations 
and prices — the first of the country's economic reforms. The re- 
forms involved some limited decentralization of authority, most 
notably giving enterprises more autonomy in handling investment 
funds. The intention was not to alter the Soviet economic model 
to any great extent but rather to enhance its overall operation. The 
reforms did not result in noticeable improvements in economic per- 
formance, however. Eventually, in 1962, planners quietly scrapped 
the entire reform program, reimposing most of the central controls. 

During the early 1960s, industrial production stagnated. The 
agricultural sector also registered a relatively poor performance. 
Agriculture had been a weak part of the economy throughout the 
1950s, consistently failing to reach planned output targets, and the 



140 




The Prazdroj brewery, Plzen 



minimal reforms of 1958-59 had done little to alter the situation. 
Targets set for the national economy in the Third Five-Year Plan 
(1961-65) quickly proved to be overly ambitious, particularly with 
regard to foreign trade. The plan was dropped after a recession 
in 1962, and annual plans covered the remainder of the period. 
National income actually declined in 1963. By 1965 it was only 
1 .9 percent higher than in 1960, in comparison with a 6.9 percent 
growth rate in the 1956-60 period. Many factors contributed to 
the economy's poor performance, including adverse weather for 
agriculture, cancellation of orders by China resulting from the Sino- 
Soviet dispute, and unrealistic plan goals. By this time, however, 
reform-minded economists had reached the conclusion that much 
of the blame lay in deficiencies of the Soviet model. They began 
to prepare additional reform measures to improve the economy's 
efficiency. 

Serious defects in the Soviet model for economic development 
had long been recognized by some Czechoslovak economists, and 
calls for decentralization had occurred as early as 1954. Economists 
and others had argued that it was inappropriate to apply the Soviet 
model to Czechoslovakia in a dogmatic manner. The country was 
already industrialized, had few natural resources and a small in- 
ternal market, and remained dependent on foreign trade in sig- 
nificant ways. The model emphasized extensive development, such 
as building new factories, rather than intensive investment in which 



141 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

production processes were modernized and efficiency improved. 
The pressure for greater investment and defense production dur- 
ing the 1950s had caused private consumption to grow more slowly 
than net material product. The result had been a chronic infla- 
tionary bias, reflected in shortages of consumer goods and forced 
savings by the population. Plants and construction firms held large 
inventories of materials to compensate for irregular deliveries from 
suppliers. Completion of most investment projects required an in- 
ordinate amount of time, freezing funds in unproductive uses. In- 
adequate investment in agriculture had contributed to the latter' s 
chronically poor performance. Prices were also a problem, based 
as they were on often conflicting policies; prices reflected neither 
scarcity nor cost, bore little rational relationship to one another 
in the domestic market, and had become increasingly divorced from 
world prices. The system appeared to stifle innovation and to offer 
no basis for selecting between investment and production alterna- 
tives or for judging efficiency. 

By the early 1960s, several Czechoslovak economists had ana- 
lyzed these problems and had remedies to offer. One spokesman 
for the reformers was the economist Ota Sik, a member of the KSC 
Central Committee and its Economic Commission (see National 
Organization, ch. 4). Party and government officials listened be- 
cause after the 1962 recession and the earlier failure of the 1958 
reforms they recognized that something had to be done. In October 
1964, the party published a set of principles for major economic 
reform and, beginning in 1965, started implementing specific mea- 
sures. In June 1966, the Thirteenth Party Congress gave its offi- 
cial approval to the new program, which came to be called the New 
Economic Model (NEM). Some influential party leaders remained 
opposed to the reforms, apparently concerned about possible domes- 
tic political repercussions. These party leaders engaged in what they 
termed "correction of deficiencies," but in the process they diluted 
the content of the reform measures. Only after the party leader- 
ship changed in January 1968 did support for the reforms increase 
and the pace of reform quicken (see The Reform Movement, ch. 1). 

The reform program was multifaceted, and portions of it were 
never implemented. Its principal object was to limit significantly 
the role of the central planning authorities while expanding the 
autonomy and responsibility of the enterprises. The central plan- 
ning authorities were to concern themselves only with overall long- 
term planning of economic development and to provide general 
guidance through the formulation of a limited number of economic 
goals. Enterprises and their associations would be free to deter- 
mine short-term production targets within the framework of the 



142 



The Economy 



overall goals. Individual enterprises were to become financially via- 
ble, realizing a profit from their sales after covering all costs and 
various state levies. State subsidies would gradually end; enterprises 
that could not operate at a profit would have to close. Profit, rather 
than fulfillment of planned quantitative output targets, was to 
become the main criterion for evaluating the economic performance 
of enterprises. This change in emphasis, it was hoped, would make 
enterprises more competitive and more responsive to the demands 
of customers. At the same time, producers were to be increasingly 
exposed to foreign competition, so that they would seek to increase 
their own productivity and lower prices. As a means of earning 
much-needed hard currencies, exports to Western countries were 
to be stimulated through incentives encouraging enterprises to make 
their products competitive on world markets; the incentives would 
include the right to retain a portion of the foreign currency profit. 

In the reform program, a more realistic system of prices was to 
replace the centrally determined system. Prices were to reflect actual 
costs, the supply and demand situation, and relevant world prices. 
Enterprises were to finance investments with their own resources 
and interest-bearing bank loans and would have to justify their 
investments in terms of need, effectiveness, and cost so that 
widespread waste of investment resources would cease. The state 
would provide investment funds only for key economic develop- 
ment projects. Finally, a revised wage and salary system was to 
eliminate egalitarianism in the wage structure and substitute a sys- 
tem based on individual work performance and on results obtained 
by the employing enterprise. 

To ensure greater concentration and specialization of industrial 
production, the government consolidated enterprises into large 
production units resembling trusts or cartels managed by "branch 
directorates." These large production units formed an intermedi- 
ate link between the enterprises and the ministries. The branch 
directorates had overall responsibility for the performance of enter- 
prises under their jurisdiction, but the division of authority between 
the larger unit or trust and its subordinate members was not clearly 
defined. 

In the spring of 1968, the government permitted enterprises to 
experiment with worker participation in management through the 
establishment of enterprise councils. Direct involvement of workers 
in the management of enterprises was expected to bring about an 
improvement in morale and performance by calling into play the 
workers' self-interest. The form of the councils was left vague 
because it v/as thought that the varying sizes of enterprises would 
necessitate different forms. 



143 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

In sponsoring their program, Czechoslovak reformers did not 
intend to introduce free enterprise or to permit free play of market 
forces. They were committed socialists trying to improve economic 
management under continuing party control, but with fewer rigid 
controls than had formerly existed. They had implemented only 
a portion of their program by August 1968, when Soviet and other 
Warsaw Pact troops invaded the country and the reform experi- 
ment came to an end. The reforms and other elements of the Prague 
Spring had become too threatening to party control, at least in the 
Soviet view, to be allowed to continue (see Intervention, ch. 1). 

The next two years saw the gradual dismantling of most of the 
program. By the early 1970s, almost all traces of the reform mea- 
sures had vanished. Economic "normalization" resulted in a rever- 
sion to mandatory central planning, price controls, and the system 
of material balances. Only a few modifications of the central plan- 
ning system remained, including devolution of some aspects of plan- 
ning to the consolidated production units and modification of some 
plan indicators to emphasize efficiency, productivity, quality, and 
innovation rather than simply gross output targets. 

In spite of the apparently disruptive changes and political tur- 
moil of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Czechoslovak economy 
continued to grow at a respectable rate throughout the period. From 
1966 to 1970, the period of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, net material 
product grew at an average annual rate of 6.9 percent, well ex- 
ceeding the planned yearly increase of 4.1 to 4.4 percent. Perfor- 
mance was also gratifying during the Fifth Five-Year Plan 
(1971-75). During this period, net material product grew some- 
what more slowly, averaging 5.7 percent yearly, but still exceeded 
the planned rate of 5.1 percent yearly. The fastest growing sectors 
in industry during both planning periods were chemicals and en- 
gineering (growing at an annual rate of 8 to 10 percent); the slowest 
growing sectors were fuels (3 to 5 percent) and consumer goods 
(4 to 6 percent). Wages, incomes, and personal consumption levels 
rose at respectable rates despite an overall increase in investment. 
Agriculture continued to be a weak area but had improved mark- 
edly. By 1975 the agricultural sector was almost self-sufficient in 
animal production, and self-sufficiency in crop production appeared 
to be an attainable goal. Rural wages rose, and mechanization 
progressed rapidly. 

During the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1976-80), by contrast, eco- 
nomic performance was far less satisfactory; in the closing years 
of the period, the slowdown in economic growth became especially 
noticeable. Net material product grew by only 3.7 percent yearly 
on average, instead of the 4.9 percent called for by the plan. Both 



144 



The Economy 



agriculture and industry failed to meet planned growth targets; 5.7 
to 6.0 and 2.7 to 2.8 percent yearly growth rates were planned, 
respectively, whereas the rates actually achieved were 4.5 and 1.8 
percent. The plan called for an annual average increase in labor 
productivity of 4.5 percent, an important goal, given constraints 
on expansion of the labor force; 3.3 percent was actually achieved. 
Other difficulties included insufficient technological improvement, 
failure to meet the conservation goals for energy and materials, 
and less than full use of fixed assets. In addition, the performance 
of agriculture was disappointing, particularly after the optimal cli- 
matic conditions and bumper crops of the early 1970s. Problems 
in agriculture were in part a result of drought (1976) and severe 
winter and spring flooding (1979). Other factors, such as short- 
ages of agricultural machinery and spare parts and poor quality 
of fertilizer, also had an impact on the agricultural sector. Large 
imports of grain necessarily continued. During the plan period, 
growth rates in personal consumption declined, reaching a low point 
of 0.5 percent in 1979. At the same time, in contrast to the previ- 
ous plan period, retail prices rose by about 11 percent over the 
5-year period. During the last few years of the plan, there were 
widespread consumer complaints about the unavailability of basic 
commodities such as meat, milk, and vegetables. 

The economy's performance was lackluster despite the continuing 
infusion of substantial investment funds. Since 1948, investment 
had been the most dynamic element of economic growth, with a 
growth rate substantially exceeding that of national income. Gross 
investment had reached a peak of about 31 percent of national 
income expenditures in the 1950s during Czechoslovakia's most 
extensive development phase. Gross investment limits of about 30 
percent of national expenditures had been typical during the 1960s. 
The same ceiling was set for the Fifth Five-Year Plan, but the in- 
vestment rate was edging up. The limit was raised to a maximum 
of 31 to 33 percent for the Sixth Five-Year Plan, but actual expen- 
ditures exceeded this rate, being closer to 34 percent. In part, the 
rise in the investment rate in the 1970s reflected large capital 
expenditures for increased mining of coal and other fuels and for 
the development of engineering branches to produce equipment 
for nuclear power plants. Nevertheless, given the considerable fund- 
ing poured into the economy, the mediocre condition of the Czecho- 
slovak industrial plant in general at the end of the 1970s must have 
been discouraging to economic planners. 

The energy and trade problems Czechoslovakia faced in the late 
1970s were also major factors in the slowdown in industrial growth. 
The terms on which Czechoslovakia conducted foreign trade had 



145 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

begun to deteriorate sharply by the mid-1970s. After 1974 the rapid 
rise of world oil prices was partially reflected in the price of oil from 
the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia's principal source of fuel and 
raw materials. Prices of other materials on which the country's econ- 
omy depended also increased faster than the prices of its exports, 
which consisted primarily of manufactured goods (especially 
machinery). Party and government leaders were cautious about 
increasing foreign indebtedness and attempted to maintain a high 
level of exports. Increasingly in the 1970s, a substantial portion 
of the country's production of consumer goods and machinery was 
diverted to export markets to meet the rising import bill. Restraints 
on imports from noncommunist countries reduced inputs for domes- 
tic industries. 

At the beginning of the 1980s, the economy had substantial limi- 
tations, which were recognized by economists, political leaders, and 
even the public at large. The country had perhaps the oldest stock 
of plant and equipment in Eastern Europe, a stagnant resource 
base, and growing dependence on energy and material imports. 
To reduce requirements for energy and raw materials and to in- 
crease the competitiveness of Czechoslovak exports, domestic 
production needed to become more efficient. Furthermore, con- 
sumption standards continued to be well below those found in 
Western Europe. 

Economic planners set relatively modest growth targets for the 
Seventh Five- Year Plan, revising their goals downward two years 
into the plan. "Intensification" of the economy — focusing on ef- 
ficient use of resources rather than simply quantitative growth — 
was the keynote of government policy. The revised goals called for 
a growth rate in net material product of 10.5 to 13.5 percent. Gross 
industrial output was to increase by 14 to 18 percent, and gross 
agricultural output by 7 to 10 percent. Personal consumption was 
to rise by less than 3 percent. 

The early years of the Seventh Five-Year Plan saw a serious 
slump in the economy. During 1981 and 1982, personal consump- 
tion actually declined. The cost of living rose more rapidly than 
wages. During the final three years, however, an economic recov- 
ery made up for the earlier poor performances; according to offi- 
cial calculations, the country succeeded in either meeting or 
surpassing domestic goals during the plan period as a whole. Offi- 
cial reports listed the growth rate of net material product at 1 1 per- 
cent, growth of gross industrial output at 14.5 percent, growth of 
gross agricultural output at 9.8 percent, and increase in personal 
consumption at 5.5 percent. Results of the "intensification" 
effort were disappointing, however, as leaders acknowledged. 



146 



The Economy 



During the plan, consumption of energy decreased by only 1.7 per- 
cent per annum, less than the 2 percent goal of the plan (see table 
8, Appendix A). 

The relatively favorable outcome of the Seventh Five- Year Plan 
was noteworthy, particularly because several international trends 
had had negative effects on the Czechoslovak economy during the 
period. A recession in developed Western countries dampened their 
markets for Czechoslovak exports; and in 1981 the Soviet Union 
announced its intention to scale back oil exports to Eastern Europe, 
including Czechoslovakia, by 10 percent. Although in 1983 and 
1984 worldwide prices for oil began to drop, the Comecon (or 
Soviet) price, tied to a 5-year formula, caused the price of Soviet 
oil (16.4 million of the 16.6 million tons imported by Czechoslovakia 
in 1984) to continue to climb. In 1982 the decision of Western banks 
to restrict credit to Eastern Europe as a result of Poland's serious 
payment problems and the sizable debts of other East European 
countries impeded Czechoslovakia's foreign trade with the West. 

The poor performance of the economy in the early 1980s per- 
suaded party leaders that some changes were needed. Therefore, 
in conjunction with the Seventh Five- Year Plan, in 1981 the govern- 
ment introduced a series of limited reforms called the "Set of Mea- 
sures to Improve the System of Planned National Economic 
Management after 1980." Relatively conservative in design and 
initiated without fanfare, these reforms permitted somewhat greater 
freedom of action for managers of enterprises in selected opera- 
tional areas, giving them more authority over their own invest- 
ment activities and over providing financial incentives to workers. 
The intention was to make industry as a whole more aware of prices 
and costs. The reforms did not call for any appreciable loosening 
of central planning and control. In 1982 parallel reform measures 
were introduced for agriculture; the measures permitted farm offi- 
cials to exercise greater management initiative and limited the num- 
ber of binding targets imposed on farm production. Many Western 
observers believed that these reforms did have a helpful effect during 
the final years of the plan. It was felt, however, that these partial 
reforms were not sufficiently comprehensive to bring about the 
modernization and improvements in efficiency sought by Czecho- 
slovakia's leaders. 

Economic Sectors 

Mining and Energy 

In the mid-1980s, Czechoslovakia's mineral resources were 
meager. The country was heavily dependent on imports of raw 



147 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

materials for use in industry (see table 9, Appendix A). Deposits 
of ferrous metals were small and low grade; in 1983 production 
amounted to 1.9 million tons. Imports, especially from the Soviet 
Union, supplied the dominant share of iron ore for the country's 
important iron and steel industry. Magnetite, a basic input for the 
steel industry, was more plentiful, making exports possible dur- 
ing the 1970s and 1980s. Deposits of nonferrous metals were limited 
or nonexistent. Imports supplied most of the country's needs for 
these metals. In 1983 about 9,500 tons of copper and 3,800 tons 
of lead were produced. The same year, 7,000 tons of zinc were 
mined, but imports supplied the bulk of requirements. The coun- 
try also produced limited amounts of gold and mercury. Imports 
supplied most of the country's needs for nonferrous metals. Czecho- 
slovakia did supply most of its own requirements for nonmetallic 
minerals to support the manufacture of building materials, glass, 
and ceramics. 

The bulk of the country's mining activity involved coal, the prin- 
cipal domestic energy source. Located primarily in northern 
Bohemia and Moravia, freely extractable reserves reportedly 
amounted to 5.8 billion tons as of 1986. Of this quantity, about 
30 percent was bituminous coal. In 1985 production of all coal 
amounted to 126.6 million tons, a 2. 1 percent drop over 1984 that 
signaled the accelerating exhaustion of easily worked, high-grade 
reserves. In 1985 Czechoslovakia depended on coal for 60 percent 
of its energy consumption in contrast with 88 percent in 1960. 

The decline in the share of total primary energy consumption 
represented by coal had occurred even though coal production had 
expanded throughout the 1970s. During these years, the growing 
need for energy was met primarily by imported oil and, from the 
mid-1970s, by natural gas; almost all imports of oil and gas came 
from the Soviet Union. Domestic crude oil sources and produc- 
tion were modest. Within Czechoslovakia itself, numerous small 
oil and gas fields had been discovered, but production was minor 
(about 100,000 tons of crude oil and 800 million cubic meters of 
natural gas in 1985). These supplied only a small fraction of the 
country's needs. Geological surveys largely ruled out the possibil- 
ity of future discoveries of major oil or gas deposits, although one 
significant new source of natural gas was discovered in 1985 near 
Gbely in western Slovakia. 

During the 1970s, the Soviet Union found it increasingly difficult 
and costly to meet the fuel and raw materials needs of Czecho- 
slovakia and other East European countries. The unexploited Soviet 
resources tended to be located in Siberia, where extraction and 
transport were difficult and costly. One solution to the problem 



148 



The Tisovd power station, near Sokolov 



was Comecon's decision to adjust Soviet energy prices annually 
after 1974; as a result, Soviet prices approached — and eventually 
at times exceeded — world market prices. The adjustment improved 
the terms of trade of the Soviet Union at the expense of Czecho- 
slovakia and its neighbors when world prices for many commodi- 
ties, particularly crude oil, rose sharply in the middle and late 1970s. 
The higher prices in turn resulted in a larger return to the Soviet 
Union for its exports of fuels and raw materials and helped to finance 
expansion of Soviet production capacity. In addition, in the 1970s 
Comecon initiated several joint projects, such as the construction 
of a major natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Eastern 
Europe and of large nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union (see 
Appendix B). The participating countries, including Czecho- 
slovakia, received payments in the form of natural gas and elec- 
tricity. In the mid-1980s, Czechoslovakia also participated in 
construction of the Yamburg natural gas pipeline "Progress" in 
the Soviet Union. 

From 1967 to 1984, Czechoslovakia benefited additionally from 
a special agreement with the Soviet Union — in effect a Czecho- 
slovak credit from 1967 — whereby Czechoslovakia received 5 mil- 
lion tons of Soviet crude oil a year at a late 1960s price, which was 
just a small fraction of the world market price. Thus while increased 
Soviet fuel and raw materials export prices imposed a severe bur- 
den on Czechoslovakia, the cost was substantially less than if the 



149 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

country had imported these materials from noncommunist coun- 
tries. In 1980 a Czechoslovak official indicated that Czechoslovakia 
was paying about one-fourth the world price for its oil imports. 
By 1985, however, the situation had changed dramatically. In 1981 
the Soviet Union had announced a 10-percent cutback in the crude 
oil it would deliver to East European countries during the 1981-85 
period. Subsequently — and for a variety of other reasons — world 
oil prices plummeted, but the Soviet price, based on the five-year 
formula, continued to rise. 

In the mid-1980s, the country's leaders considered energy con- 
servation essential. Czechoslovakia's heavy reliance on fuel imports 
was costly. Imports supplied 95 percent of the country's fuel needs, 
and the country needed to import about 16.6 million tons of crude 
oil and 10.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas each year. Conser- 
vation was also essential because although Soviet supplies of natural 
gas were expected to increase, the more important flow of crude 
oil was likely to stagnate. In the short run, extraction of domestic 
coal would help Czechoslovakia meet its growing energy needs, 
but the increase would be slow and costly because deeper deposits 
had to be mined in order to meet quotas. The fuel problem was 
especially acute because Czechoslovak industry had a high input 
of energy per unit of national income, a rate substantially higher 
than that of Western Europe and some East European countries 
(7.5 tons of standard fuel per inhabitant per year). Industrial con- 
sumption of largely imported raw materials and energy was 
acknowledged to be perhaps as much as 40 percent higher than 
in comparable advanced industrial countries. The KSC leadership 
rightly believed that considerable savings were possible. 

Nevertheless, conservation alone would not suffice. Since the 
1970s, economic planners had been pursuing an ambitious nuclear 
energy program. In the long run, in their judgment, nuclear power 
was absolutely vital to the projected energy balance. In late 1978, 
the first major nuclear power plant (of Soviet design) began oper- 
ation at Jaslovske Bohunice. In 1985 and 1986, portions of the 
Dukovany station began test runs, and preliminary site work was 
underway for two more power stations, at Mochovce in western 
Slovakia and Temelin in southern Bohemia. Nuclear power's share 
of the total electricity supply increased to almost 20 percent in 1986. 
According to the long-range plan, with expansion of this power 
station plus construction of additional stations and the import of 
electricity from joint nuclear projects in the Soviet Union, nuclear 
power would provide 30 percent or more of total electricity by 1990. 
Plans called for nuclear power to account for over 53 percent of 
electricity by the year 2000. Although the 1986 Chernobyl 



150 



The Economy 



accident in the Soviet Union did not alter the government's com- 
mitment to nuclear power, particularly since none of the existing 
or planned reactors used the kind of technology employed at 
Chernobyl, Czechoslovak leaders acknowledged the need for a 
thorough review of safety measures. Subsequently a number of spe- 
cial conferences were held concerning nuclear power issues. Czecho- 
slovakia was well positioned to fuel its ambitious nuclear program; 
in the mid-1980s, the country was an important producer of ura- 
nium. Little information on uranium output was available, but an- 
nual production was estimated by Western analysts at 2,000 to 3,000 
tons. The reserves were located in the Krusne hory of Bohemia. 

In the mid-1980s, Czechoslovakia had a substantial number of 
hydroelectric plants, located mainly on the Vah and Vltava rivers. 
Work was underway on a major hydroelectric power project on 
the Danube River at Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros, a controversial joint 
project with Hungary to which environmentalists, especially in 
Hungary, had objected. The completed project was expected to 
supply about 4 percent of Czechoslovak energy requirements. In 
1986 the government approved plans for construction of several 
additional power stations on the Labe and Vah rivers by the end 
of the century. Czechoslovakia imported some electricity each year 
from Romania. 

Industry 

Czechoslovakia inherited the bulk of existing industrial assets 
following the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World 
War I. Industrialization continued in the interwar years. Even 
before World War II, the country's armaments and heavy indus- 
tries were producing commodities accepted throughout the world. 
World War II left Czechoslovak industrial facilities largely intact. 
In the late 1940s, Czechoslovakia was one of the most industrial- 
ized countries in the world, and the quality of it products was com- 
parable to that of other industrialized countries. 

After the KSC took control of the country, the industrial sector — 
particularly defense and heavy industry — received priority in terms 
of investment funds, labor, and materials. Industry was the lead- 
ing sector in expansion of the economy. The industrial base grew 
rapidly, as recorded by the official index of industrial production. 
Starting from a base of 100 in 1948, the index increased to 371.9 
in 1960 and 665.5 in 1970. The late 1970s witnessed some deceler- 
ation in industrial growth, and the index increased from 921.4 in 
1975 to 1,156.7 in 1980. In 1985 the index reached 1,322. The 
figures suggested substantial growth, and industry's overall per- 
formance since World War II had in fact been impressive. However, 



151 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

various Western studies of the computation of the index of indus- 
trial production in communist countries indicated a significant up- 
ward bias relative to the calculated planned rate of growth of 
industrial production used for planning purposes. The main cause 
of the bias appeared to be higher prices recorded for newly introduced 
products; in many cases, there was little or no difference between 
the new product and a similar item produced the year before. The 
bias appeared to be larger in such branches as machinery and chem- 
icals and tended to enhance plan results. Over time, the bias also 
led to overstatement of the structural change in fast- growing branches 
of industry that were introducing new products. 

In 1985 the most important branches of industry in terms of the 
monetary value of their contribution to the economy were 
machinery, electrical engineering, metalworking, chemicals, as- 
bestos, rubber, and ferrous metallurgy (including ore extraction). 
Important manufactured products were vehicles, railroad goods, 
aircraft, electrical goods, heavy machinery, and precision equip- 
ment. During the 1970s, Czechoslovakia had signed specialization 
and joint investment agreements with other Comecon members, 
committing the country to specific long-term obligations in par- 
ticular production branches (machine tools and railroad locomo- 
tives, for example), partly to ensure the inflow of energy and raw 
materials. In the 1980s, Czechoslovakia was — except for the Soviet 
Union — Comecon 's only builder of heavy-duty nuclear power 
equipment and was a joint supplier of such products to other Come- 
con members. For export, Czechoslovakia specialized in smaller 
units, while the Soviet Union supplied the larger capacity reac- 
tors. In the early and mid-1980s, as part of an effort to "restruc- 
ture" the industrial economy, the government sought to reduce 
the relative importance of metallurgy within the industrial sector, 
cutting back particularly on such traditional products as pig iron, 
raw steel, and rolled ferrous products in favor of more profitable 
and less energy-intensive branches. 

Despite its favored position within the economy, the industrial 
sector had serious weaknesses in the mid-1980s. A particularly sig- 
nificant problem was the high energy and material inputs required 
for a unit of industrial output. Czechoslovak machinery was often 
heavier than comparable West European equipment and was 
usually less productive. The slow rate of technological innovation 
had caused a decline in the country's share of machinery markets 
in developing nations, noncommunist industrialized countries, and 
Comecon countries in comparison with the 1950s. Related problems 
were design limitations and lengthy project completion times, which 
frequently caused investments to be less productive than hoped. 



152 




The V. I. Lenin factory of the Skoda engineering works, Plzen 



In addition, old equipment was retired slowly. In 1986 the aver- 
age age of industrial machinery and equipment was 12 years; 10 
percent of the machinery was more than 25 years old, and the per- 
centage was reportedly increasing. These circumstances contributed 
to the low productivity of Czechoslovak workers compared with 
their counterparts in Western Europe. Moreover, the overall quality 
of Czechoslovak exports was frequently below world standards; offi- 
cial government pronouncements emphasized the inadequate tech- 
nological level of activities in the economy as a whole. Imbalances 
persisted between supply and demand, both at home and on for- 
eign markets. In 1986 a prominent Czechoslovak economist argued 
that industry's problems stemmed in part from inadequate speciali- 
zation, insufficient use of foreign licenses, and cumbersome re- 
straints on research projects. 

Most of these problems had already existed in some form during 
the 1970s, and the government had introduced several measures in- 
tended to correct the deficiencies. Laws introduced in 1971 (which 
went into effect in 1975) had granted limited powers and a degree 
of decentralization to the intermediate level of administration, posi- 
tioned between ministries and production enterprises. The inter- 
mediate level consisted of associations of industrial enterprises in 
the same or closely related branches, resembling trusts. The intent 
was to reduce overhead expenditures, such as planning and research, 
while promoting innovation and technological development. Changes 
also were introduced in the wage and price systems in an attempt 
to improve efficiency. Despite these measures, there was reason for 
continuing dissatisfaction in the 1980s. 

Agriculture 

Even before World War II, industrialization in Czechoslovakia 
had substantially reduced the relative importance of agriculture in 



153 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

the economy. Before the KSC gained control of the government, 
Czechoslovak agriculture consisted primarily of small to mid-size 
family farms with an efficiency on a par with most of Europe. The 
situation did not change until 1949, when the KSC initiated a policy 
of collectivization. The pace of collectivization was rather gradual 
until the late 1950s and was generally more thorough in the Czech 
lands than in Slovakia. Collectivization was essentially completed 
by 1960. Large numbers of farmers, particularly the young, left 
agriculture for more attractive industrial jobs. In the 1960s, the 
active farm population consisted largely of women and older men. 

Under communist rule, agriculture received much less attention 
and investment funding than industry. Partly because of this fact, 
agricultural output grew slowly, not regaining prewar levels of 
production until the 1960s. Falling productivity and the need to 
increase farm output to reduce agricultural imports eventually drew 
official attention to agriculture. A principal government goal was 
to encourage large-scale farming that could benefit from modern 
technologies and powerful farm equipment. Proceeding slowly dur- 
ing the 1960s, consolidation of farms accelerated in the 1970s. Most 
of the larger cooperatives encompassed several villages and raised 
a variety of crops and livestock. In the 1960s, in an effort to in- 
crease farm incomes, the government raised the prices of farm 
products; during the previous decade, by contrast, prices for farm 
produce had been kept low, partly to extract workers and invest- 
ment funds for the expansion of industry. By the early 1970s, the 
average farm income reportedly had reached parity with that of 
urban white-collar workers. The farm labor force of the 1980s was 
relatively young (45 percent was under 40 years of age in 1980) 
and well educated. The performance of the agricultural sector im- 
proved markedly during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. 
In 1960 the official index of gross agricultural output (in constant 
1980 prices) had stood at 96, compared with 100 in 1936. In 1970 
the index reached 116.8, and by 1980 it had increased to 143. Be- 
tween 1981 and 1985, according to official sources, total agricul- 
tural production increased by 9.8 percent over the 1980 level. 

The total land area of postwar Czechoslovakia is nearly 12.8 mil- 
lion hectares, of which almost 6.8 million hectares are considered 
agricultural land. The remaining land is classified as nonagricul- 
tural and includes 4.5 million hectares of forests. In the mid-1980s, 
agricultural activity was spread throughout the country. Urbani- 
zation and industrialization had slowly but steadily reduced the 
amount of agricultural land; it declined by over 600,000 hectares 
between 1948 and the late 1970s. In 1984 irrigation facilities existed 
for over 322,000 hectares, a little over 6 percent of the arable land. 



154 



The Economy 



In addition, as of 1980 the country had 1.3 million hectares of 
drained area, constituting about 18 percent of all agricultural land. 
Extensive additional irrigation and drainage had high priority in 
agricultural planning, despite the heavy costs of these procedures, 
because there was very little new land that could be brought under 
cultivation less expensively. The small amount of irrigated land 
made crop production heavily dependent on weather conditions. 

In 1985 some 95 percent of the country's agricultural land was 
in the socialist sector. The basic unit of production in the mid-1980s 
was the "unified agricultural cooperative," or farmers' collective. 
Collective farms had increased in area by 6.5 times since 1950. 
In 1985 there were 1,677 collectives with 997,798 members. In 1985 
there were 226 state farms, which were officially owned and oper- 
ated by the government and which employed 166,432 workers. In 
1985 collective farms held about 4.3 million hectares (plus about 
87,000 hectares in private plots), and state farms held 2.1 million 
hectares. Members of collective farms were permitted to cultivate 
personal plots of one-half hectare or less and to maintain some 
livestock. Such personal plots had reached a peak of popularity in 
the early 1960s, when they had accounted for 355,000 hectares. 
By 1975 their area had decreased to 171,000 hectares. Production 
from personal plots was minor and served primarily as a food source 
for the cultivator. Private farmers owned only 404,000 hectares, 
consisting mainly of small farms in the hill country of Slovakia. 
By 1980 there were only 150,000 such small farms operating. In 
1982, however, the government introduced measures to encourage 
private small-scale animal breeding and fruit and vegetable culti- 
vation. Planning authorities did not expect that this activity would 
be the main source of income for small farmers, and they limited 
the land used for this purpose primarily to that reclaimed from cur- 
rently unused, somewhat marginal agricultural land, estimated at 
100,000 hectares in 1984. The government hoped, however, that 
a large proportion of demand for fruit and green vegetables, as 
well as for meat, would be satisfied in this way. In 1984, accord- 
ing to official reports, small-scale private producers accounted for 
about 10 percent of meat production, 38 percent of vegetable 
production, and 64 percent of fruit production. A secondary pur- 
pose of the government measures — land reclamation — was a mat- 
ter of considerable urgency because of the decline in agricultural 
land that took place in the 1970s and early 1980s. 

Government policy encouraged cooperation and specialization 
among the various agricultural units. Both informal and formal 
arrangements existed. Mutual aid in terms of machinery or labor 
for particular tasks had long been practiced among neighboring 



155 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

farms, and this continued under the collectivized farming system. 
More formal arrangements took shape in the 1960s and expanded 
in the 1970s. Many of these took the form of "joint agricultural 
enterprises," entities that somewhat resembled stock companies. 
Some cooperative organizations specialized in such activities as fat- 
tening of hogs or cattle, production of eggs, or drying and produc- 
tion of feed mixtures. Others offered agrochemical, construction, 
land improvement, or marketing services. A large number engaged 
in multiple activities. 

Management of most large farms is organized hierarchically on 
three levels. On large cooperative farms, an assembly of members 
or their elected representatives is legally responsible for farm oper- 
ation, although a committee and its chairman carry out daily 
management of operation. In practice, the assembly functions 
largely to ratify decisions already made by the chairman. As cooper- 
ative farms have increased in size, the authority of the assembly 
of members has declined. "Boards of economic management," con- 
sisting of the chairman and a staff of experts on various operations, 
have taken over the most important management functions. The 
second echelon of management in large cooperatives or state farms 
has responsibility for smaller operations in either a specific area 
or a particular branch of production. The third level of manage- 
ment organizes the labor force performing the farm work, such as 
the field brigades. The chairman of a cooperative or the director 
of a state farm holds most of the power in the organization, and 
the subordinate levels are severely restricted in their decision 
making. 

Crop cultivation has slowly become less important in the gross 
output of the agricultural sector. Cropping and livestock were almost 
equal branches in 1960, but by 1985 crops accounted for only 43 
percent of gross agricultural output compared with 57 percent for 
livestock products. Main crop products in the 1980s were wheat, 
barley, potatoes, sugar beets, rye, and hops (an important export 
crop). Sugar, derived from sugar beet production, is both a sig- 
nificant export crop (especially to hard currency areas) and an 
important item of domestic consumption. Fruit and vegetable acre- 
age accounted for only a small part of the cultivated area. Since 
the 1950s, the supply of livestock has gradually increased because 
of government encouragement. Producers have been urged to meet 
the demand for meat that accompanied the rise in income levels 
of the population. After the collectivization of agriculture, raising 
livestock increasingly became a large-scale operation, usually un- 
dertaken in conjunction with cropping. The major constraint to 
livestock expansion has been a shortage of fodder and feed 



156 



The Economy 



mixtures, although government pricing policies and the labor de- 
mands of animal husbandry have also tended to deter efforts. Dur- 
ing the 1970s, progress was made in expanding the supplies of 
fodder and feed mixtures and the country's processing capacity. 
However, it remained necessary to supplement the supply of feed 
and fodder through imports, which became increasingly burden- 
some because they came from noncommunist countries and thus 
required payment in convertible currencies. 

The basic aim of agricultural policy in the mid-1980s, with regard 
to both crop and livestock production, was self-sufficiency. Record 
harvests in 1984 and 1985 made it possible virtually to halt grain 
imports, which had amounted to about 500,000 tons per year. Dur- 
ing the Seventh Five- Year Plan, the government was able to reduce 
imports of feed grains to one-third the level of the previous five- 
year plan without causing a reduction in per capita meat consump- 
tion, an achievement suggesting that the efficiency of animal 
husbandry had improved. Performance in the agricultural sector 
as a whole remained uneven in the 1980s, however. Although some 
outstanding farms were obtaining excellent grain yields, the uneven 
quality of farm management contributed to large discrepancies in 
performance between farms. 

Transportation 

Czechoslovakia is one of Europe's major transit countries for 
north-south movement. In 1985 Czechoslovakia had a highly de- 
veloped transportation system consisting of 13,130 kilometers of 
railroad tracks, 73,809 kilometers of roads, and 475 kilometers of 
inland waterways, according to official sources (see fig. 13). The 
country also had 1 ,448 kilometers of pipelines for transport of crude 
oil, 1,500 kilometers for refined products, and 7,500 kilometers 
for natural gas. The state owned and subsidized the means of trans- 
port, and passenger fares were among the lowest in the world. In 
1985 cargo movement totaled over 99 billion ton-kilometers. Of 
the nearly 90 billion ton-kilometers of cargo-carrying service per- 
formed by public transportation, railroads handled about 81 per- 
cent, roads 13 percent, inland waterways 5 percent, and civil 
aviation less than 1 percent. Since the 1970s, in an effort to save 
fuel, the government had been encouraging the displacement of 
freight transport from the highways to the railroads, 

Major improvements were made in the transport infrastructure 
after World War II, particularly with regard to the railroads, and 
the result was a relatively extensive and dense road and railroad 
network. In developing the transportation system, the government's 
primary goal was to facilitate movement of industrial goods; 



157 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 




The Economy 



passenger traffic, while not neglected, received secondary consider- 
ation. Nevertheless, in the 1980s transportation frequently was a 
bottleneck in the economy because of low operating efficiency and 
long-term inadequate investment. In the mid-1980s, both rail and 
highway transport systems were in need of substantial upgrading. 
Although the shortcomings of the systems were well known and 
received considerable public attention, limited funding slowed the 
pace of improvement. During the 1981-85 plan period, for exam- 
ple, almost 97 percent of the funding available for railroads — Kcs36 
billion (for value of the koruna — Kcs — see Glossary) — had to be 
spent on repair and replacement, leaving scant resources for major 
improvement projects. In 1985 about 22 percent of the tracks in 
the rail network were double track. About 28 percent were electri- 
fied, including the main east- west Friendship Railway linking 
Prague with the Soviet border, which formed the basis of the net- 
work. Situated near the center of Europe, Czechoslovakia had rail 
links to surrounding countries, and transit traffic moved in all direc- 
tions. Many of the difficulties of the railroads were caused by lack 
of new equipment, poor maintenance of tracks and rolling stock 
(partly caused by the lack of spare parts), an insufficient number 
of skilled workers, and constant pressure to keep operating. The 
railroad management also had to cope with outmoded station fa- 
cilities. 

The highway system has received less attention than the rail- 
roads during the decades since World War II. Most improvements 
have focused on local roads, and, in general, the country has been 
slow to develop modern highways. Nevertheless, highway cargo 
movement increased rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, doubling be- 
tween 1970 and 1979. It was only in 1980 that a modern superhigh- 
way was completed linking the three largest cities (Prague, Brno, 
and Bratislava), a distance of 317 kilometers. This project had 
started in 1938 and was left uncompleted from the early 1940s to 
the late 1960s. In 1985 approximately 482 kilometers, or some- 
what less than 1 percent of the road network, consisted of superhigh- 
ways. Public officials acknowledged that the status and maintenance 
of the system remained inadequate for the country's needs. 

As a landlocked country, Czechoslovakia has no maritime ports. 
In the mid-1980s, the country's overseas trade passed through East 
German, West German, Polish, and Yugoslav ports. The Labe 
and Danube rivers were both navigable in Czechoslovakia. In the 
1980s, the Vltava was carrying increasing amounts of traffic, and 
efforts were underway to make it more extensively navigable. Prin- 
cipal river ports were located at Prague, Deem, Komarno, and 
Bratislava. 



159 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Civil aviation played a particularly significant role in the move- 
ment of passengers. Czechoslovak Airlines, the state airline com- 
pany, serviced most European cities and also provided domestic 
services. A regional airline, Slov-Air, headquartered in Bratislava, 
provided additional domestic service. In 1985 civil aviation trans- 
ported 1.2 million travelers. About 90 percent of this transporta- 
tion service consisted of international flight. 

In the mid-1980s, Czechoslovakia had a relatively well developed 
communications system. According to official data, there were 
3,591,045 telephones in the country in 1985, about 23.2 telephones 
for every 100 persons, the greatest density of telephones among 
Comecon countries. There were 4,233,702 licensed radios, or one 
for every 3.7 persons, and 4,368,050 licensed televisions, or one 
for every 3.6 persons. Both journalism and broadcasting were closely 
supervised by the government, but many inhabitants could receive 
West German or Austrian television and radio transmissions as 
well as Czechoslovak broadcasts. 

Banking and Finance 

The koruna (Kcs), or crown, is the national currency and con- 
sists of 100 halers. In 1986 the currency continued to be converti- 
ble only under restricted conditions and at official rates. Violation 
of exchange regulations constituted a serious offense. The koruna 
could be used only within the country and was not used in foreign 
trade. In 1987 the official, or commercial, exchange rate was Kcs5.4 
per US$1; the tourist, or noncommercial, rate was Kcsl0.5 per 
US$1. The koruna was legally defined in terms of 123 milligrams 
of gold, which provided a historical basis for the commercial rate. 

At the head of the country's banking system was the State Bank 
of Czechoslovakia. The State Bank was the central bank, the 
government's financial agent, the country's commercial bank, an 
investment bank, and the clearing agent for collection notices. It 
also supervised the other banking in the country and, in conjunc- 
tion with specific ministries, formulated the financial plan for 
Czechoslovakia. The other banks, also state owned, were subor- 
dinate to the State Bank and relegated to special functions. The 
Commercial Bank of Czechoslovakia was primarily the bank for 
foreign currency transactions. Three additional banks — two of 
which were savings banks, one for each of the republics, provid- 
ing credit to individuals — completed the banking system in 1980. 

The main function of the banking system was to act as the govern- 
ment 's agent in implementing the financial plan, an important part 
of which consisted of expanding and contracting credit to meet the 
economy's needs. The central authorities controlled most 



160 



The Economy 



investments directly, and the national plan regulated production. 
The State Bank acted as a supervisory agent in extending credit 
to the enterprises, ensuring that the investments met plan goals. 
The bulk of bank credit was for working capital, largely utilized 
to finance the purchase of materials and the sale of finished products. 
The powers of the State Bank appeared to be somewhat limited, 
however, since credit was extended according to guidelines for 
planned production. The central authorities set interest rates, which 
neither reflected the cost of capital nor appreciably affected the flow 
of credit. Instead, beginning in the 1970s, interest rates were 
differentiated to accomplish objectives of the plan. Interest rates 
were low for enterprises modernizing a production process. Puni- 
tive rates were used if firms deviated from plan goals. In the 
mid-1980s, the greatest portion of investment credits went to the 
industrial sector, followed by agriculture, construction, and retail 
trade. 

The banking system operated within the framework of the finan- 
cial plan. Major elements of the financial plan included allocation 
to consumption and investment, foreign and domestic financing 
of investment, and wage and price changes. Planning authorities 
were in a position to use the centralized banking system to carry 
out major corrective measures, as occurred in 1953 when infla- 
tionary pressures became serious and the population's accumulated 
savings were largely wiped out by a conversion of the currency. 
After this experience, officials placed stricter controls on invest- 
ments, permitting real wages and the standard of living to rise 
gradually. But in the late 1970s, and particularly in the early 1980s, 
the worsening terms of trade, bottlenecks in the economy, and the 
need for large investments in energy and industry combined to limit 
the allocations for consumption. 

Imposition of the Soviet model introduced a chronic inflation- 
ary bias into the Czechoslovak economy, although the inflation was 
not necessarily reflected in prices. Control of prices (only private 
food produce, especially fruit and vegetables, were priced freely) 
repeatedly produced inflationary manifestations in other areas, such 
as shortages in the market and increased savings by the popula- 
tion. Although officials generally limited the rise in prices (caus- 
ing price indexes to advance slowly), by the mid-1970s prices had 
to be adjusted upward more frequently. This trend continued into 
the 1980s, and major food price increases occured in 1982. 

In addition to the banking system, another major financial tool 
for implementing economic policies and the annual plan was the 
central and republic government budgets. The Czechoslovak 
government published little budget information. Western 



161 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

observers believed that small surpluses of revenues were more com- 
mon than deficits, however. Budget revenues were derived primarily 
from state economic organizations and the turnover tax. Income 
taxes provided a small part of revenues. Other minor revenue 
sources included agricultural taxes and customs duties. The plan- 
ning authorities redistributed these budget funds according to the 
plan guidelines, using the budget to encourage certain sectors 
through subsidies or investment funds. Official policy, for exam- 
ple, stressed rapid development of the Slovak economy, which re- 
quired the transfer of funds collected in the Czech lands. In 1983 
the Slovak Socialist Republic received a fractionally larger share 
of total revenue (34 percent) than population figures alone would 
have warranted (32 percent of the country's total population lived 
in the Slovak Socialist Republic). 

Central authorities set prices on over 1.5 million kinds of 
goods. State enterprises were theoretically autonomous financial 
entities that covered costs and profits from sales. Because the 
government set production quotas, wage rates, and prices for the 
products manufactured and the inputs used in the process, 
however, managers had little freedom to manage. In the 1950s, 
the government had collected nearly all enterprise funds above 
costs for redirection according to its priorities. After the 1958 re- 
forms, enterprises obtained a little more control over surplus 
funds, although the government continued to control the amount 
of the surplus. In the 1980s, the government was encouraging en- 
terprises to undertake modernization and other limited invest- 
ment from their own funds and bank credit and to rely less on 
budget funds. 

The turnover tax, another major source of budget revenue, was 
originally employed in the Soviet Union as a simple and effec- 
tive method of collecting most of the funds needed by the govern- 
ment without requiring extensive bookkeeping and estimating. 
It was introduced in Czechoslovakia in 1953 and lost its impor- 
tance as the chief source of revenue only in the late 1960s, when 
other levies extracted funds from state enterprises. The tax was 
collected on goods destined for retail, the rate varying accord- 
ing to the difference between the producer's costs plus approved 
margin and the selling price as specified by pricing officials. Re- 
tail prices of manufactured consumer goods, such as clothing and 
particularly tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, and sugar, 
were substantially higher than those of such basic necessities as 
potatoes, milk, and eggs. The turnover tax appeared to be both 
a source of revenue and a tool used to influence consumption 
patterns. 



162 



Grounds of the 
Brno Trade Fair 
Courtesy 
Czechoslovak Life 



Foreign Trade 

An important characteristic of the Soviet model that was imposed 
on Czechoslovakia in 1948 was the attempt to insulate the domes- 
tic economy and minimize the impact of world economic trends. 
The system accomplished this in part by severely restricting for- 
eign currency transactions and confining them to official channels 
at fixed and favorable exchange rates. Within a few years, the ex- 
change rate had lost its historical basis and no longer bore any direct 
relationship to purchasing power in other currencies. The Soviet 
model tended to treat foreign trade as a minor aspect of planning. 
Imports were simply those materials needed to meet the net material 
balances for the economy, while those commodities that were least 
needed for the national plan were surrendered for export. Cost was 
not a real consideration because there was no basis for estimating 
cost; essentially the central authorities made a political decision that 
commodity X was needed enough to give up commodity Y for it. 
Such decisions were often of minor importance in the large Soviet 
economy. The same was not true in Czechoslovakia, where for- 
eign trade played a prominent role in the national economy. The 
establishment of state-owned foreign trade enterprises, which served 
as buffers between foreign companies and the domestic producers 
of exports and consumers of imports, further isolated the domes- 
tic economy. The foreign trade companies bought Czechoslovak 



163 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

goods for export at domestic prices and sold foreign goods to 
Czechoslovak customers at domestic prices; but the other half of 
these transactions, involving actual foreign trade, took place in for- 
eign currencies in foreign markets. The government budget then 
made adjustments to compensate for any unwanted gains and losses 
caused by varying foreign and domestic prices. 

The foreign trade enterprises successfully carried out the govern- 
ment 's policy of rapidly redirecting the bulk of the country's for- 
eign trade from noncommunist countries to communist countries 
in the period from 1948 to 1953. Many observers contended, 
however, that the new system had seriously adverse effects on the 
economy. Isolating domestic producers of export products — 
primarily manufactured goods — from developments abroad slowed 
the introduction of new technology, the upgrading of the appear- 
ance of products, and the development of sales and service staffs 
with adequate parts inventories. Isolation hampered the develop- 
ment of export industries and products, reinforcing the autarkic 
bias of the Soviet model. 

After Stalin's death in 1953, Czechoslovak trade with Western 
countries gradually revived, although it still was far below prewar 
levels. More than two-thirds of the foreign trade continued to be 
with Comecon member states. Because of its relatively advanced 
industrial position within Comecon, Czechoslovakia initially had 
a secure market for its machinery and equipment exports. As years 
passed, however, the Soviet Union absorbed growing portions of 
Czechoslovakia's export capacity and very soon the country came 
to depend on the Soviet Union for imports of raw materials as well. 

By the 1960s, it became clear that the country's dependence on 
foreign trade was substantial and that a restructuring of the econ- 
omy was necessary. In the 1970s, the government authorized a 
number of large enterprises to deal directly, or through affiliations 
with Czechoslovak foreign trade companies, with foreign purchasers 
of their products. To encourage further export and modernization, 
the central authorities permitted Czechoslovak firms to retain a 
regulated portion of export proceeds. Authorities also acknowledged 
that the economy seriously lagged behind the noncommunist in- 
dustrialized countries in application of new technologies. In re- 
sponse, they increased imports of Western products and processes 
that incorporated advanced technology. 

In the mid-1970s, the terms of trade for Czechoslovakia began 
to deteriorate rapidly. In 1975 the pricing system used to set values 
on imports and exports in trade between communist countries was 
adjusted to make them more current and closer to world prices (see 
Appendix B). The adjustment raised the price of fuels and raw 



164 



The Economy 



materials (primarily Czechoslovak imports) much more than it did 
manufactured goods (the country's main export). The same trend 
manifested itself in trade with Western industrialized countries. 
During the late 1970s, the terms of trade continued to worsen; 
greater and greater quantities of exports were required to purchase 
the same volume of imports. The combination of worsening terms 
of trade and the difficulty of expanding exports caused Czecho- 
slovakia's trade imbalance to grow in almost every area. Between 
1975 and 1979, the country's excess of imports over exports was 
nearly US$1 .2 billion with the Soviet Union, US$690 million with 
Eastern Europe, and US$3.3 billion with noncommunist developed 
countries. These imbalances emerged despite efforts to conserve 
fuel and raw material use, to slow the volume of other imports, 
and to increase exports. 

During the 1970s, Czechoslovakia, like other countries of Eastern 
Europe, turned to West European credit sources to obtain finan- 
cial help for imports as well as longer term investments in modern 
technology. Czechoslovakia did not publish information on these 
credits. However, one Western estimate placed Czechoslovakia's 
hard currency debt to the West at the end of 1979 at US$4 billion 
gross and about US$3. 1 billion net. Czechoslovak officials had been 
much more prudent in building up a foreign currency debt than 
had several other East European nations, however, and the coun- 
try's credit standing remained good. 

Beginning in 1980, Czechoslovakia was able to achieve a trade 
surplus with noncommunist countries, but only by drastically cur- 
tailing imports. When Western banks tightened credit to Eastern 
Europe in 1982 (largely in reaction to Polish insolvency), Czecho- 
slovakia redoubled its efforts to curb imports and pay off its debt. 
This cautious attitude continued to prevail even after the credi- 
tors' policy eased. The government's stance did have the disad- 
vantage of depriving Czechoslovakia of potentially helpful Western 
technology. However, at the end of 1984, Czechoslovakia could 
boast one of the lowest net hard-currency debts per capita (about 
US$15 per inhabitant) in Eastern Europe; only Bulgaria's debt was 
lower. With the Soviet Union, by contrast, Czechoslovakia con- 
tinued to run a substantial deficit. 

In the mid-1980s, according to official statistics, Czechoslovak 
trade activities remained overwhelmingly oriented toward intra- 
Comecon trade. Within Comecon, in keeping with the plan for 
regional specialization set forth in the Comprehensive Program of 
1971, Czechoslovakia concentrated on production of machine tools 
and electric railroad locomotives; the traditionally strong Czecho- 
slovak armaments industry also remained important. In 1985 almost 



165 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

78 percent of total Czechoslovak foreign trade turnover was with 
Comecon members. Trade with "developed capitalist countries," 
by contrast, was listed at just under 16 percent; and developing 
countries accounted for over 6 percent. Most Western analysts be- 
lieved that official Czechoslovak methods of calculation tended to 
overstate considerably the value of trade conducted in transferable 
rubles, i.e.,, with Comecon partners, and to underestimate the value 
of hard currency trade with noncommunist countries. Neverthe- 
less, the general structure of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade was 
unmistakable. 

Czechoslovak trade was heavily concentrated among a relatively 
small group of countries. Five countries — the Soviet Union, the 
German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Poland, Hungary, 
and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) — accounted 
for 71.7 percent of all foreign trade in 1985, according to official 
statistics. The Soviet Union exerted a powerful influence over the 
Czechoslovak economy. In 1985 it accounted for 44.8 percent of 
foreign trade turnover, according to official statistics (see table 10, 
Appendix A). In 1985 by far the most important exports from 
Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union were machinery and various 
kinds of equipment, such as machine tools, power generating equip- 
ment, instruments and laboratory equipment, agricultural ma- 
chinery, railroad rolling stock and other transport equipment, and 
equipment for the food, textile, and chemical industries. Such items 
made up over 60 percent of exports to the Soviet Union. Other 
minor items were ores and metals, clothing and footwear, chemi- 
cals, furniture, domestic appliances, and beverages. Czechoslovak 
imports from the Soviet Union, by contrast, consisted primarily 
of raw materials and energy-related items; petroleum and petro- 
leum products accounted for almost 43 percent of import value, 
and natural gas and electricity totaled 18 percent. Other imported 
products were machinery and transport equipment, representing 
almost 10 percent of total imports; metal ores, coal and coke, and 
pig iron and ferroalloys made up almost 8 percent. 

Second, third, and fourth in order of rank in Czechoslovak for- 
eign trade turnover were East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. 
Other East European Comecon countries — Bulgaria and 
Romania — were also of considerable importance (seventh and ninth 
in rank, respectively). Czechoslovak exports to these countries in 
1985, according to official data, consisted mainly of machinery and 
transport equipment, chemical products, and (especially to Hun- 
gary) coal and briquettes. Imports likewise were primarily 
machinery and transport equipment, chemical products, and 



166 



The Economy 



various other manufactured goods. Czechoslovakia also imported 
food and animal products from Hungary. 

Among noncommunist countries, an important trade partner was 
West Germany (fifth in rank). Principal Czechoslovak exports to 
West Germany in 1985 were various manufactured goods (espe- 
cially paper and paperboard, textiles, and iron and steel products), 
mineral fuel products (briquettes, coke, and refined petroleum 
products), and chemical products. Principal imports from West Ger- 
many were machinery (textile- and leather- working machinery, 
machine tools, and electrical machinery and instruments), chemi- 
cal products, and various manufactured goods. Other significant 
trading partners were Austria, Britain, Italy, and France. Engineer- 
ing products, which accounted for more than 50 percent of all 
Czechoslovak exports, had a share of only 10 to 11 percent in non- 
communist trade, owing to very strong and successful West Euro- 
pean competition. Instead, consumer goods, metallurgical products, 
chemicals, and fuels and raw materials were more important. With 
regard to imports from noncommunist countries, Czechoslovakia 
in 1986 was especially interested in the high technology offered by 
Western Europe and Japan (twenty-fifth in rank). Particularly in 
demand were products from engineering, electronics, and electri- 
cal engineering industries, as well as biotechnology and pharmaceu- 
ticals. 

As of 1985, Czechoslovakia also conducted substantial amounts 
of trade with Yugoslavia, China, Syria, and Cuba. Czechoslovak 
trade with the United States (twenty-third in rank) was modest. 
In 1985 Czechoslovak exports to the United States included, among 
other things, footwear and jewelry, glassware, steel bars, wire, 
shaped steel, prepared or preserved meats, and hops. In 1985 
imports consisted, among other things, of raw materials (hides and 
skins, seeds for producing vegetable oil, and ores and concentrates 
of base metals), specialized industrial machinery, and printed 
materials. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Czechoslovakia 
had imported substantial amounts of grain from the United States, 
but more abundant domestic harvests enabled the country to reduce 
these imports in the mid-1980s. 

The Eighth Five-Year Plan, 1986-90 

The Eighth Five- Year Plan called for further "intensification" 
within the economy. The plan focused on raising the quality and 
technological level of production, lowering the cost of energy and 
materials in relation to output, increasing labor productivity, 
accelerating the pace of innovation at the workplace, improving 
discipline, and continuing the "structural" shift of the economy 



167 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

from productive activities requiring great consumption of energy 
to more advanced technologies and capital-intensive industry. 
National income was to rise 19 percent, or just over 3.5 percent 
annually on average. Plans called for industrial output to grow 15.8 
percent, an average increase of about 3 percent yearly, while per- 
sonal consumption was to grow by only 11.9 percent. Modest as 
these targets were, they were higher than the results achieved dur- 
ing the Seventh Five- Year Plan. Only agriculture was to grow at 
a rate slower than that of the previous plan period; with a total 
increase of 6.9 percent, it would average just over 1 percent growth 
annually. Investment, while still low, would increase 10.4 percent 
during the plan (as compared with 2.5 percent in the 1981-85 pe- 
riod). Special attention was to be given to the machine-building 
and electronics industries, the chemical and metallurgical indus- 
tries, construction of nuclear power plants and expansion of the 
natural gas network, and environment-related projects. The plan 
called for exports to grow at a higher rate than the national in- 
come. The government did not plan any substantial borrowing in 
hard currency, concentrating instead on paying off its relatively 
modest (US$2 billion) debt to the West. 

The plan called for achievement of the desired growth largely 
through improved labor productivity; 92 to 95 percent of the growth 
was to occur in this way. Material costs were to fall by 1 .5 percent 
yearly on average, and specific consumption of fuel was to fall by 
2.9 percent. Achievement of both of these goals would require 
greater savings than had been possible during the 1981-85 plan 
period. 

In the mid-1980s, Czechoslovak leaders acknowledged the per- 
sisting weaknesses in the country's economy and its need to moder- 
nize more rapidly. Although the government announced no major 
reforms in conjunction with the Eighth Five-Year Plan, in 1987 
an experiment was begun involving about 120 industrial enterprises. 
These enterprises were to receive only key planning figures from 
the central authorities; otherwise, they were to have increased 
autonomy in planning production, seeking profitable forms for their 
activities, and managing their own finances. The reforms repre- 
sented a significant step beyond the modest "Set of Measures" 
of 1981, which had retained strict central controls. Western analysts 
viewed the experiment as a cautious response to the more ambi- 
tious reforms sponsored by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev 
in the Soviet Union. 



* * * 



168 



The Economy 



For English readers, a valuable source of information is John N. 
Stevens's Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads, which surveys the period 
from 1948 to the early 1980s. Much of the statistical data concern- 
ing economic policy and performance in this chapter has been drawn 
from Stevens's survey. Official statistics may be found in the an- 
nual Bulletin of the Statm banka ceskoslovenska. The Foreign Broad- 
cast Information Service's Daily Report: Eastern Europe provides 
current reporting of statistics and economic developments carried 
in the Czechoslovak media. Issues of current concern to Czecho- 
slovak economists are presented in the commentaries and essays 
of Czechoslovak Economic Digest. The United States Congress Joint 
Economic Committee regularly prints collections of articles on 
Eastern Europe; as of mid- 198 7, the most recent collection was the 
three- volume East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980s, pub- 
lished in 1985 and 1986. 

The standard sources of economic statistics in the Czech lan- 
guage are the yearly Statistickd rocenka CSSR and the Historickd statis- 
tickd rocenka CSSR. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



169 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Czechoslovak coat of arms 



IN 1987 CZECHOSLOVAKIA completed its eighteenth year 
under the leadership of Gustav Husak. Placed in power by the 
Soviets eight months after the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion 
of Czechoslovakia, the Husak regime moved quickly to undo the 
policies of the previous government, led by Alexander Dubcek, and 
to eliminate what remained of the reform movement known as the 
Prague Spring. Within two years, Husak's policies of "normali- 
zation" succeeded in restoring centralized party control in Czecho- 
slovakia and reestablishing Czechoslovakia's status as a loyal Soviet 
ally prepared to follow Moscow's directives in both international 
and domestic affairs. 

The normalization process begun after the 1968 invasion set the 
stage for the emergence in the 1970s of an extremely orthodox po- 
litical environment. Normalization extended to almost every aspect 
of Czechoslovak life. Politically, above all else, it meant the rein- 
forcement of the absolute monopoly of power held by the Com- 
munist Party of Czechoslovakia. In the economy, it meant the 
entrenchment of a command economy that left virtually no room 
for market forces. In the social sphere, it meant party control of 
all associational groupings, education, and the printed word. Fi- 
nally, in the area of national security, it meant increased police 
powers and the near subordination of the Czechoslovak People's 
Army to the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. 

Czechoslovakia's political orthodoxy continued in the 1980s. 
Despite rampant bureaucratization, poor economic performance, 
inefficient administration, and widespread popular apathy, the 
Husak government introduced no significant changes in organi- 
zation, personnel, or policies from the early 1970s through the 
mid-1980s. Only in early 1987, undoubtedly in response to pres- 
sure from the new leadership in Moscow, did the Husak govern- 
ment announce that Czechoslovakia was preparing to introduce 
Soviet-style reforms aimed at improving Czechoslovakia's falter- 
ing economy. 

Political Setting 

Geopolitical Considerations 

Lying between the Germans and the Russians, the Czecho- 
slovak state has had its political life in modern times determined, 
to a considerable extent, by geopolitical factors. In the 1980s, 



173 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Czechoslovakia continued to demonstrate subservience to the poli- 
cies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in domes- 
tic and especially in foreign affairs. 

Czechoslovakia's political alignment with the Soviet Union began 
during World War II. In 1945 it was the Soviet Red Army that 
liberated Prague from the Nazis. The continued presence of the 
Red Army in Czechoslovakia until 1946 facilitated the communists' 
efforts to reorganize local government, the militia, and the Czecho- 
slovak army and to place communists in key positions. Following 
the February 1948 coup d'etat in which the communists seized 
power, Soviet influence over Czechoslovakia grew markedly. It was 
abetted through formal alliances, such as the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon) and the Warsaw Pact, and through 
direct intervention, in the 1968 invasion (see Intervention, ch. 1). 

In the immediate post- World War II period, many Czechoslovak 
citizens supported the alliance with the Soviet Union. They did 
not anticipate, however, the rigidities of the Stalinist rule that fol- 
lowed. The people of Czechoslovakia had known authoritarian rule 
and a lack of civil rights during centuries of domination by the 
Hapsburgs and under Nazi rule during the war. But the extent 
of the repression during the early years of the rule by the Com- 
munist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunisticka strana Cesko- 
slovenska — the KSC) was unprecedented. In the early 1950s, some 
900,000 persons were purged from the ranks of the KSC; about 
100,000 were jailed for such political crimes as "bourgeois nation- 
alism." Antonin Novotny became first secretary of the KSC in 
1953, the year of Stalin's death, and continued to rule in Stalin's 
rigidly authoritarian style for fifteen years. In practice (though not 
in rhetoric), Novotny ignored Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 denun- 
ciation of Stalin and made no attempt to imitate the Soviet Union's 
decentralization of communist party rule. A considerable portion 
of the party hierarchy did take note of the Soviet decentralization, 
however. In 1968 they removed Novotny from power and initi- 
ated the Prague Spring (see The Prague Spring, 1968, ch. 1). 

Ethnic Considerations 

Another essential ingredient in Czechoslovak political culture has 
been the varying political aspirations of the nation's two major 
ethnic groups, the Czechs and the Slovaks (see Ethnic Groups, 
ch. 2). Slovaks were never as satisfied as the Czechs with the na- 
tion created in 1918 because they felt dominated by the numeri- 
cally superior Czech nationals. Slovak nationalists fought diligently 
throughout the 1920s for greater Slovak autonomy, and in the next 
decade they succeeded in obtaining constitutional changes granting 



174 



Government and Politics 



more autonomy to Slovakia. In March 1939, Slovakia, encouraged 
by Hitler, seceded from the new state and allied itself with Ger- 
many, calling itself the Slovak Republic. Although nominally in- 
dependent under the leadership of Monsignor Jozef Tiso, the new 
Slovak state in reality functioned as a Nazi satellite. After Hitler's 
defeat, Slovakia was reunited with the Czech lands. 

The communist takeover in 1 948 did not lead to equitable treat- 
ment of Czechs and Slovaks. The Stalinist purges of the early 1950s 
were particularly harsh on Slovaks; indeed, the definition of ''bour- 
geois nationalism" coincided quite precisely with the aspirations 
of Slovak nationalism. Among the Slovak leaders arrested and jailed 
in the early 1950s was Gustav Husak. Husak later was rehabili- 
tated and eventually named general secretary (the title changed 
from first secretary in 1971) of the KSC and president of the 
republic. 

Slovak aspirations for greater autonomy played an important 
role in the political environment during the 1960s. The reform 
movement associated with the Prague Spring advocated greater 
independence for Slovakia. The 1968 constitutional amendments 
redefined Czechoslovakia as a federation of two equal states, the 
Czech nation and the Slovak nation, and increased the responsi- 
bilities of the constituent republics. However, this decentralization 
of power did not survive the 1968 invasion and subsequent nor- 
malization policies. On paper, the federation remained and the 
Slovak Socialist Republic retained its separate communist party 
organization and republic-level government organs. In practice, 
whatever power the 1968 amendments gave to the Slovaks was 
diminished when the Husak regime reestablished centralized party 
and government control in the 1970s. 

The 1968 Invasion 

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a pivotal event 
in Czechoslovakia's political development. The August interven- 
tion by forces from the Soviet Union, the German Democratic 
Republic (East Germany), Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary marked 
the beginning of the end of the Prague Spring and the reformist 
policies introduced by the Dubcek regime. It also set the stage for 
the reemergence in Czechoslovakia of a pro- Soviet regime and a 
politically orthodox environment. 

In January 1968, Alexander Dubcek, who since 1963 had been 
first secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia (Komunisticka 
strana Slovenska — KSS), was chosen to replace Antonin Novotny 
as first secretary of the KSC. Dubcek was not then the leader of 
the KSC reformers but rather was a compromise selection. The 



175 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

removal of Novotny triggered an outpouring of demands for fur- 
ther changes in all sectors of society. The drive for reform cen- 
tered on four broad issues: the overall question of political structure 
and participation, justice and civil liberties, Czech-Slovak relations, 
and economic organization and planning. In April 1968 the KSC 
Central Committee issued its so-called Action Program, which out- 
lined steps toward constructing a "Czechoslovak way to socialism." 
within the framework of a socialist society ruled by the communist 
party, the program attempted to decentralize and democratize the 
system of authority by reducing the role of the KSC in national 
life and transferring greater responsibility to the elected bodies of 
government. Other goals of the reform were to introduce strong 
guarantees of civil liberties and justice by establishing a system of 
checks and balances and reducing the power of police organs; to 
construct a more equitable relationship between Czechs and Slovaks 
by granting greater autonomy to the latter; and to institute a de- 
centralized planning apparatus with aspects of market socialism. 

A number of public opinion polls taken at the time indicated 
that the reforms envisioned in the Action Program received an ex- 
traordinary measure of public support. It was for this reason that 
they aroused deep concern among the leadership of the Soviet Union 
and neighboring communist nations. Those leaders feared that the 
reformist policies in Czechoslovakia would result in the erosion of 
the authority of the communist party, which in turn would weaken 
Czechoslovakia's commitment to socialist unity and to the Warsaw 
Pact and Comecon alliances. They also worried that the implemen- 
tation of reforms in Czechoslovakia would lead to calls for similar 
reforms in the Soviet Union and other East European nations. 

During the night of August 20-21, the armies of five Warsaw 
Pact nations invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia. The KSC 
Presidium issued a statement over Prague radio condemning the 
invasion and appealing to the people to remain calm and the army 
not to resist. No armed resistance was forthcoming. Instead, outrage 
at the massive invasion was expressed nonviolently: road signs were 
altered and removed to slow the oncoming invaders; radio trans- 
mitters were repeatedly moved to elude takeover; and foreign sol- 
diers were refused service in stores and restaurants and were 
engaged in heated arguments with Czechoslovak citizens from 
whom they vainly sought cooperation. 

As the Warsaw Pact troops moved into Prague, Soviet secur- 
ity forces arrested Dubcek and other top party leaders and flew 
them to Moscow. Meanwhile, despite the presence of Warsaw Pact 
troops in Prague, the National Assembly met August 21-27, and 
delegates managed to convene the "Extraordinary" Congress of the 



176 



Government and Politics 



Czechoslovak Communist Party. Dubcek's supporters in the 
government refused to recognize the Soviet-imposed government 
and instead demanded to join Dubcek in directly negotiating with 
the Soviets. The talks resulted in the signing of the Moscow Pro- 
tocol, an uneasy compromise allowing Dubcek to remain in power 
but also requiring the dismissal of some reformists, a tightening 
of press control, a commitment to no persecution of pro-Soviet com- 
munists, and increased Soviet control over KSC appointments. 
After signing the Moscow Protocol, Dubcek was allowed to return 
to Prague, where he resumed his duties as first secretary of the party. 

Dubcek's efforts to maintain political control and to salvage the 
reform program were stymied by the new conditions imposed by 
the Soviets. Furthermore, popular resistance to the Soviet inva- 
sion continued and was reflected in such episodes as the public sui- 
cide of a university student and the vandalizing of Prague's Aeroflot 
office. All of these factors kept tensions high and led to Dubcek's 
ouster in April 1969. He was replaced by the more orthodox, Soviet- 
backed Gustav Husak. 

The Policy of Normalization 

Once in power, the Husak regime acted quickly to "normal- 
ize" the country's political situation. The chief objectives of Husak's 
normalization were the restoration of firm party rule and the 
reestablishment of Czechoslovakia's status as a committed mem- 
ber of the socialist bloc. The normalization process involved five 
interrelated steps: consolidate the Husak leadership and remove 
reformers from leadership positions; revoke or modify the laws 
enacted by the reform movement; reestablish centralized control 
over the economy; reinstate the power of police authorities; and 
expand Czechoslovakia's ties with other socialist nations. Within 
a week of assuming power, Husak began to consolidate his leader- 
ship by ordering extensive purges of reformists still occupying key 
positions in the mass media, judiciary, social and mass organiza- 
tions, lower party organs, and, finally, the highest levels of the KSC. 
In the fall of 1969, twenty-nine liberals on the Central Committee 
were replaced by conservatives. Among the liberals ousted was 
Dubcek, who was dropped from the Presidium (the following year 
Dubcek was expelled from the party; he subsequently became a 
minor functionary in Slovakia, where he still lived in 1987). Husak 
also consolidated his leadership by appointing potential rivals to 
the new government positions created as a result of the 1968 Con- 
stitutional Law of Federation. 

Once it had consolidated power, the Husak regime moved quickly 
to implement other normalization policies. In the two years 



177 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



following the invasion, the new leadership revoked some reformist 
laws (such as the National Front Act and the Press Act) and sim- 
ply did not enforce others. It returned economic enterprises, which 
had been given substantial independence during the Prague Spring, 
to centralized control through contracts based on central planning 
and production quotas. It reinstated extreme police control, a step 
that was reflected in the harsh treatment of demonstrators mark- 
ing the first-year anniversary of the August intervention. Finally, 
Husak stabilized Czechoslovakia's relations with its allies by 
arranging frequent intrabloc exchanges and visits and redirecting 
Czechoslovakia's foreign economic ties toward greater involvement 
with socialist nations. By May 1971, party chief Husak could report 
to the delegates attending the officially sanctioned Fourteenth Party 
Congress that the process of normalization had been completed 
satisfactorily and that Czechoslovakia was ready to proceed toward 
higher forms of socialism (see National Organization, this ch.). 

A Climate of Orthodoxy 

The objectives of normalization were the restoration of firm KSC 
rule and the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia's position in the 
socialist bloc. Its result, however, was a political environment that 
placed primary emphasis on the maintenance of a stable party 
leadership and its strict control over the population. 

A remarkable feature of the KSC leadership under Husak has 
been the absence of significant changes in personnel. The stability 
of the leadership during the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s 
could be attributed not to unanimity in political opinion but rather 
to practical compromise among different factions vying to retain 
their leadership positions. Husak' s leadership, then, was based not 
on any ability he may have had to rally opinion but rather on his 
skill in securing consensuses that were in the mutual interest of 
a coalition of party leaders. 

Husak led the conservative (sometimes called the "moderate" 
or "pragmatic") wing of the KSC leadership. An important Slovak 
communist party functionary from 1943 to 1950, Husak was 
arrested in 1951 and sentenced to three years — later to life 
imprisonment — for "bourgeois nationalism" during the Stalinist 
purges of the era. Released in 1960 and rehabilitated in 1963, Husak 
rose to be a deputy prime minister under Dubcek, whom he later 
denounced, and was named KSC first secretary in April 1969 and 
president of the republic in July 1975. Above all, Husak has been 
a survivor who learned to accommodate the powerful political forces 
surrounding him. 



178 




179 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Other prominent conservatives who remained in power in 1987 
included Lubomfr Strougal, premier of Czechoslovakia; Peter 
Colotka, premier of the Slovak Socialist Republic; Jozef Lenart, 
first secretary of the KSS; and Josef Kempny, chairman of the 
Czech National Council. These leaders generally supported the re- 
forms instituted under Dubcek during the late 1960s but success- 
fully made the transition to orthodox party rule following the 
invasion and Dubcek' s decline from power. Subsequently, they 
adopted a more flexible stance regarding economic reform and dis- 
sident activity. 

Opposed to the conservatives within the KSC leadership were 
the so-called hard-liners. Their leader was Vasil Bil'ak, a Ukrain- 
ian from Slovakia who had been a member of the Presidium since 
1968 and was chairman of the party's Ideological Commission. 
Other hard-liners in the top party leadership included Karel 
Hoffman, a Central Committee secretary and Presidium member; 
Antonin Kapek, Presidium member; Jan Fojtfk, secretary; Alois 
Indra, Presidium member and chairman of the Federal Assembly 
(replaced the National Assembly under 1968 federation law); and, 
on most issues, Milos Jakes, chairman of the Economic Commis- 
sion and Presidium member. These hard-liners opposed economic 
and political reforms and took a harsh stand on dissent. 

After the 1968 invasion, Husak successfully ruled over what was 
essentially a coalition of the conservative and hard-line factions 
within the top party leadership. The method by which he ruled 
was commonly summed up as "reluctant terror." It involved careful 
adherence to the Soviet Union's policy objectives and the use of 
what was perceived as the minimum amount of repression at home 
necessary to fulfill these objectives and prevent a return to Dubcek- 
style reformism. As one result, the membership of the KSC leader- 
ship has changed very little since 1971 . The Sixteenth Party Con- 
gress in 1981 reelected the incumbent members of the Presidium 
and Secretariat and elevated one candidate member, Jakes, to full 
membership in the Presidium. The Seventeenth Party Congress 
in 1986 retained the incumbent Secretariat and Presidium and 
added three new candidate members to the Presidium. In March 
1987, Josef Korcak retired from the Presidium and was replaced 
by Ladislav Adamec. At the same time, Hoffman, a Presidium 
member, was also appointed a Central Committee secretary. 

Popular control during the era of orthodoxy was maintained 
through various means. Repeated arrests and imprisonment of 
persons opposing the regime, such as members of Charter 77 and 
religious activists, continued throughout the 1970s and into the 
1980s (see Dissent and Independent Activity, ch. 1). Less coercive 



180 



Government and Politics 



controls, such as punishment through job loss, demotion, denial 
of employment, denial of educational opportunities, housing re- 
strictions, and refusal to grant travel requests, also prevailed. 

Another means by which the Husak regime maintained control 
was to offer considerable consumer gains as a substitute for the 
loss of personal freedom. Government policies in the first half of 
the 1970s resulted in high economic growth and large increases in 
personal consumption. The widespread availability of material 
goods placated the general populace and promoted overall accep- 
tance of Husak's stringent political controls. During the late 1970s, 
however, Czechoslovakia's economy began to stagnate, and the 
regime's ability to appease the population by providing material 
benefits diminished. 

Although the Husak regime succeeded in preserving the status 
quo in Czechoslovakia for nearly two decades, it faced in the 1980s 
both internal and external pressures to reform. Domestically, poor 
economic performance hindered the government's ability to produce 
the goods needed to satisfy consumer demands (see Economic Policy 
and Performance, ch. 3). Pressure for political change continued 
from activists representing, for example, the Roman Catholic 
Church and the Charter 77 movement. Externally, Czechoslovakia 
struggled to find a suitable response to the changes introduced by 
the new leadership in Moscow. The 1985 election of Mikhail 
Gorbachev as general secretary of the CPSU precipitated a wave 
of personnel changes in the Soviet party apparatus and a strong 
emphasis on exploring new ways to stimulate economic growth. 
Czechoslovakia's initial response to the reformist trends in the Soviet 
Union focused on voicing public support for Gorbachev's new pro- 
grams while steadfastly avoiding introducing similar programs 
within Czechoslovakia. However, in early 1987, on the eve of 
Gorbachev's visit to Prague, Husak announced that Czechoslovakia 
was preparing to implement widespread reforms patterned after 
the Soviet "restructuring" (perestroika) campaign. The Czechoslovak 
leader did not specify what the reforms might include, but his an- 
nouncement suggested a significant departure from previous poli- 
cy and represented an apparent victory for the pro-reform, 
"pragmatic" wing of the KSC. 

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 

Founded in 1921, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
(Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska — KSC) was one of some 
twenty political parties that competed within the democratic frame- 
work of the Czechoslovak Republic (also known as the First Repub- 
lic), but it never gained sufficient strength to be included in that 



181 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



government (see Czechoslovak Democracy, ch. 1). During World 
War II many KSC leaders sought refuge in the Soviet Union, where 
they made preparations to increase the party's power base once 
the war ended. In the early postwar period the Soviet-supported 
Czechoslovak communists launched a sustained drive that culmi- 
nated in their seizure of power in 1948. Once in control, the KSC 
developed an organizational structure and mode of rule patterned 
closely after those of the CPSU. 

Power is formally held by the National Front of the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic, a coalition in which the KSC holds two-thirds 
of the seats while the remaining one-third are shared among five 
other political parties. But in fact the KSC holds an absolute mo- 
nopoly on political power, and the other parties within the National 
Front are little more than auxiliaries. Even the governmental struc- 
ture of Czechoslovakia exists primarily to implement policy deci- 
sions made within the KSC. To ensure its monopoly on power, 
the KSC places its members in all policy-making positions within 
the government. 

National Organization 

KSC organization is based on the Leninist concept of democratic 
centralism, which provides for the election of party leaders at all 
levels but requires that each level be fully subject to the control of 
the next higher unit. Party ideologues assert that democratic cen- 
tralism is the most important principle in the organizational struc- 
ture and activity of the party. Accordingly, party programs and 
policies are directed from the top, and resolutions of higher organs 
are unconditionally binding on all lower organs and individual party 
members. In theory, policy matters are freely and openly discussed 
at congresses, conferences, and membership meetings and in the 
party press. In practice, however, these discussions merely reflect de- 
cisions made by a small contingent of top party officials. 

According to party statutes, the supreme KSC organ is the party 
congress, which normally convenes every five years for a session 
lasting less than one week (see fig. 14). An exception was made 
with respect to the Fourteenth Party Congress, which was held in 
August 1968 under Dubcek's leadership. This congress was sub- 
sequently declared illegal, its proceedings were stricken from party 
records, and a second "legal" Fourteenth Party Congress was held 
in May 1971 . The Fifteenth Party Congress was held in April 1976; 
the sixteenth, in April 1981; and the seventeenth, in March 1986. 

The party congress theoretically is responsible for making 
basic policy decisions; in practice, however, it is the Presidium 
of the Central Committee that holds the decision-making and 



182 



Government and Politics 



policy-making responsibilities. The congress merely endorses the 
reports and directives of the top party leadership. The statutory 
duties assigned the party congress include determination of the 
party's domestic and foreign policies; approval of the party pro- 
gram and statutes; and election of the Central Committee and the 
Central Control and Auditing Commission, as well as discussion 
and approval of their reports. 

Between congresses the Central Committee is responsible for 
directing party activities and implementing general policy decisions. 
Party statutes also provide that the Central Committee functions 
as the primary arm of KSC control over the organs of the federal 
government and the republics, the National Front, and all cultural 
and professional organizations. Party members who hold leading 
positions in these bodies are responsible directly to the Central Com- 
mittee for the implementation of KSC policies. In addition, the 
Central Committee screens nominations for all important govern- 
ment and party positions and selects the editor in chief of Rudeprdvo, 
the principal party newspaper. The Central Committee generally 
meets in full session at least twice a year. 

Nevertheless, the Central Committee, like the party congress, 
has rarely acted as more than a rubber stamp of policy decisions 
made by the party Presidium. (As an exception to this rule, when 
factional infighting developed within the Presidium in 1968, the 
Central Committee assumed crucial importance in resolving 
the dispute and ousted First Secretary Novotny in favor of Dubcek.) 
Generally, decisions on which the Central Committee votes 
are reached beforehand so that votes taken at the sessions are 
unanimous. 

Central Committee membership increased gradually from the 
mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. At the Fifteenth Party Congress in 
1976, the number of full members in the Central Committee rose 
from 115 to 121; in 1981, from 121 to 123; and in 1986, from 123 
to 135. The number of candidate members rose from forty-five to 
fifty-three in 1976, to fifty-five in 1981, and to sixty-two in 1986. 
Of the 135 full members elected in 1986, almost 26 percent were 
newcomers to the Central Committee, as were approximately 81 
percent of the 62 candidate members selected. In terms of compo- 
sition, the Central Committee normally included leading party and 
government officials, military officials, and a cross section of out- 
standing citizens. 

The Presidium of the Central Committee, which conducts the 
work of the party between full committee sessions, formally is elected 
by the Central Committee; in reality, the top party leaders deter- 
mine its composition. The Sixteenth Party Congress in 1981 elected 



183 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 





PARTY 
CONGRESS 






CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE 



COMMISSIONS AND 
DEPARTMENTS 

I 



CENTRAL CONTROL AND 
AUDITING COMMISSION 
CHAIRMAN: 
Jaroslav Hajn 

OTHER 
COMMISSIONS (4) 



DEPARTMENTS (18) 



PRESIDIUM 
I 



MEMBERS 
Ladislav Adamec 
Vasil Bilak 
Peter Colotka 
Karel Hoffman 
Gustav Husak 
Alois Indra 
Milos Jakes 
Antonin Kapek 
Josef Kempny 
Jozef Lenart 
Lubomir Strougal 

CA N DIDAT E 
MEMBERS 

Jan Fojtik 
Josef Haman 
Vladimir Herman 
Miloslav Hruskovic 
Ignac Janak 
Frantisek Pitra 



SECRETARIAT 



GENERAL 
SECRETARY 
Gustav Husak 
SECRETARIES 
Mikulas Beno 
Vasil Bilak 
Jan Fojtfk 
Josef Haman 
Josef Havlin 
Karel Hoffman 
Milos Jakes 
Frantisek Pitra 
Jindrich Polednik 

MEMBERS 
Zdenek Horeni 
Marie Kabrhelova 
Miroslav Zavadil 



CZECH SOCIALIST 
REPUBLIC 



1 

SLOVAK SOCIALIST 

REPUBLIC 
I 



COMMUNIST PARTY OF 
SLOVAKIA 



REGIONAL CONFERENCES (8) 
REGIONAL COMMITTEES 
SECRETARIAT 



REGIONAL CONFERENCES (4) 
REGIONAL COMMITTEES 
SECRETARIAT 



DISTRICT CONFERENCES 
DISTRICT COMMITTEES 
SECRETARIAT 



DISTRICT CONFERENCES 
DISTRICT COMMITTEES 
SECRETARIAT 



MEMBERSHIP MEETING 
CHAIRMAN 
SECRETARIES 



MEMBERSHIP MEETING 
CHAIRMAN 
SECRETARIES 



Figure 14. Organization of the Communist Party 

of Czechoslovakia, with Top Party Officials, 1987 



184 



Government and Politics 



twelve full members and one candidate member to the Presidium. 
Membership fluctuated between the sixteenth and seventeenth con- 
gresses; just before the Seventeenth Party Congress it stood at eleven 
full members and three candidate members. The Seventeenth Party 
Congress retained all the incumbents and added three new candi- 
date members. 

While the Presidium functions as the highest policy-making 
authority in the party hierarchy, the Secretariat of the Central Com- 
mittee acts as the party's highest administrative authority and as 
the nerve center of the party's extensive control mechanism. The 
Secretariat supervises the implementation of decisions made in the 
Presidium, controls the movement up and down the party ladder, 
and directs the work within the party and government apparatus. 
Under Husak, the composition of the Secretariat, like that of the 
Presidium, has remained rather constant, although in 1987 
Secretariat membership did increase with the additions of Hoffman 
as secretary and Miroslav Zavadil as member. The authority and 
function of the KSC Presidium and Secretariat continued to be 
interlocked in 1987 by the dual membership of Husak, Bil'ak, 
Fojtik, Hoffman, Jakes, Josef Haman, and Frantisek Pitra. 

Another important organ in the party hierarchy is the Central 
Control and Auditing Commission. As its name implies, the com- 
mission plays a dual role, overseeing party discipline and super- 
vising party finances. As an organ for the enforcement of party 
standards, the Central Control and Auditing Commission has fre- 
quently wielded its power to suspend or expel "deviant" party 
members. It was this commission that directed the massive purges 
in party membership during the early and late 1970s. 

Members of the Central Control and Auditing Commission are 
elected at each party congress (the Seventeenth Party Congress 
elected fifty-four members). These members then elect from among 
themselves a chairman, deputy chairmen, and a small presidium. 
Subunits of the commission exist at the republic, regional, and dis- 
trict levels of the party structure. The enforcement of party dis- 
cipline down to the local level also involves the People's Control 
Commission, which is part of the government structure. Frantisek 
Ondfich, the minister-chairman of the People's Control Commis- 
sion in late 1986, also served on the Central Control and Auditing 
Commission. 

Other KSC commissions in 1987 included the Agriculture and 
Food Commission, the Economic Commission, the Ideological 
Commission, and the Youth Commission. In 1987 the party also 
had eighteen departments: agitation and propaganda; agriculture, 
food industry, forestry, and water management; Comecon 



185 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

cooperation; culture; economic administration; economics; educa- 
tion and science; elected state organs; external economic relations; 
fuels and energy; industry; transportation and communications; 
international affairs; mass media; political organization; science 
and technology; social organizations and national committees; state 
administration; and a general department. In most instances the 
party departments paralleled agencies and ministries of the govern- 
ment and supervised their activities to ensure conformity with KSC 
norms and programs. Also under the supervision of the Central 
Committee were two party training centers — the Advanced School 
of Politics and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. 

Lower-Level Organization 

At the republic level the party structure deviates from the govern- 
ment organization in that a separate communist party unit exists 
in the Slovak Socialist Republic but not in the Czech Socialist 
Republic. The KSS emerged from World War II as a party dis- 
tinct from the KSC, but the two were united after the communist 
takeover in 1948. The reform movement of the 1960s advocated 
a return to a system of autonomous parties for the two republics. 
The Bureau for the Conduct of Party Work in the Czech Lands 
was created as a counterpart to the KSS, but it was suppressed 
after the 1968 invasion and by 1971 had been stricken from party 
records. The KSS remained, however, undoubtedly as a conces- 
sion to Slovak nationalism. Nevertheless, the KSS functions solely 
as a regional affiliate of the KSC. The KSS does not operate as 
an independent political institution but rather as directed by the 
Prague party leadership. 

The organizational structure and modus operandi of the KSS 
parallel those of the KSC . The KSS party congress meets for several 
days every five years (just before the KSC party congress). The 
KSS party congress selects its central committee members and can- 
didate members, who in turn select a presidium, a secretariat, and 
a first secretary. Jozef Lenart, selected as KSS first secretary in 
1970, still held that position seventeen years later. Following the 
March 1986 party congress, the KSS Presidium consisted of eleven 
members; the Secretariat included, in addition to Lenart, three 
secretaries and two members; and the Central Committee com- 
prised ninety-five full members and thirty- six candidate members. 
The KSS in 1986 also had its own. Central Control and Auditing 
Commission, four other commissions, twelve party departments, 
and one training facility. 

The next step down the party hierarchy is the regional level. The 
KSC has ten regional subdivisions (seven in the Czech lands, three 



186 



Government and Politics 



in Slovakia) identical to the kraje, the ten major governmental ad- 
ministrative divisions. In addition, however, the Prague and 
Bratislava municipal party organs, because of their size, are given 
regional status within the KSC . Regional conferences select regional 
committees, which in turn select a leading secretary, a number of 
secretaries, and a regional control and auditing commission. 

Regional units are broken down into a total of 1 14 district-level 
organizations. District conferences are held simultaneously every 
two to three years, at which time each conference selects a district 
committee that subsequently selects a secretariat to be headed by 
a district secretary. In the spirit of democratic centralism, authority 
and responibility are delegated from the higher KSC bodies through 
these successive tiers of the party structure. The regional commit- 
tees develop the basic programs for the regions and guide the dis- 
trict committees, while the district organizations oversee and direct 
the local party units. 

At the local level the KSC is structured according to what it calls 
the "territorial and production principle"; the basic party units 
are organized in work sites and residences where there are at least 
five KSC members. In enterprises or communities where party 
membership is more numerous, the smaller units function under 
larger city, village, or factorywide committees. The highest authority 
of the local organization is, theoretically, the monthly member- 
ship meeting, attendance at which is a basic duty of every mem- 
ber. Each group selects its own leadership, consisting of a chairman 
and one or more secretaries. It also names delegates to the confer- 
ence of the next higher unit, be it at the municipal (in the case 
of larger cities) or district level. Local units are described in party 
statutes as the basis of all party organization and are given specific 
responsibilities that include participating in the management of eco- 
nomic enterprises; training and indoctrinating members; developing 
and disseminating propaganda aimed at nonmembers; participat- 
ing actively in social, economic, and cultural activities; and em- 
ploying constructive criticism to improve socialist development and 
community life. 

Membership and Training 

Since assuming power in 1948, the KSC has had one of the largest 
per capita membership rolls in the communist world. Whereas the 
Leninist guidelines for an elitist party cadre dictate that about 
5 percent of the population should be party members, in Czecho- 
slovakia party membership in 1986 comprised approximately 
1 1 percent of the population. The membership roll has often been 
alleged by party ideologues to contain a large component of 



187 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

inactive, opportunistic, and "counterrevolutionary" elements. 
These charges were used on two occasions — between 1948 and 1950 
and again between 1969 and 1971 — as a pretext to conduct mas- 
sive purges of the membership. In the first case, the great Stalinist 
purges, nearly 1 million members were removed; in the wake of 
the Prague Spring and subsequent invasion, about half that num- 
ber either resigned or were purged from the KSC. 

Although party leaders did not bemoan the decrease in mem- 
bership, they did express concern about the effects of the purge 
on the social and age distribution of the party membership. 
Although no official statistics were available, unofficial sources 
claimed that Czechs constituted as many as 90 percent of those 
purged in the wake of the 1968 invasion. The purges hit especially 
hard among youth, blue-collar workers, and the intelligentsia within 
the party membership. As a result, recruitment was especially strong 
among youth and the working class during the 1970s. It was reported 
that 90 percent of those enrolled between 1971 and 1976 were under 
thirty-five years of age and that 62 percent of all new members 
were classified as workers. The party's membership efforts in the 
1980s focused on recruiting politically and professionally well- 
qualified people willing to exercise greater activism in implement- 
ing the party's program. Party leaders at the Seventeenth Party 
Congress in 1986 urged the recruitment of more workers, young 
people, and women. 

Membership in the KSC is contingent upon completion of a one- 
year period as a candidate member. Candidate members may not 
vote or be elected to party committees. In addition to candidates 
for party membership, there are also candidates for party leader- 
ship groups from the local levels to the Presidium. These candi- 
dates, already party members, are considered interns training for 
the future assumption of particular leadership responsibilities. 

The indoctrination and training of party members is one of the 
basic responsibilities of the regional and district organizations, and 
most of the party training is conducted on these levels. The regional 
and district units work with the local party organizations in set- 
ting up training programs and in determining which members will 
be enrolled in particular courses of study. On the whole, the sys- 
tem of party schooling has changed little since it was established 
in 1949. The district or city organization provides weekly classes 
in the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, the history of com- 
munism, socialist economics, and the current party position on 
domestic and international affairs. 

Members training for positions as party functionaries attend 
seminars at the schools for Marxism-Leninism set up in local areas 



188 



Government and Politics 



or at the more advanced institutes for Marxism-Leninism found 
in Prague, Brno, and Bratislava. The highest level of party train- 
ing is offered at the Advanced School of Politics in Prague. Designed 
to train the top echelon of the party leadership, the three-year cur- 
riculum has the official status of a university program and is said 
to be one of the best programs in political science in Eastern Europe. 
These institutions are under the direction of the KSC Central Com- 
mittee. 

Auxiliary Parties, Mass Oganizations, and Mass Media 

The KSC is grouped together with the KSS, four other political 
parties, and all of Czechoslovakia's mass organizations under the 
political umbrella of the National Front of the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic. Founded in 1945 to coordinate the coalition of ruling 
parties, the National Front became subordinate to the KSC after 
the 1948 coup. Since then the National Front has functioned as 
a conveyer of KSC policy directives to the other political parties 
and mass organizations. An important function of the National 
Front is to nominate all candidates for public office and to super- 
vise elections. Individuals running for public office need not be 
communist, but all candidates must be approved by the National 
Front. Thus, National Front candidates typically receive more than 
99 percent of the votes (voters in Czechoslovakia have the right 
to refrain from marking their ballots if they do not want to vote 
for any of the National Front candidates; however, few voters exer- 
cise that right for fear of official reprisal). 

The National Front in the 1980s included two Czech noncom- 
munist parties and two Slovak noncommunist parties. The Czecho- 
slovak Socialist Party, which had approximately 17,000 members 
in 1984, drew most of its membership from the former urban middle 
class and white-collar workers. The Czechoslovak People's Party, 
which had about 66,000 members in 1984, was primarily Roman 
Catholic and rurally based. The two Slovak parties, the Slovak 
Revival Party and the Slovak Freedom Party, were very small and 
drew their support from the peasant population and Roman Catho- 
lics. Each party was organized along the lines of the KSC, having 
a party congress, central committee, presidium, and secretariat. 
Other than having a small number of seats in the Czech National 
Council, Slovak National Council, and the Federal Assembly, these 
parties had little input into governmental affairs. They served as 
auxiliaries of the KSC and in no way represented an alternative 
source of political power. 

The National Front also grouped together a myriad of mass orga- 
nizations in the workplace, at schools, and in neighborhoods. 



189 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Although mass organizations permeated nearly all aspects of social 
organization, the most important consisted of trade unions, 
women's groups, and youth organizations. Whereas in noncom- 
munist nations such organizations act partly as political interest 
groups to put pressure on the government, in Czechoslovakia the 
mass organizations have acted as support groups for the KSC and 
as channels for the transmission of party policy to the population 
at large. This is evidenced by the fact that KSC officials direct the 
mass organizations at virtually every level. 

The Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, which claimed over 
7.5 million members in 1984, combined trade unions of workers 
in virtually every productive capacity. In 1987 its president, 
Miroslav Zavadil, also chaired its governing body, the Central 
Council of Trade Unions. The organization of the Central Coun- 
cil of Trade Unions is similar to that of the KSC in that it consists 
of a central committee that selects a secretariat and a presidium. 
In addition to the chairman, the Central Council of Trade Unions 
has two deputy chairmen. In the spirit of federalized bureaucratic 
structures that permeated Czechoslovak political organization in 
the 1970s, the Czech Council of Trade Unions and the Slovak 
Council of Trade Unions were created. 

The Czechoslovak Union of Women, which had about 1 mil- 
lion members in 1984, was chaired in 1987 by Marie Kabrhelova. 
Its structure includes the familiar secretariat and presidium and 
a central auditing and control commission. Like the trade union 
governing organization, the Czechoslovak Union of Women over- 
sees the Czech Union of Women and the Slovak Union of Women. 
In 1986 Vasil Mohorita headed the Czechoslovak Socialist Union 
of Youth, which in 1983 claimed over 1.5 million members. A 
branch organization for youth from eight to fifteen years of age 
is known as the Pioneers. The aim of both groups is to indoctrinate 
youth in socialist values and prepare them for membership in the 
KSC . Other mass organizations include the Union of Agricultural 
Cooperatives, the Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters, the Union for 
Cooperation with the Army, the Peace Committee, and the Phys- 
ical Culture Association. 

As in all East European communist countries, the mass media 
in Czechoslovakia are controlled by the party. Private ownership 
of any publication or agency of the mass media is generally for- 
bidden, although churches and other organizations publish small 
periodicals and newspapers. Even with this informational monopoly 
in the hands of organizations under KSC control, all publications 
are reviewed by the government's Office for Press and Informa- 
tion. Censorship was lifted for three months during the 1968 Prague 



190 



Government and Politics 



Spring but afterward was reimposed under the terms of the 1966 
Press Law. The law states that the Czechoslovak press is to pro- 
vide complete information, but it must also advance the interests 
of socialist society and promote the people's socialist awareness of 
the policy of the communist party as the leading force in society 
and state. 

The chief newspaper of the KSC is the Prague daily, Rude prdvo, 
which, with a circulation of 900,000, is the most widely read and 
most influential newspaper in the country. Its editor in 1987 was 
Zdenek Hofenf, a member of the Secretariat of the KSC Central 
Committee. Its sister publication, Bratislava's, Pravda, is the organ 
of the KSS. Other Prague dailies with large circulations are Lidovd 
demokracie, published by the Czechoslovak People's Party; Mladd 
fronta, published by the Czechoslovak Socialist Union of Youth; 
Price, published by the Central Council of Trade Unions; and 
Svobodne Slovo, published by the Czechoslovak Socialist Party. 

Government concern about control of the mass media is such 
that it is illegal to own a duplicating machine or to reproduce more 
than eleven copies of any printed material. Nevertheless, a fairly 
wide distribution of underground publications (popularly known 
as samizdat throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) that 
were established during the Nazi occupation continued through- 
out communist rule into the 1980s. 

The Czechoslovak Press Agency (Ceskoslovenska tiskova 
kancelaf — CTK) receives a state subsidy and is controlled by the 
federal government through its Presidium. The government also 
controls several domestic television and radio networks. In addi- 
tion, many citizens in Czechoslovakia have been able to pick up 
broadcasts from foreign radio and television stations, both from 
communist Poland and Hungary and from noncommunist coun- 
tries like Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many). The Voice of America and the British Broadcasting 
Corporation also have had sizable audiences in Czechoslovakia, 
and their broadcasts have been subject to only occasional jamming. 
Radio Free Europe broadcasts, however, were extensively jammed. 

Constitutional Development 

The Constitution promulgated on July 1 1 , 1960, was the nation's 
second post-World War II constitution, and, though extensively 
revised through later amendments, it continued in effect in 1987. 
It replaced the 1948 constitution (often called the Ninth-of-May 
Constitution), which had come into force shortly after the com- 
munist seizure of power. The 1948 constitution established the van- 
guard role of the KSC within the Czechoslovak state and 



191 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

government administration under the Leninist principle of 
democratic centralism. It also granted a degree of autonomy to 
Slovakia, which was given its own legislative body and governmental 
structure, although these were made subordinate to the central 
authorities in Prague. The most important change in the 1960 Con- 
stitution was that it severely limited the autonomy granted Slovakia. 
The executive branch of the Slovak government was abolished and 
its duties assigned to the Presidium of the Slovak National Coun- 
cil, thus combining executive and legislative functions into a sin- 
gle body. The National Assembly of the central government was 
given authority to overrule decisions of the Slovak National Council, 
and central government agencies took over the administration of 
the major organs of Slovak local government. The 1960 Constitu- 
tion reaffirmed that the KSC is the "proven vanguard of the 
working class" and that the governing of society and the state should 
continue to be in accordance with the principle of democratic cen- 
tralism. It further declared that "socialism has triumphed in our 
country" and that "we are proceeding toward the construction of 
an advanced socialist society and gathering strength for the transi- 
tion to communism." It also acknowledged "our great ally, the 
fraternal Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Accordingly, the 
name of the nation was changed from the Czechoslovak People's 
Democracy to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 

The 1960 Constitution consists of a preamble and 112 articles 
divided into 9 groupings called chapters. Chapter 1, titled "The 
Social Order," describes Czechoslovakia as "a unitary State of two 
fraternal nations possessing equal rights — the Czechs and the 
Slovaks." Article 2 states that "all power in the Czechoslovak So- 
cialist Republic shall belong to the working people." State power 
will be exercised "through representative bodies which are elected 
by [the working people], controlled by them, and accountable to 
them." Principles of the socialist economic system, "in which the 
means of production are socially owned and the entire national econ- 
omy directed by plan," are also laid out. Socialist ownership takes 
two forms: state ownership of natural resources, the means of in- 
dustrial production, public transportation and communications, 
banks and insurance firms, and health, educational, and scientific 
facilities; and cooperative ownership, which is the property of peo- 
ple's cooperatives. Small private enterprises "based on the labor 
of the owner himself and excluding exploitation of another's labor" 
are permitted. Personal ownership of consumer goods, homes, and 
savings derived from labor is guaranteed, as is inheritance of such 
property. 



192 



Hradcany, traditional seat 
of the Czechoslovak 
government, and the Mala 
Strana section, Prague 



Chapter 2 describes the rights and duties of citizens. Equal rights 
regardless of nationality, race, or sex are guaranteed. Education 
is free and compulsory to the age of sixteen; citizens of Hungar- 
ian, Ukrainian, and Polish origin are ensured "every opportunity 
and all means for education in their mother tongue. ' ' Lifetime med- 
ical care and material security in old age and in case of disability 
are guaranteed. Freedom of speech and of the press "consistent 
with the interests of the working people" are guaranteed. Also 
guaranteed is the "right to profess any religious faith or to be 
without religious conviction, and to practice religious beliefs inso- 
far as this does not contravene the law." Citizens are duty bound 
to serve in the armed forces, and conscientious objection based on 
religious conviction is specifically prohibited. 

On October 27, 1968, the promulgation of the Constitutional 
Law of Federation amended fifty-eight articles of the Constitution 
concerning the structure of government. Again the reform con- 
cerned Slovak autonomy; the concentration of governmental 
authority in Prague was a source of discontent within Slovakia 
throughout the 1960s, and the federalization of the Czechoslovak 
government codified in the 1968 constitutional amendments was 
virtually the only product of the reform movement associated with 
the Prague Spring to survive. The Czechoslovak state was declared 
to be composed of ' 'two equal fraternal nations, ' ' the Czech Socialist 
Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic, each with its own 



193 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

national administration paralleling and, at least in theory, equal in 
status to the federal government. Dual citizenship was established, 
and many of the former functions of the central government were 
instead placed under the jurisdiction of the two national govern- 
ments. The federal government retained exclusive jurisdiction over 
foreign affairs, national defense, federal reserves, and national re- 
sources and held joint jurisdiction in a number of other matters, 
but the extent of the federalization reform was remarkably vast. 

The most significant and lasting change under the 1968 constitu- 
tional law was the replacement of the unicameral National Assem- 
bly with a bicameral legislature known as the Federal Assembly (see 
fig. 15). The two bodies, given equal authority, were the Chamber 
of the People, which was identical to the old National Assembly, 
and the Chamber of the Nations, which contained an equal num- 
ber of Czechs and Slovaks. This institutional reform, together with 
a provision that certain decisions required the majority consent of 
each half (Czech and Slovak) of the Chamber of the Nations, was 
designed to end Slovak fear of Czech domination of the legislative 
branch of the government. 

It soon became clear, however, that many aspects of the 1968 
federalization were politically, as well as administratively, imprac- 
tical. Political power remained firmly centralized in the KSC 
(proposals to federalize the party were dropped after the 1968 inva- 
sion), and the administration of two economic systems, two police 
systems, and the like proved unworkable. July 1971 amendments 
to the 1968 Constitutional Law of Federation unified the adminis- 
tration of these and other government functions, ended the prac- 
tice of dual citizenship and, most important, authorized the federal 
government to interfere with and invalidate measures of the national 
governments. Although most of the structures of the 1968 reform 
remained intact, observers of the Czechoslovak system of govern- 
ment in the 1970s agreed that federalism remained little more than 
a facade after the enactment of the 1971 constitutional amendments. 
In May 1975, the 1968 Constitutional Law of Federation was fur- 
ther amended to allow Husak to take over the presidency from the 
ailing Ludvik Svoboda. At the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1986, 
Husak called for the preparation of a new constitution to replace 
the 1960 document. 

Government Structure 

In 1987 the government structure was based on the amended 
1960 Constitution, which identifies the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic as a federative state of two equal fraternal nations. The 
Constitution stipulates the creation of separate government 



194 



Government and Politics 



structures for the Czech Socialist Republic, located in Prague, and 
the Slovak Socialist Republic, situated in Bratislava. These repub- 
lic governments share responsibility with the federal government 
in areas such as planning, finance, currency, price control, agricul- 
ture and food, transportation, labor, wages, social policy, and the 
media. The central government, located in Prague, has exclusive 
jurisdiction over foreign policy, international relations, defense, fed- 
eral stockpiles, federal legislation and administration, and the fed- 
eral judicial system. 

Government institutions in Czechoslovakia perform legislative, 
executive, and judicial functions. The Constitution clearly defines 
the responsibilities for making and implementing policy that each 
branch of government holds. In reality, however, all decisions of 
state are made by the communist party. Government organs exist 
purely to administer the party program. 

The Legislature 

The highest legislative institution is the Federal Assembly, which 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution recognizes as "the supreme organ 
of state power and the sole statewide legislative body." The Federal 
Assembly is divided into two equal chambers, the Chamber of the 
People and the Chamber of the Nations. The Chamber of the Peo- 
ple reflects a system of proportional representation: in 1986 it in- 
cluded 134 deputies from the Czech Socialist Republic and 66 
deputies from the Slovak Socialist Republic. The Chamber of Na- 
tions has 150 members, 75 from each republic. Deputies are selected 
through popular elections and serve five-year terms of office; all 350 
serve concurrently. 

After an election each chamber meets to select its own presidium 
consisting of three to six members. Together, the chambers elect 
the forty-member Presidium of the Federal Assembly, which serves 
as the legislative authority when the assembly is not in session. A 
joint session of the Federal Assembly selects its chairman and vice 
chairman. In 1987 Alois Indra served as chairman, a post to which 
he had been appointed in 1971. 

The Federal Assembly meets in regular session at least twice a 
year, in the spring and fall. Legislation presented to the assembly 
at these sessions must be approved by both chambers and in some 
cases requires a majority vote by both the Czech and the Slovak 
deputies in the Chamber of the Nations. Constitutionally, the Fed- 
eral Assembly has exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of foreign 
policy, fundamental matters of domestic policy, the economic plan, 
and supervision of and control over the executive branch of gov- 
ernment. In practice, however, its function is largely confined to 



195 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION 



LEGISLATURE 
(FEDERAL ASSEMBLY) 



PRESIDIUM 

l-^-l 

CHAMBER CHAMBER 
OF THE OF THE 
NATIONS PEOPLE 



EXECUTIVE BRANCH 



PREMIER 1 



DEPUTY PREMIERS* 

MINISTERS*AND 
MINISTERIAL-LEVEL 
OFFICEHOLDERS 



JUDICIARY 



SUPREME COURT 



OFFICE OF 
THE PROSECUTOR 



REPUBLIC AND LOWER ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS 
I 



I 

CZECH SOCIALIST REPUBLIC 

I 

THE GOVERNMENT 

I 



CZECH 
NATIONAL 
COUNCIL 



DEPUTY PREMIERS 

MINISTERS AND 
MINISTERIAL-LEVEL 
OFFICEHOLDERS 



SUPREME 
m COURT 



REGIONAL 
NATIONAL 
COMMITTEES 



r 



JUDICIARY 



SLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC 
I 

THE GOVERNMENT 



REGIONAL 
COURTS 

DISTRICT 
COURTS 

OFFICE OF 
THE 
PROSECUTOR 



SUPREME 
COURT 

REGIONAL 
COURTS 

DISTRICT 
COURTS 

OFFICE OF 
THE 
PROSECUTOR 



DISTRICT 
NATIONAL 
COMMITTEES 






MUNICIPAL 
NATIONAL 
COMMITTEES 





DEPUTY PREMIERS 

MINISTERS AND 
MINISTERIAL-LEVEL 
OFFICEHOLDERS 



SLOVAK 
NATIONAL 
COUNCIL 



REGIONAL 
NATIONAL 
COMMITTEES 






DISTRICT 
NATIONAL 
COMMITTEES 




1 


MUNICIPAL 
NATIONAL 
COMMITTEES 





* Together make up Presidium of the Government 



Figure 15. Government Organization, 1987 



approving measures placed before it by the KSC. Laws in Czecho- 
slovakia are decided at the highest level of the communist party 
and presented to the Federal Assembly for its unanimous approval. 

The Executive Branch 

The executive branch of government consists of the president, 
the premier, a number of deputy premiers, and the federal 



196 



Government and Politics 



ministers. According to the Constitution, the president is elected 
by the Federal Assembly to a five-year term of office. In practice, 
the president is first selected by the KSC leadership and then "offi- 
cially" voted into office by the Federal Assembly. As head of state, 
the president represents the nation in diplomatic affairs, receives 
and appoints envoys, convenes the Federal Assembly, and signs 
laws into force. He is commander in chief of the armed forces and 
is empowered to appoint or remove the premier, other members 
of the executive, and other high civilian and military officials. There 
is no vice president; rather, the Constitution provides that if the 
presidential office becomes vacant, the premier will be entrusted 
with the president's duties until the Federal Assembly elects a new 
president. 

The premier, the deputy premiers (numbering ten in 1987), and 
the federal cabinet ministers are collectively termed "the govern- 
ment," which is constitutionally defined as "the supreme execu- 
tive organ of state power. " All are chosen by the Central Committee 
of the KSC and formally appointed by the president. If both cham- 
bers of the Federal Assembly vote to censure any or all members 
of the government, the president is obliged to remove those mem- 
bers. The premier, deputy premiers, and ministers collectively form 
the Presidium of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic. This Presidium supervises and controls the activities of 
the federal ministries, commissions, and other departments. These 
Presidium functions appear to correspond to the purpose of the 
government as stated in the Constitution, which is to ensure the 
implementation of laws enacted in the Federal Assembly and to 
coordinate, direct, and control activities in the federal ministries 
and other federal offices. 

Federal ministers are important administrators, but they lack 
the political weight of their counterparts in most noncommunist 
countries. The number of ministries and the division of responsi- 
bilities among them have varied over time. In August 1986 there 
were thirteen federal ministries: agriculture and food; communi- 
cation; electrotechnical industry; finance; foreign affairs; foreign 
trade; fuels and power; general engineering; interior; labor and 
social affairs; metallurgy and heavy engineering; national defense; 
and transportation. In addition, five individuals held positions that 
granted them ministerial status. These include the minister- 
chairmen of the Federal Price Office and the People's Control Com- 
mission, the chairman of the State Planning Commission, and the 
minister-deputy chairmen of the State Planning Commission and 
the State Commission for Research and Development and Invest- 
ment Planning. These ministerial and ministerial-level positions 



197 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

within the government parallel similar organs within the KSC, 
where policy is actually formed before it is enacted by federal 
government officials. 

The Judiciary 

The highest judicial organ at the federal level is the Supreme 
Court of Czechoslovakia. Supreme Court judges are elected by the 
Federal Assembly to serve ten-year terms of office. The Federal 
Assembly also selects a chairman and vice chairman of the Supreme 
Court. If the chairman is from the Czech Socialist Republic, the 
vice chairman must be from the Slovak Socialist Republic, and vice 
versa. The two republics must be represented by an equal num- 
ber of Supreme Court judges. Below the Supreme Court of Czecho- 
slovakia are the Supreme Court of the Czech Socialist Republic 
and the Supreme Court of the Slovak Socialist Republic. 

Below the supreme court of each republic are regional and dis- 
trict courts. District courts (one in each district) are the courts of 
general civil jurisdiction and limited criminal jurisdiction and are 
presided over by one professional judge and two lay judges (there 
are no juries in the Czechoslovak judicial system). Regional courts 
(one in each kraj) are located in the capitals of each of Czecho- 
slovakia's ten kraje and in Prague. They function as appellate courts 
and also have jurisdiction over trials in serious criminal cases where 
imprisonment exceeding five years may be imposed. Regional and 
district professional judges are chosen by the Czech National Coun- 
cil and the Slovak National Council; lay judges are chosen by dis- 
trict national committees. The Supreme Court of the Czech Socialist 
Republic and the Supreme Court of the Slovak Socialist Republic 
serve as appellate courts for their respective regional courts and 
also hear petitions for breach of law against decisions by the lower 
courts. The supreme courts of the two republics decide in panels 
of three professional judges. 

Petitions for breach of law against decisions of the republic 
supreme courts are heard in the Supreme Court at the federal level. 
In addition to serving as the nation's final court of appeals, the 
Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia examines the legality of deci- 
sions of the federal government and, in general, ensures the uni- 
form interpretation of the laws. It also hears requests for recognition 
of foreign judgments in Czechoslovakia. The decisions of the 
Supreme Court emanate from "benches," which comprise the 
Supreme Court chairman and selected professional judges. The 
Supreme Court also acts as the final court of appeal in military 
cases, although below the Supreme Court level military cases are 
handled in military courts, which are distinct from civil courts. 



198 



Government and Politics 



Another powerful arm of the judiciary is the Office of the Prose- 
cutor. The general prosecutor, a federal officer, is appointed and 
removed by the president. In addition to the federal office, an Office 
of the Prosecutor exists for each republic. The republic office is 
administered by the republic Ministry of Justice. Prosecutors are 
responsible for supervising the observance of laws and legal regu- 
lations by public bodies and individual citizens. The Office of the 
Prosecutor is responsible for prosecuting both criminal and civil 
cases. Prosecutors may recommend modification or repeal of laws, 
and they have the right to summon citizens to appear before them. 

Republic and Lower Administrative Levels 

The administrative units of Czechoslovakia's two republics are, 
in each instance, a unicameral legislative body called the national 
council, an executive branch known as the government, and a 
judiciary consisting of a supreme court and an office of the prose- 
cutor. Like its corresponding federal government unit, the Fed- 
eral Assembly, the national council is described as the highest organ 
of state power in the republic, whereas the government is the 
"supreme executive authority." The 1968 constitutional amend- 
ments that created the two republican, or "national," governmental 
units initiated a truly federal system of government, which 
flourished briefly. Since that time, revisions of and deviations from 
the 1968 amendments have made the two national governments 
clearly subordinate to the federal governmental structure in Prague. 
This is apparent both in legislation, such as a 1971 law that autho- 
rized the federal government to interfere with and invalidate repub- 
lican government initiatives, and in the interlocking responsibilities 
of certain officials within the two levels of government. For exam- 
ple, the premier of each republic is a deputy premier in the federal 
government, and the chairman of each national council is a mem- 
ber of the Presidium of the Federal Assembly. 

Because of the numerical superiority of the Czech population, 
the Czech National Council has 200 representatives and the Slovak 
National Council only 150. Except for the difference in the num- 
ber of deputies, the provisions of the federal Constitution apply 
equally to the national councils of each republic: deputies are elected 
to five-year terms of office; the national councils must hold at least 
two sessions annually; and each national council elects its own 
presidium (fifteen to twenty-one members in the Slovak National 
Council and up to twenty-five members in the Czech National 
Council), which is empowered to act when the full national coun- 
cil is not in session. 



199 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

In each of the two republics the executive branch consists of a 
premier, three deputy premiers, and a number of ministers. Both 
the Czech and the Slovak governments have ministers of agricul- 
ture and food, construction, culture, development and technology, 
education, finance, forestry and water resources, health, industry, 
interior, justice, labor and social affairs, and trade. The chairmen 
of the State Planning Commission and the People's Control Com- 
mission also hold ministerial status in each republic; the govern- 
ment of the Czech Socialist Republic includes, in addition, two 
ministers without portfolio. 

Below the level of the republics (the national administrations), 
Czechoslovakia is divided into 10 kraje, 114 districts, and several 
thousand municipal and local units. The principal organs of govern- 
ment at these levels, known as national committees, function in 
accordance with the principle of democratic centralism. The 1968 
Constitutional Law of Federation specifies that the national govern- 
ments direct and control the activities of all national committees 
within their respective territories. 

The system of national committees was established at the close 
of World War II by the then-existing provisional government and 
was used by the communists as a means of consolidating and ex- 
tending their control. On the local level, the membership of the 
national committees consists of from fifteen to twenty-five persons. 
National committees on the higher levels are proportionately larger: 
national committees at the district level have from 60 to 120 mem- 
bers, and national committees at the kraj level have between 80 
and 150 members. National committee members are popularly 
elected for five-year terms of office. Each national committee elects 
a council from among its membership. The council, composed of 
a chairman, one or more deputy chairmen, a secretary, and an 
unspecified number of members, acts as the coordinating and con- 
trolling body of the national committee. To expedite the work of 
the national committee, the council establishes commissions and 
other subcommittees and can issue decrees and ordinances within 
its area of jurisdiction. 

The national committees on the local level are assigned particu- 
lar areas of jurisdiction, including maintaining public order and 
organizing the implementation of the political, economic, and cul- 
tural tasks assigned by the KSC and the federal government. The 
Constitution charges the national committees with the responsi- 
bility of organizing and directing the economic, cultural, health, 
and social services in their areas. The committees must also "en- 
sure the protection of socialist ownership" and see that the "rules 
of socialist conduct are upheld." 



200 




Town Hall, Plzen 



201 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Electoral System 

Elections in Czechoslovakia are held not to offer the electorate 
an opportunity to participate in a democratic choice of their govern- 
ment representatives but to confirm the representatives chosen 
by the KSC hierarchy. The July 1971 electoral law lengthened the 
time between elections from four to five years (1971, 1976, 1981, 
1986, and so forth) and designated that they take place in the fall, 
so that each election comes shortly after the party congress in the 
spring. The 1971 law replaced a 1967 electoral law that allowed 
the electorate to participate in the choice of candidates; the 1967 
law was never applied because the 1968 elections were postponed 
by the August invasion. The November 1971 elections, then, were 
the first to be held since 1964. These, like every election, proposed 
single slates of candidates for the Federal Assembly, the two na- 
tional councils, and the regional, district, and municipal national 
committees. The voter may cross out (disapprove) or not cross out 
(approve) the name of any or all official candidates nominated by 
the National Front. Polling booths are rarely used, and voting is 
often carried out collectively by the work force of each enterprise 
or by other groups of the population. 

The 1971 elections were preceded by a concerted effort by a group 
of dissidents calling themselves the Socialist Movement of Czecho- 
slovak Citizens to urge citizens to boycott the elections or cross off 
official names in protest of the undemocratic character of the 1971 
election law. Official election results, nevertheless, showed that 99.5 
percent of the 10.3 million eligible voters did cast ballots, and of 
these, some 99.8 percent voted for the official candidates. Follow- 
ing the election, rumors circulated that, in fact, up to 10 percent 
of the population had not voted and that between 10 and 25 per- 
cent of the voters had crossed out official names. Whatever the case, 
after the election some 200 persons associated with the Socialist 
Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens were arrested. Trials were held 
during July and August 1972, at which 47 persons were sentenced 
to a total of 118 years in prison. 

In elections held in May 1986, Czechoslovak officials reported 
that 99.4 percent of registered voters participated in the Federal 
Assembly elections, and 99.9 percent of the total vote cast went 
to National Front candidates. Similar results were reported in the 
elections for the Czech National Council and the Slovak National 
Council and in the lower-level national committees. 

Popular Political Expression 

Evaluating public opinion within such a rigid and closed politi- 
cal climate is difficult. Following the 1968 invasion^ information 



202 



Government and Politics 



emanated largely from Czechoslovak emigres and Western visi- 
tors to Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak citizens risked official retali- 
ation by speaking openly about political matters. Such sources were 
remarkably consistent, nevertheless, in reporting that the Husak 
government held the active support of some 10 percent of the popu- 
lation. One study conducted by a group of "former" sociologists 
in 1974 found that active support existed among 10 to 15 percent 
of the population. This group, according to the study, consisted 
of persons involved in the Stalinist repression who feared that a 
liberal regime would force them to account for their crimes, as well 
as paid party bureaucrats, old-age pensioners, careerists, "para- 
sites" who would serve any regime, and a handful of extremist com- 
munist ideologues. One observer noted that "there has not been 
such a gap between the ruler and the ruled since the Nazi occu- 
pation." 

Reaction to Normalization 

The absence of popular support for the Husak leadership was 
an inevitable reaction to the repressive policies instituted during 
the normalization process. Early post-invasion efforts to keep alive 
the spirit of the Prague Spring were quashed through a series of 
subversion trials in 1972 that led to jail sentences ranging from 
nine months to six and one-half years for the opposition leaders. 
Czechoslovak citizens over the age of fifteen were required to carry 
a small red identification book, containing an array of informa- 
tion about the individual and a number of pages to be stamped 
by employers, health officials, and other authorities. All citizens 
also had permanent files at the office of their local KSC neighbor- 
hood committee, another at their place of employment, and another 
at the Ministry of Interior. 

The most common attitudes toward political activity since the 
1968 invasion have been apathy, passivity, and escapism. For the 
most part, citizens of Czechoslovakia retreated from public politi- 
cal concern during the 1970s into the pursuit of the private plea- 
sures of consumerism. Individuals sought the material goods that 
remained available during the 1970s, such as new automobiles, 
houses in the country, household appliances, and access to sport- 
ing events and entertainment. As long as these consumer demands 
were met, the populace for the most part tolerated the stagnant 
political climate. 

Another symptom of the political malaise during the 1970s 
was the appearance of various forms of antisocial behavior. Petty 
theft and wanton destruction of public property reportedly were 
widespread. Alcoholism, already at levels that alarmed officials, 



203 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

increased; absenteeism and declining worker discipline affected 
productivity; and emigration, the ultimate expression of aliena- 
tion, surpassed 100,000 during the 1970s. 

Charter 77 

The most prominent opposition to the process of normalization 
has been the movement known as Charter 77. The movement took 
its name from the title of a document initially circulated within 
Czechoslovakia in January 1977 (see Appendix D). Originally ap- 
pearing as a manifesto in a West German newspaper and signed 
by 243 Czechoslovak citizens representing various occupations, po- 
litical viewpoints, and religions, the document by the mid-1980s 
had been signed by 1,200 people. Charter 77 criticized the govern- 
ment for failing to implement human rights provisions of a num- 
ber of documents it had signed, including the Czechoslovak 
Constitution, the Final Act of the 1975 Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (Basket III of the Helsinki Accords), and 
United Nations covenants on political, civil, economic, and cul- 
tural rights. The document also described the signatories as a 
"loose, informal, and open association of people . . . united by 
the will to strive individually and collectively for respect for human 
and civil rights in our country and throughout the world." It em- 
phasized that Charter 77 is not an organization, has no statutes 
or permanent organs, and "does not form the basis for any op- 
positional political activity." This final stipulation was a careful 
effort to stay within the bounds of Czechoslovak law, which makes 
organized opposition illegal. 

The government's reaction to the appearance of Charter 77, 
which circulated in samizdat form within Czechoslovakia and was 
published in full in various foreign newspapers, was harsh (see Police 
Repression, ch. 5). The official press described the manifesto as 
"an antistate, antisocialist, and demagogic, abusive piece of writ- 
ing," and individual signers were variously described as "traitors 
and renegades," "a loyal servant and agent of imperialism," "a 
bankrupt politician," and "an international adventurer." Several 
means of retaliation were used against the signers, including dis- 
missal from work, denial of educational opportunities for their chil- 
dren, suspension of drivers' licenses, forced exile, loss of citizenship, 
and detention, trial, and imprisonment. 

The treatment of the signers of Charter 77 prompted the 
creation in April 1978 of a support group, the Committee for the 
Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (Vybor na obranu nespraved- 
live stfhanych — VONS), to publicize the fate of those associated 
with the charter. In October 1979 six leaders of this support group, 



204 



Government and Politics 

including Vaclav Havel, were tried for subversion and sentenced 
to prison terms of up to five years. 

Repression of Charter 77 and VONS members continued in the 
1980s. Despite unrelenting discrimination and arrests, however, 
the groups continued to issue reports on the government's viola- 
tions of human rights. These documents remained an important 
source of information on Czechoslovakia's internal affairs. 

Religious Activists 

Another aspect of popular political expression during the 1970s 
and 1980s was religious activism. Czechoslovakia during this time 
witnessed what was described as a "rebirth of religious faith," es- 
pecially noticeable among Czechoslovak youth, and greater activ- 
ism on the part of the Roman Catholic Church. The former was 
manifested by an increase in young people's church attendance and 
overall participation in church-related activities. The latter was 
reflected in a greater number of "underground" church services, 
greater Catholic clergy and lay involvement in the Charter 77 move- 
ment, widespread dissemination of Catholic samizdat publications, 
and a shift in the position of the church's hierarchy regarding 
church-state relations. Since the election of a Polish cardinal as pope, 
the Czech primate, Frantisek Cardinal Tomasek, has taken a more 
independent stand. He has condemned the Czechoslovak Associ- 
ation of Catholic Clergy (more commonly known as Pacem in 
Terris), the pro-regime organization of priests, arguing the impor- 
tance of peace and human rights at the government-sponsored 
Prague World Peace Assembly in 1983; and increased his support 
of Charter 77. 

Government reaction to the religious activists has been harsh. 
Repression against the clergy, including arrests, trials, imprison- 
ment, and even raids against homes for elderly priests and nuns, 
reportedly increased in the 1980s. Also, government restrictions 
on religious education, church publications, and the number of 
priests were enforced vigorously. Undoubtedly fearful of its potential 
impact, the Husak government rejected Pope John Paul IPs ac- 
ceptance of Cardinal Tomasek' s 1984 invitation to visit Czecho- 
slovakia. 

Foreign Relations 

Nowhere is the Soviet Union's overwhelming influence on 
Czechoslovakia more evident than in foreign relations. Since as 
far back as 1947, when the Klement Gottwald cabinet succumbed 
to Soviet pressure and withdrew its announced participation in the 
Marshall Plan, Czechoslovakia has followed Moscow's lead in 



205 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

international affairs. Unlike the communist regimes in Yugosla- 
via and Romania, no Czechoslovak regime since 1948 has devi- 
ated significantly from Soviet foreign policy. Even the Dubcek 
government, though seeking reform in economic and domestic po- 
litical matters, emphasized during its abbreviated existence that 
it did not advocate a significant change in its foreign policy tenets 
and alliances. 

In the late 1980s, Czechoslovakia's alliances with the Soviet 
Union and other East European communist states remained the 
dominant factor influencing Czechoslovak foreign policy. The 
Husak regime showed little foreign policy initiative, opting instead 
to echo the Soviet position on every major issue, as it had done 
for eighteen years. Czechoslovakia's conduct of foreign policy 
reflected its determination to maintain at all costs the political, eco- 
nomic, and military unity of the socialist bloc. 

Policy Making and Administration 

The principal foreign policy decision-making body is the KSC . 
Within the party the decision-making responsibility resides in the 
Presidium of the KSC Central Commmittee, which is aided by 
the party's Department of International Affairs. The department 
provides pertinent information and policy recommendations to the 
Presidium, channels the party's decisions to the appropriate govern- 
ment agencies, and supervises the implementation of policy. 

The extent of Soviet influence on Czechoslovakia's foreign policy 
suggests that major policy decisions by the party hierarchy receive 
prior approval from Moscow. The precise mechanics of Soviet con- 
trol are not certain, but it is likely that Moscow exercises its authority 
through frequent bilateral and multilateral consultations involv- 
ing high-level party and government officials. Czechoslovak and 
Soviet officials met frequently throughout the 1970s and the first 
half of the 1980s in sessions that included ad hoc summit meet- 
ings, sessions of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Com- 
mittee, Comecon meetings, Soviet and East European party 
congresses, bilateral meetings between party leaders, and lower level 
policy meetings, such as those of the Council of Foreign Ministers 
of the Warsaw Pact. The continued presence in Czechoslovakia 
of five ground divisions and two air divisions of Soviet troops un- 
doubtedly contributed to Soviet influence. 

Within the federal system of government, the bulk of adminis- 
trative responsibility for foreign affairs falls on the Ministry of For- 
eign Affairs and, to a lesser extent, on the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade. These ministries are under the supervision of the premier 
in his role as head of government. The president, however, as head 



206 



Mikhail Gorbachev meting with 
Gustdv Husdk during a 1987 visit to Czechoslovakia 
Courtesy Czechoslovak Life 

of state, not only chooses the premier and ministers of foreign af- 
fairs and foreign trade but is also constitutionally mandated to 
represent the nation in its external relations and to appoint diplo- 
matic envoys. Committees on foreign relations exist in both cham- 
bers of the Federal Assembly. Sometimes these committees are given 
specific assignments in policy analysis and serve as channels through 
which the regime submits foreign policy legislation to the assem- 
bly. All foreign policy legislation requires passage by both cham- 
bers of the Federal Assembly. 

The central organ for implementation of foreign relations, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is charged with the direction, coordi- 
nation, and implementation of foreign policy and the protection 
of Czechoslovak national interests in international affairs. It also 
has a role as a coordinating agency for other federal and republic 
organs; it is supposed to provide them with knowledge of the govern- 
ment's foreign policies and to ensure their cooperation with those 
policies. In 1987 the ministry was organized into ten geographic 
departments, ten functional and administrative sections, two train- 
ing institutes, and one international relations society. Each of the 
subdivisions was headed by a director and a deputy director. The 
entire operation of the ministry functioned under the direction of 
the minister of foreign affairs (in early 1987 Bohuslav Chnoupek, 



207 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

who had assumed the post in 1971), a first deputy minister, five 
additional deputy ministers, and offices for the minister's secretariat 
and general secretariat. 

The ministry's administrative sections in 1987 included ad- 
ministration of foreign cultural establishments; services to the 
diplomatic corps; basic foreign policy questions; consuls; cultural, 
educational, scientific, and health relations; diplomatic protocol; 
international economics; international law; international organi- 
zations; and press. Also under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
were the Institute of International Relations (for which the Cen- 
tral Committee of the KSC holds joint responsibility), the 
Czechoslovak Foreign Institute, and the Czechoslovak Society for 
International Relations. 

The Ministry of Foreign Trade is considerably smaller than the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1987 it was led by a minister, two 
first deputy ministers, and seven other deputy ministers. It also 
contained departments organized according to geographic region, 
economic system, and level of economic development. Other com- 
ponents of this ministry included the Central Customs Adminis- 
tration and the Legal Affairs Department. 

Relations with Communist Nations 

Central to Czechoslovakia's relations with communist nations 
in the late 1980s was its relationship with the Soviet Union. In his 
address to the Seventeenth Party Congress in March 1986, Husak 
reasserted the importance Czechoslovakia attaches to its alliance 
with the Soviet Union. The party chief reconfirmed the "lasting 
significance of the alliance, friendship, and cooperation with the 
USSR for vital interests of the Czechoslovak people and for 
safeguarding the security of our state." That alliance, which Husak 
described as "based on mutual respect and understanding and on 
the identity of views between our communist parties on all the fun- 
damental questions," represents the "safeguard on which we rest 
all our plans and perspectives." 

Soviet influence in Czechoslovak foreign affairs was institution- 
alized after 1948 through the economic alliance of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), founded in 1949, and 
the Warsaw Pact military alliance, founded in 1955 and renewed 
in 1985 (see Appendix B; Appendix C). The framework for Soviet 
influence was expanded with the 1968 introduction of the so-called 
Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty and the 1970 Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between Czecho- 
slovakia and the Soviet Union. Devised as a Soviet justification 
of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Brezhnev Doctrine 



208 



Government and Politics 



asserts the right of military intervention by Warsaw Pact forces 
whenever one of the member countries is perceived by Moscow 
to be threatened either internally or externally, or whenever events 
in one of these nations are perceived to endanger the socialist alli- 
ance. Shortly after the invasion, Czechoslovak officials effectively 
endorsed the doctrine when they explained that the Warsaw Pact 
troops "decided to render internationalist assistance to Czecho- 
slovakia" after receiving appeals for help from "party and state 
leaders, communists, and working people of Czechoslovakia." The 
1970 friendship treaty, among other provisions, legitimized the in- 
vasion and the ongoing stationing of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak 
soil and bound Czechoslovakia to support any war engaged in by 
the Soviets. 

Since coming to power in 1969, the Husak regime has pursued 
one fundamental objective in its relations with the Soviet Union: 
to maintain its position as a loyal ally and a staunch defender of 
Soviet policies. In pursuing this goal, Czechoslovak officials have 
downplayed any distinct Czechoslovak foreign policy interests that 
may have existed and instead have adopted Soviet interests as their 
own. Whereas other East European communist regimes on numer- 
ous occasions in the 1970s and 1980s adopted foreign policy posi- 
tions that differed from those of the Soviets, the Husak regime has 
consistently echoed the Soviet stance. 

Probably the most pressing issue affecting Czechoslovakia's re- 
lations with the Soviet Union in the late 1980s was trade. In 1986 
trade with the Soviets constituted almost 50 percent of Czecho- 
slovakia's total trade (see Foreign Trade, ch. 3). Heavily depen- 
dent on the Soviet Union for energy, Czechoslovakia was hard hit 
by the rising cost of Soviet energy exports. Domestic economic 
problems, such as declining productivity, low investment, and cor- 
ruption, made it difficult for Czechoslovakia to produce high-quality 
exports for the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia's response to these 
trends was to advocate even further integration of the Comecon 
network and particularly the Soviet and Czechoslovak economies. 

Czechoslovakia conducted its relations with the other communist 
nations of Eastern Europe largely through the multilateral facili- 
ties of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. The Prague government 
was a proponent of the integration of both the economies and the 
foreign policies of the nations of the region, and it pursued this 
goal through the mechanisms of Comecon and the Council of For- 
eign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact. 

Bilateral relations between Czechoslovakia and the communist 
nations of Eastern Europe were, in large part, a reflection of their 
respective relations with the Soviet Union. East Germany, which 



209 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

shared the vision of Soviet-dominated "proletarian international- 
ism" and was the most ardent critic of the Dubcek regime during 
the 1970s, became Czechoslovakia's closest friend in Eastern Eu- 
rope. Poland, with which Czechoslovakia shares a border of some 
600 kilometers, was another close friend of the Husak regime 
through the 1970s. The development of independent trade unions 
and the demand for economic and political reform in Poland in 
1980-81 led to strains in the otherwise amicable relations between 
the two countries. Labor strife in Poland concerned Czechoslovak 
authorities primarily for two reasons: Poland's port of Szczecin 
served as Czechoslovakia's main sea outlet, and strikes there dis- 
rupted Czechoslovak exports and imports; but, even more impor- 
tant, officials feared that labor unrest in Poland would spill over 
into Czechoslovakia. The mining area around Ostrava, which was 
close to the Polish border and inhabited by a sizable Polish minority, 
was of special concern, and some labor difficulty was reported in 
the area in late 1980. Czechoslovak officials feared that dissident 
intellectuals and workers in Czechoslovakia might unite in their 
support of the working-class dissidents in Poland. 

Not surprisingly, Czechoslovakia became the East European na- 
tion loudest in its denunciation of Poland's deviation from socialist 
unity. At the Sixteenth Party Congress in April 1981 , Husak harshly 
criticized the independent labor unions and their leadership and 
blamed the "antisocialist" forces abroad for encouraging the "coun- 
terrevolutionaries" inside Poland. He pledged support for fellow 
Polish communists but withheld explicit support for the Polish party 
or its leadership. The Czechoslovak leadership applauded the De- 
cember 1981 imposition of martial law in Poland, referring to it as a 
necessary act of self-defense. Once martial law was established, 
Czechoslovakia ceased its criticism of Poland and instead turned 
its attention to resolving bilateral issues, primarily Czechoslovak- 
Polish trade. 

Romania refused to participate with its fellow Warsaw Pact mem- 
bers in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Instead, it loudly condemned 
the action and, as a result, had less cordial relations with the Husak 
regime than with other Warsaw Pact members. Yugoslavia too con- 
demned the invasion, and the Yugoslav ideological stance has 
evoked constant criticism from Prague, although trade relations 
between the two states have continued. Albania also condemned 
the invasion, using it as a pretext to withdraw from the Warsaw 
Pact. Albania's ideological dispute with Moscow precluded the de- 
velopment of normal relations with Czechoslovakia. 

Likewise, commercial relations with China, which were active 
until 1964, were strained thereafter by the Sino-Soviet dispute and 



210 



Government and Politics 



by China's condemnation of the 1968 Warsaw Pact action. In the 
1980s, Czechoslovakia's relations with China began to improve as 
both nations sought to expand bilateral trade as a first step toward 
improving political ties. 

Czechoslovakia has remained active in its relations with nations 
of the Third World, especially socialist nations and what is termed 
"the national liberation struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin Amer- 
ica." Although Czechoslovakia had political and trade relations 
with the whole gamut of Third World communist nations during 
the mid-1980s, its relations were especially close (perhaps because 
of relative geographic proximity) with Ethiopia, the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, and the Mongolian People's 
Republic. Of Soviet-aligned but noncommunist countries, Syria 
and Libya were particularly close to Czechoslovakia. Of the "na- 
tional liberation movements," the Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion and the insurgents in southern Africa were especially favored 
by Prague. Czechoslovak relations with the communist Third World 
typically involved political and military cooperation, trade, and eco- 
nomic and technological cooperation. 

Relations with Noncommunist Nations and Multilateral Ties 

In the spirit of detente of the 1970s, Czechoslovakia expanded 
and improved its relations with many noncommunist nations. These 
efforts were hindered by memories of the 1968 invasion, which con- 
tinued to be condemned by virtually every nation outside the Soviet 
orbit. Another hindrance that appeared in the latter half of the de- 
cade and continued adversely to affect Czechoslovak foreign rela- 
tions in the 1980s was its poor human rights record. Its repression 
of dissent, especially regarding Charter 77, brought wide condem- 
nation from the noncommunist world and some Eurocommunists. 
Despite these problems, important strides were made in some areas. 
An improvement of relations with its two noncommunist neigh- 
bors, West Germany and Austria, was perhaps the most impor- 
tant step forward in Czechoslovak foreign policy during the decade. 

Czechoslovak relations with West Germany have in many 
respects mirrored the state of East-West relations since World War 
II. The cold war and East German sensitivities precluded any diplo- 
matic thaw until the late 1960s, when the Soviet Union began to 
promote contact between its allies and the West. Consultation be- 
tween Czechoslovakia and West Germany began in October 1970 
but proceeded slowly, largely because of differing views as to how 
to nullify the Munich Agreement, a source of Czechoslovak bit- 
terness since 1938. A treaty was signed in December 1973 and im- 
plemented in July 1974 that declared the Munich Agreement 



211 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

immoral and null and void; proclaimed the territorial integrity of 
both countries and renounced the use of force or threats; and called 
for the development of cooperation in economy, science, technol- 
ogy, culture, antipollution measures, sports, and transportation. 
A long-term agreement was concluded in January 1975 covering 
economic, industrial, and technical cooperation, and a treaty on 
cultural cooperation was signed in April 1978. 

Although these documents provided a framework for a wide range 
of improvements in relations, their implementation progressed 
slowly. Trade between the two countries increased (West Germany 
was Czechoslovakia's largest noncommunist trading partner), but 
disagreements continued to hinder political relations. In April 1978 
the governments agreed that their foreign ministers would meet 
at least once a year, but meetings scheduled for 1979 and 1980 were 
canceled because of West German protests over trials of Czecho- 
slovak human rights advocates and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979. When the foreign ministers were 
finally able to meet in December 1980, international affairs prevailed 
over bilateral matters. Despite the fact that both parties expressed 
a desire to improve bilateral relations, the main subjects for dis- 
cussion were the issues of detente, arms control, and concern for 
the territorial integrity of Poland. At a February 1983 meeting of 
foreign ministers, the deployment of new missiles in Western 
Europe and environmental protection were the principal topics dis- 
cussed. 

Relations with Austria, Czechoslovakia's neutral neighbor to the 
south, warmed considerably during the mid- and late 1970s. A 
December 1974 property-law settlement resolved claims that had 
severely damaged relations since World War II and paved the way 
for the raising of diplomatic relations to the embassy level. The 
March 1979 visit of Austria's president was the first presidential- 
level visit between the nations since the 1920s. Nevertheless, two 
years later a variety of problems continued to strain relations. These 
included the question of the reunion of families of Czechoslovak 
exiles in Austria, Austrian criticism of Czechoslovakia's treatment 
of dissidents, and a reported trade imbalance caused by the low 
quality of Czechoslovak exports. 

In 1981 a planned visit to Austria by Husak was canceled be- 
cause of Austrian objections to Czechoslovakia's treatment of 
Charter 77 members and the revelation that Czechoslovakia had 
sent intelligence agents to spy on Czechoslovak exiles in Austria. 
The visit eventually took place the following year, but Czecho- 
slovak-Austrian relations remained difficult as new tensions arose. 
In a 1984 border incident, for example, Czechoslovak border guards 



212 



Government and Politics 



mortally wounded a defector after he had reached Austrian soil 
and left him to die without notifying Austrian authorities. At a 1985 
meeting, the Czechoslovak and Austrian foreign ministers agreed 
to work to improve relations. The following year, Austria's presi- 
dent visited Czechoslovakia, where he discussed with Husak efforts 
to establish closer bilateral ties. 

Relations between Czechoslovakia and the United States had 
been very good during the interwar period of the First Republic. 
These relations were based on trade between two economically ad- 
vanced nations, political affinities between the two democracies, 
and the presence of a large number of Czech and Slovak immigrants 
and their descendants in the United States. After 1948, however, 
relations deteriorated rapidly, partly because of disagreements over 
the compensation for the property owned by Americans but seized 
or nationalized by the Czechoslovak government. Relations were 
somewhat better in the area of family reunification. Here, the 
United States succeeded in securing exit visas for some Czecho- 
slovak citizens wishing to emigrate to the United States to join their 
families. Trade relations were modest, and it was anticipated that 
there would be no trade agreement until claims were settled. In 
the late 1980s, bilateral relations remained strained because of 
United States criticism of Prague's continued repression of human 
rights activists. 

Bilateral relations with the rest of the noncommunist world fo- 
cused on trade matters. After Western Europe, some of Czecho- 
slovakia's most significant noncommunist trading partners included 
India, Iraq, and Indonesia. Politically, Czechoslovakia's relations 
with noncommunist nations mirrored the Soviet Union's relations 
with those same nations. For example, Czechoslovakia firmly 
aligned itself with the Arab cause against Israel in the Middle East 
and with black nationalists against South Africa. 

Czechoslovakia's most important multilateral ties are with the 
member states of the Soviet-dominated Comecon and Warsaw Pact. 
In addition, Czechoslovakia is a founding member of the United 
Nations and has acted as an active proponent of the causes of the 
Soviet Union and its followers within that body. During 1978 and 
1979 it served as a member of the Security Council. It has also 
been an active member of a large number of United Nations special- 
ized agencies, including the International Labor Organization; the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; 
the World Health Organization; the Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation; and many others. Czechoslovakia also participates in the 
work of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment and is a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 



213 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Trade. Czechoslovakia participates with other Warsaw Pact mem- 
bers, the nations of Western Europe, and the United States in ef- 
forts to institutionalize East- West detente, including the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reduction negotiations. 

* * * 

Of the few English-language books on Czechoslovak politics pub- 
lished during the 1980s, one that provides a good overview of 
Czechoslovak politics and government is Czechoslovakia: Profile of 
a Socialist Republic at the Crossroads of Europe by David W. Paul. In 
general, information on Czechoslovakia's internal politics and es- 
pecially on its foreign relations is found in specific chapters of books 
on East European relations. For example, chapters in Soviet-East 
European Relations by Robert L. Hutchings and Soviet Influence in 
Eastern Europe by Christopher D. Jones address both domestic and 
foreign policy issues. 

The best information sources for current events in Czechoslovakia 
are the Radio Free Europe Research Situation Report: Czechoslovakia, 
the Joint Publications Research Service East Europe Report, and the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Eastern Europe. 
The Radio Free Europe Research Bulletins provide analyses of cur- 
rent events, as well as detailed background reports on political 
affairs. The East Europe Report and Daily Report: Eastern Europe in- 
clude translations of broadcast announcements and important 
articles from key newspapers and journals currently published in 
Czechoslovakia. Finally, the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency Directory of Czechoslovak Officials is a valuable reference aid 
and is updated periodically. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



214 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Manpower, barbed wire, and electronics — 

important elements of national security in Czechoslovakia 



THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE'S ARMY of the late 1980s 
comprised ground and air forces under the supervision of the Minis- 
try of National Defense. The ground forces accounted for about 
70 percent of the total strength of the forces, which in early 1986 
was slightly more than 200,000. The armed forces that constitute 
the people's army have been committed by treaty to the Eastern 
Europe-Soviet alliance known as the Warsaw Pact. Another mili- 
tary force, the Border Guard, which patrols the country's fron- 
tiers, was supervised by the Ministry of Interior, as were two 
paramilitary police forces — Public Security and State Security — 
and a part-time, national guard force known as the People's Militia. 
Manpower for the armed forces and the Border Guard was ob- 
tained through a system of universal male conscription; service in 
the other organizations was voluntary. Women also served in the 
armed forces and the police forces in small numbers but were not 
subject to conscription. 

All the forces underwent a political purge after the short period 
of reform in the late 1960s that culminated in an invasion by the 
armies of five other Warsaw Pact members. The greatest person- 
nel loss at that time occurred in the army, where large numbers 
of officers who had supported the reform movement either volun- 
tarily resigned or were forced out; the other services were simi- 
larly affected, but to a lesser degree. Western analysts disagreed 
about whether the armed forces had recovered their pre-invasion 
size, quality, or morale by the late 1980s. Some Western analysts 
also questioned the reliability of the Czechoslovak forces, but others 
were convinced that the forces would honor their commitment to 
the Warsaw Pact if called upon. 

Five Soviet ground divisions remained in Czechoslovakia after 
the departure of the other Warsaw Pact invasion forces in 1968. 
After nearly two decades, these Soviet forces had become an in- 
tegral part of the Warsaw Pact defenses in the area, but for many 
Czechoslovak citizens their presence was still a cause of resentment. 
In guarded moments, some citizens have referred to the Soviet 
forces as an army of occupation. The leaders of the government 
and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, however, have been 
obsequious in their contacts with Soviet officials and periodically 
have even thanked the invaders for having shown Czechoslovakia 
the error of its ways. Marked public unease was also evident in 
1983 when the Soviet Union began deploying operational-tactical 
missiles in Czechoslovakia. 



217 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

The Czechoslovak munitions industry, which was already well 
developed when the country was a part of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, continued to produce arms and military equipment in the 
1980s. The Skoda armament works of Plzen was famous long before 
World War I, and the British Bren gun of World War II fame was 
originally developed in Brno, from which its name was derived. 
Skoda and other manufacturers of munitions have maintained a 
reputation for quality during the communist era, and Czecho- 
slovakia has become a major supplier of arms to Third World coun- 
tries. The industry also has supplied weapons and equipment for 
the country's own forces and for other Warsaw Pact forces. Produc- 
tion has included small arms, machine guns, antitank weapons, 
armored vehicles, tanks (of Soviet design), and jet aircraft. 

Armed Forces: Historical and Political Setting 
Historical Background and Traditions 

To 1918 

Although the history of Czechoslovakia as a sovereign state dates 
only from the breakup of the Hapsburg Empire at the end of World 
War I, the military traditions of the Czechs and Slovaks date back 
to the upheavals of the Middle Ages in Central Europe. Boleslav I 
of Bohemia, for example, commanded Czech troops at the Battle 
of Lechfeld in 955, when the forces of the Holy Roman Empire 
under Otto I finally halted the Hungarian raids through Europe. 
After their defeat, the Hungarians retreated into the Carpathian 
Basin, and for most of the next 1,000 years the Slovaks remained 
under Hungarian domination. 

King John of Bohemia and his son Charles fought on the side 
of the French against the English during the Hundred Years' War 
(1337-1453). John, lashed to his horse because of blindness, rode 
to his death on the battlefield at Crecy. Charles, wounded in the 
same battle, returned to Prague as king and was later crowned Holy 
Roman Emperor. He is remembered in Czechoslovakia as an en- 
lightened, benevolent king of Bohemia. Charles founded the univer- 
sity that bears his name and ordered the construction of the bridge 
across the Vltava River, which was also named in his honor. Charles 
hired French and Italian architects to build the churches, palaces, 
and mansions that made Prague one of Europe's most beautiful 
cities. 

Additional popular military traditions originated in the religious 
wars of the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the Hus- 
site wars, Jan Zizka became a military leader of such skill and bril- 
liance that his name is well remembered more than 500 years later. 



218 



National Security 



Two centuries after the Hussite wars, religious strife again wracked 
the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia, and at the Battle of White 
Mountain in 1620, Czech freedom was lost to the Austrian Haps- 
burgs (see Hapsburg Absolutism and the Bohemian Estates, ch. 1). 

The Establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic 

Throughout the centuries of foreign rule, the Czechs were sub- 
jected, at times, to intense Germanization and the Slovaks to 
Magyarization; nevertheless, both maintained their ethnic identi- 
ties, and during the collapse of empires and kingdoms that accom- 
panied World War I, they seized the opportunity for independence. 
During the war, Czechs and Slovaks in large numbers deserted 
the armies of Austria and Hungary, respectively, to form the 
Czechoslovak Legion, military units that fought for the Allied 
powers in the hope that they were contributing to their own na- 
tional liberation. The largest Czechoslovak units were formed on 
the eastern front, but the Russians did not trust them and, until 
the overthrow of the tsar, did not commit them to battle. 

During the period of the Provisional Government in Russia, 
Alexander Kerensky, then minister of war, allowed General Aleksei 
Brusilov to include Czechoslovak units in his army as he prepared 
for a major Russian offensive in June 1917. Russian units, pres- 
sured by the Bolsheviks, refused to fight; but the Czechoslovak sol- 
diers, motivated by dreams of a free homeland, fought valiantly. 
At the Battle of Zborov on the Galician front, they broke through 
Austro-Hungarian lines and captured more than 4,000 of the 
enemy, including about 60 officers. They also captured several ar- 
tillery pieces and machine guns plus quantities of ammunition and 
supplies. The cost in casualties at Zborov was high — almost 200 
killed and 700 wounded — but the taste of victory was sweet and 
was heightened by the presence in Russia of Tomas Masaryk. 

With the collapse of the eastern front imminent, Masaryk in Rus- 
sia and Eduard Benes in France desperately tried to arrange a plan 
whereby the Czechoslovak Legion would be evacuated through 
Archangel and shipped to France, where it would be employed in 
the Allied cause. After the Bolshevik takeover, when the Czecho- 
slovak leaders deemed it impossible to evacuate such a large force 
through northern Russia, a new plan called for the legion to travel 
across Siberia to Vladivostok and cross the Pacific, North America, 
and the Atlantic to France, where it would be committed to com- 
bat. At first the Bolsheviks, desirous of ridding the country of such 
a large foreign armed force, approved of the evacuation through 
Siberia, with the stipulation that the Czechoslovak units give up 



219 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

their weapons. Refusing the order to disarm, the legionnaires 
clashed with the Red Army. Because the 40,000 to 60,000 Czecho- 
slovak troops constituted the strongest force between European Rus- 
sia and the Pacific Coast, they were able to take control of the 
Trans-Siberian Railroad, a move necessary to protect their route 
of departure. Merely by their presence along the strategic railroad, 
the legionnaires became an important element in the Russian civil 
war and frequently fought against the Soviet troops. When the war 
in Europe ended, Czechoslovakia gained independence, and Allied 
armies intervened in Russia before the last unit of the Czechoslovak 
Legion was repatriated. 

The republic that encompassed the former Czech lands — 
Bohemia and Moravia — as well as Slovakia and Ruthenia (also 
known as Carpatho-Ukraine) created an army in 1918 and an air 
force two years later. Personnel for these forces were recruited from 
the legions that had fought in Russia, Italy, and France, as well 
as from the demobilized troops of the defeated Austro-Hungarian 
armies. Many of the problems of multinationalism that had plagued 
the Hapsburgs were passed on to the successor states and to their 
armed forces. The new Czechoslovak forces mirrored the ethnic 
groups from which they were drawn — Czechs, Germans, Slovaks, 
Hungarians, and Ruthenians (Ukrainians), plus much smaller 
numbers of Jews, Poles, and Romanians. (Most Jews had been 
assimilated and were not categorized as a minority in the armed 
forces.) Ethnic strength in the forces generally reflected percentages 
in the population, although Czechs were overrepresented, partic- 
ularly in the officer corps, which they dominated. Although out- 
right discrimination by the Czechs against minorities was not 
tolerated, ethnic friction did exist, and the question of reliability 
worried the Czech-controlled general staff and defense ministry. 

Munich and After 

After the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany in early 1938, 
the fear of a similar fate increased in Czechoslovakia; the authori- 
ties, however, were determined to fight rather than to submit quietly 
as the Austrians had done. President Benes ordered a partial mobili- 
zation, and the country began to prepare for the war that appeared 
to be inevitable. At that time, treaties pledged French, British, and 
Soviet aid to Czechoslovakia, but at Munich in September Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain of Britain and Premier Edouard 
Daladier of France capitulated to Hitler's demands and agreed to 
sacrifice Czechoslovakia in exchange for the peace promised by 
Hitler. Because the Soviet Union's pledge depended on whether 
or not France abided by its commitment, Czechoslovakia was left 



220 



National Security 



without allies. Hitler promised at Munich to take only the Sudeten- 
land, but less than six months later, on March 15, 1939, German 
troops marched into Prague. Bohemia and Moravia became a Nazi 
protectorate; Slovakia was granted a measure of autonomy but, 
in effect, became a puppet state (see The War Years, 1939-45, 
ch. 1). The Czechoslovak army, which could have mobilized as 
many as thirty divisions, was disarmed and disbanded. 

During the occupation of the Czech lands, acts of resistance and 
sabotage were met with vicious reprisals. Persecution became par- 
ticularly severe under Reinhard Heydrich, who was appointed 
Reich protector of Bohemia and Moravia in September 1941 . Less 
than nine months later Heydrich, who had previously been deputy 
to the infamous Heinrich Himmler, was assassinated by two 
Czechoslovak commandos who had been trained in Britain and 
parachuted into their homeland to carry out the mission. Nazi retri- 
bution was swift and frightful. The village of Lidice, selected as 
the target for punishment, was completely obliterated. All male 
inhabitants over age sixteen were shot, all women were sent to con- 
centration camps, and all children were sent to German orphanages. 
Even Lidice, however, did not end Czechoslovak resistance (see 
Czech Resistance, ch. 1). 

In Slovakia conditions were little better for the average citizen 
than in the Czech lands. Despite its ostensible position as an au- 
tonomous state administered by Slovaks, this puppet state had 
quickly taken on the characteristics of a police state, and the oc- 
cupying forces pressed the Germanization of the people. All oppo- 
sition was suppressed, and before long underground resistance 
groups arose as they had in Bohemia and Moravia. The various 
Slovak resistance forces coalesced into a single command and staged 
the Slovak National Uprising from August through October 1944. 
Although unsuccessful, this uprising was one of the most signifi- 
cant rebellions in Nazi-occupied Europe (see Slovak Resistance, 
ch. 1). 

In addition to those fighters who devoted their energies to the 
resistance movements in various parts of the country, many other 
Czechoslovak citizens escaped abroad to join Allied armed forces 
or to form all-Czechoslovak units. Various contingents, including 
the First Czechoslovak Corps under the command of General 
Ludvik: Svoboda, fought alongside Soviet formations as they liber- 
ated eastern Europe. However, these forces arrived in Slovakia too 
late to relieve the resistance units, which suffered heavy losses during 
the Slovak National Uprising. In western Europe, a Czechoslovak 
infantry brigade and three air squadrons accompanied the British 
forces in the invasion of the continent. 



221 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

President Benes, in the meanwhile, had spent most of the war 
years in London. In March 1945 he traveled to Moscow for negoti- 
ations about the program and composition of the new Czechoslovak 
government that would be formed as the country was liberated. 
The town of Kosice in eastern Slovakia was designated as a tem- 
porary capital, and the Kosice Program, which outlined a detailed 
plan for government, was published there. Eight key governmental 
posts were designated to be filled by members of the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska — 
KSC), including the Ministry of National Defense, which was put 
under the charge of Svoboda. The government moved from Kosice 
to Prague on May 10, 1945, and, as defense minister, Svoboda 
began organizing the armed forces along Soviet lines as agreed to 
in the Kosice Program. Svoboda, a genuine war hero, had fought 
in both world wars. As a twenty-year-old conscript in the Austro- 
Hungarian army in 1915, he had been sent to the Russian front, 
where he deserted and joined the forces that eventually became 
the Czechoslovak Legion. After returning to civilian life briefly in 
the early 1920s, Svoboda joined the new army and spent the rest 
of his life in service, which included the presidency of the republic 
from 1968 to 1975. 

As World War II neared its end in 1945, the American Third 
Army under the command of General George S. Patton was in 
Czechoslovakia near Plzen (Pilsen) and was fully capable of liber- 
ating Prague, but prior political arrangements had reserved that 
highly symbolic act for the Red Army. Over four decades later, 
Czechoslovak citizens were still frequently reminded that the Red 
Army had paid a high price in lives and wealth to secure their free- 
dom from the Nazis. They were constantly told that they owed an 
everlasting debt of gratitude to their liberators. That many in the 
Czechoslovak Legion died fighting alongside Russian soldiers in 
Russia during World War I was rarely publicized. 

The armed forces that Svoboda began to rebuild in 1945 were 
heavily influenced by the Soviet forces in which many Czechoslovaks 
had served, including many officers and noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs) who had become members of the KSC. Svoboda had not 
yet become a party member, although he certainly sympathized 
with the Soviet cause, and approximately one-third of his top com- 
mands were held by communist generals. That communist officers 
had taken over the posts of troop education officers at all levels, 
almost without exception, was perhaps of even greater significance. 
In the election of 1946, military garrisons voted heavily for the com- 
munist candidates. Because of the intense political activism of the 



222 



National Security 



communists, however, antagonism arose between the communist- 
influenced officers from the eastern front and those air force officers 
from the western front who had been based in London during the 
war. These two groups constituted the bulk of armed forces per- 
sonnel in the early postwar period. 

The Communists Take Over 

After the 1946 election, the communists began to lose some of 
their popularity, and, as the 1948 election approached, their pub- 
lic support began to decline. Not leaving anything to chance, the 
communists staged a coup d'etat in February 1948 rather than wait 
for the scheduled May election. To ensure passivity among mili- 
tary units that might object to such unconstitutional methods, 
Svoboda confined all noncommunist commanders to quarters. Var- 
ious units under communist command were placed on alert dur- 
ing the coup, but they were not needed and were not used as the 
legitimate government was ousted and a Moscow-oriented, com- 
munist regime was installed. 

Early in the new era, the ranks of officers and NCOs were thinned 
as the military forces, along with all other institutions, were purged 
to ensure political reliability. The armed forces — now called the 
Czechoslovak People's Army (Ceskoslovenska lidova armada — 
CSLA) — suffered initially from the loss of competent personnel, 
but as Soviet advisers reorganized units to fit the Soviet pattern 
and trained the Czechoslovaks to use the Soviet equipment that 
was arriving in quantity, the forces gradually developed a credible 
combat capability. 

Having cleaned the governmental institutions of opposition ele- 
ments, the communist rulers conducted another purge in the early 
1950s, this time seeking purity within the party. Svoboda, who had 
joined the KSC in 1948, was among those who fell into disfavor. 
Charged with treason, he was removed from his post as defense 
minister and sent to work on a collective farm. Others, however, 
fared worse. Rudolf Slansky, for example, who was first secretary 
of the party, was executed. Slansky and Svoboda were both 
rehabilitated — posthumously in the case of Slansky. Svoboda 
regained his army rank in 1955 and became commandant of the 
Klement Gottwald Military Political Academy, a post he held until 
his retirement from military service in 1959. Although the morale 
of the troops suffered from the purges, the size of the military es- 
tablishment grew rapidly, increasing from 140,000 in 1950 to over 
250,000 in 1951. These well-trained and highly disciplined forces 
were considered to be capable and competent in 1955 when Czecho- 
slovakia committed its forces to the alliance formed under the terms 



223 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance — the Warsaw Pact. 

The CSLA's prestige continued to grow during the next decade 
as it increasingly became a "junior partner" in Soviet military 
strategy in both Eastern Europe and the Third World. Unlike Hun- 
gary and Poland, Czechoslovakia experienced no upheavals in 1956 
and was therefore considered to be, from the Soviet point of view, 
the most reliable of the front-line Warsaw Pact states. The CSLA 
gave support to the increased Soviet military presence in the Third 
World. As the Soviet Union became a supplier of arms, Czecho- 
slovakia supplied training expertise to Third World military officers. 
The CSLA also underwent considerable modernization in the early 
1960s as the Soviet Union redefined the role of the non-Soviet 
Warsaw Pact members in Warsaw Pact military strategy. As 
Warsaw Pact strategy shifted from one of massive retaliation to 
one of limited nuclear warfare, the Czechoslovak military was 
assigned a specific role to play in the event of war with the West — to 
tie down North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in 
the southern part of the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany). 

Yet it was precisely this enhanced prestige and concomitant duties 
that gave rise to increasing discontent in what had been considered 
up to that time a solidly pro-Soviet military establishment. The 
modernization of the CSLA required and spawned an officer corps 
whose level of education was much higher than that of its predeces- 
sor. This educated officer corps, however, increasingly resented 
the amount of time it was required to devote to its own political 
education. Some officers also believed that the country's new 
Warsaw Pact role unjustly favored Warsaw Pact and Soviet defense 
interests at the expense of Czechoslovakia's. Romania had previ- 
ously raised this question regarding its own role in the Warsaw 
Pact. According to the Warsaw Pact's own estimates, the CSLA 
would take casualties of 60 to 70 percent in a war against NATO, 
and Czechoslovakia itself would be turned into a nuclear battlefield. 
That the Soviet Union made repeated attempts to station troops 
and nuclear warheads within Czechoslovakia during this time must 
have exacerbated the situation. Soviet requests were repeatedly 
turned down, but tensions arose during the process. 

The general dissatisfaction within the Czechoslovak military 
became increasingly evident. In 1966 Czechoslovakia, following 
the lead of Romania, rejected the Soviet Union's call for more mili- 
tary integration within the Warsaw Pact and sought greater input 
in planning and strategy for the Warsaw Pact's non-Soviet mem- 
bers. At the same time, plans to effect great structural changes in 



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Czechoslovak military organizations were under discussion. All 
these debates heated up in 1968 during the period of political liber- 
alization known as the Prague Spring, when CSLA commanders 
put forward plans to democratize the armed forces, plans that in- 
cluded limiting the role of the party (see The Prague Spring, ch. 1). 
National military doctrine became an even greater issue when two 
important documents were released: the Action Program of the 
Ministry of Defense and the Memorandum of the Klement 
Gottwald Military Political Academy. These documents stated that 
Czechoslovakia should base its defense strategy on its own geopo- 
litical interests and that the threat from the West had been over- 
stated. Although the regime of Alexander Dubcek, the party first 
secretary (title changed to general secretary in 1971), was careful 
to reassure the Soviet Union that Czechoslovakia would remain 
committed to the Warsaw Pact, Moscow felt challenged by these 
developments, which undoubtedly played a major role in the deci- 
sion to invade in August 1968. 

The Fraternal Invasion 

On August 20, 1968, Warsaw Pact forces — including troops from 
Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hun- 
gary, Poland, and the Soviet Union — invaded Czechoslovakia. 
Approximately 500,000 troops, mostly from the Soviet Union, 
poured across the borders in a blitzkrieg-like advance (see Inter- 
vention, ch. 1). 

The invasion was meticulously planned and coordinated, as the 
operation leading to the capture of Prague's Ruzyne International 
Airport in the early hours of the invasion demonstrated. A special 
flight from Moscow, which had prior clearance, arrived just as the 
Warsaw Pact troops began crossing the borders. The aircraft car- 
ried more than 100 plainclothes agents, who quickly secured the 
airport and prepared the way for a huge airlift. Giant An- 12 air- 
craft began arriving at the rate of one per minute, unloading Soviet 
airborne troops equipped with artillery and light tanks. As the oper- 
ation at the airport continued, columns of tanks and motorized rifle 
troops headed toward Prague and other major centers, meeting 
no resistance. 

By dawn on August 21, 1968, Czechoslovakia was an occupied 
country. During the day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "with 
the endorsement of the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic and on behalf of the Government of the Republic" trans- 
mitted to the governments of the invading countries "a resolute 
protest with the requirement that the illegal occupation of Czecho- 
slovakia be stopped without delay and all armed troops be 



225 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

withdrawn. " That evening in a nationwide radio broadcast Presi- 
dent Svoboda stated that the Warsaw Pact forces had entered the 
country "without the consent of the constitutional organs of the 
state," thus officially denying the Soviet claim that they had been 
invited into the country to preserve socialism. The people of Czecho- 
slovakia generally resented the presence of foreign troops. They 
demonstrated their objections in mass gatherings in the streets and 
by various acts of passive resistance. The invading troops could 
see that they had not been invited into and were not wanted in 
Czechoslovakia. 

One of the priority missions of the Warsaw Pact forces during 
the early stages of the invasion was to neutralize the Czechoslovak 
armed forces. That mission proved to be easy because Czechoslovak 
authorities had confined the armed forces to their barracks. In effect, 
the Czechoslovak forces were prisoners in their own barracks 
although, on orders from the Warsaw Pact command, they had 
not been disarmed. At the end of three weeks, the Soviet units that 
had surrounded Czechoslovak military installations were pulled 
back, but the suspicions that had been aroused among the troops 
on both sides were not easily dispelled. Czechoslovak military 
spokesmen tried to depict their forces as the same strong, efficient 
organization that had previously manned the westernmost wall of 
the Warsaw Pact, but obvious doubts had been raised in the minds 
of authorities in the other countries. Czechoslovak citizens, in turn, 
wondered about allies who could so suddenly become invaders. 

' 'Normalization ' 3 

It was not until October 16 that agreement was reached for the 
partial withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact armies. The Soviet Union 
made a big show over the agreement, sending Premier Aleksei 
Kosygin to Prague as leader of a high-level delegation to observe 
the ceremony. Czechoslovak joy was tempered by the knowledge 
that a sizable army of occupation would remain after the bulk of 
the invading force had departed. The Bulgarian, East German, 
Hungarian, and Polish troops were ordered to leave the country, 
but Soviet units were to remain in what was referred to as "tem- 
porary stationing." In the agreement, Czechoslovakia retained 
responsibility for defense of its western borders, but Soviet troops 
were to be garrisoned in the interior of the country. As events trans- 
pired, however, the major Soviet headquarters and four of its five 
ground divisions were deployed in the Czech Socialist Republic, 
where they remained in mid- 1987. 

During the talks leading to the agreement, the Soviet negotia- 
tors pressed their Czechoslovak counterparts to reduce the size of 



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the CSLA by eliminating the personnel who had supported the 
Dubcek regime. Yet the subsequent force reduction was caused by 
more than direct Soviet pressure. Dubcek' s Prague Spring and the 
subsequent invasion by Warsaw Pact allies had had many ramifi- 
cations within the armed forces, particularly among the professionals 
of the officer corps and the NCO corps. In the year preceding the 
ouster of Antonm Novotny, the first secretary of the KSC, definite 
schisms had occurred between those officers supporting the old order 
and those favoring the reform movement. In February 1968, shortly 
after Dubcek had replaced Novotny as first secretary, Major Gen- 
eral Jan Sejna defected to the West. He revealed that he and other 
hard-line communists had planned to keep Novotny in office, by 
force if necessary, but the plan fell through when the Presidium 
voted to oust Novotny. The political dichotomy in the military led 
to a great thinning of the ranks after the downfall of Dubcek and 
the rise to power of Gustav Husak in early 1969. 

Once its power was consolidated, the Husak government sought 
to re-establish party control over the armed forces and to ensure 
their full integration into a Warsaw Pact dominated by the Soviet 
Union. The Klement Gottwald Military Political Academy — the 
center of the military debate of the mid-1960s — was temporarily 
closed, and the CSLA officer corps was purged. When the purge 
was completed in 1975, some 11,000 officers and about 30,000 
NCOs had been dismissed. Officer strength in the army was 
reduced by one-third and in the air force by one-half. Demorali- 
zation also contributed to this dramatic decrease. In the months 
following the invasion, nearly 58 percent of all army officers under 
30 years of age resigned, and by June 1969 an estimated 50 per- 
cent of all students in the country's military academies also had 
resigned. In order to overcome this drastic reduction in manpower, 
the qualifications — whether educational or otherwise — for officer 
candidates were lowered, and at least some candidates were rushed 
through officer training school in half the normal time. Substan- 
tial material and career incentives were used to entice young peo- 
ple into the ranks of officers. The effect of these measures was 
difficult to assess precisely, but it was clear that their effect must 
have been minimal. In 1979 a West German source noted that 
officer shortages in the CSLA at that time ranged from 20 percent 
in the air force to 70 percent in the motorized infantry. Overall 
military strength dropped from 240,000 in 1966 to 168,000 in 1969 
and generally stayed below 200,000 for most of the 1970s. Ironi- 
cally, General Martin Dzur, the minister of national defense at 
the time of the invasion, survived the purges and early retirements 
and retained his post until his death in January 1985. 



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Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

In the post-Dubcek era, the armed forces suffered from the apa- 
thy that seemed to infect the entire society after the Stalin-like crush- 
ing of the Prague Spring. The failure to resist the "fraternal" 
invaders undermined the prestige of the military in its own eyes 
and in the eyes of the public. Despite the purges of possibly un- 
reliable personnel and the redoubling of propaganda efforts in mili- 
tary schools and training programs, some outside observers in the 
1970s and 1980s questioned the reliability of the Czechoslovak forces 
in the event of an East-West conflict. The most frequent questions 
concerned their reliability in a prolonged offensive war in Western 
Europe or in a war that was going badly for Warsaw Pact forces. 
Other outside analysts, however, believed that the Czechoslovak 
armed forces were well trained, well equipped, and well motivated 
and that they were capable of carrying their share of Warsaw Pact 
operations, particularly in defense of their homeland (see Soviet 
Influence, this ch.). 

Government and Party Control 

The Constitution of 1960, which replaced the original communist 
constitution of 1948, converted the Czechoslovak Republic into the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. According to the Constitution, 
"defense of the country and its socialist social order" was the 
"supreme duty and a matter of honor for every citizen." Citizens 
were "duty bound" to serve in the armed forces as prescribed by 
law. The law provided for a system of universal male conscription. 

The president of the federal republic is titular head of the armed 
forces by virtue of his constitutional designation as commander in 
chief. In that capacity, he has the power to appoint and promote 
general officers, but real power is wielded by the State Defense 
Council (Rada obrany statu), which alone has the authority to for- 
mulate policy and budget the resources deemed necessary. The 
council, in turn, is dominated by the KSC, which Article 4 of the 
Constitution asserts is "the guiding force in society." 

In 1985 the Czechoslovak government allocated 7.6 percent of 
its annual budget to defense spending. This percentage included 
expenses for police, militia, and border guards. Some Western 
analysts believe that this figure was quite large for a country the 
size of Czechoslovakia, even if the considerable sums devoted to 
internal security are taken into account. Other observers, however, 
have pointed out that defense spending has never recovered its 
pre- 1968 levels. In any case, defense spending as a percentage of 
the total budget has been gradually increasing since 1974, when 
it stood at 5.7 percent. 



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National Security 



Policy making in the armed forces since 1969 has been a func- 
tion of the State Defense Council, which was established by law in 
January of that year. Although the council is a governmental body, 
the interlocking nature of top governmental and party organs en- 
sures that the KSC controls it. Because of official secrecy laws, lit- 
tle has been published concerning the council, its meetings, or its 
functions. When established in 1969, the State Defense Council 
consisted of the first secretary of the KSC as chairman and the pre- 
mier of Czechoslovakia as vice chairman. Members were the 
minister of national defense, the chief of the General Staff, the 
minister of interior, the chairman of the Czech National Front, 
the first secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia (Komunis- 
ticka strana Slovenska — KSS), the premier of the Czech Socialist 
Republic, and the premier of the Slovak Socialist Republic. In 1987 
officials holding these positions were members of the KSC Secre- 
tariat, Presidium, Central Committee, or a combination of these 
bodies. Ostensibly the council was responsible to the Federal Assem- 
bly, but the political power of its membership made it responsible 
only to itself (see The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, ch. 4). 

According to its establishing statute, the State Defense Council 
was intended to be the governmental agency charged with evalu- 
ating the country's international obligations and threats to national 
security. Based upon such evaluation, determinations would be 
made concerning basic concepts of defense and the configuration 
of the armed forces. The council also is responsible for determin- 
ing the proportion of the annual budget that will be used for the 
support of the defense establishment, and it has final approval of 
operational planning. During wartime, it would oversee mobili- 
zation of the economy as well as the population, direct civil defense 
measures, and act as the supreme decision-making body for the 
military forces. The council also is charged with internal security 
matters. 

Defense councils were also established in the governments of the 
Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic, which 
together constituted the federation that was one of the few legacies 
of the ill-fated Action Program of Dubcek (see The Prague Spring, 
1968, ch. 1). The legislation creating the federal structure, the Con- 
stitutional Law of Federation of October 27, 1968, survived the 
period of so-called normalization under Husak and continued in 
force in late 1987. Both national republics established operating 
governments, but defense was among the responsibilities retained 
by federal authorities (see Government Structure, ch. 4). The pur- 
pose and function of the defense councils in the constituent repub- 
lics was not revealed. It was known, however, that their members 



229 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

were appointed and subject to recall by the chairman of the State 
Defense Council. 

The Ministry of National Defense is the government agency 
responsible for the administration and operation of the armed forces. 
As is true in most Warsaw Pact countries, this ministry is patterned 
on its Soviet counterpart. Under the direction of the State Defense 
Council, as of 1987 the defense ministry organized, equipped, and 
trained the combat and support elements of the military services. 
The ministry also planned peacetime operations and training, as 
well as formulating the necessary plans for wartime operation. 
Additionally, the ministry allocated the funds that have been desig- 
nated for defense in the national budget. The minister of national 
defense customarily has been a serving officer, the only four-star 
general on active duty. Defense ministers have usually ranked high 
in the KSC (membership in the Central Committee, for example), 
but as of 1987 no defense minister had served concurrently in the 
Presidium. 

When the military was restructured to fit the communist mold 
in the late 1940s, a political network similar to that of the Soviet 
forces was superimposed on Czechoslovak military organization 
at every level. Political officers, assigned to all units down to and 
including battalion, were subordinate to the armed forces' Main 
Political Directorate, which was linked directly to the KSC Cen- 
tral Committee. The chief of the Main Political Directorate in early 
1987, Lieutenant General Jaroslav Klicha, was a member of the 
KSC Central Committee, as was his first deputy. Despite their 
separate channels of communication and their political subordi- 
nation, political officers were subject to normal command and could 
not countermand orders of their military commanders, as had some- 
times been true in the Soviet armed forces in earlier years. 

Party domination was ensured by the interlocking of party and 
government positions, that is, by the practice of filling top posi- 
tions in the government with key party officials. Husak, for exam- 
ple, occupied the top position in the party — general secretary — and 
the top position in the government — president. In the military, he 
was the commander in chief and the chairman of the State Defense 
Council. In effect, all lines led to Husak, but party control was 
not dependent solely on a single individual. For example, most 
officers and many senior NCOs were party members, many others 
aspired to membership, and young officers and NCOs were mem- 
bers of party-sponsored youth organizations. Conscripts were 
proselytized by unit activists, and political orientation made up a 
significant part of the routine training programs of military units. 



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Party indoctrination courses were part of the curricula at military 
schools and academies. 

General Dzur, who had been appointed minister of national 
defense by Dubcek in April 1968, was co-opted into the KSC Cen- 
tral Committee in August of that year and continued in both ca- 
pacities until his death. Dzur's highest command position on active 
duty had been as a battalion commander from 1946 until 1948, 
but, as evidenced by his party activity since 1943, he was very much 
a politician. In addition to becoming minister of national defense 
and the highest ranking member of the armed forces, Dzur dis- 
played unusual political acumen not only by surviving the Dubcek 
debacle but also by retaining his military and party positions. His 
successor, General Milan Vaclavik, was likewise elected to the Cen- 
tral Committee, but only after his appointment as minister of na- 
tional defense in 1985. General Karel Rusov, first deputy minister 
of national defense and second in rank and importance to Vaclavik 
in the military hierarchy, had been a member of the party since 
1946 and was elected to the Central Committee in 1981, as was 
General Miloslav Blahnik, the chief of staff. Czechoslovakia had 
fewer high-ranking military officers in the party hierarchy than was 
generally the case in other Warsaw Pact countries. 

Soviet Influence 

Loyalties 

Zdenek Mlynaf, secretary of the Central Committee under 
Dubcek who later emigrated, has written that one of the reasons 
the military was not ordered to resist the invaders in August 1968 
was the questionable loyalty of the armed forces leadership. Mlynaf 
believed that some CSLA units could have been persuaded by their 
officers to join the "fraternal, international" armies of the Warsaw 
Pact, which, according to the widely disseminated propaganda, in- 
vaded only to help Czechoslovakia preserve its socialist way of life. 
While the hopelessness of resisting the invasion against overwhelm- 
ing military forces must have stayed the hands of those charged 
with organizing the country's defense, they undoubtedly took the 
question of loyalty into consideration. 

The possibility of divided loyalties that worried Mlynaf and others 
in 1968 had its roots in the development of the country since in- 
dependence. Czechs and Slovaks were among the few peoples of 
Eastern Europe who did not harbor hatred of or grudges against 
the Russians. Many, both civilian and military, were openly Rus- 
sophile in attitude — certainly pro- Soviet if not procommunist. Such 
attitudes were strengthened when Czechoslovakia was abandoned 



231 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

at Munich in 1938 and again when Soviet armies liberated most 
of the country in 1945. When the armed forces were rebuilt after 
World War II, those Czechoslovak fighters who had returned with 
the Soviets gained the upper hand over those who had fought in 
the West, ensuring that Soviet influence would be paramount (see 
Historical Background and Traditions, this ch.). 

The armed forces stood aside in 1948 during the communist coup 
d'etat. After the coup, Svoboda and other high-ranking officers 
joined the KSC and, with assistance and advice from large num- 
bers of Soviet military advisers, began to reform the CSLA along 
Soviet lines. Many officers and NCOs — particularly the veterans 
of service with American, British, and French forces — were dis- 
charged and replaced by less experienced but politically reliable 
personnel. Combat readiness was low for several years after the 
coup as forces were restructured to conform to the Soviet pattern. 
Weapons and equipment of German design were eventually 
replaced by items of Soviet manufacture or design. As personnel 
were trained and educated according to Soviet programs and cur- 
ricula, which included heavy doses of political indoctrination, the 
strategy and tactics of warfare devised by the Soviet high command 
became the doctrine of the Czechoslovak forces. By the time of the 
founding of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the CSLA was already achiev- 
ing a reputation as a well -trained, efficient organization. 

By the early 1960s, the CSLA was considered one of the most 
loyal and modern of the Warsaw Pact forces; it was, in effect, a 
satellite of the Soviet military establishment. In following the Soviet 
lead, the Czechoslovak military simply mirrored the country's com- 
munist hierarchy, which tried to be more communist than the Soviet 
Union by retaining its rigid Stalinist approach long after de- 
Stalinization had occurred in the Soviet Union and other areas of 
Eastern Europe. Soviet equipment and weapons were delivered in 
quantity and periodically updated; Soviet methods of military edu- 
cation and training were adopted; many officers were sent to the 
Soviet Union for advanced schooling; and field training included 
multinational exercises usually under Soviet direction. The thought 
that this military clone might be lost through the actions of politi- 
cal and military reformers, even though they were communist 
reformers, apparently frightened the Soviet leadership. Undoubt- 
edly, this factor weighed heavily in the decision to invade Czecho- 
slovakia in 1968. 

Soviet Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia 

Soviet influence within the armed forces became even stronger 
after 1968 because of the units left behind after the withdrawal of 



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National Security 



the main invasion forces. Resignations and purges eliminated the 
officers and NCOs who would have objected to the Soviet occupa- 
tion, whereas those who remained on active duty and those recruited 
to replace losses were inclined to favor strong Soviet ties. In late 
1987, nearly two decades after the invasion, five Soviet divisions 
were still stationed in Czechoslovakia and, to all outward appear- 
ances, Soviet influence was undiminished. 

Soviet military units deployed outside the borders of the Soviet 
Union after World War II have been organized in groups rather 
than in fronts, which was the wartime designation of these major 
formations. Throughout the postwar era, the largest deployment 
of Soviet forces outside its borders has been the Group of Soviet 
Forces in Germany located in East Germany. Other groups were 
the Northern Group of Forces in Poland, the Southern Group of 
Forces in Hungary, and the Central Group of Forces in Czecho- 
slovakia. The Central Group of forces comprised two tank divi- 
sions, three mechanized infantry divisions, three missile brigades, 
an artillery brigade, and an airborne assault brigade. Total strength 
was about 85,000. Group headquarters was located in the town 
of Milovice, northwest of Prague. In October 1984, Colonel General 
Viktor Yermakov was named by Moscow to command the Cen- 
tral Group of Forces, replacing Lieutenant General Grigoriy 
Borisov, who had assumed command in January 1981. 

Four of the five Soviet ground divisions in Czechoslovakia were 
stationed in the Czech lands (Milovice, Mlada Boleslav, Vysoke 
Myto, and Bruntal), while one was headquartered in Slovakia 
(Zvolen). Armaments in early 1987 included 1,500 main battle 
tanks, 650 artillery pieces, 90 multipurpose rocket launchers, and 
300 front-line aircraft, including 120 helicopters. The aircraft 
inventory also included Su-25 ground attack airplanes. The Cen- 
tral Group of Forces also possessed fifty operational and operational- 
tactical nuclear missiles consisting of SS-21s, SS-22s, and SS-23s. 
The SS-21 sites included Zvolen, Topol'cany, and Vysoke Myto 
in Slovakia, and at Plzefi, Ceske Budejovice, Mlada Boleslav, 
Susice, Milovice, HavKckuv Brod, Bruntal, and Tabor in the Czech 
lands. In 1983 the Czechoslovak government attempted to muster 
public support for the decision to install these missiles. The Czecho- 
slovak citizenry, however, realizing that their country had now 
become a primary target in a future war, did not support the 
installation. 

The Central Group of Forces is a legacy of the 1968 invasion; 
until that event, Czechoslovakia had had no Soviet troops stationed 
permanently within its borders. The degree of permanence of the 
Central Group of Forces has in the past appeared to be a matter 



233 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

of semantics. For several years after the invasion, the deployment 
was referred to officially as "temporary," and a commission for 
the Temporary Stationing of Soviet Forces on Czechoslovak Ter- 
ritory existed for at least the first ten years. The Soviet purpose 
in maintaining troop units of the magnitude of the Central Group 
of Forces is undoubtedly twofold: first, to avoid any future Dubcek- 
like deviations and, second, to increase substantially the strength 
of the Warsaw Pact on its westernmost frontier. 

External Threats to National Security 

As of 1987, the party and government leaders of Czechoslovakia 
continued to assert that West Germany, NATO, and the United 
States represented the major external threats to their country's 
security. Alleged West German revanche was periodically 
denounced in the Czechoslovak press, and those German organi- 
zations that called for Germany's 1937 borders to be restored were 
especially singled out for criticism, as was the Sudeten German 
Emigre Organization, an organization of those Germans expelled 
from Czechoslovakia after World War II. Bonn and ultimately 
Washington were seen by Prague to be exploiting German revan- 
chist sentiments for their own purposes. Dzur had stated in 1984 
that NATO was seeking to "achieve military superiority . . . over 
the Soviet Union and other countries of the Warsaw Pact, to dic- 
tate [NATO's] will to independent states, to stop the worldwide 
revolutionary process, and to dominate the world." A rabid anti- 
American campaign reached its peak when the Soviet Union failed 
to prevent the installation of Pershing II and cruise missiles in 
Western Europe. The deployment of these missiles during the early 
1980s was portrayed as a threat to the European military balance. 
The Czechoslovak leadership, however, did not mention that the 
missiles had been installed in response to the deployment of Soviet 
SS-20 missiles in the western Soviet Union beginning in 1977. 
When the Soviet Union installed SS-21 and SS-23 missiles in 
Czechoslovakia starting in 1983, the Czechoslovak public was 
noticeably unenthusiastic. 

A different kind of threat was seen emanating from Poland at 
the beginning of the 1980s. The development of the Solidarity trade 
union movement there obviously alarmed the communist hierar- 
chy in Czechoslovakia, which feared that the labor unrest might 
spill over into their country. Czechoslovak spokesmen warned the 
Poles that their toying with socialism could be compared with the 
Czechoslovak heresy of 1968 and might result in the same kind 
of disaster. 



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National Security 

Armed Forces 
Ground Forces 

Of the approximately 201,000 personnel on active duty in the 
CSLA in 1987, about 145,000, or about 72 percent, served in the 
ground forces (commonly referred to as the army). About 100,000 
of these were conscripts. As in other Warsaw Pact armed forces, 
the army was by far the largest service. In Czechoslovakia the army 
was divided into three categories: arms (zbrane), auxiliary arms 
(pomocne), and services (sluzby). The arms included infantry, armor, 
artillery, and engineers. Auxiliary arms included the signal, chem- 
ical, and transportation branches. The service branches provided 
the CSLA with medical, veterinarian, ordnance, quartermaster, 
administration, justice, and topographic services. Patterned after 
the Soviet model, the rear services of the CSLA were responsible 
for the procurement of weapons, ammunition, military equipment, 
and other supplies needed by the armed forces. Some of the equip- 
ment required was produced within Czechoslovakia, while the 
Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states supplied the remainder 
needed. 

Tactical organization followed the Soviet pattern except for some 
minor local variations and modifications for differences in equip- 
ment. Many of the small arms and lighter, crew-served weapons 
used by the Czechoslovak forces were manufactured locally, some- 
times requiring slight changes from the Soviet norm of organiza- 
tion for small units. The primary strength of the army in 1987 was 
in five tank divisions, five motorized rifle divisions, one airborne 
regiment, six engineering brigades, and one artillery division con- 
sisting of two antitank regiments, two conventional artillery bri- 
gades, and three surface-to-surface missile brigades. One of the 
tank divisions and three of the motorized rifle divisions were con- 
sidered to be category one, that is, at full strength and fully 
equipped. The remaining divisions were maintained at lower man- 
ning levels — category two or three — that is, between one-third and 
three-quarters manpower strength, but with full equipment, 
although some of it might have been obsolete. Full strength of a 
tank division was estimated at about 1 1 ,000 officers and men; that 
of a motorized rifle division at 14,000 (see fig. 16). 

In keeping with Soviet doctrine, both kinds of Czechoslovak 
divisions were tank-heavy organizations. Motorized rifle divisions 
possessed 266 tanks; tank divisions possessed 335. (A United States 
armored division had 324 tanks, only 1 1 fewer than a Warsaw Pact 
tank division, but the American organization had about 7,300 more 
personnel.) In 1987, the Czechoslovak army possessed 3,000 T-54s 



235 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



MOTORIZED 
RIFLE DIVISION 



HEADQUARTERS 
AND 

HEADQUARTERS 
ELEMENTS 



MOTORIZED 
RIFLE REGIMENT 




ROCKET 
BATTALION 
(FROG) 



MULTIPLE 
ROCKET LAUNCHER 
BATTALION 



ARTILLERY 
REGIMENT 



AIR DEFENSE 
REGIMENT 



RECONNAISSANCE 
BATTALION 



ENGINEER 
BATTALION 



SIGNAL 
BATTALION 




TANK 
DIVISION 



HEADQUARTERS 
AND 

HEADQUARTERS 
ELEMENTS 



TANK 
REGIMENT 



MOTORIZED 
RIFLE REGIMENT 



ROCKET 
BATTALION 
(FROG) 



MULTIPLE 
ROCKET LAUNCHER 
BATTALION 



CHEMICAL 
DEFENSE 
BATTALION 



MOTOR 
TRANSPORT 
BATTALION 



ARTILLERY 
REGIMENT 



AIR DEFENSE 
REGIMENT 



RECONNAISSANCE 
BATTALION 



ENGINEER 
BATTALION 



SIGNAL 
BATTALION 



MAINTENANCE 
BATTALION 



MEDICAL 
BATTALION 



TRAFFIC 
CONTROL 
COMPANY 



FIELD 
BAKERY 



Figure 16. Representative Motorized Rifle and 
Tank Divisions, 1980 



236 



National Security 



and T-55s that were acquired during the 1960s. During the mid- 
1980s, the T-55s underwent modification, which indicated that the 
CSLA intended to keep them in service into the 1990s. The Czecho- 
slovak tank inventory also included about 500 T-72s, a model that 
appeared in Soviet units in the early 1970s and began to be seen 
in Warsaw Pact armies about 1980. Czechoslovakia and Poland 
reportedly are jointly building the T-72. 

The CSLA's artillery inventory in 1987 included 250 M-53 
(100mm), 100 M-1931 and M-1937 (122mm), and 75 M-46 
(130mm) guns. It also included 90 M-137 (152mm) gun-howitzers 
and 250 D-30 (105mm), M-30 (122mm) towed, and M-1974 
(122mm) self-propelled howitzers, plus 175 DANA (M-77) 
(152mm) Tatra 813 truck-mounted, self-propelled howitzers. In- 
troduction of the heavy Soviet M-240 (240mm) self-propelled mor- 
tar began in late 1986 or early 1987; it will probably be employed 
with the 2S7 (203mm) self-propelled gun that was known to have 
been in use in 1986. These two weapons may be scheduled to use 
nuclear munitions. In 1986 the CSLA also possessed 200 RM-70 
(122mm) and 120 M-51 (130mm) multiple rocket launchers and 
40 FROG, 4 SS-21, and 27 Scud surface-to-surface missiles. 
Replacement of Scud-B missiles with SS-23 missiles and the in- 
stallation of SS-12Ms began in 1986. All these missiles are nuclear 
capable. Antitank weapons included P-27 (1 12mm) grenade launch- 
ers, 100 82mm recoilless launchers, and AT-3 Sagger, AT-4 
Spigot, and AT-5 Spandrel antitank guided weapons. Air defense 
weaponry consisted of 575 S-60 (57mm) towed and M-53/59 
(30mm) self-propelled antiaircraft guns, as well as 175 SA-4, SA-6, 
SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, and SA-13 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). 
Reconnaissance units in the CSLA possessed 1,250 OT-65 and 
BRDM scout cars. Motorized infantry units were equipped with 
1,100 BVP-1 and 50 BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles and 2,500 
OT-62, OT-64, and OT-810 armored personnel carriers. 
Although the CSLA imported much of its ground forces weaponry 
from the Soviet Union, domestic industry supplied a good portion 
of the army's needs. This included small-caliber weapons and var- 
ious models of guns, howitzers, rocket launchers, grenade launch- 
ers, antiaircraft guns, and armored personnel carriers. The CSLA 
received equipment from other non- Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. 
Czechoslovakia, in turn, exported its weaponry to both other War- 
saw Pact nations and the Third World. 

One Western analyst has noted that the CSLA's artillery 
holdings in 1986 were 60 percent of that possessed by a Soviet 
10-division, 2-army front. This disparity, plus the decided 



237 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

inferiority of the T-54/55 tanks to NATO's tanks, could cause the 
CSLA serious difficulties in the event of war with the West. 

Air Force 

The Czechoslovak Air Force (Ceskoslovenske letectvo) is tacti- 
cal in nature; that is, its mission is to support the ground forces 
and air defense of the country. As of 1987, Czechoslovakia had 
no counterpart to the Long-Range Air Force of the Soviet Union. 
Air force personnel in 1987 numbered approximately 56,000. The 
ratio of career personnel to conscripts was about two to one. 

The Czechoslovak Air Force was organized into two air armies. 
The 7th Air Army was headquartered in Prague and possessed an 
underground facility at Cerny vrch; the 10th Air Army was sta- 
tioned in Hradec Kralove. The air armies consisted of four air 
divisions with a total of fourteen regiments. The air force possessed 
twenty-two military airfields and fourteen reserve military air- 
fields (see fig. 17). Four of the military airfields — Mimon, Mlade, 
Olomouc, and Sliac — were used by the Soviet air force. Six of the 
reserve military airfields were used for civil aviation. In 1987 the 
air force possessed 465 combat aircraft and about 40 armed helicop- 
ters. Of the four fighter- ground attack regiments, one consisted 
of fifty Su-7BM/Us, one of forty MiG-23Ms, one of thirty 
MiG-21/21 Us, and one of twenty-five Su-25 aircraft. Six inter- 
ceptor regiments possessed 275 MiG-21, MiG-21 U, and MiG-23 
jet aircraft, half of which were used for air defense and half for 
battlefield support. In early 1987 the Czechoslovak Air Force 
apparently had recently received one squadron of the most up-to- 
date MiG-23 BuM fighter bombers. 

The reconnaissance regiment flew twenty MiG-21 RFs, ten 
Su-22s, and fifteen Aero L-29s. The two transport regiments had 
at their disposal two An- 12s, six An-24s, forty IL-14s (undergo- 
ing replacement by An-26s), one Tu-134, and two let L-410 Ms. 
The one helicopter regiment consisted of three independent squa- 
drons, which together possessed forty Mi-24 attack helicopters, 
sixty-five Mi-8 and sixty Mi-4 medium transport helicopters, and 
fifty-five Mi-2 and twenty Mi-1 light transport helicopters. The 
Czechoslovak Air Force used Z-43 aircraft for liaison purposes. 

The Czechoslovak air defense system comprised a command 
headquarters, with 3 divisions consisting of 6 SAM regiments pos- 
sessing some 40 sites and 250 SA-2/3 missiles. The system included 
aircraft detection and surveillance stations and antiaircraft artillery 
units. Most of the SAM sites were located strategically along the 
border with West Germany. Antiaircraft artillery units are used 
for defense against low-flying targets. 



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Manpower 

National defense legislation enacted into law within a year after 
the Communist takeover in 1948 provided for universal male con- 
scription. Male citizens must register for the draft in the spring 
of the year in which they become eighteen years of age. Unless 
rejected because of physical reasons or given an educational defer- 
ment, most are inducted shortly after registration. In 1986 a little 
less than 70 percent of the ground forces and about 32 percent of 
the air forces were conscripts. 

Early legislation provided for the annual class of draftees to be 
inducted in the fall, but since 1968 half of the annual class has been 
called up in the spring and half in the fall. As of 1987 the basic 
term of service for conscripts was two years in the ground forces 
and three years in the air forces; however, to avail themselves of 
technical training some conscripts opted to serve longer terms. 
Czechoslovak law made no provision for conscientious objection; 
anyone convicted of evading military service was subject to a prison 
sentence of up to five years or from five to fifteen years during a 
state of emergency. 

Of the more than 100,000 young men reaching draft age in 1985, 
slightly more than three-quarters were expected to be found fit for 
service, which would provide an adequate number of conscripts 
to replace those completing their tours of duty during the year. 
In 1982 the number of Czechoslovak males who were under 30 
years of age and who had performed military service within the 
previous 10 years numbered 700,000. The number in the entire 
military age-group, that is, between the ages of 18 and 50, totaled 
about 3.5 million in the mid-1980s. Of that number, as many as 
three-quarters could be considered mentally and physically fit for 
service if a general mobilization were ordered. Although not sub- 
ject to conscription, women also served in the armed forces in small 
numbers. Women could join the CSLA if they had graduated from 
high school, passed a qualifying examination, fulfilled the estab- 
lished health and other criteria, and completed a one-year special- 
ized course. 

Reserve obligations for conscripts who had completed their ac- 
tive duty generally lasted until age fifty. Upon discharge the con- 
script was enrolled in the so-called First Reserve, where he remained 
until reaching age forty. During this period, reserve soldiers and 
NCOs had to participate in a total of sixteen weeks of exercises. 
These sixteen weeks generally included three four-week-long ex- 
ercises that reservists had to take part in during the years in which 
they turned twenty-four, twenty-seven, and thirty-two. Between 



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Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 




240 



National Security 



ages forty and fifty, the reservists were carried on the rolls of the 
Second Reserve. As reservists grow older, the numbers available 
for call-up (particularly in the Second Reserve) are reduced by many 
factors, including state of health, occupation of key position in the 
civilian economy, and hardship cases. Nevertheless, the reserve 
program would be considered of major importance in any mobili- 
zation. Because of the heavy annual turnover in conscript ranks, 
there are always a substantial number of reservists whose active- 
duty service has occurred within a ten-year period. 

All Warsaw Pact countries have mobilization plans, and all con- 
duct occasional mobilization exercises. Because of strict national 
security laws, however, little is publicized concerning such exer- 
cises in Czechoslovakia; presumably they take place at the local 
rather than the national level. 

In 1987 no official data were available on salaries of officers, war- 
rant officers, and NCOs, nor had information been published on 
the pay of conscripts. Such data are also considered state secrets. 
The Czechoslovak press, however, has described the incentives 
attached to a recruiting program started in 1969. Benefits included 
a reduction in basic military service (one year instead of two) and 
bonuses; higher grants and privileges were offered to graduates of 
secondary schools and universities. A former officer in the Czecho- 
slovak Air Force who emigrated has described the pay and benefits 
of military pilots: a salary of Kcs7,000 a month (for value of the 
koruna — see Glossary), full board "of excellent quality," 30 days' 
leave plus a 2-week compulsory rest at the Jesenik spa per year, 
and additional benefits depending on qualifications. The remuner- 
ation of pilots was thus "comparable to that of the director of a 
medium-sized state enterprise with 5,000 or more employees." 
Given the nature of the society, as of 1987 it was safe to assume 
that high-ranking officers were well paid and probably received 
salaries in excess of those paid to civilians at comparable levels of 
employment. 

Education and Training 

Much of the military education system developed since 1948 has 
been patterned on Soviet models with the assistance of Soviet 
advisers. The same may be said of troop training programs in gar- 
rison and in the field. 

Conscript Training 

New inductees entered into a rigorous program from the start. 
The first few days of military service were devoted to physical 
examination, issuance of uniforms, and other routine matters. 



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Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

During the first weeks, the conscripts underwent physical fitness 
testing in order to discover deficiencies and to remedy them. Ini- 
tial training consisted of elementary drill and instruction on cus- 
toms of service. A typical daily schedule included six hours of 
training, two hours of supervised political discussion, and two hours 
of recreation. Part of each Saturday was devoted to cleanup and 
inspection; the remainder of the weekend was free. Not until the 
completion of the initial phase of the training were new soldiers 
sworn into service. The swearing in and the taking of the oath to 
defend the homeland constituted a ceremonial occasion to which 
parents and close relatives were invited. After the ceremony, train- 
ing for combat became the full-time, six-days-a-week occupation 
of most conscripts for the duration of their active duty. 

The training year was divided into four phases, the first of which 
was devoted to individual training. In this initial phase, trainees 
received extensive physical fitness training and learned to handle 
individual weapons. During this period, conscripts went on progres- 
sively longer forced marches carrying field packs and practiced live 
firing of rifles, pistols, and submachine guns. In the second phase 
of the training year, trainees received platoon and company train- 
ing and learned to handle crew-served weapons. The third phase 
stressed battalion-level exercises wherein the companies learned to 
coordinate actions to achieve various military objectives. The cul- 
mination of the training year was the large unit — division or 
higher — exercise where combined arms operations were stressed 
under conditions simulating actual combat. Exercises were critiqued 
in detail for the ultimate edification of company grade officers who, 
with the assistance of the regular NCOs, became responsible for 
the retraining of their units to correct deficiencies and avoid repeat- 
ing mistakes in future exercises. 

Training programs were similar in all Warsaw Pact member 
states, and all followed the Soviet lead. The training program was 
based on the principle that a soldier should be either training to 
fight or fighting. There were few frills for the conscripts of the 
Warsaw Pact forces; free time, furloughs, recreational programs, 
and the like ranged from minimal to nonexistent. Conscripts spent 
their time training or working; much time was spent in the field, 
where military leaders believe that their armies are honed for tasks 
of the modern battlefield. In addition to the subjects commonly 
studied by soldiers around the world, Warsaw Pact conscripts also 
received considerable political propaganda, which was repeated to 
the point of tedium. Common propaganda themes included the 
importance of Marxism-Leninism in the training of the armed 
forces, the leading role of the party in "the building of an advanced 



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National Security 



socialist army," and praise of the Soviet forces that liberated the 
country from the Nazis. 

The culmination of the training cycle was reached during the 
increasingly frequent Warsaw Pact exercises involving Czechoslovak 
and Soviet forces as well as those of one or several other Warsaw 
Pact members. Winter exercises held in February 1987 involved 
only the CSLA and units of the Central Group of Forces. The 
Friendship 86 exercises, on the other hand, involved Czechoslovak 
and Hungarian forces as well as the Soviet forces stationed in 
Czechoslovakia. The Friendship exercises, which were held in 
western Bohemia near Doupov and Melnik, consisted of three parts: 
countering an enemy attack; crossing the Labe River near Melnik, 
north of Prague; and making a mechanized counterattack with all 
service branches participating. Another large operation was the 
Friendship 79 winter exercises in which various armies practiced 
with live ammunition while undergoing simulated nuclear and 
chemical attack. In this particular exercise, Soviet units were respon- 
sible for the decontamination of Warsaw Pact armies. Czechoslovak 
forces, however, did receive regular training in decontamination 
procedures and were frequently tested on their proficiency. 

Specialized and Officer Training 

In 1987 the CSLA operated schools ranging from secondary 
schools through colleges for the academic, technical, and political 
training and advancement of regular personnel. All military training 
institutions were highly politicized in keeping with the party orien- 
tation of armed forces customary in communist countries. Many 
senior officers, in addition to successfully completing military school- 
ing at all levels in Czechoslovakia, also have been sent to the Soviet 
Union for courses in that country's military institutions. General 
Vaclavik, for example, attended the Moscow Military Academy 
of the General Staff and the Frunze Military Academy. 

At the highest level were the military academies, which contained 
two categories of institutions. First was the "university category." 
This group included the Klement Gottwald Military Political Acad- 
emy in Bratislava, the Military Medical Research and Continuing 
Education Department of Jan Evangelist Purkyn Institute in Hradec 
Kralove, and the Military Section of the Department of Physical 
Education and Sport at Charles University in Prague. The Klement 
Gottwald Military Political Academy prepared cadres for the 
political apparatus of the CSLA. The medical academy prepared 
military cadres in general medicine, stomatology, and general phar- 
macy. The physical education department at Charles University 



243 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

produced specialists in sports organization, sports medicine, and 
related subjects. 

The other category of military academies included five "tech- 
nical" institutions. These were the Antonm Zapotocky Academy 
in Brno, the Ludvik Svoboda Higher Academy of the Ground 
Forces in Vyskov, the Military Technical Academy of Czecho- 
slovak-Soviet Friendship in Liptovsky Mikulas, the Military Avi- 
ation Academy of the Slovak National Uprising in Kosice, and the 
Military Department of the Academy of Transport and Commu- 
nications in Zilina. Students from these schools were graduated 
with the title o ^engineer and the rank of lieutenant. 

In 1987, the CSLA also operated four gymnasiums, or secon- 
dary schools, and eight "military intermediate specialized train- 
ing" institutions. The military gymnasiums offered courses of study 
comparable to civilian gymnasiums, with some military education 
and an emphasis on physical fitness. The specialized training in- 
stitutions offered different areas of technical training. The gym- 
nasiums and the technical schools were both four-year institutions. 
Graduation from military secondary schools led to commissioning 
in the armed forces. Previously the mandatory two-year conscript 
tour was also part of the procedure, but that requirement for duty 
in the ranks was cut to five months in 1980. For a brief period after 
1968, candidates for commission dropped noticeably, but the allure 
of a prestigious career overcame political antipathy, and during 
the 1980s the number of young men seeking military commission 
was adequate. 

In 1987 all but one of the specialized training institutes were con- 
nected with two-year officer schools, the students of which become 
second-lieutenants upon graduation. The two one-year officer 
schools offered specialized training to gymnasium graduates be- 
tween eighteen and twenty years of age. 

As of 1987, women could not enroll as students in the Czecho- 
slovak military schools; they could, however, take specialized courses 
to become home air defense specialists, operators in the special- 
purpose radio technical troops, ground specialists for the air force, 
office typists, or radio operators. Depending on the speciality, train- 
ing courses were held in Prague, Kosice, and Nove Mesto nad 
Vahom. Upon passing a final examination, the graduates became 
members of the CSLA, either as enlisted personnel with a three- 
year service obligation, as career enlisted personnel with the rank 
of warrant officer, or as cadre NCOs. 

Premilitary Training 

In 1987 all male students had to take basic premilitary subjects 
in the last three years of the regular nine-year primary school. 



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According to some critics, however, such training was uneven and 
inconsistent among the various school districts, and teachers at 
schools of all levels lacked sufficient training. Military education 
took up only twenty-five hours a year and included medical, civil 
defense, topographic, weapons firing, and basic training. 

Paramilitary Training 

In 1987 the largest paramilitary organization in Czechoslo- 
vakia was the Association for Cooperation with the Army (Svaz 
pro spolupraci s armadou — SVAZ ARM). Established in 1951, 
SVAZ ARM was a carbon copy of the Soviet Union's All-Union 
Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Air Force, and 
Navy. SVAZARM claimed a membership in 1985 of a little over 
1 million; 60 percent of the members were under 35 years of age, 
43 percent under 20 years, and 18 percent under 15 years. This 
organization popularized defense training through special interest 
groups that centered mostly on sports, some of the groups having 
direct military application. As of 1987, for example, SVAZARM 
recruited and trained pilot conscripts for the Higher Military Avi- 
ation School in Kosice. The training included at least twenty flight 
hours of advanced glider training and thirty-seven to forty hours 
of basic training on motorized airplanes, as well as the necessary 
aviation theory. Additional skills taught by SVAZARM that had 
direct military applicability included parachuting, rifleshooting, 
doghandling, and amateur radio operation. Other activities, for 
example, automobile driving and airplane modeling, were of du- 
bious value to the military. In fact, one Western observer has called 
SVAZARM "a huge (and prosperous) sports and recreational 
organization, only 'paramilitary' in the broadest sense of the word." 

Other organizations involved with paramilitary training, includ- 
ing civil defense training, were the Revolutionary Trade Union 
Movement, the Czechoslovak Socialist Union of Youth, the 
Pioneers organization, and the Czechoslovak Physical Culture 
Association. They appear to have played a secondary role to 
SVAZARM in this regard. During the mid-1980s, Czechoslovak 
military officers frequently complained that young draftees were 
physically soft. They were said to lack basic military knowledge 
and to regard service as an obligation to be endured rather than 
as a patriotic duty. These complaints mirrored those made in the 
1970s despite subsequent increases in the amount of paramilitary 
education in the secondary schools, in the attention paid to physi- 
cal education curricula, in the activities of paramilitary organiza- 
tions, and in propaganda efforts that attempted to instill in youth 
a positive attitude toward service in the armed forces. Many adults 



245 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

were said to view paramilitary training as useless or ineffective 
against weapons of mass destruction. Some employers who were 
responsible for such training were said merely to go through the 
motions of instruction and even to look for excuses to prevent con- 
scripts and reservists from participating. 

Uniforms and Rank Insignia 

In 1987 the Czechoslovak air and ground forces uniforms were 
the same style and color, except for two air force officer mess-dress 
uniforms, which were blue as opposed to the traditional olive green. 
Officers and warrant officers had three basic uniforms (dress, ser- 
vice, and field) designed for year-round wear. NCOs and enlisted 
personnel had only year-round and field uniforms. The service uni- 
form for officers and enlisted personnel was worn for garrison duty 
and routine training activities and, with minor variations, was used 
as a dress uniform by enlisted men. The service uniform consisted 
of a single-breasted, open-collar, four-pocket, olive-green coat worn 
with matching trousers, a khaki shirt, and a black tie. NCOs and 
enlisted men wore this uniform with black boots and belt and an 
olive-green garrison cap. A variation of the uniform for NCOs and 
enlisted men consisted of olive-green trousers, a green-gray shirt, 
black boots, and an olive-green garrison cap. 

The summer service uniform for ground force officers resem- 
bled that used by the NCOs except that it was worn with an olive- 
green shirt, trousers with red piping on the outer-leg seam, brown 
boots, Sam Browne belt, and a service cap. The air force officer 
service uniform consisted of olive-green trousers with blue piping 
on the outer-leg seam, a green-gray shirt-jacket that buttoned at 
the waist, and brown, low-quarter shoes. The summer service uni- 
form for ground force and air force generals resembled the officers' 
service uniform except that the former was worn with a white shirt 
and had trouser-piping consisting of two white stripes for the ground 
forces and two blue stripes for the air force. 

The NCOs and enlisted men had a summer and a winter dress 
uniform that closely resembled their service uniform except that 
it was worn with a white shirt and a service cap. A full-length over- 
coat with a fur collar, a fur cap, and gloves were worn with the 
winter dress uniform. 

Ground force officers had a service/dress uniform that, with the 
addition of a silver belt and aiguillettes, functioned as a parade 
uniform. Both ground and air force generals and officers had mess 
uniforms that consisted of an open-collar coat with two waist pock- 
ets. The ground force uniform was olive green, and the air force 
uniform was blue. 



246 



National Security 



The field uniform worn by all personnel consisted of a light- green 
coat and trousers with a tear-drop and dark-green leaf pattern that 
served as camouflage. In winter all personnel wore this same uni- 
form with a fur cap and a belted, single-breasted overcoat that had 
a snap-in lining and a detachable collar. White overalls were used 
for winter camouflage. The airborne troops also had a tricolor (yel- 
low, brown, and green), puzzle-piece pattern camouflage uniform 
with a matching soft field cap. 

In 1987 the rank insignia of ground and air force personnel were 
indicated by gold and silver stars and round silver studs of vary- 
ing number and size. Rank insignia were worn with the field uni- 
form on shoulder-strap sleeves and on shoulder boards made of 
the same material as the uniform. The shoulder boards and sleeves 
of warrant officers were trimmed with silver piping, while those 
of generals and field officers were trimmed with gold piping. 

The rank structure of the armed forces was broken down into 
twenty-one ranks: four general officer ranks, three field grade officer 
ranks, four company grade officer ranks, three warrant officer 
ranks, three regular NCO ranks, and four conscript ranks. Tradi- 
tionally, the rank of army general was reserved for the minister 
of national defense, who was always an active-duty army officer 
(see fig. 18). 

Internal Security and Public Order 

The Ministry of Interior is responsible for public order and in- 
ternal security. The ministry controls the armed security organi- 
zations in the country except for the regular armed forces and some 
prison guards. It is also responsible, inter alia, for fire prevention, 
government archives, and passport and visa control. In theory the 
interior ministries that exist at the Czech and Slovak Socialist repub- 
lic levels have similar responsibilities and functions, but the real 
power rests in the federal ministry in Prague. The federal Minis- 
try of Interior is considered one of the key posts because of the power 
inherent in the control of the country's security agencies. In 
mid- 1987, the minister of interior was Vratislav Vajnar, who had 
held the post since 1983. Vajnar was concurrently a deputy in the 
Chamber of the People in the Federal Assembly and a member 
of the KSC Central Committee. 

At the end of World War II, when President Benes established 
the first postwar government at Kosice, control of the Ministry of 
Interior was sought and obtained by the KSC. Party member 
Vaclav Nosek was appointed minister and began the process of con- 
verting the security forces into arms of the party. Anticommunist 
police officers and officials were fired, noncommunist personnel 



247 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 




248 



National Security 



were encouraged to join the party or its youth organization, and 
all were subjected to heavy doses of communist propaganda. It was 
Nosek's packing of the police hierarchy with communists that caused 
the protest resignation of anticommunist government ministers in 
February 1948, leading to the coup d'etat. When the coup took 
place, Nosek's communist-dominated security forces ensured an 
easy takeover. 

During the purges of the early 1950s, the security agencies aided 
the Klement Gottwald faction against those communists accused 
of antistate crimes. Police participation in the purges, their arro- 
gance and lack of scruples in dealing with ordinary citizens, and 
their brutal methods of interrogation were typical of the Stalinist 
model that they emulated. The term Secret Police as an official 
appellation was dropped in 1953, but the public, almost thirty years 
later, still used the title in referring to State Security. 

As was the case in the military, but to a lesser extent, some mem- 
bers of the security forces were weeded out for having supported 
the Dubcek reforms. Stability returned to the security forces early 
in the 1970s — during normalization — and the forces have kept a 
tight rein on Czechoslovaks ever since. The repressive measures 
have led to discontent and dissidence, but never to a degree that 
was beyond control. Many Western observers and most expatri- 
ates of the era reported that the public became apathetic after the 
Warsaw Pact invasion and the return to rigid communist orthodoxy. 
The dissent movement known as Charter 77 that took form in 1977 
was certainly a rebuke to the government and to the KSC , but it 
was far from being a mass movement and was rather easily con- 
tained by the security police (see Police Repression, this ch.; Charter 
77, ch. 4). Ten years after its inception, the Charter 77 group re- 
mained small; security forces had ensured that it would not attract 
mass support. 

The National Security Corps 

The police in Czechoslovakia are not called police, but rather 
security. The National Security Corps (Sbor narodm bezpecnosti — 
SNB) comprises Public Security (Vefejna bezpecnost — VB) and 
State Security (Statm bezpecnost — StB). Public Security is a 
uniformed force that performs routine police duties throughout the 
country. State Security, the former Secret Police, is a plainclothes 
force, also nationwide, that is at once an investigative agency, an 
intelligence agency, and a counterintelligence agency. Any activ- 
ity that could possibly be considered antistate falls under the pur- 
view of State Security. In mid- 1987, strength figures for the SNB 
were not available. A 1982 article in the Czechoslovak press 



249 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

indicated that 75 percent of the SNB members were either mem- 
bers or candidate members of the KSC and that 60 percent were 
under 30 years of age. In 1986 about 80 percent of the SNB mem- 
bers in Slovakia came from worker or farmer families. 

The SNB is an armed force, organized and trained as such but 
equipped to perform police rather than military functions. Its mem- 
bers are subject to military discipline and are under the jurisdic- 
tion of military courts. Ranks in the SNB correspond to equivalent 
levels in the CSLA. As of 1987 the SNB was a volunteer service, al- 
though the conscription system was apparently used to rebuild the 
force after the loss of personnel at the end of the Dubcek period. 
Citizens having the requisite physical and educational qualifica- 
tions could apply for direct appointment to the SNB. Qualifica- 
tions included completion of the compulsory nine years of schooling 
and of the basic conscript tour in the armed forces; higher educa- 
tion was required of those seeking appointment to higher level po- 
sitions, for example, scientific, technical, and investigative positions. 
The Ministry of Interior operated its own higher level educational 
institute, which trained security personnel at different stages of their 
careers. The Advanced School of the National Security Corps, 
which occupied a large complex of buildings in Prague, granted 
academic degrees to the SNB and the Border Guard, also under 
the Ministry of Interior. 

Public Security performs routine police functions at all levels from 
federal to local. In 1987 it was reported to be a relatively small 
force for the extent of its responsibility, but it was augmented by 
volunteer auxiliary units. Articles in the Slovak press in the 
mid-1980s referred to 27,000 auxiliary guards in 3,372 units as- 
sisting Public Security in Slovakia alone. No figure was available 
for the number of auxiliary guards and the number of guard units 
in the Czech lands, but it is reasonable to assume that these num- 
bers would be at least double that reported for Slovakia. The fed- 
eral minister of interior controlled other forces that could be ordered 
to assist Public Security if needed, and he could also request fur- 
ther help from the military. 

In mid- 198 7, the olive-drab uniform of Public Security was 
almost identical to the CSLA uniform, but red shoulder boards 
and red trimming on hats distinguished Public Security personnel 
from military. Public Security vehicles were yellow and white. The 
initials VB appeared on the sides, front, and rear of police vehicles. 

Public Security and State Security units were deployed through- 
out the country and had headquarters at regional and district levels; 
there were 10 kraje and 114 districts in 1987. Public Security forces 
also established sections in rural areas. Both forces were under the 



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National Security 



ostensible supervision of the ministries of interior of the Czech and 
Slovak socialist republics. However, there seemed to be no ques- 
tion that operational direction of the security forces emanated from 
the Ministry of Interior at the federal level and that the two minis- 
tries of the component republics had administrative rather than 
supervisory functions. 

People's Militia 

In the early, chaotic days after World War II, armed guard units 
were formed in factories, mines, and other installations to protect 
private property and prevent sabotage. Most of the personnel as- 
signed to these units were controlled by communist-dominated 
unions, and although the guard units may have been necessary to 
prevent lawlessness at the time, they were committed to the ulti- 
mate goal of taking over the enterprises they were hired to pro- 
tect. The importance of the guard units to the communist takeover 
in 1948 and the extent of their activity seemed to vary widely in 
different areas of the country; nevertheless, some historians credit 
them with having paved the way for the coup. Whatever their par- 
ticipation may have been, the guard units were institutionalized 
when legislation in 1948 created the People's Militia, of which the 
guards formed the nucleus. The militia's mission was the defense 
of the socialist society, and militia personnel were given powers 
of arrest equal to those of the regular police. 

Compared with the regular armed forces and the security forces, 
the People's Militia proved relatively conservative during the Prague 
Spring. While publicly proclaiming its support for the Dubcek re- 
forms, the militia also warned against departing from Soviet-style 
socialism. The KSC later reported that some "unfirm" and "fel- 
low traveler' ' elements of the militia had had to be removed dur- 
ing the period of stabilization, but in the early 1970s the force had 
been rebuilt and had regained the confidence of the party leader- 
ship. Although a membership goal of 250,000 had frequently been 
discussed by party officials, the total strength had always been shy 
of that figure; in 1986 membership numbered about 120,000. 
Specialized militia courses were given at the Ludvik Svoboda Higher 
Academy of the Ground Forces in Vyskov. 

In 1987 President Husak was listed as the supreme commander 
of the People's Militia, and the chief of staff (who actually directed 
the organization) was Miroslav Novak, who had held the post since 
1973. In February 1981, Novak signed an agreement pledging the 
cooperation of the militia in a joint effort with SVAZARM to up- 
grade civil defense throughout the country. According to news 
releases, both organizations had traditionally been involved in civil 



251 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

defense, and the new agreement was designed to coordinate their 
endeavors. 

Border Guard 

Another militarized security force subordinated to the Ministry 
of Interior is the Border Guard (Pohranicm straz), which was es- 
tablished in 1951 as a separate agency under the then-existing 
Ministry of National Security. In 1987 the Border Guard, whose 
strength was estimated at 11,000, was commanded by General 
Anton Nemek, whose headquarters was in Prague. The Border 
Guard is an armed force subject to the same military regulations 
that govern the CSLA. In mid- 198 7, in addition to the individual 
small arms carried by its personnel, the Border Guard also had 
some armored vehicles, antitank guns, and machine guns. 

The main strength of the Border Guard has been deployed along 
the West German border since 1950. Smaller units patrolled the 
Austrian frontier as well as the borders with East Germany and 
Poland. Only a few units were stationed on the Hungarian and 
Soviet borders. The basic operational unit was the battalion, which 
was divided into companies and platoons and could be grouped 
into brigades for administrative purposes. The federal minister of 
interior could call the Border Guard to supplement security forces 
if necessary, and in wartime it could be assigned to the army either 
to serve specialized guard functions or to fight as infantry. Mem- 
bers of the Antiaircraft Defense (Protivzdusna obrana) helped the 
Border Guard by instituting air patrols. The portion of the border 
with Hungary formed by the Danube River was patrolled by the 
Border Guard, which used launches and patrol boats equipped with 
radar and infrared sighting devices. 

Criminal justice System 

Incidence of Crime 

Although not covered extensively in the press in mid- 1987, crime 
appeared to be nearly as widespread in Czechoslovakia as it was 
in much of the West. In general, however, crime statistics have 
not been published since 1980. 

General Crime 

Gypsies (especially in Slovakia) and young people were viewed 
as the primary perpetrators of crime, and alcohol was seen as a 
major factor. In Slovakia, for example, 65,869 offenses and petty 
offenses were registered between January and November 1983; this 
number was 52 percent more than in the same period of 1982. 



252 



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Gypsies reportedly were responsible for about 20 percent of these 
crimes, even though they made up less than 3 percent of the popu- 
lation of Slovakia (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). "Economic crime," 
a wide category including shoplifting and vandalism, accounted 
for Kcsl 16 million worth of damages. Losses due to burglary went 
up 37 percent between 1981 and 1985. In 1985, in the Czech 
Socialist Republic alone, the value of goods stolen was reported 
as Kcs43 million. Burglaries were a special problem in large cities, 
especially Prague. Property was inadequately protected, although 
security devices (such as security locks) were available in the stores. 

In the mid-1980s, statistics were not available for rape and other 
violent crimes. In the 1970s, when statistics were published, the 
number of court cases involving rape and child abuse fluctuated 
between 1,623 and 2,475 a year, peaking in 1973. Rapists "on 
the prowl" appeared to be a common phenomenon, and young 
girls were warned not to hitchhike. The penalty for rape was three 
to eight years' imprisonment, which increased to fifteen years if 
death occurred. The penalty for child abuse was from one to eight 
years and up to fifteen years if death resulted. 

Juvenile delinquency was on the rise in the 1980s and usually 
involved children from broken homes. Parents were held respon- 
sible for their children and could be prosecuted for allowing their 
child's truancy. Juveniles were believed responsible for about 21 
percent of all crime, often vandalizing state-owned property. Youth 
gangs were not unknown; and drug abuse and alcoholism were 
major problems. Children convicted of crimes served terms in 
juvenile correctional and training facilities, apart from adults. They 
might also be placed in the protective custody of the state, but there 
was a shortage of institutions to provide such care. 

The most common offense in Czechoslovakia was nonpayment 
of mandatory child support. In a country in which divorce was com- 
monplace, this abuse had become a serious problem. In 1985 ap- 
proximately 3,800 child support cases were prosecuted in the Czech 
Socialist Republic alone. In general, convicted parents were given 
the maximum sentence and were often sent to work camps. 

Black-market money changing was also common in Czecho- 
slovakia, as it appeared to be in all East-bloc economies. The black- 
market changer might be a taxi driver or someone on the street 
corner waiting for foreign tourists who needed Czechoslovak cur- 
rency or for Czechoslovak citizens who needed hard currency. Such 
a money changer would exchange hard (Western) currency for 
Czechoslovak koruny at a far better rate than the State Bank of 
Czechoslovakia, often doubling that figure. This "speculation" was 
highly illegal, and the papers carried reports of such transactions. 



253 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

On occasion, these money changers were agents of the government 
who tried to entrap foreigners in a crime. 

Drinking and Drugs 

In 1987 the official Czechoslovak press conveyed the impression 
that the country had few social problems. Occasionally, however, 
reports appeared on such topics as alcohol abuse, illegal drugs, theft, 
and ''hooliganism" (a catch-all term that covered everything from 
disorderly conduct to vandalism). 

Drinking has always been part of Czech and Slovak life; however, 
it has become a serious problem since the 1948 communist coup. 
Apparently, many people drink because there is nothing else to 
do and because it is a way to escape the dreariness that pervades 
life in Czechoslovakia. As of 1987 drinking during the workday 
and drunkenness on the job reportedly were common and even 
tolerated. 

In 1984 Czechoslovakia's per capita consumption of hard liquor 
(over 20 proof) was 8.2 liters, of beer 140.1 liters, and of wine 15.5 
liters. The total amounted to 163.8 liters per capita of alcoholic 
drinks, as compared with 101.2 liters per capita of nonalcoholic 
drinks, i.e., alcoholic drinks were consumed at a rate of 1.6 times 
that of nonalcoholic drinks. There were, however, differences in 
the drinking habits of Czechs and Slovaks. In 1983 the Czech 
Socialist Republic's per capita consumption of beer was 154. 1 liters, 
whereas the Slovak Socialist Republic's per capita consumption 
was 111.8 liters. (Czech beer is world famous; Pilsner beer, for 
example, is named after the city of Plzen.) The Slovak Socialist 
Republic, on the other hand, consumed hard liquor at a rate of 
12.2 liters per capita, while the Czech Socialist Republic came in 
at 6.3 liters. Wine consumption was slightly higher in Slovakia (17.0 
liters) than in the Czech lands (14.8 liters). On the whole, the popu- 
lation spent about 19 percent of its total expenditures for food 
products (about Kcsl9 billion annually) on alcohol. Some consumer 
goods might have been in short supply, but alcohol, especially beer, 
was plentiful and omnipresent. Czechoslovakia, along with France, 
West Germany, and East Germany, was among the world's highest 
consumers of alcoholic beverages, and consumption was increasing. 

In the Czech Socialist Republic, consumption of alcohol was 
linked to 47 percent of all violent crimes and 56 percent of all rape 
cases. In the Slovak Socialist Republic, the figures were about the 
same, alcohol figuring in about 50 percent of all crimes. 

In 1984 alcoholism was the third most frequent reason cited by 
women seeking divorce. ("Irreconcilable differences" was first, fol- 
lowed by "infidelity.") Over 18 percent of the women involved 



254 



National Security 



in divorces gave alcoholism as a reason, whereas only 1 percent 
of men secured divorces for this reason. In Slovakia 26 percent 
of women and 2 percent of men divorced because of alcoholism; 
in the Czech lands these figures were roughly 16 percent for women 
and 1 percent for men. 

Although in the 1 980s the press started attacking alcoholism more 
vociferously than it had in the past, little was actually done to fight 
the problem. Production of alcoholic beverages increased, and they 
were sold at affordable prices, while production of soft drinks was 
neglected and their quality was very poor. In October 1984, the 
government sharply raised the price of alcoholic beverages, but this 
measure was not intended to reduce alcohol consumption, inas- 
much as the price of nonalcoholic beverages was also raised sig- 
nificantly. Because the government had a monopoly on the sale 
of alcoholic beverages, it would have lost a great deal of money 
if the country had suddenly become "dry." (Spending on alcohol 
was also a means of absorbing excess savings because there was 
little in the way of quality consumer goods to spend them on.) 
Rather than trying to prohibit alcohol consumption, the govern- 
ment relied on education, especially of the young, but without much 
success. The government also established ineffective alcoholism 
boards, which citizens viewed as a token gesture. 

Drugs have also been a growing problem in recent years, espe- 
cially among young people, although abuse was not believed to 
be at Western levels. As of 1987 the printing of drug- abuse statis- 
tics was banned, so that much of what was known about the problem 
came from Western or nonofficial Czechoslovak sources. The coun- 
try had an estimated 500,000 drug addicts, although this figure 
consisted mostly of those addicted to various kinds of medicines. 
Drug users were a relatively young group; most were in their teens 
and twenties. According to Charter 77, about 50 percent of ad- 
dicts were males between fifteen and nineteen years of age. In the 
case of females, more adult women were addicted than teenage girls. 
Urine tests of prison inmates showed that about 50 percent used 
drugs. 

Most of the drugs came from pharmacies and were widely avail- 
able, often without a prescription. Such drugs included ampheta- 
mines and barbiturates; codeine was especially popular. Marijuana, 
heroin, cocaine, LSD, and other illegal drugs, although rare, were 
also available. They were often smuggled into the country, although 
sometimes they were produced in clandestine domestic laborato- 
ries by persons having a knowledge of chemistry. Drug dealers were 
usually taxi drivers, hotel employees, black marketers, money 
changers, and students. 



255 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

It was also a common practice to buy certain over-the-counter 
drugs and mix them. A 1961 law that remained in force in 1987 
covered only the production and distribution of illegal narcotics 
(heroin, cocaine, and marijuana) and made no provision for drugs 
produced from legal drugs. Pharmaceutical supplies and prescrip- 
tion drugs were sometimes illegally diverted to an enterprising per- 
son who would concoct new drugs and sell them on the black 
market. New legislation had been proposed, but no details were 
available in mid- 1987. 

Facilities for the treatment of drug addiction were inadequate. 
Although in 1983 about 8,400 addicts were officially registered in 
hospital psychiatric departments — 1 ,700 at the Prague Drug Abuse 
Center alone — only a few beds were set aside for addicts, and 
specialized care and supervision were rarely provided. There were 
three drug abuse centers in the country, one each in Prague, Brno, 
and Liberec, but they could not adequately cope with addicts. 

Charter 77 tried to bring the growing drug problem to the at- 
tention of the government, calling for more public awareness. The 
official attitude, however, was that drug abuse, characteristic of 
sick, decaying, bourgeois Western society, did not exist in socialist 
Czechoslovakia because there was no reason for it to exist. 

Penal Code 

Other than for the period of Nazi domination, Czechoslovakia 
operated under two different penal codes for the first thirty-two 
years of its existence. Bohemia and Moravia used the Austrian Penal 
Code, which had been in effect in those areas before independence, 
whereas Slovakia used the Hungarian Penal Code. Both codes had 
been amended during the years of independence, but no distinc- 
tively Czechoslovak code had been formulated until the KSC hastily 
improvised one after the coup. 

This 1950 Penal code was harsh and repressive, reflecting the 
siege mentality of the communist elite, who felt threatened by the 
people they ruled. Amendments in the mid-1950s eliminated some 
of the harshest aspects, and a new code was issued in 1961, with 
a revision in 1973. The 1961 code underwent no significant alter- 
ation during the Prague Spring in 1968. 

The Czechoslovak Constitution of 1960 guarantees basic politi- 
cal freedoms while negating them in Article 34, which states that 
citizens are "in all their actions to pay heed to the interests of the 
socialist state and the society of the working people." This article 
thus provides a way for laws to be written that infringe on rights 
guaranteed elsewhere in the Constitution. 



256 



Morning exercises for the inmates of a penitentiary near Prague 

Courtesy United Nations (J. Foxx) 

Still in effect in late 1987, the Czechoslovak Penal Code of 1961 
enroached upon such constitutionally guaranteed rights as freedom 
of speech, the press, and association. According to provisions of 
the code's "Sedition" section, people participating in mass demon- 
strations "against the Republic, its organs or public organizations 
of the working people" could be punished by sentences of up to 
15 years' imprisonment, and under certain circumstances — for ex- 
ample, proof of conspiracy, acts resulting in death, or acts com- 
mitted during a declared defense emergency — even death. Article 
98 dictated punishments for "subversive activity against the so- 
cial and governmental system of the Republic, against its territorial 
integrity, defensive capacity or independence, or against its inter- 
national interests." Article 100 specified prison sentences of up to 
five years for inciting two or more people against the subjects 
enumerated in Article 98 or "against the alliances or friendly re- 
lations between the Republic and other states." Articles 102 and 
104 allowed for prison sentences for those who "publicly defame" 
the state or its officials or those of any state "belonging to the world 
socialist system." Article 112 stipulated prison sentences of up to 
three years for persons harming the interests of Czechoslovakia 
abroad. 

Thus, the Penal Code provided that those who criticized the 
Czechoslovak government or its policies would be imprisoned. Sen- 
tences tended to be more severe for crimes against the state or state 
property than for crimes against the person or personal property. 
The death penalty, although infrequentiy carried out, was permitted 
for several crimes against the state and for a few heinous crimes 
against the person. 

The 1973 revisions to the code increased the maximum allow- 
able prison sentence from fifteen to twenty-five years for so-called 



257 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

antisocialist crimes. The death penalty was extended to cover hijack- 
ing or kidnapping crimes in which death resulted and to cover cases 
in which such crimes were committed during a state of emergency. 
Penalties were increased for fleeing the country and for disclosing 
state secrets abroad. Articles 106 and 107, concerning state secrets, 
were expanded to include so many areas of information about the 
government, the economy, the military, and other institutions that 
news coverage became almost meaningless. Published articles or 
public statements only mildly critical of the regime have led to ar- 
rests and conviction, and criticisms of the Soviet Union or of Soviet 
involvement in Czechoslovakia have resulted in prison sentences. 

Although the 1961 code was harsh, it was never adhered to 
strictly. The KSC often issued secret instructions to judges to en- 
sure that certain court rulings would be in accord with its wishes. 
The Dubcek reformers attempted to stop this practice during the 
period of the Prague Spring, but it was resumed during the subse- 
quent period of "normalization." 

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Penal Code with its amend- 
ments allowed the regime to protect itself against any further 
democratization attempts. When the Charter 77 movement 
emerged, the laws that the authorities could use to crush the in- 
cipient democratic force were in the code. Because the offenses for 
which people were being arrested, e.g. , signing Charter 77 or speak- 
ing publicly against repression, could be construed as crimes un- 
der the Penal Code, those arrested were charged as criminals when 
in fact they were political offenders. 

In 1984 the government introduced a form of punishment for 
political prisoners called "protective supervision," a kind of in- 
ternal exile and house arrest. In two such cases, Charter 77 signa- 
tories Ladislav Lis and Jan Litomisky were required to report daily 
to a local police station at a specific time, seven days a week. Vio- 
lations, including tardiness, could be punished by additional sen- 
tences. Those subject to such measures were also subject to house 
searches at any time. 

Criminal Procedure Code 

The 1961 Criminal Procedure Code states that a person will not 
be prosecuted for acts not established as crimes in law and will not 
be considered guilty until tried by competent authority. An accused 
may select his or her own attorney and, if in detention, may con- 
sult privately with counsel. During trial defendants may not be pro- 
hibited from making statements on all charges and on evidence 
brought against them; they may describe circumstances, exhibit 
evidence, and make motions in their defense. The code provides 



258 



National Security 



that the accused be informed of his rights at appropriate times dur- 
ing preliminary investigations, detention, and trial. Trials are con- 
ducted in the language of the defendant and in a manner suited 
to the person's educational background or ability to understand 
court proceedings. Only evidence submitted during the trial can 
be considered in determining the verdict and sentence. 

Police are restricted by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, but violations occur. In cases of search and seizure, for ex- 
ample, a warrant is required before police may enter a home. The 
only exceptions are emergency situations when an official cannot 
be found and when evidence may be lost or destroyed. Despite the 
provision, house searches have been conducted without warrants, 
and even though the practice declined during the 1970s and 1980s, 
people continued to complain that they did not feel secure in their 
own homes. Pretrial detention is another area where the code has 
been violated. Two months is the legal limit, but some cases have 
extended for six months and longer despite the law. For the pro- 
tection of arrested persons, the code provides that they may be held 
for no longer than forty-eight hours, at which time a government 
prosecutor must make a decision concerning release or holding for 
investigation. However, according to reports from many who had 
been arrested on political charges, the forty-eight-hour limitation 
was frequently circumvented. 

Another article of the Criminal Procedure Code that was vio- 
lated with seeming impunity dealt with the conduct of trials. 
Although the code states that trials must be open, in many cases 
involving political charges courtrooms have been packed with spec- 
tators selected by the authorities, and in most cases foreign cor- 
respondents have been barred. Amnesty International reported that 
in 1976 a courtroom in which four young musicians were tried was 
literally filled with people invited by officials, leaving only ten spaces 
for the families, friends, and supporters of the defendants. In that 
case, the prosecutor also made changes in the case file without 
notifying defense lawyers, and the judge refused the defense law- 
yers' request for a postponement that would enable them to study 
the changes. The defense was also refused permission to call wit- 
nesses who had given testimony in the pretrial investigation. In 
a similar fashion, during the so-called Jazz Section trial in early 
1987, the court did not allow the section's long-time counsel to par- 
ticipate or even to attend the trial. 

Penal System 

According to federal law, "The purpose of imprisonment is 
to prevent the convicted person from engaging in continued 



259 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

criminal activity and to educate him systematically toward becoming 
a law-abiding citizen. The execution of imprisonment must not 
humiliate human dignity." The laws regulating the operation of 
prisons appear just and humane and take into account up-to-date 
theories of penology. Prison authorities are directed to treat 
prisoners with compassion and respect for human dignity; educa- 
tion and rehabilitation, rather than punishment, are stressed. 
Prisoners are required to work, but the law states that work hours 
will be comparable to those in outside society. Remuneration will 
be fair, and prisoners may build up savings while incarcerated. 
Cultural and educational projects are to be provided for nonwork 
hours, and prison libraries are to be well stocked. From first-hand 
accounts of released prisoners, however, it appears that the actu- 
ality of prison life fell far short of the norms directed by law. 

As of 1987, prison conditions in Czechoslovakia were poor, es- 
pecially for political prisoners, who often were subjected to the 
"third category" of imprisonment, the so-called "harshest regime." 
Some former prisoners complained of beatings by authorities and 
confinement in substandard cells. Others told of beatings and ill- 
treatment by fellow prisoners that were ignored, or possibly en- 
couraged, by guards. Complaints about food were widespread, and 
dietary deficiencies led to ailments that required medical attention 
after release. Medical care in prisons was said to be deficient, and 
family visits were sometimes curtailed or prohibited. These short- 
comings were routinely reported during the 1970s and 1980s by 
Amnesty International, which concluded that prison conditions in 
Czechoslovakia fell below "internationally accepted standards." 

A January 1979 report in Vienna's Die Presse about prison con- 
ditions in Czechoslovakia referred to the "disastrous" conditions 
of that country's sixteen remand prisons, or those prisons used for 
pretrial detention. Cells were said to be tiny, facilities primitive, 
and medical care haphazard. Prisoners were charged a daily rate 
for their upkeep, which they were required to pay after release. 
Some prisoners reportedly owed as much as an average worker 
earned in five months. The more than twenty non-remand prisons 
were said to be in extremely poor condition, most having been built 
prior to World War II or even prior to World War I and never 
modernized. Discipline in the prisons was said to have become more 
severe after 1968. Punishments of prisoners included cutting the 
already small food ration or taking away the privilege of receiving 
a package once every three months. As had been reported frequentiy 
by released prisoners, political offenders were confined with com- 
mon criminals, and the educational programs called for by law 
rarely existed in practice. Prisoners were allowed one library book 



260 



National Security 



and one newspaper per week. It was reported that, more often than 
not, the library book was a collection of speeches by some party 
functionary. 

Physical abuse of political prisoners by prison personnel was also 
not unknown. In 1987 Die Presse reported that one prisoner serv- 
ing a one-year term for alleged "incitement to rebellion" was beaten 
so badly by the prison warden that he could neither stand nor walk 
without the help of police officers when making a court appear- 
ance; moreover, scars on his abdomen showed that prison officials 
and investigation officers had extinguished cigarettes on his body. 

Prisoners or former prisoners who complained publicly about 
mistreatment and poor prison conditions were severely punished. 
For reporting on harsh conditions at several prisons, Jin Wolf was 
accused of "divulging state secrets" in December 1983 and given 
a six-year sentence at the harshest regime. In June 1984, Jin 
Gruntorad received an additional fourteen-month sentence for com- 
plaining that he was beaten by a prison guard. 

Details on the total number of penal institutions (referred to as 
corrective educational facilities) were not routinely publicized. Well- 
known prisons are located at Prague-Pankrac, Bory-Plzen, and 
Litomefice in Bohemia; Mirov and Ostrava in Moravia, and 
Leopoldov in Slovakia. Facilities at Prague-Ruzyne and Brno- 
Bohunice served primarily as detention centers for people being 
held during pretrial investigation or those awaiting appeal hear- 
ings. The prison system, including the Corps of Corrective Edu- 
cation (prison guards), was administered by the governments of 
the Czech and Slovak socialist republics through their ministries 
of justice. 

Police Repression 

A manifesto made public under the title Charter 77 in January 
1977 challenged the government to live up to its own laws in regard 
to the rights — human, political, and social — of the Czechoslovak 
people (see Charter 77, ch. 4; Appendix D). The manifesto revealed 
that Dubcek- style reformism was alive and well eight years after 
Dubcek himself had been forced into obscurity. Signed during the 
next two years by several hundred citizens representing the entire 
spectrum of economic, political, and social life, the document 
claimed to be apolitical, but in an authoritarian state any demand 
for a lessening of authoritarianism is inherently political, and the 
government reacted accordingly. The police responded by sharply 
increasing the very activities of which the Charter complained, that 
is, unwarranted arrests, illegal searches, harsh interrogations, and 



261 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

general harassment. Charter spokesman Jan Patocka, a well-known 
and highly respected retired professor, died one week after an in- 
tensive interrogation by State Security agents. Another prominent 
signer, Vaclav Havel, who had been blacklisted as a playwright 
for earlier support of Dubcek, was arrested immediately, held for 
four months, and then released without being charged. Havel was 
rearrested in 1979 and sentenced to prison for antistate crimes. 

Repression continued into the 1980s as the dissidents refused 
to give up their demand that the basic laws of the land apply to 
everyone, including those officials sworn to uphold them. In April 
1978, a group calling itself the Committee for the Defense of the 
Unjustly Persecuted (Vybor naobranu nespravedlive stihanych — 
VONS) was formed to publicize the police vendetta against the 
signers of Charter 77. The new group itself then became a police 
target, and in October 1979 several of its members were convicted 
on charges of subversion and sentenced to prison terms. By early 
1987, the Charter 77 movement and its offspring, VONS, were 
still clinging tenaciously to their demand that legal processes be 
observed, a demand that had brought grief to the members but 
had also attracted world attention. The movement remained small, 
and the security agencies always had the upper hand, but the dis- 
sidents refused to capitulate. 

The use of brutal methods by the Czechoslovak police continued 
into the 1980s. In a 1984 report, Amnesty International cited 
Czechoslovakia as a country that used torture as a tool of state pol- 
icy. Yet continued concern in the West with human rights in 
Czechoslovakia may have helped to ameliorate the situation after 
that time. In a 1986 telephone interview with Austrian radio, a 
Charter 77 spokesman said that the political oppression of human 
rights activists had diminished somewhat and was not as severe 
as it had been in the early 1980s. The police also showed restraint 
at a December 1985 demonstration in downtown Prague com- 
memorating the death of John Lennon, a restraint that had been 
lacking at a similar demonstration the previous year. Neverthe- 
less, marked oppression of religious groups and believers continued 
unabated into the 1980s (see Religion, ch. 2). As one Western ob- 
server has suggested, this differentiated approach toward dissent 
indicates that the Czechoslovak government considered religious 
activists, who are supported by a large segment of the population, 
to be more of a threat than a small number of political dissidents. 

A number of excellent monographs concerning various aspects 
of Czechoslovak national security have been published in the 1980s. 



262 



National Security 



Party control of the military, the professionalism and nationalism 
of the officer corps, and Czechoslovak- Soviet military relations are 
discussed in East European Military Establishments by A. Ross Johnson, 
Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexie v. William J. Lewis's The 
Warsaw Pact presents useful information about the structure, train- 
ing, and equipment of both the CSLA and the internal security 
forces. A former wing commander in the Czechoslovak Air Force, 

v 

Zbynek Cefovsky, has written several excellent articles for Armed 
Forces based on his experience and insights. Much has been writ- 
ten by Condoleezza Rice concerning the reliability of the CSLA 
and the cohesion and loyalties of its military elite. Richard C. 
Martin has focused on force modernization and how it may affect 
the performance of the CSLA in a future war. Otto Ulc, a former 
Czechoslovak judge, has continued to write highly entertaining and 
informative monographs on various aspects of life in Czecho- 
slovakia, including dissent, crime, and public attitudes toward the 
emplacement of Soviet nuclear- tipped missiles in the country. And 
finally, The Military Balance, published annually by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, the Yearbook on International Communist 
Affairs, and the various Janes publications are convenient sources 
of information on personnel strength and weapons. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



263 



Appendix A 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Estimated Population of Principal Cities, January 1986 

3 Population by Size of Community, 1950 and 1980 

4 Ethnic Groups, Selected Years, 1930-84 

5 Population by Social Group, Selected Years, 1930-84 

6 Education Institutions and Enrollment, Selected School Years, 

1948-49 to 1985-86 

7 Labor Force by Sector, 1960 and 1985 

8 Production of Selected Industrial Commodities, 1985 

9 Imports and Exports by Commodity Category, 1985 
10 Direction of Foreign Trade, 1985 



265 



Appendix A 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



Table 2. Estimated Population of Principal Cities, January 1986 

City Population City Population 

Prague 1,193,513 Olomouc 106,086 

Bratislava 417,103 Liberec 100,917 

Brno 385,684 Hradec Kralove 99,571 

Ostrava 327,791 Ceske Budejovice 94,451 

Kosice 222,175 Pardubice 94,206 

Plzen 175,244 Havffov 91,873 

Source: Based on information from Statistickd rocenka CSSR, 1985, Prague, 1986, 91. 



267 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Table 3. Population by Size of Community, 1950 and 1980 
(as percentage of total population) 



Size of Community 


1950 


1980 


0-199 


4.5 


0.7 


onn a on 




r 1 

0.1 


500-999 


15.8 


10.0 


1,000-1,999 


14.3 


11.6 


2,000-4,999 


14.2 


13.2 


5,000-9,999 


7.4 


8.6 


10,000-19,999 


6.1 


10.8 


20,000-49,999 


6.7 


11.3 


50,000-999,999 


2.9 


10.8 


100,000 and over 


14.0 


17.9 



TOTAL 100.0 100.0 



Source: Based on information from Historickd statistickd rocenka CSSR, 1985, Prague, 1986, 62. 



Table 4. Ethnic Groups, Selected Years, 1930-84 
(as percentage of total population) 



Ethnic Group 


1930 


1950 


1970 


1980 


1984 


Czech 


, ; 53.0 


67.8 


65.0 


63.6 


63.4 




16.4 


26.4 


29.2 


30.7 


31.3 




4.3 


3.0 


4.0 


4.0 


3.8 


German 


23.6 


1.3 


0.6 


0.5 


0.4 


Polish 


0.7 


0.6 


0.5 


0.5 


0.5 




0.8 


0.6 


0.4 


0.4 


0.3 


Other and undetermined 


1.1 


0.3 


0.3 


0.3 


0.3 


TOTAL 


, , . , 100.0* 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 



* Figures do not add to 100 percent because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Historickd statistickd rocenka CSSR, 1985, Prague, 1986, 
62; and Statistickd rocenka CSSR, 1985, Prague, 1986, 95. 



268 



Appendix A 



Table 5. Population by Social Group, Selected Years, 1930-1984 
(as percentage of total population) 



Social Group 


1930 


1950 


1970 


1984 




57 3 


56.5 


60.1 


48.1 




6.8 


16.5 


27.4 


40.7 


Members of cooperatives 




0.1 


11.1 


8.8 


Other employees of cooperatives 






2.0 


0.9 


Small and medium-size farmers 


.... 22.1 


20.2 


1.2 


0.2 






3.1 1 


0.1 


0.1 


Small craftspeople and tradespeople .... 


8.2 


3.7 


0.1 


0.1 2 




5.5 








TOTAL 3 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 



--- means negligible. 

1 Data include remaining capitalists. 

2 1983. 

3 Figures do not add to 100 percent because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Historickd statistickd rocenka CSSR, 1985, Prague, 1986, 
62; and Statistickd rocenka CSSR, 1985, Prague, 1986, 95. 



Table 6. Education Institutions and Enrollment, Selected School Years, 
1948-49 to 1985-86 



Institution 


1948-49 


1960-61 


1970-71 


1985-86 


Preschool 












4,664 


6,633 


8,227 


11,477 


Students 


205,416 


285,863 


377,593 


681,515 


Primary 

Number 


14,286 


12,581 


10,831 


6,332 




1,523,290 


2,152,834 


1,966,448 


2,074,403 


Secondary 
Gymnasiums 


292 


440 


343 


343 


Students 


70,440 


73,778 


110,038 


134,392 


Vocational 












643 


725 


706 


562 


Students 


92,610 


238,201 


286,407 


261,422 


University 

Number 


22 


50 


37 


36 




64,703 


94,040 


131,099 


168,699 



Source: Based on information from Statistickd rocenka CSSR, 1986, Prague, 1987, 546, 549, 
566; and Historickd statistickd rocenka CSSR, 1985, Prague, 1986, 388, 390, 393. 



269 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Table 7. Labor Force by Sector, 1960 and 1985 
(in thousands) 



Sector 1960 1985 



Productive 

Agriculture 1,466,006 945,562 

Forestry 101,727 94,236 

Industry 2,253,061 2,845,283 

Construction 457,898 630,293 

Geology 8,863 17,909 

Design 42,374 78,113 

Freight transport 182,040 235,878 

Industrial communications 36,276 56,345 

Internal trade 393,607 682,596 

Foreign trade 16,464 25,806 

Technical equipment supply 32,122 68,823 

Agricultural produce purchasing 30,644 38,927 

Publishing and other productive activities 1 1,461 16,193 

Total productive 5,032,543 5,735,964 

Nonproductive 

Public transport 111,463 152,495 

Nonindustrial communications 36,276 56,345 

Science, research, and development 96,449 175,045 

Residential management 29,244 100,127 

Residential services 14,150 40,343 

Traffic services 2,080 6,511 

Communal services 77,567 140,988 

Education 215,765 435,322 

Culture 49,876 126,093 

Healthcare 156,138 326,404 

Social work 12,815 47,296 

Trade and technical services 13,887 54,361 

Finance 21,928 25,280 

Insurance 5,714 7,794 

Administration, judiciary, prosecution, 

and arbitration 97,719 118,061 

Social organizations 21,641 55,670 

Other 9,422 1,853 

Total nonproductive 972,134 1,869,988 



TOTAL 6,004,677 7,605,952 



Source: Based on information from Historickd statistickd rocenka CSSR, Prague, 1985, 146-47; 
and Statistickd rocenka CSSR, 1986, Prague, 1986, 184. 



270 



Appendix A 



Table 8. Production of Selected Industrial Commodities, 1985 



Commodity 


Unit 


Production 






26,223 




. . -do- 


100,387 


Electricity 


millions of kilowatt-hours 


80,622 


Pig iron 


. . . thousands of tons 


9,562 


Crude steel 


-do- 


15,036 




-do- 


11,037 




-do- 


10,265 


Lime 


-do- 


3,227 


Nitrogenous fertilizer 


. . . thousands of tons of nitrogen 


582 






1,100 


Chemical fibers 


-do- 


193 


Automobiles and supply vehicles 


. . . thousands 


184 




-do- 


177 




-do- 


731 


Trucks 


-do- 


48 






2,833 






1,460 


Metal-cutting machine tools 


. . . millions of korunas 


4,575 




-do- 


1,625 




-do- 


3,195 


Wheeled and crawler tractors 


-do- 


35 


Washing machines 


. . . thousands 


445 


Refrigerators and freezers 


-do- 


480 


Freezers 


-do- 


160 




-do- 


432 


Color televisions 


-do- 


193 






7,819 


Paper and cardboard 


. . . thousands of tons 


964 


Cotton fabric 


. . . millions of meters 


606 


* For value of the koruna — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Statistika, No. 3, Prague, 1986, 137. 



271 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Table 9. Imports and Exports by Commodity Category, 1985 
(in millions of United States dollars) 1 



Commodity Category Imports Exports 





6,156 


10,152 




7,229 


2,369 


Agricultural and forestry products 


2,165 


1,122 




1,020 


2,743 


Other 


1,324 


1,425 



TOTAL 17,894 17,810 2 



1 Imports and exports are free on board. The values of imports and exports by commodity category 
were calculated by applying East European data on percentage breakdowns to total imports expressed 
in United States dollars. 

2 Figures do not add to total because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, National 
Foreign Assessment Center, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1987, Washington, 1987, 
105-06. 



Table 10. Direction of Foreign Trade, 1985 
(in millions of United States dollars) 1 



Country 


Imports 


Exports 


Soviet Union 


8,256 


7,802 


Eastern Europe 


5,133 


4,757 


Developing countries 


2,711 


2,778 


Less developed countries 


711 


1,281 



TOTAL 2 17,894 17,810 



1 Domestic currency converted into United States dollars at the exchange rate prevailing at the time 
of the transactions. Exports and imports are free on board. Trade with the communist countries was 
derived by converting the value of the trade expressed in the currency of each East European country 
to rubles and then to United States dollars at the prevailing foreign exchange rate. 

2 Totals as published. 

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, National 
Foreign Assessment Center, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1987, Washington, 1987, 
103-04. 



272 



Appendix B 



The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 

THE FOUNDING of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(also referred to as Comecon, CMEA, CEMA, or the Council) 
dates from a 1949 communique agreed upon by the Soviet Union, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The 
precise reasons for Comecon's formation in the aftermath of World 
War II are quite complex, given the political and economic tur- 
moil of that time. However, Joseph Stalin's desire to enforce Soviet 
domination of the small states of Eastern Europe and to mollify 
some states that had expressed interest in the Marshall Plan (see 
Glossary) were the primary factors in Comecon's formation. The 
stated purpose of the organization was to enable member states 
"to exchange economic experiences, extend technical aid to one 
another, and to render mutual assistance with respect to raw materi- 
als, foodstuffs, machines, equipment, etc." 

Until the late 1960s, cooperation was the official term used to 
describe Comecon activities. In 1971, with the development and 
adoption of the Comprehensive Program for the Further Exten- 
sion and Improvement of Cooperation and the Further Develop- 
ment of Socialist Economic Integration by Comecon Member 
Countries, Comecon activities were officially termed integration. In 
simplest terms, economic integration is defined as internationaliz- 
ing the production of manufactured and semimanufactured goods, 
resources, and services. More specifically, integration attempts to 
equalize "differences in relative scarcities of goods and services 
between states through the deliberate elimination of barriers to trade 
and other forms of interaction." Although such equalization has 
not been a pivotal point in the formation and implementation of 
Comecon's economic policies, improved economic integration has 
always been Comecon's goal. 

Soviet domination of Comecon is a function of its economic, 
political, and military power. The Soviet Union possesses 90 per- 
cent of Comecon members' land and energy resources, 70 percent 
of their population, 65 percent of their national income, and 
industrial and military capacities second in the world only to those 
of the United States. The location of many Comecon committee 
headquarters in Moscow and the large number of Soviet nationals 
in positions of authority also testify to the power of the Soviet Union 
within the organization. 



273 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Soviet efforts to exercise political power over its Comecon part- 
ners, however, have been met with determined opposition. The 
"sovereign equality" of members, as described in the Comecon 
Charter, assures members that if they do not wish to participate 
in a Comecon project they may abstain. East European members 
have frequently invoked this principle in fear that economic inter- 
dependence would further reduce political sovereignty. Thus, 
neither Comecon nor the Soviet Union as a major force within 
Comecon has supranational authority. Although this fact ensures 
some degree of freedom from Soviet economic domination of the 
other members, it also deprives Comecon of necessary power to 
achieve maximum economic efficiency. 

As of 1987, those countries holding full membership in Come- 
con were the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Romania, 
Poland, Cuba, the Mongolian People's Republic (Mongolia), and 
Vietnam. (For the purposes of this appendix, the phrases "East 
bloc," the "six European members," or the "European members 
of Comecon" are used interchangeably to refer to Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. 
When Yugoslavia and Albania are referred to, they are mentioned 
specifically by name.) The primary documents governing the objec- 
tives, organization, and functions of Comecon are the Charter of 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (first adopted in 1959 
and subsequentiy amended; all references herein are to the amended 
1974 text); the Comprehensive Program for the Further Extension 
and Improvement of Cooperation and the Further Development 
of Socialist Economic Integration by the Comecon Member Coun- 
tries, adopted in 1971; and the Comprehensive Program for Scien- 
tific and Technical Progress up to the Year 2000, adopted in 
December 1985. The 1985 Comprehensive Program for Scientific 
and Technical Progress and the rise to power of Soviet general secre- 
tary Mikhail S. Gorbachev have increased Soviet influence in 
Comecon operations and have led to attempts to give Comecon 
some degree of supranational authority. The Comprehensive Pro- 
gram for Scientific and Technical Progress seeks to improve eco- 
nomic cooperation through the development of a more efficient and 
interconnected scientific and technical base. 

Membership, Structure, Nature, and Scope 
Membership 

In a January 1949 meeting in Moscow, representatives of Bul- 
garia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet 



274 



Appendix B 



Union reached the formal decision to establish the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance. The communique announcing the 
event cited the refusal of these countries to "subordinate them- 
selves to the dictates of the Marshall Plan" (see Glossary) and their 
intention to resist the trade boycott imposed by "the United States, 
Britain and certain other countries of Western Europe" as the major 
factors contributing to the decision "to organize a more broadly 
based economic cooperation among the countries of the people's 
democracy and the USSR." 

Albania joined the six original members in February 1949, and 
East Germany entered Comecon in 1950. (Albania, although it 
had not formally revoked its membership as of mid- 198 7, stopped 
participating in Comecon activities in 1961.) Mongolia acceded 
to membership in 1962, and in the 1970s Comecon expanded its 
membership to include Cuba (1972) and Vietnam (1978). As of 
1987 there were ten full members: the Soviet Union, six East 
European countries, and three extraregional members (see table 
A, this Appendix). 

Geography, therefore, no longer unites Comecon members. Wide 
variations in economic size and level of economic development have 
also tended to generate divergent interests among the member 
countries. All these factors have combined to give rise to signifi- 
cant differences in the member states' expectations about the 
benefits to be derived from membership in Comecon. 

Unity is provided instead by political and ideological factors. All 
Comecon members are "united by a commonality of fundamen- 
tal class interests and the ideology of Marxism- Leninism" and have 
common approaches to economic ownership (state versus private) 
and management (plan versus market). In 1949 the ruling com- 
munist parties of the founding states were also linked internation- 
ally through the Cominform (see Glossary), from which Yugoslavia 
had been expelled the previous year. Although the Cominform was 
disbanded in 1956, interparty links continue to be strong among 
Comecon members, and all participate in periodic international 
conferences of communist parties. Comecon provides a mechanism 
through which its leading member, the Soviet Union, has sought 
to foster economic links with and among its closest political and 
military allies. The East European members of Comecon are also 
militarily allied with the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact (see 
Appendix C). 

Official statements stress, however, that Comecon is an open 
international organization. Its Charter (Article II, Paragraph 2) 
invites membership from "other countries which share the aims 
and principles of the Council and have expressed their willingness 



275 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Table A. National Participation in the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon), November 1986 1 



Member Countries 



Bulgaria (1949) 
Czechoslovakia (1949) 
Hungary (1949) 
Poland (1949) 
Romania (1949) 
Soviet Union (1949) 



Albania (1949) 2 
East Germany (1950) 
Mongolia (1962) 
Cuba (1972) 
Vietnam (1978) 



Nonmember Countries 



That regularly sent observer That have concluded 

delegations to annual ses- formal agreements of 

sions in 1981-86: cooperation with 

Comecon: 



Afghanistan 
Angola 
Ethiopia 
Laos 

Mozambique 
Nicaragua 
South Yemen 
Yugoslavia 



Yugoslavia (1964) 
Finland (1973) 
Iraq (1975) 
Mexico (1975) 
Nicaragua (1983) 
Mozambique (1985) 



1 Dates of accession in parentheses. 

2 Albania joined Comecon in February 1949, one month after the organization was 
formed by the original six members. Although it has not formally revoked its mem- 
bership, Albania has not participated in Comecon activities since 1961. 



to assume the obligations contained in the . . . Charter." In the 
late 1950s, a number of other communist-ruled countries — China, 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Mon- 
golia, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia — were invited to participate as 
observers in Comecon sessions. Although Mongolia and Vietnam 
later gained full membership, China stopped attending Come- 
con sessions after 1961. Yugoslavia negotiated a form of associate 
status in the organization, specified in its 1964 agreement with 
Comecon. 



276 



Appendix B 



There are four kinds of relationships a country may have with 
Comecon: full membership, associate membership, nonsocialist 
"cooperant" status, and "observer country" status. Mutual agree- 
ment determines the precise nature of the relationship. As has been 
noted, Comecon has ten full members. Yugoslavia is the only coun- 
try considered to have associate member status. On the basis of 
the 1964 agreement, Yugoslavia participates in twenty-one of the 
thirty-two key Comecon institutions as if it were a full member. 
Finland, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Mozambique have a non- 
socialist cooperant status with Comecon. Because the governments 
of these countries are not empowered to conclude agreements in 
the name of private companies, the governments do not take part 
in Comecon operations. They are represented in Comecon by com- 
missions made up of members of the government and the business 
community. The commissions are empowered to sign various 
"framework" agreements with Comecon' s Joint Commission on 
Cooperation. Since 1957 Comecon has allowed certain countries 
with communist or pro-Soviet governments to attend sessions as 
observers. In November 1986, delegations from Afghanistan, Ethio- 
pia, Laos, Nicaragua, and the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (South Yemen) attended the 42d Council Session as 
observers. 

Structure 

Although not formally part of the organization's hierarchy, the 
Conference of First Secretaries of Communist and Workers' Par- 
ties and of the Heads of Government of the Comecon Member 
Countries is Comecon' s most important organ. These party and 
government leaders gather for conference meetings regularly to dis- 
cuss topics of mutual interest. Because of the rank of conference 
participants, decisions made here have considerable influence on 
the actions taken by Comecon and its organs. 

The official hierarchy of Comecon consists of the Session of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Executive Committee 
of the Council, the Secretariat of the Council, four council com- 
mittees, twenty-four standing commissions, six interstate confer- 
ences, two scientific institutes, and several associated organizations 
(see fig. A, this Appendix). These bodies will be examined in turn. 

The Session, officially the highest Comecon organ, examines fun- 
damental problems of socialist economic integration and directs 
the activities of the Secretariat and other subordinate organizations. 
Delegations from each Comecon member country attend these 
meetings. Prime ministers usually head the delegations, which meet 
during the second quarter of each year in a member country's 



277 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

capital (the location of the meeting is determined by a system of 
rotation based on the Cyrillic alphabet). All interested parties must 
consider recommendations handed down by the Session. A treaty 
or other kind of legal agreement implements adopted recommen- 
dations. Comecon itself may adopt decisions only on organizational 
and procedural matters pertaining to itself and its organs. 

Each country appoints one permanent representative to main- 
tain relations between members and Comecon between annual 
meetings. An extraordinary Session, such as the one in December 
1985, may be held with the consent of at least one-third of the mem- 
bers. Such meetings usually take place in Moscow. 

The highest executive organ in Comecon, the Executive Com- 
mittee, is entrusted with elaborating policy recommendations and 
supervising their implementation between sessions. In addition, 
it supervises work on plan coordination and scientific-technical 
cooperation. Composed of one representative from each member 
country, usually a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, 
the Executive Committee meets quarterly, usually in Moscow. In 
1971 and 1974, the Executive Committee acquired economic 
departments that rank above the standing commissions. These eco- 
nomic departments considerably strengthened the authority and 
importance of the Executive Committee. 

There are four council committees: Council Committee for 
Cooperation in Planning, Council Committee for Scientific and 
Technical Cooperation, Council Committee for Cooperation in 
Material and Technical Supply, and Council Committee for Coop- 
eration in Machine Building. Their mission is "to ensure the com- 
prehensive examination and a multilateral settlement of the major 
problems of cooperation among member countries in the economy, 
science, and technology." All committees are headquartered in 
Moscow and usually meet there. These committees advise the stand- 
ing commissions, the Secretariat, the interstate conferences, and 
the scientific institutes in their areas of specialization. Their juris- 
diction is generally wider than that of the standing commissions 
because they have the right to make policy recommendations to 
other Comecon organizations. 

The Council Committee for Cooperation in Planning is the most 
important of the four. It coordinates the national economic plans 
of Comecon members. As such, it ranks in importance only after 
the Session and the Executive Committee. Made up of the chair- 
men of Comecon members' national central planning offices, the 
Council Committee for Cooperation in Planning draws up draft 
agreements for joint projects, adopts a resolution approving these 
projects, and recommends approval to the concerned parties. If 



278 



Appendix B 



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279 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



its decisions were not subject to approval by national governments 
and parties, this committee would be considered Comecon's 
supranational planning body. 

The international Secretariat, Comecon's only permanent body, 
is Comecon's primary economic research and administrative organ. 
The secretary, who has been a Soviet official since Comecon's crea- 
tion, is the official Comecon representative to Comecon member 
states and to other states and international organizations. Subor- 
dinate to the secretary are his deputy and the various departments 
of the Secretariat, which generally correspond to the standing com- 
missions. The Secretariat's responsibilities include preparation and 
organization of Comecon sessions and other meetings conducted 
under the auspices of Comecon; compilation of digests on Comecon 
activities; conduct of economic and other research for Comecon 
members; and preparation of recommendations on various issues 
concerning Comecon operations. 

In 1956 eight standing commissions were set up to help Comecon 
make recommendations pertaining to specific economic sectors. The 
commissions have been rearranged and renamed a number of times 
since the establishment of the first eight. In 1986 there were twenty- 
four standing commissions (see fig. B, this Appendix). 

Each commission is headquartered in the capital of a member 
country and headed by one of that country's leading authorities 
in the field addressed by the commission. The Secretariat super- 
vises the actual operations of the commissions. The standing com- 
missions have authority only to make recommendations, which must 
then be approved by the Executive Committee, presented to the 
Session, and ratified by the interested member countries. Com- 
missions usually meet twice a year in Moscow. 

The six interstate conferences (on water management, internal 
trade, legal matters, inventions and patents, pricing, and labor 
affairs) serve as forums for discussing shared issues and experiences. 
They are purely consultative and generally act in an advisory 
capacity to the Executive Committee or its specialized committees. 

The scientific institutes on standardization and on economic 
problems of the world socialist system concern themselves with theo- 
retical problems of international cooperation. Both are headquar- 
tered in Moscow and are staffed by experts from various member 
countries. 

Several affiliated agencies, having a variety of relationships with 
Comecon, exist outside the official Comecon hierarchy. They serve 
to develop "direct links between appropriate bodies and organi- 
zations of Comecon member countries." These affiliated agencies 
are divided into two categories: intergovernmental economic 



280 



Comecon headquarters, 
Moscow 




organizations (which work on a higher level in the member coun- 
tries and generally deal with a wider range of managerial and coor- 
dinative activities) and international economic organizations (which 
work closer to the operational level of research, production, or 
trade). A few examples of the former are the International Bank 
for Economic Cooperation (manages the transferable ruble system), 
the International Investment Bank (in charge of financing joint 
projects), and Intermetal (encourages cooperation in ferrous metal- 
lurgy). International economic organizations generally take the form 
of either joint enterprises, international economic associations or 
unions, or international economic partnerships. The latter includes 
Interatominstrument (nuclear machinery producers), Intertekstil- 
mash (textile machinery producers), and Haldex (a Hungarian- 
Polish joint enterprise for reprocessing coal slag). 

Nature of Operation 

Comecon is an interstate organization through which members 
attempt to coordinate economic activities of mutual interest and 
to develop multilateral economic, scientific, and technical coopera- 
tion. The Charter states that "the sovereign equality of all mem- 
bers" is fundamental to the organization and procedures of 
Comecon. The Comprehensive Program further emphasizes that 
the processes of integration of members' economies are "completely 
voluntary and do not involve the creation of supranational bodies." 



281 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Hence under the provisions of the Charter, each country has the 
right to equal representation and one vote in all organs of Comecon, 
regardless of the country's economic size or the size of its contri- 
bution to Comecon's budget. 

The "interestedness" provisions of the Charter reinforce the prin- 
ciple of "sovereign equality." Comecon's recommendations and 
decisions can be adopted only upon agreement among the inter- 
ested members, and each has the right to declare its "interest" 
in any matter under consideration. Furthermore, in the words of 
the Charter, "recommendations and decisions shall not apply to 
countries that have declared that they have no interest in a particu- 
lar matter." 

Although Comecon recognizes the principle of unanimity, disin- 
terested parties do not have a veto but rather the right to abstain 
from participation. A declaration of disinterest cannot block a project 
unless the disinterested party's participation is vital. Otherwise, the 
Charter implies that the interested parties may proceed without the 
abstaining member, affirming that a country that has declared a 
lack of interest "may subsequently adhere to the recommendations 
and decisions adopted by the remaining members of the Council." 

The descriptive term Comecon applies to all multilateral activi- 
ties involving members of the organization and is not restricted 
to the direct functions of Comecon and its organs. This usage may 
be extended as well to bilateral relations among members, because 
in the system of socialist international economic relations, multi- 
lateral accords — typically of a general nature — tend to be imple- 
mented through a set of more detailed, bilateral agreements. 

Comecon Versus the European Economic Community 

Although Comecon is loosely referred to as the "European Eco- 
nomic Community (EEC) of Eastern Europe," important contrasts 
exist between the two organizations. Both organizations administer 
economic integration; however, their economic structure, size, 
balance, and influence differ. The EEC incorporates the 270 mil- 
lion people of Western Europe into economic association through 
intergovernmental agreements aimed at maximizing profits and 
economic efficiency on a national and international scale. It is a 
regionally, not ideologically, integrated organization, whose mem- 
bers have all attained an accomplished level of industrialization and 
are considered to be roughly equal trading partners. The EEC is 
a supranational body that can adopt decisions (such as removing 
tariffs) and enforce them. Activity by members is based on initia- 
tive and enterprise from below (on the individual or enterprise level) 
and is strongly influenced by market forces. 



282 



Appendix B 



Chemical Industry (East Berlin, 1956) 1 



Nonferrous Metallurgy 
(Budapest, 1956) 



Ferrous Metallurgy (Moscow, 1956) 



Machine Building (Prague, 1956) 



Coal Industry (Warsaw, 1956) 



Light Industry (Prague, 1958) 



Peaceful Utilization of Atomic 
Energy (Moscow, 1960) 



Currency and Finance (Moscow, 1962) 



Radio Technology and Electronics 
(Budapest, 1963) 



Geology (Ulan Bator, 1963) 



Civil Aviation (Moscow, 1975) 



New Materials and Technologies for 2 
Their Production and Development 



Oil and Gas Industry 
(Bucharest, 1956) 



Electrical Power (Moscow, 1956) 



Foreign Trade (Moscow, 1956) 



Agriculture (Sofia, 1956) 



Construction (East Berlin, 1958) 



Transportation (Warsaw, 1958) 



Standardization (East Berlin, 1962) 



Statistics (Moscow,1962) 



Food Industry (Sofia, 1963) 



Post and Communications 
(Moscow, 1971) 



Public Health (Moscow, 1975) 



Biotechnology 2 



Location of headquarters and date of formation in parentheses. 
2 These two commissions were formed sometime after 1980. They were probably formed as a part of the 
Comprehensive Program of Scientific and Technical Progress approved at the 41st Council Session in 
December 1 985. The location of their headquarters is unknown. 



Source: Based on information from O. A. Chukanov, ed., Nauchno-tekhnicheskoe sotrud- 
nichestvo stran SEV, Moscow, 1986, 10-11; andjozef M. van Brabant, Socialist 
Economic Integration, Cambridge, 1980, 189. 

Figure B. Comecon Standing Commissions, 1986 



Comecon joins together 450 million people in 10 countries and 
on 3 continents. The level of industrialization from country to coun- 
try differs greatly: the organization links three underdeveloped 



283 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

countries — Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam — with some highly 
industrialized states. Likewise, a large national income difference 
exists between European and non-European members. The physi- 
cal size, military power, and political and economic resource base 
of the Soviet Union make it the dominant member. In trade among 
Comecon members, the Soviet Union usually provides raw materi- 
als, and East European countries provide finished equipment and 
machinery. The three underdeveloped Comecon members have 
a special relationship with the other seven. Comecon realizes dis- 
proportionately more political than economic gains from its heavy 
contributions to these three countries' underdeveloped economies, 
(see Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam, this Appendix). 

Socialist economic integration, or "plan coordination," forms 
the basis of Comecon's activities. In this system, which mirrors 
the member countries' planned economies, the decisions handed 
down from above ignore the influences of market forces or private 
initiative. Comecon has no supranational authority to make deci- 
sions or to implement them. Its recommendations can only be 
adopted with the full concurrence of interested parties and do not 
affect those members who declare themselves disinterested parties. 

Evolution 
Early Years 

During Comecon's early years (through 1955), its sessions were 
convened on an ad hoc basis. The organization lacked clear struc- 
ture and operated without a charter until a decade after its found- 
ing. These loose arrangements reflected the limited goals of 
Comecon at the time and the character of the Marshall Plan (also 
governed by a loose structure), to which Comecon served as a 
response. 

From 1949 to 1953, Comecon's function consisted primarily of 
redirecting trade of member countries toward each other and 
introducing import-replacement industries, thus making members 
economically more self-sufficient. Little was done to solve economic 
problems through a regional policy. This was a period, moreover, 
when their first five-year plans, formulated along the Soviet model, 
preoccupied the East European members. In the headlong pursuit 
of parallel industrialization strategies, East European governments 
turned their attention inward. Because of Stalin's distrust of mul- 
tilateral bodies, bilateral ties with the Soviet Union quickly came 
to dominate the East European members' external relations. Each 
country dealt with the Soviets on a one-to-one basis by means of 
direct consultations with Moscow through local Soviet missions. 



284 



Appendix B 



Although reparations transfers (extracted by the Soviet Union in 
the immediate postwar years from those East European states it 
regarded as former World War II enemies) had been replaced by 
more normal trade relations, outstanding reparations obligations 
were not halted until 1956. In these circumstances, there was 
scarcely need or scope for multilateral policies or institutions. 

Rediscovery of Comecon after Stalin's Death 

After Stalin's death in 1953, however, new leaders and new 
approaches emerged in the countries of the region. The more 
industrialized and the more trade dependent of the East European 
countries (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland) had 
belatedly recognized the need to adapt the Soviet autarkic model 
to their own requirements. New approaches to foreign trade 
emerged during discussions of economic reform. Given their iso- 
lation from the rest of the world and the dominance of intrabloc 
trade in their external relations, interest in these countries inevitably 
centered on new forms of regional cooperation. For small, centrally 
planned economies, this meant the need to develop a mechanism 
through which to coordinate investment and trade policies. 

Instability in Eastern Europe and integration in Western Europe 
increased the desirability of regularizing intrabloc relations in a 
more elaborate institutional framework. The 1955 Warsaw Treaty 
on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (see Appen- 
dix C) and its implementing machinery reinforced political-military 
links. On the economic front, Comecon was rediscovered. The 
example of the 1957 Treaty of Rome (see Glossary), which initiated 
the processes of West European economic integration, gave impe- 
tus and direction to Comecon' s revival. 

Rapid Growth in Comecon Activity, 1956-63 

The years 1956 to 1963 witnessed the rapid growth of Comecon 
institutions and activities, especially after the 1959 Charter went 
into effect. Comecon, for example, launched a program to unify 
the electrical power systems of its member states and in 1962 created 
the Central Dispatching Board to manage the unified system. The 
organization took similar steps to coordinate railroad and river 
transport. In 1963 a special bank, the International Bank for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation, was created to facilitate financial settlements 
among members. In this period, Comecon also undertook a num- 
ber of bilateral and multilateral investment projects. The most nota- 
ble project led to the coordinated construction of the Friendship 
(Druzhba) oil pipeline for the transport and distribution of crude 
oil from the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe. The Joint Institute 



285 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

for Nuclear Research, established in 1956, initiated cooperation 
in another area of long-term importance. 

Parallel to these developments, the Soviet Union led efforts to 
coordinate the investment strategies of the members in the interest 
of a more rational pattern of regional specialization, increased 
productivity, and a more rapid overtaking of the capitalist econo- 
mies. These efforts culminated in 1962 with the adoption at the 
15th Council Session of the Basic Principles of the International 
Socialist Division of Labor. Although the principles of specializa- 
tion were generally favored by the more industrial, northern- tier 
states, the less developed East European countries were concerned 
that such specialization would lead to a concentration of industry 
in the already established centers and would thus thwart their own 
ambitious industrialization plans. Moreover the increased economic 
interdependence that the Basic Principles called for had inevitable 
political connotations. The latter were reinforced in 1962 by arti- 
cles and speeches by Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev propos- 
ing a central Comecon planning organ to implement the Basic 
Principles and foreseeing the evolution of a "socialist common- 
wealth" based on a unified regional economy. 

These proposals provoked strong and open reaction from 
Romania on the grounds of "sovereign equality" of members, as 
articulated most forcefully in the April 1964 Declaration of the 
Romanian Central Committee. Romania's opposition (combined 
with the more passive resistance of some other members) succeeded 
in forestalling supranational planning and reinforcing the interested- 
party provisions of the Charter. The institutional compromise was 
the creation of the Bureau for Integrated Planning, which was 
attached to the Executive Committee and limited to an advisory 
role on coordination of members' development plans. The Basic 
Principles, having lost their momentum, were superseded several 
years later by the Comprehensive Program. 

A Lull and Subsequent Revitalization in the Late 1960s 

After the fall of Khrushchev in 1964, the new Soviet leadership 
was preoccupied with internal matters, and the East European coun- 
tries were themselves busy with programs of economic reform. A 
comparative lull in Comecon activities ensued, which lasted until 
well after the 1968 Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia. By 
the end of the 1960s, Eastern Europe had been shaken by the 1968 
events, and there was an obvious need to revitalize programs that 
would strengthen regional cohesion. 

In the late 1960s, the question of how to proceed with plans for 
economic integration received considerable discussion in specialized 



286 



Appendix B 



journals and at international meetings of experts. Disillusioned by 
traditional instruments and concerned with the need to decentral- 
ize planning and management in their domestic economies, the 
reformers argued for the strengthening of market relations among 
Comecon states. The conservatives continued to stress the impor- 
tance of planned approaches. If carried to a logical extreme, the 
latter would involve supranational planning of major aspects of 
members' economies and the inevitable loss of national autonomy 
over domestic investment policy. The old conflict between planned 
approaches to regional specialization and the principle of sover- 
eign equality could not be avoided in any discussion of the mechan- 
ism for future cooperation. 

The Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration, 
1971 

The controversy over supranational planning led to a compromise 
in the form of the 1971 Comprehensive Program for the Further 
Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and the Further 
Development of Socialist Economic Integration, which laid the 
guidelines for Comecon activity through 1990. The Comprehen- 
sive Program incorporated elements of both the market and the 
plan approaches. Following the market approach, the Comprehen- 
sive Program sought to strengthen the role of money, prices, and 
exchange rates in intra-Comecon relations and to encourage direct 
contacts among lower level economic entities in the member coun- 
tries. At the same time, the Comprehensive Program called for more 
joint planning on a sectoral basis through interstate bodies that 
would coordinate members' activities in a given sector. New organs 
were also envisaged in the form of international associations that 
would engage in actual operations in a designated sector on behalf 
of the participating countries. Finally, the Comprehensive Program 
emphasized the need for multilateral projects to develop new 
regional sources of fuels, energy, and raw materials. Such projects 
were to be jointly planned, financed, and executed. 

The Comprehensive Program introduced a new concept in 
relations among members: "socialist economic integration." Sec- 
tion I, Paragraph 2 of the Comprehensive Program refers to the 
need "to intensify and improve" cooperation among members and 
"to develop socialist economic integration." This phrasing, which 
has since become standard, implies that the latter is a new and 
higher level of interaction, "a process of the international socialist 
division of labor, the drawing closer of [member states'] econo- 
mies and the formation of modern, highly effective national eco- 
nomic structures." The Comprehensive Program avoids, however, 



287 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

the suggestion of ultimate fusion of members' economies that had 
been contained in the 1962 Basic Principles. It sets limits to the 
integrative process in the following terms: "Socialist economic 
integration is completely voluntary and does not involve the crea- 
tion of supranational bodies." 

The term integration had formerly been used to designate the 
activities of Western regional organizations such as the EEC . Its 
new usage in the Comprehensive Program suggested parity of sta- 
tus between Comecon and the EEC. Under subsequent amend- 
ments to its Charter, the competence of Comecon to deal with other 
international organizations and third countries on behalf of its mem- 
bers was made clear. Comecon sought to attract the participation 
of developing countries in its activities. The language of the Com- 
prehensive Program may thus also be regarded as an attempt to 
revitalize the image of Comecon in order to make association with 
it an attractive alternative to associated status with the EEC. 

Comecon members adopted the Comprehensive Program at a 
time when they were actively developing economic relations with 
the rest of the world, especially with the industrialized Western 
economies. The Comprehensive Program viewed the two sets of 
policies as complementary and affirmed that "because the inter- 
national socialist division of labor is effected with due account taken 
of the world division of labor, the Comecon member countries shall 
continue to develop economic, scientific, and technological ties with 
other countries, irrespective of their social and political system." 

In the years following the adoption of the Comprehensive Pro- 
gram, Comecon made some progress toward strengthening mar- 
ket relations among members. The Comprehensive Program's 
objectives proved somewhat inconsistent with the predominant 
trends within members' economies in the 1970s, which was a period 
of recentralization — rather than decentralization — of domestic sys- 
tems of planning and management. The major exception to this 
lack of progress lay in the area of intra-Comecon pricing and pay- 
ment, where the expansion of relations with the West contributed 
to the adoption of prices and extra-plan settlements closer to inter- 
national norms. Achievements under the Comprehensive Program 
have fallen under the heading of planned approaches, especially 
in the area of joint resource development projects. A second 
Comecon bank, the International Investment Bank, was established 
in 1970 to provide a mechanism for the joint financing of such 
projects. In 1973 Comecon decided to draw up a general plan 
incorporating these measures. A number of projects formulated 
in the years immediately following adoption of the Comprehen- 
sive Program were then assembled in a document signed at the 



288 



Appendix B 



29th Council Session in 1975. Entitled the "Concerted Plan for 
Multilateral Integration Measures," the document covered the 
1976-80 five-year-plan period and was proclaimed as the first 
general plan for the Comecon economies. The joint projects 
included in the plan were largely completed in the course of the 
plan period. 

A second major initiative toward implementation of the Com- 
prehensive Program came in 1976 at the 30th Council Session, when 
a decision was made to draw up Long-Term Target Programs for 
Cooperation in major economic sectors and subsectors. The ses- 
sion designated a number of objectives to which target programs 
would be directed: "guarantee of the economically based require- 
ments of Comecon member countries for basic kinds of energy, 
fuels, and raw materials; the development of the machine-building 
industries on the basis of intense specialization and cooperation 
in production; the fulfillment of national demands for basic food- 
stuffs and industrial consumer goods; and modernization and 
development of transport links among member countries." The 
32d Council Session, held in 1978, approved target programs for 
cooperation through 1990 in the first two areas, as well as in agricul- 
ture and the food industries. These programs established the com- 
mitments to multilateral cooperation that member countries were 
to take into account when drawing up their five-year plans for the 
1980s. 

By the end of the 1970s, with the exception of Poland's agricul- 
tural sector, the economic sectors of all Comecon countries had 
converted to the socialist system. Member states had restructured 
their economies to emphasize industry, transportation, communi- 
cations, and material and technical supply, and they had decreased 
the share of resources devoted to agricultural development. Within 
industry, member states devoted additional funds to machine build- 
ing and production of chemicals. Socialist economic integration 
resulted in the production of goods capable of competing on the 
world market. 

The 1980s 

Most Comecon countries ended their 1981-85 five-year plans 
with decreased extensive economic development (see Glossary), 
increased expenses for fuel and raw materials, and decreased 
dependency on the West for both credit and hard currency imports. 
In the early 1980s, external economic relations had greater impact 
on the Comecon countries than ever before. When extending credit 
to East European countries, Western creditors did so assuming that 
the Soviet Union would offer financial assistance in the event that 



289 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

payment difficulties arose. This principle, which has always been 
rejected in the East bloc, proved inoperable in the aftermath of 
the Polish crisis of 1979-82. The sharp rise in interest rates in the 
West put the Polish debt at an excessively high level, beyond the 
amount that the Soviet Union could cover. The resulting liquidity 
shortage (see Glossary) that occurred in all Comecon countries in 
1981 forced them to reduce hard-currency imports. 

In the 1980s, high interest rates and the increased value of the 
United States dollar on international markets made debt servicing 
more expensive. Thus, reducing indebtedness to the West also 
became a top priority within Comecon. From 1981 to 1985, the 
European countries of Comecon attempted to promote the faster 
growth of exports over imports and sought to strengthen intra- 
regional trade, build up an increased trade surplus, and decrease 
indebtedness to Western countries. 

In the 1980s, Comecon sessions were held on their regular annual 
schedule. The two most notable meetings were the special sessions 
called in June 1984 and December 1985. The first summit-level 
meeting of Comecon member states in fifteen years was held with 
much fanfare on June 12-14, 1984, in Moscow (the 23d "Special" 
Session of Comecon Member Countries). The meeting was held 
to discuss coordination of economic strategy and long-term goals 
in view of the "differing perspectives and contrary interests" that 
had developed among Comecon members since 1969. More spe- 
cifically, the two fundamental objectives of the meeting were to 
strengthen unity among members and establish a closer connec- 
tion between the production base, scientific and technological 
progress, and capital construction. However, despite the introduc- 
tion of proposals for improving efficiency and cooperation in six 
key areas, Western and some Eastern analysts claimed that the 
meeting was anticlimactic and even a failure. 

The ideas and results of the June 14 session were elaborated at 
the Extraordinary 41st Council Session, which was held on Decem- 
ber 17-18, 1985, in Moscow. The meeting was heralded in the 
Comecon community as "one of the more memorable events in 
Comecon history." This special session featured the culmination 
of several years of work on the new Comprehensive Program for 
Scientific and Technical Progress up to the Year 2000. It aimed 
to create "a firm base for working out an agreed, and in some areas, 
unified scientific and technical policy and the practical implemen- 
tation, in the common interest, of higher achievements in science 
and technology." 

The Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical 
Progress up to the Year 2000 was originally to be ratified in 1986 



290 



Appendix B 



but the Soviets advocated an earlier date of completion to enable 
the Comecon countries to incorporate their commitments to 
implement the program in their next five-year plans (which started 
in January 1986). The program laid out sizable tasks in five key 
areas: electronics, automation systems, nuclear energy, develop- 
ment of new materials, and biotechnology. It sought to restruc- 
ture and modernize the member states' economies to counteract 
constraints on labor and material supplies. The need to move to 
intensive production techniques within Comecon was evident from 
the fact that from 1961 to 1984 the overall material intensiveness 
of production did not improve substantially. The 1985 program 
provided a general framework for Comecon 's new direction of 
development. Details were to be settled in bilateral agreements. 

Cooperation under the 1971 Comprehensive Program 

The distinction between "market" relations and "planned" 
relations made in the discussions within Comecon prior to the adop- 
tion of the 1971 Comprehensive Program remains a useful approach 
to understanding Comecon activities. Comecon remains in fact a 
mixed system, combining elements of both plan and market econo- 
mies. Although official rhetoric emphasizes regional planning, it 
must be remembered that intra-Comecon relations continue to be 
conducted among national entities not governed by any suprana- 
tional authority. They thus interact on a decentralized basis 
according to terms negotiated in bilateral and multilateral agree- 
ments on trade and cooperation. 

Market Relations and Instruments 

It is not surprising, given the size of the Soviet economy, that 
intra-Comecon trade has been dominated by exchanges between 
the Soviet Union and the other members. Exchanges of Soviet fuels 
and raw materials for capital goods and consumer manufactures 
have characterized trade, particularly among the original mem- 
bers. The liquidity shortage in the early 1980s forced the European 
Comecon countries to work to strengthen the importance of 
intraregional trade. In the early 1980s, intraregional trade rose to 
60 percent of foreign trade of Comecon countries as a whole; for 
individual members it ranged from 45 to 50 percent in the case 
of Hungary, Romania, and the Soviet Union, to 83 percent for 
Cuba and 96 percent for Mongolia. 

Trade among the members is negotiated on an annual basis and 
in considerable detail at the governmental level and is then followed 
up by interenterprise contracts. Early Comecon efforts to facili- 
tate trade among members concentrated on development of uniform 



291 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

technical, legal, and statistical standards and on encouragement 
of long-term trade agreements. The 1971 Comprehensive Program 
sought to liberalize the system somewhat by recommending broad 
limits to "fixed-quota" trade among members (trade subject to 
quantitative or value targets set by bilateral trade agreements). Sec- 
tion VI, Paragraph 19 of the Comprehensive Program affirms that 
"mutual trade in commodities for which no quotas are established 
shall be carried on beginning in 1971 with a view to stimulating 
the development of trade turnover, through expansion of the range 
and assortment of traded commodities, and to making trade in these 
commodities more brisk." Later in the same paragraph the Com- 
prehensive Program calls on members to "seek opportunities to 
develop the export and import of quota-free commodities and to 
create conditions essential for trade in such commodities." There 
is no evidence, however, that this appeal has had significant effect 
or that quota-free trade has grown in importance under the 
program. 

Prices 

The 1971 Comprehensive Program also called for improvement 
in the Comecon system of foreign trade prices. Administratively 
set prices, such as those used in intra-Comecon trade, do not reflect 
costs or relative scarcities of inputs and outputs. For this reason, 
intra-Comecon trade has been based on world market prices. By 
1971 a price system governing exchanges among members had 
developed, under which prices agreed on through negotiation were 
fixed for five-year periods (corresponding to those of the syn- 
chronized, five-year plans of the members). These contract prices 
were based on adjusted world market prices averaged over the 
immediately preceding five years; that is, a world-price base was 
used as the starting point for negotiation. Under this system, there- 
fore, intra-Comecon prices could and did depart substantially from 
relative prices on world markets. 

Although the possibility of breaking this tenuous link with world 
prices and developing an indigenous system of prices for the 
Comecon market had been discussed in the 1960s, the evolution 
of Comecon prices after 1971 went in the opposite direction. Far 
from a technical or academic matter, the question of prices under- 
lay vital issues of the terms of, and hence gains from, intra-Comecon 
trade. In particular, relative to actual world prices, intra-Comecon 
prices in the early 1970s penalized raw materials exporters and 
benefited exporters of manufactures. After the oil price explosion 
of 1973, Comecon foreign trade prices swung still further away from 
world prices to the disadvantage of Comecon suppliers of raw 



292 



Appendix B 



materials, in particular the Soviet Union. In view of the extra- 
regional opportunities opened up by the expansion of East-West 
trade, this yawning gap between Comecon and world prices could 
no longer be ignored. Hence in 1975, at Soviet instigation, the sys- 
tem of intra-Comecon pricing was reformed. 

The reform involved a substantial modification of existing proce- 
dures (known as the "Bucharest formula," from the location of 
the 9th Council Session in 1958 at which it was adopted), but not 
their abandonment. Under the modified Bucharest formula (which 
remained in effect as of 1987), prices were fixed every year and 
were based on a moving average of world prices for the preceding 
five years. The world-price base of the Bucharest formula was thus 
retained and still represented an average (although now moving) 
of adjusted world prices for the preceding five years. For 1975 alone, 
however, the average was for the preceding three years. Under these 
arrangements, intra-Comecon prices were more closely linked with 
world prices than before and throughout the remainder of the 1970s 
rose with world prices, although with a lag. Until the early 1980s, 
this new system benefited both the Soviet Union and the other 
Comecon countries since Soviet oil, priced with the lagged formula, 
was considerably cheaper than Organization of Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries (OPEC) oil, the price of which increased drastically 
in the 1970s. By 1983-84 this system turned to the Soviet Union's 
advantage because world market oil prices began to fall, whereas 
the lagged Soviet oil prices continued to rise. 

Exchange Rates and Currencies 

Basic features of the state trading systems of the Comecon coun- 
tries are multiple exchange rates and comprehensive exchange con- 
trols that severely restrict the convertibility of members' currencies. 
These features are rooted in the planned character of the mem- 
bers' economies and their systems of administered prices. Currency 
inconvertibility in turn dictates bilateral balancing of accounts, 
which has been one of the basic objectives of intergovernmental 
trade agreements among members. An earlier system of bilateral 
clearing accounts was replaced on January 1, 1964, by accounts 
with the International Bank for Economic Cooperation, using the 
transferable ruble as the unit of account. Although the bank pro- 
vided a centralized mechanism of trade accounting and swing credits 
to cover temporary imbalances, it could not establish a system of 
multilateral clearing given the centrally planned nature of the mem- 
bers' economies and the inconvertibility of their currencies. In 1987 
the transferable ruble remained an artificial currency functioning 
as an accounting unit and was not a common instrument for 



293 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

multilateral settlement. For this reason, this currency continued 
to be termed "transferable" and not "convertible." 

The member countries recognize that the multiplicity and incon- 
sistency of their administered exchange rates, the separation of their 
domestic prices from foreign prices, and the inconvertibility of their 
currencies are significant obstacles to multilateral trade and coopera- 
tion. As of early 1987, Comecon lacked not only a flexible means 
of payment but also a meaningful, standard unit of account. Both 
problems have vastly complicated the already complex multilateral 
projects and programs envisaged by the Comprehensive Program. 
The creation in 1971 of the International Investment Bank provided 
a mechanism for joint investment financing, but, like the Inter- 
national Bank for Economic Cooperation, this institution could not 
by itself resolve these fundamental monetary problems. 

Recognizing that money and credit should play a more active 
role in the Comecon system, the Comprehensive Program estab- 
lished a timetable for the improvement of monetary relations. 
According to the timetable, measures would be taken "to strengthen 
and extend" the functions of the "collective currency" (the trans- 
ferable ruble), and the conditions would be studied and prepared 
"to make the transferable ruble convertible into national curren- 
cies and to make national currencies mutually convertible." To 
this end, steps would be taken to introduce "economically well- 
founded and mutually coordinated" rates of exchange between 
members' currencies and "between 1976 and 1979" to prepare 
the groundwork for the introduction by 1980 of a "single rate of 
exchange for the national currency of every country." This time- 
table was not met. Only in Hungary were the conditions for con- 
vertibility gradually being introduced by reforms intended to link 
domestic prices more directly to world prices. 

Cooperation in Planning 

If countries are to gain from trade, that trade must be based on 
rational production structures reflecting resource scarcities. Since 
the early 1960s, official Comecon documents have stressed the need 
to promote among members' economies a more cost-effective pat- 
tern of specialization in production. This "international socialist 
division of labor" would, especially in the manufacturing sector, 
involve specialization within major branches of industry. In the 
absence of significant, decentralized allocation of resources within 
these economies, however, production specialization can be brought 
about only through the mechanism of the national plan and the 
investment decisions incorporated in it. In the absence at the 
regional level of supranational planning bodies, a rational pattern 



294 



Appendix B 



of production specialization among members' economies requires 
coordination of national economic plans, a process that is not merely 
technical but also poses inescapable political problems. 

The coordination of national five-year economic plans is the most 
traditional form of cooperation among the members in the area 
of planning. Although the process of consultation underlying plan 
coordination remains essentially bilateral, Comecon organs are 
indirectly involved. The standing commissions draw up proposals 
for consideration by competent, national planning bodies; the 
Secretariat assembles information on the results of bilateral con- 
sultations; and the Council Committee for Cooperation in Plan- 
ning (created by Comecon in 1971 at the same session at which 
the Comprehensive Program was adopted) reviews the progress 
of plan coordination by members. 

In principle, plan coordination covers all economic sectors. 
Effective and comprehensive plan coordination has, however, been 
significantly impeded by the continued momentum of earlier parallel 
development strategies and the desire of members to minimize the 
risks of mutual dependence (especially given the uncertainties of 
supply that are characteristic of the members' economies). Plan 
coordination in practice, therefore, remains for the most part limited 
to mutual adjustment, through bilateral consultation, of the for- 
eign trade sectors of national five-year plans. Under the Compre- 
hensive Program, there have been renewed efforts to extend plan 
coordination beyond foreign trade to the spheres of production, 
investment, science, and technology. 

Plan Coordination 

According to the 1971 Comprehensive Program, joint planning — 
multilateral or bilateral — is to be limited to "interested countries" 
and is "not to interfere with the autonomy of internal planning." 
Participating countries will, moreover, retain national ownership 
of the productive capacities and resources jointly planned. But 
"joint plans worked out by the member countries will be taken 
into account by them when drafting their long-term or five-year 
plans." 

The Comprehensive Program does not clearly assign responsi- 
bility for joint planning to any single agency. On the one hand, 
"coordination of work concerned with joint planning shall be car- 
ried out by the central planning bodies of Comecon member coun- 
tries or their authorized representatives." On the other hand, 
"decisions on joint, multilateral planning of chosen branches and 
lines of production by interested countries shall be based on 
proposals by countries or Comecon agencies and shall be made by 



295 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

the Comecon Executive Committee, which also determines the 
Comecon agencies responsible for the organization of such work." 
Finally, mutual commitments resulting from joint planning and 
other aspects of cooperation shall be incorporated in agreements 
signed by the interested parties. 

It is extremely difficult to gauge the implementation of plan coor- 
dination or joint planning under the Comprehensive Program or 
to assess the. activities of the diverse international economic organi- 
zations. There is no single, adequate measure of such cooperation. 
The only data on activities among the Comecon countries pub- 
lished by the annual Comecon yearbooks refer to merchandise trade, 
and these trade figures cannot be readily associated with coopera- 
tive measures taken under the Comprehensive Program. Occasional 
official figures are published, however, on the aggregate number 
of industrial specialization and co-production agreements signed 
by members. 

Joint Projects 

The clearest area of achievement under the Comprehensive Pro- 
gram has been the joint exploitation and development of natural 
resources for the economies of the member countries. Joint projects 
ease the investment burden on a single country when expansion 
of its production capacity is required to satisfy the needs of other 
members. Particular attention has been given to energy and fuels, 
forest industries, iron and steel, and various other metals and miner- 
als. Most of this activity has been carried out in the Soviet Union, 
the great storehouse of natural resources within Comecon. 

Joint development projects are usually organized on a "com- 
pensation" basis, a form of investment "in kind." Participating 
members advance materials, equipment, and, more recently, man- 
power and are repaid through scheduled deliveries of the output 
resulting from, or distributed through, the new facility. Repay- 
ment includes a modest "fraternal" rate of interest, but the real 
financial return to the participating countries depends on the value 
of the output at the time of delivery. Deliveries at contract prices 
below world prices will provide an important extra return. No doubt 
the most important advantage from participation in joint projects, 
however, is the guarantee of long-term access to basic fuels and 
raw materials in a world of increasing uncertainty of supply of such 
products. 

The Concerted Plan 

The multilateral development projects concluded under the Com- 
prehensive Program formed the backbone of Comecon 's Concerted 



296 



Appendix B 



Plan for the 1976-80 period. The program allotted 9 billion rubles 
(nearly US$12 billion at the official 1975 exchange rate of US$1 .30 
per ruble) for joint investments. The Orenburg project was the larg- 
est project under the Comprehensive Program. It was undertaken 
by all East European Comecon countries and the Soviet Union at 
an estimated cost ranging from the equivalent of US$5 billion to 
US$6 billion, or about half of the cost of all Comecon projects under 
the Concerted Plan. It consists of a natural gas complex at Oren- 
burg in western Siberia and the 2,677-kilometer Union (Soiuz) 
natural-gas pipeline, completed in 1978, which links the complex 
to the western border of the Soviet Union. Construction of a pulp 
mill in Ust' Ilim (in central Siberia) was the other major project 
under this program. 

These two projects differed from other joint Comecon invest- 
ments projects in that they were jointly planned and jointly built 
in the host country (the Soviet Union in both cases). Although the 
other projects were jointly planned, each country was responsible 
only for construction within its own borders. Western technology, 
equipment, and financing played a considerable role. The Soviet 
Union owns the Orenburg complex and the Ust' Ilim installation 
and is repaying its East European co-investors at a 2 percent interest 
rate with an agreed-upon amount of natural gas and wood pulp. 

The early 1980s were characterized by more bilateral investment 
specialization but on a much smaller scale than required for the 
Orenburg and Ust' Ilim projects. In these latter projects, Eastern 
Europe provided machinery and equipment for Soviet multilateral 
resource development. Work also progressed on the previously men- 
tioned Long-Term Target Programs for Cooperation (see The 
Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration, 1971 , 
this Appendix). 

Cooperation in Science and Technology 

To supplement national efforts to upgrade indigenous technol- 
ogy, the 1971 Comprehensive Program emphasizes cooperation in 
science and technology. The development of new technology is 
envisaged as a major object of cooperation; collaboration in resource 
development and specialization in production are to be facilitated 
by transfers of technology between members. The 1971 Comecon 
session, which adopted the Comprehensive Program, decided to 
establish the Special Council Committee for Scientific and Tech- 
nical Cooperation to ensure the organization and fulfillment of the 
provisions of the program in this area. Jointly planned and coor- 
dinated research programs have extended to the creation of joint 
research institutes and centers. In terms of number of patents, 



297 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

documents, and other scientific and technical information 
exchanges, the available data indicate that the Soviet Union has 
been the dominant source of technology within Comecon. It has, 
on the whole, provided more technology to its East European part- 
ners than it has received from them, although the balance varies 
considerably from country to country depending upon relative levels 
of industrial development. Soviet science also forms the base for 
several high-technology programs for regional specialization and 
cooperation, such as nuclear power and computers. 

The Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical 
Progress up to the Year 2000, adopted in December 1985, has 
boosted cooperation in science and technology. The program sets 
forth 93 projects and 800 subprojects within 5 broad areas of 
development (see Early Years, this Appendix). A Soviet ministry 
will supervise each of the areas and will be responsible for the tech- 
nical level and quality of output, compliance with research and 
production schedules, costs, and sales. Each project will be headed 
by a Soviet organization, which will award contracts to other 
Comecon-member organizations. The Soviet project heads, who 
will not be responsible to domestic planners, will have extensive 
executive powers of their own and will closely supervise all activi- 
ties. The program represents a fundamentally new approach to 
multilateral collaboration and a first step toward investing Comecon 
with some supranational authority. 

Labor Resources 

Just as the 1971 Comprehensive Program stimulated investment 
flows and technology transfers among members, it also increased 
intra-Comecon flows of another important factor of production: 
labor. Most of the transfers occurred in connection with joint 
resource development projects, e.g., Bulgarian workers aiding in 
the exploitation of Siberian forest resources, Polish workers assist- 
ing in the construction of the Union pipeline, or Vietnamese work- 
ers helping on the Friendship pipeline in the Soviet Union. Labor 
was also transferred in response to labor imbalances in member 
countries. Hungarian workers, for example, were sent to work in 
East Germany under a bilateral agreement between the two coun- 
tries. Such transfers, however, are restricted by the universal scarcity 
of labor that has emerged with the industrialization of the less 
developed Comecon countries. Moreover the presence of foreign 
workers has raised practical and ideological issues in socialist 
planned economies. It should be noted, finally, that cooperation 
in the area of labor has been by no means limited to planned 
exchanges of manpower. Comecon countries have exchanged 



298 



Appendix B 



information on experience in manpower planning and employment 
and wage policies through Comecon organs and activities. 

Power Configurations Within Comecon 
The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 

Since Comecon' s creation in 1949, the relationship between the 
Soviet Union and the six East European countries has generally 
remained the same. The Soviet Union has provided fuel, nonfood 
raw materials, and semimanufactures (hard goods) to Eastern 
Europe, which in turn has supplied the Soviet Union with finished 
machinery and industrial consumer goods (soft goods). 

This kind of economic relationship stemmed from a genuine need 
by the parties in the 1950s. Eastern Europe has poor energy and 
mineral resources, a problem exacerbated by the low energy effi- 
ciency of East European industry. As of mid- 1985, factories in 
Eastern Europe still used 40 percent more fuel than those in the 
West. As a result of these factors, Eastern European countries have 
always relied heavily on the Soviet Union for oil. For its part, in 
the 1950s Eastern Europe supplied the Soviet Union with those 
goods otherwise unavailable because of Western embargoes. Thus, 
from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, during the time when there 
was no world shortage of energy and raw materials, the Soviet 
Union inexpensively supplied its East European clients with hard 
goods in exchange for finished machinery and equipment. In 
addition, Soviet economic policies bought political and military sup- 
port. During these years, the Soviet Union could be assured of rela- 
tive political tranquillity within the bloc, obedience in international 
strategy as laid down by the Soviet Union, and military support 
of Soviet aims. By the 1980s, both parties were accustomed to this 
arrangement. The Soviet Union was particularly happy with the 
arrangement since it still could expand its energy and raw materi- 
als complex quickly and relatively cheaply. 

In the 1970s, the terms of trade for the Soviet Union had 
improved. The OPEC price for oil had soared, which put the Soviet 
Union in a very advantageous position because of its bountiful sup- 
ply of oil. The soaring price increased the opportunity cost (see 
Glossary) of providing Eastern Europe with oil at prices lower than 
those established by OPEC. In addition, extraction and transpor- 
tation costs for these goods, most of which originated in Siberia, 
were also rising. In response to the market, the Soviet Union 
decreased its exports to its East European partners and increased 
its purchases of soft goods from these countries. This policy forced 
the East European countries to turn to the West for hard goods 



299 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

despite the fact that they had fewer goods to export in return for 
hard currency. 

Any hard goods supplied to Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union 
were sold essentially at a discount price because Comecon prices 
lagged behind and were lower that those of the world market. 
Developments in the 1980s made this situation even more com- 
plex. The 1983-84 decline in international oil prices left the Soviets 
with large holdings of oil that, because of the lag in Comecon prices, 
were still increasing in price. The "nonmarket gains from preferen- 
tial trade" became quite expensive for the Soviets. East European 
profits from the implicit subsidization were almost US$102 billion 
(in 1981 dollars, using an exchange rate of 1 .81 dollars to the ruble) 
between 1972 and 1981. 

Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam 

Soviet-initiated Comecon support for the Council's three least- 
developed members — Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam — has clearly 
benefited them, but the burden on the six East European Comecon 
members has been most unwelcome. Comecon is structured in such 
a way that the more economically developed members provide sup- 
port for the less developed members in their major economic sec- 
tors. Initially, when Mongolia joined Comecon in 1962, there was 
no great added burden. The population of Mongolia was relatively 
small (1 million), and the country's subsidies came primarily from 
the Soviet Union. The addition of Cuba (9 million people) in 1972 
and Vietnam (40 million people) in 1978, however, quickly esca- 
lated the burden. As of early 1987, three-fourths of Comecon 's over- 
seas economic aid went to Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam: almost 
US$4 billion went to Cuba, US$2 billion to Vietnam (half in mili- 
tary aid), and US$1 billion to Mongolia. 

Although the Soviets carry most of the burden, since 1976 the 
East Europeans have been persuaded to take part in projects to 
boost the developing countries' economies. East European coun- 
tries import Cuban nickel and Mongolian molybdenum and cop- 
per; they are also pressed to buy staples, such as Cuban sugar 
(80 percent of Cuba's exports), at inflated prices. Eastern Europe 
also contributes to the International Investment Bank, from which 
the underdeveloped three can acquire loans at lower interest rates 
(0.5 to 2 percent) than the East Europeans themselves (2 to 5 per- 
cent). In addition, the Soviets sell their fuel and raw materials to 
Cuba, Vietnam, and Mongolia for less than it is sold to the six 
East European members, Hence the latter have become competi- 
tors for the slowly diminishing Soviet resources. As of 1987, the 
only benefit accruing to the East Europeans was the services 



300 



Appendix B 

provided by Vietnamese guest workers. However, the majority of 
the Vietnamese have worked primarily on the Friendship pipeline 
in the Soviet Union. 

Undeniably, Comecon has been investing heavily in Mongolia, 
Cuba, and Vietnam; and the three countries have benefited sub- 
stantially from these resources. In 1984 increases in capital invest- 
ments within Comecon were the highest for Vietnam and Cuba 
(26.9 percent for Vietnam and 14 percent for Cuba, compared with 
3.3 percent and less for the others, except Poland and Romania). 
Increased investments in Mongolia lagged behind Poland and 
Romania but were nevertheless substantial (5.8 percent). In 1984 
the economies of the three developing countries registered the fastest 
industrial growth of all the Comecon members (see table B, this 
Appendix). 

Given their locations, Comecon membership for Mongolia, 
Cuba, and Vietnam appears principally to serve Soviet foreign 
policy interests. The Soviet Union contributes the most to the 
development to the three poorer Comecon members, and it also 
reaps most of the benefits. The Soviet Union imports most of Cuba's 
sugar and nickel and all of Mongolia's copper and molybdenum 
(widely used in the construction of aircraft, automobiles, machine 
tools, gas turbines, and in the field of electronics). Cuba has pro- 
vided bases for the Soviet navy and military support to Soviet allies 
in Africa. Vietnam makes its naval and air bases, as well as some 
100,000 guest workers, available to the Soviets. 

At the June 1984 Comecon economic summit and at subsequent 
Council sessions, the policy of equalizing the levels of economic 
development between Comecon member countries was repeatedly 
stressed. At the November 1986 Comecon session in Bucharest, 
the East European members ''outlined measures to further improve 
cooperation with Vietnam, Cuba, and Mongolia with a view to 
developing the main sectors of these countries' national economies." 
Moreover, the Soviets have repeatedly stressed their earnestness 
in "normalizing the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and in 
including that region in the overall process of creating a universal 
system of international security." 

Support for Developing Countries 

Comecon provided economic and technical support to 34 develop- 
ing countries in 1960, 62 countries in 1970, and over 100 coun- 
tries in 1985. As of 1987, Comecon had assisted in the construction 
or preparation of over 4,000 projects (mostly industrial) in Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa (see fig. C, this Appendix). A monetary 
figure for this assistance is difficult to estimate, although a June 



301 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Table B. Change in Industrial Growth Within Comecon 
Member Countries from 1983 to 1984 
(in percentage) 



Country Change 



Bulgaria 4.3 

Cuba 12.0 

Czechoslovakia 3.9 

East Germany 4.2 

Hungary 2.8 

Mongolia 8.3 

Poland 6.0 

Romania 7.0 

Soviet Union 4.2 

Vietnam 7.2 



Source: Based on information from SEV: Voprosy i otvety, Moscow, 1985, 62. 

1986 Czechoslovak source valued the exchange between Comecon 
and developing countries at 34 billion rubles per year (US$48.4 
at the official June 1986 exchange rate of US$1 .42 per ruble). The 
precise nature of this aid was unclear, and Western observers believe 
the data to be inflated. 

From the 1960s to the mid-1980s, Comecon has sought to 
encourage the development of industry, energy, transportation, 
mineral resources, and agriculture of Third World countries. 
Comecon countries have also provided technical and economic 
training for personnel in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. When 
Comecon initially lent support to developing countries, it generally 
concentrated on developing those products that would support the 
domestic economies of the Third World, including replacements 
for imports. In the 1970s and 1980s, assistance from Comecon has 
been directed toward export-oriented industries. Third World coun- 
tries have paid for this support with products produced by the 
project for which Comecon rendered help. This policy has provided 
Comecon with a stable source of necessary deliveries in addition 
to political influence in these strategically important areas. 

Trends and Prospects 

Comecon has served for more than three decades as a frame- 
work for cooperation among the planned economies of the Soviet 
Union, its allies in Eastern Europe, and, now, Soviet allies in the 



302 



Appendix B 




, , , ,5^0 1000 KILOMETERS 



500 1000 NAUTICAL 

MILES 



Source: Based on information from Figyelo, Budapest, October 16, 1986. 

Figure C. Most Important Facilities Built in Africa by Comecon Countries, 
December 31, 1985 

Third World. Over the years, the Comecon system has grown 
steadily in scope and experience. The organization now encom- 
passes a complex and sophisticated set of institutions that represent 
a striking advance over the capabilities of the organization in the 
early 1960s. 

This institutional evolution has reflected changing and expand- 
ing goals. Initial, modest objectives of "exchanging experience" 
and providing "technical assistance" and other forms of "mutual 



303 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

aid" have been extended to the development of an integrated set 
of economies based on a coordinated international pattern of 
production and investment. These ambitious goals are pursued 
through a broad spectrum of cooperative measures extending from 
monetary to technological relations. 

At the same time, the extraregional goals of the organization have 
expanded; other countries, both geographically distant and systemi- 
cally different, are being encouraged to participate in Comecon 
activities. Parallel efforts have sought to develop Comecon as a 
mechanism through which to coordinate the foreign economic poli- 
cies of the members as well as their actual relations with nonmem- 
ber countries and such organizations as the EEC and the United 
Nations. 

Asymmetries of size and differences in levels of development 
among Comecon members have deeply affected the institutional 
character and evolution of the organization. The overwhelming 
dominance of the Soviet economy has necessarily meant that the 
bulk of intra-Comecon relations takes the form of bilateral relations 
between the Soviet Union and the smaller members of Comecon. 

These asymmetries have served in other ways to impede progress 
toward multilateral trade and cooperation within the organization. 
The sensitivities of the smaller states have dictated that the sover- 
eign equality of members remains a basic tenet of the organiza- 
tion. Despite Soviet political and economic dominance, sovereign 
equality has constituted a very real obstacle to the acquisition of 
supranational powers by Comecon organs. Nevertheless, the 1985 
Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress up 
to the Year 2000 took steps to instill some organizations with 
supranational authority. 

The planned nature of the members' economies and the lack of 
effective market-price mechanisms to facilitate integration have fur- 
ther hindered progress toward Comecon goals. Without the auto- 
matic workings of market forces, progress must depend upon 
conscious acts of policy. This tends to politicize the processes of 
integration to a greater degree than is the case in market economies. 

By 1987 Comecon' s Comprehensive Program, adopted in 1971, 
had undergone considerable change. Multilateral planning faded 
into traditional bilateral cooperation, and the Bucharest formula 
for prices assumed a revised form. The 1985 Comprehensive Pro- 
gram for Scientific and Technical Progress, or, as some Western 
analysts call it, the "Gorbachev Charter," was Comecon' s new 
blueprint for taking a firm grip on its future. Experience in the 
early 1980s showed that turning to the West and Japan for tech- 
nological advancement put Comecon in a very dangerous position 



304 



Appendix B 



because it pulled the East European members further away from 
the Soviet Union and threatened to leave the entire organization 
at the mercy of the West. The purpose of the 1985 program was 
to offset centrifugal forces and reduce Comecon's vulnerability to 
4 'technological blackmail" through broadened mutual cooperation, 
increased efficiency of cooperation, and improved quality of output. 

The success of the 1985 program will be closely tied to the suc- 
cess of Gorbachev's changes in the Soviet economy. Major projects 
for the 1986-90 period include a 5,600-kilometer natural- gas pipe- 
line from the Yamburg Peninsula (in northern Siberia) to Eastern 
Europe; the Krivoy Rog (in the Ukraine), a mining and enrich- 
ment combine that will produce 13 million tons of iron ore annu- 
ally; the annual production and exchange of 500 million rubles' 
worth of equipment for nuclear power plants; and joint projects 
for extracting coal in Poland, magnesite in Czechoslovakia, nickel 
in Cuba, and nonferrous metals in Mongolia. Recalling the failure 
record of previous Comecon projects (for example, the disappointing 
Riad computer project, which in its attempt to standardize com- 
ponents and software is producing unreliable and costly products 
that fellow members refuse to buy), some Western analysts ques- 
tion whether the 1985 program will accomplish all that it has set 
out to do. 

Although the selection is still rather sparse, several English- 
language works on Comecon appeared in the early 1980s. Socialist 
Economic Integration by Jozef van Brabant discusses in great detail 
the mechanisms and operations of socialist economic integration 
in general and Comecon in particular. It is perhaps the most com- 
prehensive English-language work on the subject. Several chap- 
ters in East European Integration and East- West Trade, edited by Paul 
Marer and John Michael Montias, are particularly helpful in 
analyzing the mechanisms of Comecon and comparing it with the 
EEC. Analysis of Comecon's operations and development in the 
modern economic and political arena is provided in Marer's "The 
Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe" in Soviet 
Policy in Eastern Europe. The best sources for up-to-date political and 
economic analysis are the Radio Free Europe background reports. 
Articles by Vladimir Sobell, in particular, give good insight into 
the 1985 Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical 
Development. 

Russian-language sources provide useful information on Come- 
con procedures and structure in addition to insight into the Soviet 



305 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



and East European view of Comecon's goals and shortcomings. 
Articles in this vein can be found in Voprosy ekonomiki and the 
"Ekonomika" series published in Moscow by Znanie. Transla- 
tions of selected articles from these publications can be found in 
the Joint Publications Research Service's USSR Report on Eco- 
nomic Affairs. The Comecon Secretariat publishes a bimonthly 
bulletin (Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo stran-chlenov SEV), which has 
a table of contents and a summary in English; an annual Statisticheskii 
ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV; and various handbooks. (For complete 
citations and further information, see Bibliography.) 



306 



Appendix C 



The Warsaw Pact 

IN APRIL 1985, the general secretaries of the communist and 
workers' parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania gathered in Warsaw to sign a protocol 
extending the effective term of the 1955 Treaty on Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which originally established 
the Soviet-led political-military alliance in Eastern Europe. Their 
action ensured that the Warsaw Pact, as it is commonly known, 
will remain part of the international political and military land- 
scape well into the future. The thirtieth anniversary of the Warsaw 
Pact and its renewal make a review of its origins and evolution 
particularly appropriate. 

The Warsaw Pact alliance of the East European socialist states 
is the nominal counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation (NATO) on the European continent (see fig. A, this Appen- 
dix). Unlike NATO, founded in 1949, however, the Warsaw Pact 
does not have an independent organizational structure but func- 
tions as part of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. In fact, through- 
out the more than thirty years since it was founded, the Warsaw 
Pact has served as one of the Soviet Union's primary mechanisms 
for keeping its East European allies under its political and mili- 
tary control. The Soviet Union has used the Warsaw Pact to erect 
a facade of collective decision making and action around the reality 
of its political domination and military intervention in the inter- 
nal affairs of its allies. At the same time, the Soviet Union also 
has used the Warsaw Pact to develop East European socialist armies 
and harness them to its military strategy. 

Since its inception, the Warsaw Pact has reflected the changing 
pattern of Soviet-East European relations and manifested problems 
that affect all alliances. The Warsaw Pact has evolved into some- 
thing other than the mechanism of control the Soviet Union origi- 
nally intended it to be, and it has become increasingly less 
dominated by the Soviet Union since the 1960s. The organizational 
structure of the Warsaw Pact has grown and has provided a forum 
for greater intra-alliance debate, bargaining, and conflict between 
the Soviet Union and its allies over the issues of national indepen- 
dence, policy autonomy, and East European participation in alli- 
ance decision making. While the Warsaw Pact retains its internal 



307 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



(Copen h agenV ) S W E DE N 



Ba/ti'c Seo 



tOO 200 Kitomtter* 



( 



^ GERMAN \ 
'DEMOCRATIC* 

— JC 1 



POLAND 



REPUBL! 



, V \ 

FEDERAL >^ ... ^ 

REPUBLIC I * Pf ° 8we 2. .Krakow f 

OF \ ? - / 

■( HUNGARY y 



SOVIET 
UNION 




\ 



AUSTRIA 




Figure A. The Warsaw Pact Member States, 1987 



function in Soviet-East European relations, its non- Soviet members 
have also developed sufficient military capabilities to become use- 
ful adjuncts of Soviet power against NATO in Europe. 



308 



Appendix C 



The Soviet Alliance System, 1943-55 

Long before the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the 
Soviet Union had molded the East European states into an alli- 
ance serving its security interests. While liberating Eastern Europe 
from Nazi Germany in World War II, the Red Army established 
political and military control over that region. The Soviet Union's 
size, economic weight, and sheer military power made its domi- 
nation inevitable in this part of Europe, which historically had been 
dominated by great powers. The Soviet Union intended to use 
Eastern Europe as a buffer zone for the forward defense of its 
western borders and to keep threatening ideological influences at 
bay. Continued control of Eastern Europe became second only to 
defense of the homeland in the hierarchy of Soviet security priori- 
ties. The Soviet Union ensured its control of the region by turn- 
ing the East European countries into subjugated allies. 

The Organization of East European National Units, 1943-45 

During World War II, the Soviet Union began to build what 
Soviet sources refer to as histoiy's first coalition of a progressive 
type when it organized or reorganized the armies of Eastern Europe 
to fight with the Red Army against the German Wehrmacht. The 
command and control procedures established in this military alli- 
ance would serve as the model on which the Soviet Union would 
build the Warsaw Pact after 1955. During the last years of the war, 
Soviet commanders and officers gained valuable experience in 
directing multinational forces that would later be put to use in the 
Warsaw Pact. The units formed between 1943 and 1945 also 
provided the foundation on which the Soviet Union could build 
postwar East European national armies. 

The Red Army began to form, train, and arm Polish and 
Czechoslovak national units on Soviet territory in 1943. These units 
fought with the Red Army as it carried its offensive westward into 
German-occupied Poland and Czechoslovakia and then into Ger- 
many itself. By contrast, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania were 
wartime enemies of the Soviet Union. Although ruled by ostensi- 
bly fascist regimes, these countries allied with Nazi Germany mainly 
to recover territories lost through the peace settlements of World 
War I or seized by the Soviet Union under the terms of the 1939 
Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. However, by 1943 the Red Army 
had destroyed the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Romanian forces 
fighting alongside the Wehrmacht. In 1944 it occupied Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Romania, and shortly thereafter it began the process 
of transforming the remnants of their armies into allied 



309 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

units that could re-enter the war on the side of the Soviet Union. 
These allied units represented a mix of East European nationals 
fleeing Nazi occupation, deportees from Soviet-occupied areas, and 
enemy prisoners of war. Red Army political officers organized 
extensive indoctrination programs in the allied units under Soviet 
control and purged any politically suspect personnel. In all, the 
Soviet Union formed and armed more than 29 divisions and 
37 brigades or regiments, which included more than 500,000 East 
European troops. 

The allied national formations were directly subordinate to the 
headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command and its 
executive body, the Soviet General Staff. Although the Soviet Union 
directly commanded all allied units, the Supreme High Command 
included one representative from each of the East European forces. 
Lacking authority, these representatives simply relayed directives 
from the Supreme High Command and General Staff to the com- 
manders of East European units. While all national units had 
so-called Soviet advisers, some Red Army officers openly discharged 
command and staff responsibilities in the East European armies. 
Even when commanded by East European officers, non-Soviet con- 
tingents participated in operations against the Wehrmacht only as 
part of Soviet fronts. 

The Development of Socialist Armies in Eastern Europe, 1945-55 

At the end of World War II, the Red Army occupied Bulgaria, 
Romania, Hungary, Poland, and eastern Germany, and Soviet 
front commanders headed the Allied Control Commission in each 
of these occupied countries. The Soviet Union gave its most 
important occupation forces a garrison status when it established 
the Northern Group of Forces (NGF) in 1947 and the Group of 
Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) in 1949. By 1949 the Soviet 
Union had concluded twenty-year bilateral treaties on friendship, 
cooperation, and mutual assistance with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania. These treaties prohibited the East 
European regimes from entering into relations with states hostile 
to the Soviet Union, officially made these countries Soviet allies, 
and granted the Soviet Union rights to a continued military presence 
on their territory. The continued presence of Red Army forces 
guaranteed Soviet control of these countries. By contrast, the Soviet 
Union did not occupy either Albania or Yugoslavia during or after 
the war, and both countries remained outside direct Soviet control. 

The circumstances of Soviet occupation facilitated the installa- 
tion of communist-dominated governments called "people's 
democracies" in Eastern Europe. The indoctrinated East European 



310 



Appendix C 



troops that had fought with the Red Army to liberate their coun- 
tries from Nazi occupation became politically useful to the Soviet 
Union as it established socialist states in Eastern Europe. The East 
European satellite regimes depended entirely on Soviet military 
power — and the continued deployment of 1 million Red Army 
soldiers — to stay in power. In return, the new East European 
political and military elites were obliged to respect Soviet political 
and security interests in the region. 

While transforming the East European governments, the Soviet 
Union also continued the process of strengthening its political con- 
trol over the East European armed forces and reshaping them along 
Soviet military lines after World War II. In Eastern Europe, the 
Soviet Union instituted a system of local communist party con- 
trols over the military based on the Soviet model. The East Euro- 
pean communist parties thoroughly penetrated the East European 
military establishments to ensure their loyalty to the newly estab- 
lished political order. At the same time, the Soviet Union built these 
armies up to support local security and police forces against domestic 
disorder or other threats to communist party rule. Reliable East 
European military establishments could be counted on to support 
communist rule and, consequently, ensure continued Soviet con- 
trol of Eastern Europe. In fact, in the late 1940s and the 1950s 
the Soviet Union was more concerned about cultivating and 
monitoring political loyalty in its East European military allies than 
increasing their utility as combat forces. 

The postwar military establishments in Eastern Europe consisted 
of rival communist and noncommunist wartime antifascist resistance 
movements, national units established on Soviet territory during 
the war, prewar national military commands, and various other 
armed forces elements that spent the war years in exile or fighting 
in the West. Using the weight of the Red Army and its occupation 
authority, the Soviet Union purged or co-opted the noncommunist 
nationalists in the East European armies and thereby eliminated 
a group likely to oppose their restructuring along Soviet lines. In 
the case of communist forces, the Soviet Union trusted and 
promoted personnel who had served in the national units formed 
on its territory over native communists who had fought in the East 
European underground organizations independent of Soviet control. 

After 1948 the East European armies adopted regular political 
education programs. This Soviet-style indoctrination was aimed 
primarily at raising communist party membership within the officer 
corps and building a military leadership cadre loyal to the socialist 
system and the national communist regime. Unquestionable politi- 
cal loyalty was more important than professional competence for 



311 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

advancement in the military hierarchy. Appropriate class origin 
became the principal criterion for admission to the East European 
officer corps and military schools. The Soviet Union and national 
communist party regimes transformed the East European military 
establishments into a vehicle of upward mobility for the working 
class and peasantry, who were unaccustomed to this kind of 
opportunity. Many of the officers in the new East European armed 
forces supported the new regimes because their newly acquired 
professional and social status hinged on the continuance of com- 
munist party rule. 

The Soviet Union assigned trusted national communist party 
leaders to the most important East European military command 
positions despite their lack of military qualifications. The East 
European ministries of defense established political departments 
on the model of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army 
and Navy. Throughout the 1950s, prewar East European com- 
munists served as political officers, sharing command prerogatives 
with professional officers and evaluating their loyalty to the com- 
munist regime and compliance with its directives. Heavily armed 
paramilitary forces under the control of the East European inter- 
nal security networks became powerful rivals for the national armies 
and checked their potentially great influence within the political 
system. The Soviet foreign intelligence apparatus also closely moni- 
tored the allied national military establishments. 

Despite the great diversity of the new Soviet allies in terms of 
military history and traditions, the Sovietization of the East Euro- 
pean national armies, which occurred between 1945 and the early 
1950s, followed a consistent pattern in every case. The Soviet Union 
forced its East European allies to emulate Soviet Army ranks and 
uniforms and abandon all distinctive national military customs and 
practices; these allied armies used all Soviet-made weapons and 
equipment. The Soviet Union also insisted on the adoption of Soviet 
Army organization and tactics within the East European armies. 
Following the precedent established during World War II, the Soviet 
Union assigned Soviet officers to duty at all levels of the East 
European national command structures, from the general (main) 
staffs down to the regimental level, as its primary means of mili- 
tary control. Although officially termed advisers, these Soviet Army 
officers generally made the most important decisions within the 
East European armies. Direct Soviet control over the national mili- 
tary establishments was most complete in strategically important 
Poland. Soviet officers held approximately half the command 
positions in the postwar Polish Army despite the fact that few spoke 
Polish. Soviet officers and instructors staffed the national military 



312 



Appendix C 



academies, and the study of Russian became mandatory for East 
European army officers. The Soviet Union also accepted many of 
the most promising and eager East European officers into Soviet 
mid-career military institutions and academies for the advanced 
study essential to their promotion within the national armed forces 
command structures. 

Despite Soviet efforts to develop political and military instru- 
ments of control and the continued presence of Soviet Army occu- 
pation forces, the Soviet Union still faced resistance to its 
domination of Eastern Europe. The Soviet troops in the GSFG 
acted unilaterally when the East German Garrisoned People's Police 
refused to crush the June 1953 workers' uprising in East Berlin. 
This action set a precedent for the Soviet use of force to retain con- 
trol of its buffer zone in Eastern Europe. 

The Warsaw Pact, 1955-70 

East-West Diplomacy and the Formation of the Warsaw Pact 

In May 1955, the Soviet Union institutionalized its East Euro- 
pean alliance system when it gathered together representatives from 
Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Roma- 
nia in Warsaw to sign the multilateral Treaty on Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which was identical to their 
existing bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union. Initially, the Soviets 
claimed that the Warsaw Pact was a direct response to the inclu- 
sion of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 
NATO in 1955. The formation of a legally defined, multilateral 
alliance organization also reinforced the Soviet Union's claim to 
great power status as the leader of the world socialist system, 
enhanced its prestige, and legitimized its presence and influence 
in Eastern Europe. However, as events inside the Soviet alliance 
developed, this initial external impetus for the formation of the War- 
saw Pact lost its importance, and the Soviet Union found a formal 
alliance useful for other purposes. The Soviet Union created a struc- 
ture for dealing with its East European allies more efficiently when 
it superimposed the multilateral Warsaw Pact on their existing 
bilateral treaty ties. 

In the early 1950s, the United States and its Western allies car- 
ried out an agreement to re-arm West Germany and integrate it 
into NATO. This development threatened a vital Soviet foreign 
policy objective: the Soviet Union was intent on preventing the 
resurgence of a powerful German nation and particularly one allied 
with the Western powers. In an effort to derail the admission of 
West Germany to NATO, the Soviet representative at the 1954 



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Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference in Berlin, Viacheslav 
Molotov, went so far as to propose the possibility of holding simul- 
taneous elections in both German states that might lead to a 
re-unified, though neutral and unarmed, Germany. At the same 
time, the Soviet Union also proposed to the Western powers a gen- 
eral treaty on collective security in Europe and the dismantling of 
existing military blocs (meaning NATO). When this tactic failed 
and West Germany joined NATO on May 5, 1955, the Soviet 
Union declared that West Germany's membership in the Western 
alliance created a special threat to Soviet interests. The Soviet Union 
also declared that this development made its existing network of 
bilateral treaties an inadequate security guarantee and forced the 
East European socialist countries to "combine efforts in a strong 
political and military alliance." On May 14, 1955, the Soviet Union 
and its East European allies signed the Warsaw Pact. 

While the Soviets had avoided formalizing their alliance to keep 
the onus of dividing Europe into opposing blocs on the West, the 
admission into NATO of the European state with the greatest poten- 
tial military power forced the Soviet Union to take NATO into 
account for the first time. The Soviet Union also used West Ger- 
many's membership in NATO for propaganda purposes. The 
Soviets evoked the threat of a re-armed, "revanchist" West Ger- 
many seeking to reverse its defeat in World War II to remind the 
East European countries of their debt to the Soviet Union for their 
liberation, their need for Soviet protection against a recent enemy, 
and their corresponding duty to respect Soviet security interests 
and join the Warsaw Pact. 

The Soviet Union had important reasons for institutionalizing 
the informal alliance system established through its bilateral treaties 
with the East European countries, concluded before the 1949 for- 
mation of NATO. As a formal organization, the Warsaw Pact 
provided the Soviet Union an official counterweight to NATO in 
East- West diplomacy. The Warsaw Pact gave the Soviet Union 
an equal status with the United States as the leader of an alliance 
of ostensibly independent nations supporting its foreign policy 
initiatives in the international arena. The multilateral Warsaw Pact 
was an improvement over strictly bilateral ties as a mechanism for 
transmitting Soviet defense and foreign policy directives to the East 
European allies. The Warsaw Pact also helped to legitimize the 
presence of Soviet troops — and overwhelming Soviet influence — 
in Eastern Europe. 

The 1955 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance between the Soviet Union and its East European allies, 
which established the Warsaw Pact, stated that relations among 



314 



Appendix C 



the signatories were based on total equality, mutual noninterfer- 
ence in internal affairs, and respect for national sovereignty and 
independence. It declared that the Warsaw Pact's function was col- 
lective self-defense of the member states against external aggres- 
sion, as provided for in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 
The terms of the alliance specified the Political Consultative Com- 
mittee (PCC) as the highest alliance organ. The founding docu- 
ment formed the Joint Command to organize the actual defense 
of the Warsaw Pact member states, declared that the national deputy 
ministers of defense would act as the deputies of the Warsaw Pact 
commander in chief, and established the Joint Staff, which included 
the representatives of the general (main) staffs of all its member 
states. The treaty set the Warsaw Pact's duration at twenty years 
with an automatic ten-year extension, provided that none of the 
member states renounced it before its expiration. The treaty also 
included a standing offer to disband simultaneously with other mili- 
tary alliances, i.e., NATO, contingent on East- West agreement 
about a general treaty on collective security in Europe. This pro- 
vision indicated that the Soviet Union either did not expect that 
such an accord could be negotiated or did not consider its new multi- 
lateral alliance structure very important. 

Early Organizational Structure and Activities 

Until the early 1960s, the Soviet Union used the Warsaw Pact 
more as a tool in East-West diplomacy than as a functioning 
political-military alliance. Under the leadership of General Secre- 
tary Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union sought to project a more 
flexible and less threatening image abroad and, toward this end, 
used the alliance's PCC to publicize its foreign policy initiatives 
and peace offensives, including frequent calls for the formation of 
an all-European collective security system to replace the continent's 
existing military alliances. The main result of Western acceptance 
of these disingenuous Soviet proposals would have been the removal 
of American troops from Europe, the weakening of ties among the 
Western states, and increasingly effective Soviet pressure on 
Western Europe. The Soviet Union also used the PCC to propose 
a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and 
the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. 

In the first few years after 1955, little of the Warsaw Pact's activity 
was directed at building a multilateral military alliance. The Soviet 
Union concentrated primarily on making the Warsaw Pact a reliable 
instrument for controlling the East European allies. In fact, the 
putatively supranational military agencies of the Warsaw Pact were 
completely subordinate to a national agency of the Soviet Union. 



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Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

The Soviet General Staff in Moscow housed the alliance's Joint 
Command and Joint Staff and, through these organs, controlled 
the entire military apparatus of the Warsaw Pact as well as the allied 
armies. Although the highest ranking officers of the alliance were 
supposed to be selected through the mutual agreement of its member 
states, the Soviets unilaterally appointed a first deputy Soviet 
minister of defense and first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff 
to serve as Warsaw Pact commander in chief and chief of staff, 
respectively. While these two Soviet officers ranked below the Soviet 
minister of defense, they still outranked the ministers of defense 
in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries. The Soviet 
General Staff also posted senior colonel generals as resident 
representatives of the Warsaw Pact commander in chief in all East 
European capitals. Serving with the "agreement of their host coun- 
tries," these successors to the wartime and postwar Soviet advisers 
in the allied armies equaled the East European ministers of defense 
in rank and provided a point of contact for the commander in chief, 
Joint Command, and Soviet General Staff inside the national mili- 
tary establishments. They directed and monitored the military train- 
ing and political indoctrination programs of the national armies 
to synchronize their development with the Soviet Army. The strict 
Soviet control of the Warsaw Pact's high military command posi- 
tions, established at this early stage, clearly indicated the subordi- 
nation of the East European allies to the Soviet Union. 

In 1956 the Warsaw Pact member states admitted East Germany 
to the Joint Command and sanctioned the transformation of its 
Garrisoned People's Police into a full-fledged army. But the Soviet 
Union took no steps to integrate the allied armies into a multi- 
national force. The Soviet Union organized only one joint War- 
saw Pact military exercise and made no attempt to make the alliance 
functional before 1961 except through the incorporation of East 
European territory into the Soviet national air defense structure. 

De-Stalinization and National Communism 

In his 1956 secret speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Com- 
munist Party of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Khrushchev 
denounced the arbitrariness, excesses, and terror of the Joseph Stalin 
era. Khrushchev sought to achieve greater legitimacy for communist 
party rule on the basis of the party's ability to meet the material 
needs of the Soviet population. His de-Stalinization campaign 
quickly influenced developments in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev 
accepted the replacement of Stalinist Polish and Hungarian lead- 
ers with newly rehabilitated communist party figures, who were 
able to generate genuine popular support for their regimes by 



316 



Appendix C 



molding the socialist system to the specific historical, political, and 
economic conditions in their countries. Pursuing his more sophisti- 
cated approach in international affairs, Khrushchev sought to turn 
Soviet-controlled East European satellites into at least semisover- 
eign countries and to make Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact 
less obvious. The Warsaw Pact's formal structure served Khrush- 
chev's purpose well, providing a facade of genuine consultation 
and of joint defense and foreign-policy decision making by the Soviet 
Union and the East European countries. 

De-Stalinization in the Soviet Union made a superficial rena- 
tionalization of the East European military establishments possi- 
ble. The Soviet Union allowed the East European armies to restore 
their distinctive national practices and to re-emphasize professional 
military opinions over political considerations in most areas. Mili- 
tary training supplanted political indoctrination as the primary task 
of the East European military establishments. Most important, the 
Soviet Ministry of Defense recalled many Soviet Army officers and 
advisers from their positions within the East European armies. 
Although the Soviet Union still remained in control of its alliance 
system, these changes in the Warsaw Pact and the NSWP armies 
removed some of the most objectionable features of Sovietization. 

In October 1956, the Polish and Hungarian communist parties 
lost control of the de-Stalinization process in their countries. The 
ensuing crises threatened the integrity of the entire Soviet alliance 
system in Eastern Europe. Although Khrushchev reacted quickly 
to rein in the East European allies and thwart this challenge to Soviet 
interests, his response in these two cases led to a significant change 
in the role of the Warsaw Pact as an element of Soviet security. 

The "Polish October" 

The October 1956, workers' riots in Poland defined the bound- 
aries of national communism acceptable to the Soviet Union. The 
Polish United Workers Party found that the grievances that inspired 
the riots could be ameliorated without presenting a challenge to 
its monopoly on political power or its strict adherence to Soviet 
foreign policy and security interests. At first, when the Polish Army 
and police forces refused to suppress rioting workers, the Soviet 
Union prepared its forces in East Germany and Poland for an 
intervention to restore order in the country. However, Poland's 
new communist party leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, and the Pol- 
ish Army's top commanders indicated to Khrushchev and the other 
Soviet leaders that any Soviet intervention in the internal affairs 
of Poland would meet united, massive resistance. While insisting 
on Poland's right to exercise greater autonomy in domestic matters, 



317 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Gomulka also pointed out that the Polish United Workers Party 
remained in firm control of the country and expressed his inten- 
tion to continue to accept Soviet direction in external affairs. 
Gomulka even denounced the simultaneous revolution in Hungary 
and Hungary's attempt to leave the Warsaw Pact, which nearly 
ruptured the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe. Gomulka' s 
position protected the Soviet Union's most vital interests and en- 
abled Poland to reach a compromise with the Soviet leadership to 
defuse the crisis. Faced with Polish resistance to a possible inva- 
sion, the Soviet Union established its minimum requirements for 
the East European allies: upholding the leading role of the com- 
munist party in society and remaining a member of the Warsaw 
Pact. These two conditions ensured that Eastern Europe would 
remain a buffer zone for the Soviet Union. 

The Hungarian Revolution 

By contrast, the full-scale revolution in Hungary, which began 
in late October with public demonstrations in support of the riot- 
ing Polish workers, openly flouted these Soviet stipulations. An 
initial domestic liberalization acceptable to the Soviet Union quickly 
focused on nonnegotiable issues like the communist party's exclu- 
sive hold on political power and genuine national independence. 
With overwhelming support from the Hungarian public, the new 
communist party leader, Imre Nagy, instituted multiparty elec- 
tions. More important, Nagy withdrew Hungary from the War- 
saw Pact and ended Hungary's alliance with the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Army invaded with 200,000 troops, crushed the Hungarian 
Revolution, and brought Hungary back within limits tolerable to 
the Soviet Union. The five days of pitched battles left 25,000 Hun- 
garians dead. 

After 1956 the Soviet Union practically disbanded the Hungarian 
Army and reinstituted a program of political indoctrination in the 
units that remained. In May 1957, unable to rely on Hungarian 
forces to maintain order, the Soviet Union increased its troop level 
in Hungary from two to four divisions and forced Hungary to sign 
a status-of-forces agreement, placing the Soviet military presence 
on a solid and permanent legal basis. The Soviet Army forces sta- 
tioned in Hungary officially became the Southern Group of Forces 
(SGF). 

The events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary forced a Soviet 
re-evaluation of the reliability and roles of the NSWP countries 
in its alliance system. Before 1956 the Soviet leadership believed 
that the Stalinist policy of heavy political indoctrination and enforced 
Sovietization had transformed the national armies into reliable 



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Appendix C 



instruments of the Soviet Union. However, the East European 
armies were still likely to remain loyal to national causes. Only 
one Hungarian Army unit fought beside the Soviet troops that put 
down the 1956 revolution. In both the Polish and the Hungarian 
military establishments, a basic loyalty to the national communist 
party regime was mixed with a strong desire for greater national 
sovereignty. With East Germany still a recent enemy and Poland 
and Hungary now suspect allies, the Soviet Union turned to 
Czechoslovakia as its most reliable junior partner in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. Czechoslovakia became the Soviet Union's first 
proxy in the Third World when its military pilots trained Egyptian 
personnel to fly Soviet-built MiG fighter aircraft. The Soviet Union 
thereby established a pattern of shifting the weight of its reliance 
from one East European country to another in response to various 
crises. 

The Post-1956 Period 

After the very foundation of the Soviet alliance system in Eastern 
Europe was shaken in 1956, Khrushchev sought to shore up the 
Soviet Union's position. Several developments made the task even 
more difficult. Between 1956 and 1962, the growing Soviet-Chinese 
dispute threatened to break up the Warsaw Pact. In 1962 Albania 
severed relations with the Soviet Union and terminated Soviet rights 
to the use of a valuable Mediterranean naval base on its Adriatic 
Sea coast. That same year, Albania ended its active participation 
in the Warsaw Pact and sided with the Chinese against the Soviets. 
Following the example of Yugoslavia in the late 1940s, Albania 
was able to resist Soviet pressures. Lacking a common border with 
Albania and having neither occupation troops nor overwhelming 
influence in that country, the Soviet Union was unable to use either 
persuasion or force to bring Albania back into the Warsaw Pact. 
Khrushchev used Warsaw Pact meetings to mobilize the political 
support of the Soviet Union's East European allies against China 
and Albania, as well as to reinforce its control of Eastern Europe 
and its claim to leadership of the communist world. More impor- 
tant, however, after Albania joined Yugoslavia and Hungary on 
the list of defections and near-defections from the Soviet alliance 
system in Eastern Europe, the Soviets began to turn the Warsaw 
Pact into a tool for militarily preventing defections in the future. 

The Internal Function of the Warsaw Pact 

Although Khrushchev invoked the terms of the Warsaw Pact as 
a justification for the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the action was 
in no sense a cooperative allied effort. In the early 1960s, however, 



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Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

the Soviets took steps to turn the alliance's Joint Armed Forces 
(JAF) into a multinational invasion force. In the future, an appeal 
to the Warsaw Pact's collective self-defense provisions and the par- 
ticipation of allied forces would put a multilateral cover over 
unilateral Soviet interventions to keep errant member states in the 
alliance and their communist parties in power. The Soviet Union 
sought to legitimize its future policing actions by presenting them 
as the product of joint Warsaw Pact decisions. In this way, the 
Soviets hoped to deflect the kind of direct international criticism 
they were subjected to after the invasion of Hungary. However, 
such internal deployments were clearly contrary to the Warsaw 
Pact's rule of mutual noninterference in domestic affairs and con- 
flicted with the alliance's declared purpose of collective self-defense 
against external aggression. To circumvent this semantic difficulty, 
the Soviets merely redefined external aggression to include any 
spontaneous anti-Soviet, anticommunist uprising in an allied state. 
Discarding domestic grievances as a possible cause, the Soviet 
Union declared that such outbreaks were a result of imperialist 
provocations and thereby constituted external aggression. 

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union began to prepare the Warsaw 
Pact for its internal function of keeping the NSWP member states 
within the alliance. The Soviet Union took a series of steps to trans- 
form the Warsaw Pact into its intra-alliance intervention force. 
Although it had previously worked with the East European mili- 
tary establishments on a bilateral basis, the Soviet Union started 
to integrate the national armies under the Warsaw Pact framework. 
Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko, who became com- 
mander in chief of the alliance in 1960, was uniquely qualified to 
serve in his post. During World War II, he commanded a Soviet 
Army group that included significant Polish and Czechoslovak 
units. Beginning in 1961, Grechko made joint military exercises 
between Soviet forces and the allied national armies the primary 
focus of Warsaw Pact military activities. 

The Soviet Union arranged these joint exercises to prevent any 
NSWP member state from fully controlling its national army and 
to reduce the possibility that an East European regime could suc- 
cessfully resist Soviet domination and pursue independent policies. 
The Soviet-organized series of joint Warsaw Pact exercises was 
intended to prevent other East European national command 
authorities from following the example of Yugoslavia and Albania 
and adopting a territorial defense strategy. Developed in the 
Yugoslav and Albanian partisan struggles of World War II, ter- 
ritorial defense entailed a mobilization of the entire population for 
a prolonged guerrilla war against an intervening power. Under this 



320 



Appendix C 



strategy, the national communist party leadership would maintain 
its integrity to direct the resistance, seek international support for 
the country's defense, and keep an invader from replacing it with 
a more compliant regime. Territorial defense deterred invasions 
by threatening considerable opposition and enabled Yugoslavia and 
Albania to assert their independence from the Soviet Union. By 
training and integrating the remaining allied armies in joint exer- 
cises for operations only within a multinational force, however, the 
Soviet Union reduced the ability of the other East European coun- 
tries to conduct military actions independent of Soviet control or 
to hinder a Soviet invasion, as Poland and Hungary had done in 
October 1956. 

Large-scale multilateral exercises provided opportunities for 
Soviet officers to command troops of different nationalities and 
trained East European national units to take orders from the War- 
saw Pact or Soviet command structure. Including Soviet troops 
stationed in the NSWP countries and the western military districts 
of the Soviet Union, joint maneuvers drilled Soviet Army forces 
for rapid, massive invasions of allied countries with the symbolic 
participation of NSWP units. Besides turning the allied armies into 
a multinational invasion force for controlling Eastern Europe, joint 
exercises also gave the Warsaw Pact armies greater capabilities for 
a coalition war against NATO. In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union 
modernized the NSWP armies with T-54 and T-55 tanks, self- 
propelled artillery, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) equipped 
with conventional warheads, and MiG-21 and Su-7 ground attack 
fighter aircraft. The Soviet Union completed the mechanization 
of East European infantry divisions, and these new motorized rifle 
divisions trained with the Soviet Army for combined arms combat 
in a nuclear environment. These changes greatly increased the mili- 
tary value and effectiveness of the NSWP forces. In the early 1960s, 
the Soviet Union gave the East European armies their first real 
supporting role in its European theater operations. 

Romania and the Warsaw Pact 

Ironically, at the very time that the Soviet Union gave the War- 
saw Pact more substance and modernized its force structure, resent- 
ment of Soviet political, organizational, and military domination 
of the Warsaw Pact and the NSWP armies increased. There was 
considerable East European dissatisfaction with a Warsaw Pact 
hierarchy that placed a subordinate of the Soviet minister of defense 
over the East European defense ministers. The Soviets considered 
the national ministers of defense, with the rank of colonel general, 
equivalent only to Soviet military district commanders. The strongest 



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Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

objections to the subordinate status of the NSWP countries inside 
the Warsaw Pact came from the Communist Party of Romania 
(Partidul Communist Roman) and its military leadership under 
Nicolae Ceau§escu. 

The first indications of an independent Romanian course 
appeared while the Soviet Union was shoring up its hold on Eastern 
Europe through formal status-of-forces agreements with its allies. 
In 1958 Romania moved in the opposite direction by demanding 
the withdrawal from its territory of all Soviet troops, advisers, and 
the Soviet resident representative. To cover Soviet embarrassment, 
Khrushchev called this a unilateral troop reduction contributing 
to greater European security. Reducing its participation in War- 
saw Pact activities considerably, Romania also refused to allow 
Soviet or NSWP forces, which could serve as Warsaw Pact inter- 
vention forces, to cross or conduct exercises on its territory. 

In the 1960s Romania demanded basic changes in the Warsaw 
Pact structure to give the East European member states a greater 
role in alliance decision making. At several PCC meetings, Roma- 
nia proposed that the leading Warsaw Pact command positions, 
including its commander in chief, rotate among the top military 
leaders of each country. In response, the Soviet Union tried again 
to mollify its allies and deemphasize its control of the alliance by 
moving the Warsaw Pact military organization out of the Soviet 
General Staff and making it a distinct entity, albeit still within the 
Soviet Ministry of Defense. The Soviet Union also placed some 
joint exercises held on NSWP territory under the nominal com- 
mand of the host country's minister of defense. However, Soviet 
Army commanders still conducted almost two-thirds of all War- 
saw Pact maneuvers, and these concessions proved too little and 
too late. 

With the aim of ending Soviet domination and guarding against 
Soviet encroachments, Romania reasserted full national control over 
its armed forces and military policies in 1963 when, following the 
lead of Yugoslavia and Albania, it adopted a territorial defense 
strategy called "War of the Entire People." This nation-in-arms 
strategy entailed compulsory participation in civilian defense 
organizations, militias, and reserve and paramilitary forces, as well 
as rapid mobilization. The goal of Romania's strategy was to make 
any Soviet intervention prohibitively protracted and costly. Roma- 
nia rejected any integration of Warsaw Pact forces that could 
undercut its ability to resist a Soviet invasion. For example, it ended 
its participation in Warsaw Pact joint exercises because multi- 
national maneuvers required the Romanian Army to assign its 
forces to a non-Romanian command authority. Romania stopped 



322 



Appendix C 



sending its army officers to Soviet military schools for higher edu- 
cation. When the Romanian military establishment and its educa- 
tional institutions assumed these functions, training focused strictly 
on Romania's independent military strategy. Romania also ter- 
minated its regular exchange of intelligence with the Soviet Union 
and directed counterintelligence efforts against possible Soviet 
penetration of the Romanian Army. These steps combined to make 
it a truly national military establishment responsive only to domestic 
political authorities and ensured that it would defend the country's 
sovereignty. 

Romania's independent national defense policy helped to 
underwrite its assertion of greater policy autonomy. In the only 
Warsaw Pact body in which it continued to participate actively, 
the PCC, Romania found a forum to make its disagreements with 
the Soviet Union public, to frustrate Soviet plans, and to work to 
protect its new autonomy. The Soviet Union could not maintain 
the illusion of Warsaw Pact harmony when Romanian recalcitrance 
forced the PCC to adopt "coordinated" rather than unanimous 
decisions. Romania even held up PCC approval for several weeks 
of the appointment of Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Iakubovskii 
as Warsaw Pact commander in chief. However, Romania did not 
enjoy the relative geographical isolation from the Soviet Union that 
made Yugoslav and Albanian independence possible, and the Soviet 
Union would not tolerate another outright withdrawal from the 
Warsaw Pact. 

The Prague Spring 

In 1968 an acute crisis in the Soviet alliance system suddenly 
overwhelmed the slowly festering problem of Romania. The Prague 
Spring represented a more serious challenge than that posed by 
Romania because it occurred in an area more crucial to Soviet secu- 
rity. The domestic liberalization program of the Czechoslovak com- 
munist regime led by Alexander Dubcek threatened to generate 
popular demands for similar changes in the other East European 
countries and even parts of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union 
believed it necessary to forestall the spread of liberalization and 
to assert its right to enforce the boundaries of ideological permissi- 
bility in Eastern Europe. However, domestic change in Czechoslo- 
vakia also began to affect defense and foreign policy, just as it had 
in Hungary in 1956, despite Dubcek' s declared intention to keep 
Czechoslovakia within the Warsaw Pact. This worrying develop- 
ment was an important factor in the Soviet decision to invade 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 — one that Western analysts have generally 
overlooked. 



323 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

The new political climate of the Prague Spring and the lifting 
of press censorship brought into the open a longstanding debate 
within the Czechoslovak military establishment over the nature of 
the Warsaw Pact and Czechoslovakia's membership in it. In the 
mid-1960s, this debate centered on Soviet domination of the NSWP 
countries and of the Warsaw Pact and its command structure. 
Czechoslovakia had supported Romania in its opposition to Soviet 
calls for greater military integration and backed its demands for 
a genuine East European role in alliance decision making at PCC 
meetings. 

In 1968 high-ranking Czechoslovak officers and staff members 
at the Klement Gottwald Military Academy began to discuss the 
need for a truly independent national defense strategy based on 
Czechoslovakia's national interests rather than the Soviet security 
interests that always prevailed in the Warsaw Pact. The fundamen- 
tal premise of such an independent military policy was that an 
all-European collective security system, mutual nonaggression 
agreements among European states, the withdrawal of all troops 
from foreign countries, and a Central European nuclear-free zone 
could guarantee the country's security against outside aggression 
better than its membership in the Warsaw Pact. Although the Soviet 
Union had advocated these same arrangements in the 1950s, 
Czechoslovakia was clearly out of step with the Soviet line in 1968. 
Czechoslovakia threatened to complicate Soviet military strategy 
in Central Europe by becoming a neutral country dividing the War- 
saw Pact into two parts along its front with NATO. 

The concepts underpinning this developing Czechoslovak 
national defense strategy were formalized in the Gottwald Academy 
Memorandum circulated to the general (main) staffs of the other 
Warsaw Pact armies. The Gottwald Memorandum received a 
favorable response from Poland, Hungary, and Romania. In a tele- 
vised news conference, at the height of the 1968 crisis, the chief 
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's military department, 
Lieutenant General Vaclav Prchlfk, denounced the Warsaw Pact 
as an unequal alliance and declared that the Czechoslovak Army 
was prepared to defend the country's sovereignty by force, if neces- 
sary. In the end, the Soviet Union intervened to prevent the 
Czechoslovak Army from fully developing the military capabili- 
ties to implement its newly announced independent defense strategy, 
which could have guaranteed national independence in the politi- 
cal and economic spheres. The August 1968 invasion preempted 
the possibility of the Czechoslovak Army's mounting a credible 
deterrent against future Soviet interventions. The Soviet decision 



324 



Appendix C 



in favor of intervention focused, in large measure, on ensuring its 
ability to maintain physical control of its wayward ally in the future. 

In contrast to its rapid, bloody suppression of the 1956 Hun- 
garian Revolution, the Soviet Union engaged in a lengthy cam- 
paign of military coercion against Czechoslovakia. In 1968 the 
Soviet Union conducted more joint Warsaw Pact exercises than 
in any other year since the maneuvers began in the early 1960s. 
The Soviet Union used these exercises to mask preparations for, 
and threaten, a Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia that would 
occur unless Dubcek complied with Soviet demands and abandoned 
his political liberalization program. Massive Warsaw Pact rear ser- 
vices and communications exercises in July and August enabled 
the Soviet General Staff to execute its plan for the invasion without 
alerting Western governments. Under the pretext of exercises, 
Soviet and NSWP divisions were brought up to full strength, reserv- 
ists were called up, and civilian transportation resources were 
requisitioned. The cover that these exercises provided allowed the 
Soviet Union to deploy forces along Czechoslovakia's borders in 
Poland and East Germany and to demonstrate to the Czechoslo- 
vak leadership its readiness to intervene. 

On August 20, a force consisting of twenty-three Soviet Army 
divisions invaded Czechoslovakia. Token NSWP contingents, 
including one Hungarian, two East German, and two Polish divi- 
sions, along with one Bulgarian brigade, also took part in the 
invasion. In the wake of its invasion, the Soviet Union installed 
a more compliant communist party leadership and concluded a 
status-of-forces agreement with Czechoslovakia, which established 
a permanent Soviet presence in that country for the first time. Five 
Soviet Army divisions remained in Czechoslovakia to protect the 
country from future "imperialist threats." These troops became 
the Central Group of Forces (CGF) and added to Soviet strength 
directly bordering NATO. The Czechoslovak Army, having failed 
to oppose the Soviet intervention and defend the country's 
sovereignty, suffered a tremendous loss of prestige after 1968. At 
Soviet direction, reliable Czechoslovak authorities conducted a 
purge and political re-education campaign in the Czechoslovak 
Army and cut its size. After 1968 the Soviet Union closed and 
reorganized the Klement Gottwald Military Academy. With its one- 
time junior partner now proven unreliable, the Soviet Union turned 
to Poland as its principal East European ally. 

The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia showed the hollow- 
ness of the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe in both its 
political and its military aspects. The Soviet Union did not convene 
the PCC to invoke the Warsaw Pact's terms during the 1968 crisis 



325 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

because a formal PCC session would have revealed a deep rift in 
the Soviet alliance and given Czechoslovakia an international plat- 
form from which it could have defended its reform program. The 
Soviet Union did not allow NSWP officers to direct the Warsaw 
Pact exercises that preceded the intervention in Czechoslovakia, 
and Soviet Army officers commanded all multinational exercises 
during the crisis. While the intervention force was mobilized and 
deployed under the Warsaw Pact's commander in chief, the Soviet 
General Staff transferred full operational command of the inva- 
sion to the commander in chief of the Soviet ground forces, Army 
General I.G. Pavlovskii. Despite the participation of numerous 
East European army units, the invasion of Czechoslovakia was not 
in any sense a multilateral action. The Soviet invasion force car- 
ried out all important operations on Czechoslovakia's territory. 
Moreover, the Soviet Union quickly withdrew all NSWP troops 
from Czechoslovakia to forestall the possibility of their ideological 
contamination. NSWP participation served primarily to make the 
invasion appear to be a multinational operation and to deflect direct 
international criticism of the Soviet Union. 

While the participation of four NSWP armies in the Soviet-led 
invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated considerable Warsaw Pact 
cohesion, the invasion also served to erode it. The invasion of 
Czechoslovakia proved that the Warsaw Pact's internal mission 
of keeping orthodox East European communist party regimes in 
power — and less orthodox ones in line — was more important than 
the external mission of defending its member states against exter- 
nal aggression. The Soviet Union was unable to conceal the fact 
that the alliance served as the ultimate mechanism for its control 
of Eastern Europe. Formulated in response to the crisis in Czecho- 
slovakia, the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine declared that the East 
European countries had "limited" sovereignty to be exercised only 
as long as it did not damage the interests of the "socialist com- 
monwealth" as a whole. Since the Soviet Union defined the interests 
of the "socialist commonwealth," it could force its NSWP allies 
to respect its overwhelming security interest in keeping Eastern 
Europe as its buffer zone. 

The Romanian leader, Ceausescu, after refusing to contribute 
troops to the Soviet intervention force as the other East European 
countries had done, denounced the invasion of Czechoslovakia as 
a violation of international law and the Warsaw Pact's cardinal 
principle of mutual noninterference in internal affairs. Ceau§escu 
insisted that collective self-defense against external aggression was 
the only valid mission of the Warsaw Pact. Albania also objected 
to the Soviet invasion and indicated its disapproval by withdrawing 



326 



Appendix C 



formally from the Warsaw Pact after six years of inactive mem- 
bership. 

The Organizational Structure of the Warsaw Pact 

The Warsaw Pact administers both the political and the mili- 
tary activities of the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe. A 
series of changes beginning in 1969 gave the Warsaw Pact the struc- 
ture it retained through the mid-1980s. 

Political Organization 

The general (first) secretaries of the communist and workers' 
parties and heads of state of the Warsaw Pact member states meet 
in the PCC (see table A, this Appendix). The PCC provides a for- 
mal point of contact for the Soviet and East European leaders in 
addition to less formal bilateral meetings and visits. As the highest 
decision-making body of the Warsaw Pact, the PCC is charged with 
assessing international developments that could affect the security 
of the allied states and warrant the execution of the Warsaw Pact's 
collective self-defense provisions. In practice, however, the Soviet 
Union has been unwilling to rely on the PCC to perform this func- 
tion, fearing that Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania could 
use PCC meetings to oppose Soviet plans and policies. The PCC 
is also the main center for coordinating the foreign policy activi- 
ties of the Warsaw Pact countries. Since the late 1960s, when several 
member states began to use the alliance structure to confront the 
Soviets and assert more independent foreign policies, the Soviet 
Union has had to bargain and negotiate to gain support for its for- 
eign policy within Warsaw Pact councils. 

In 1976 the PCC established the permanent Committee of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs (CMFA) to regularize the previously 
ad hoc meetings of Soviet and East European representatives to 
the Warsaw Pact. Given the official task of preparing recommen- 
dations for and executing the decisions of the PCC, the CMFA 
and its permanent Joint Secretariat have provided the Soviet Union 
an additional point of contact to establish a consensus among its 
allies on contentious issues. Less formal meetings of the deputy 
ministers of foreign affairs of the Warsaw Pact member states 
represent another layer of alliance coordination. If alliance problems 
can be resolved at these working levels, they will not erupt into 
embarrassing disputes between the Soviet and East European lead- 
ers at PCC meetings. 

Military Organization 

The Warsaw Pact's military organization is larger and more active 



327 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 
Table A. Formal Meetings of the Warsaw Pact Agencies, 1956-87 





Date 


Place 


Body 


Final Communique Summary 


1956 


January 


Prague 


PCC 1 


National People's Army of East 
Germany formed 


1958 


May 


Moscow 


-do- 


Proposed nonaggression pact with 
NATO. Removal of Soviet troops 
from Romania 


1960 


February 


-do- 


-do- 




1961 


March 


-do- 


-do- 




1962 


June 


-do- 


-do- 




1963 


July 


-do- 


-do- 




1965 


January 


Warsaw 


-do- 


Convening a conference on collec- 
tive security in Europe in 1966 




July 


Bucharest 


-do- 


Strengthening peace and security 
in Europe 


1968 


March 


Sofia 


-do- 




1969 


-do- 


Budapest 


-do- 


The Committee of Ministers of 
Defense (CMD) established. An 
appeal for a Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). Improving the command 
and control, structure, and agen- 
cies of the Warsaw Pact 




December 


Moscow 


Military 
Council 


Strengthening the command and 
control agencies of the Warsaw 
Pact 




-do- 


-do- 


CMD 


Strengthening the defense capabil- 
ity of the Warsaw Pact 


1970 


April 


Budapest 


Military 
Council 






May 


ooiia 


LjIVHJ 






August 


Moscow 


PCC 


The situation in Europe 




October 


Varna 


Military 
Council 






December 


East Berlin 


PCC 


Third World conflicts. Strengthen- 
ing security in Europe 


1971 


March 


Budapest 


CMD 


Developing Warsaw Pact com- 
mand, control, and communica- 
tions systems 




May 


East Berlin 


Military 
Council 






October 


Poland 


-do- 





328 



Appendix C 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



Place 



Body 



Final Communique Summary 



1972 January 

February 
April 

October 



Prague 

East Berlin 
Bucharest 

Minsk 



PCC 



CMD 

Military 
Council 

-do- 



Peace, security, and cooperation 
in Europe 

The situation in Europe 
Interaction among the allied 



1973 February 
May 

October 



Warsaw 
Sofia 

Prague 



CMD 

Military 
Council 

-do- 



1974 February 
March 

April 

November 



Bucharest 
Budapest 

Warsaw 
East Berlin 



CMD 

Military 
Council 

PCC 

Military 
Council 



Third World conflicts 



1975 January 

May 

October 
November 



Moscow 

Warsaw 

Bucharest 
Prague 



CMD 

Military 
Council 

-do- 

CMD 



Current activities of the directive 
agencies of the JAF 2 



Improving training methods. Cur- 
rent activities of the directive 
agencies of the JAF 



1976 May Kiev 

November Bucharest 



Decembei 



Sofia 



Military 
Council 

PCC 



CMD 



Furthering detente in Europe. 
Committee of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs (CMFA) estab- 
lished 

Current activities of the JAF' s 
command and control agencies 



1977 May 
-do- 
October 
November 



Prague 
Moscow 

Sofia 
Budapest 



Military 
Council 

CMD 



Military 
Council 

CMD 



Problems of peace, security, and 
cooperation in Europe 



329 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



Place 



Both 



Final Communique Summary 



1978 April 
May 



October 

November 

December 



Sofia 

Budapest 

East Berlin 

Moscow 
East Berlin 



CMFA 

Military 
Council 

-do- 

PCC 

CMD 



The Belgrade CSCE review 
meeting 



The status of detente in Europe 



1979 April 

May 
October 

December 
-do- 



Warsaw 

Budapest 
Bucharest 

Warsaw 
-do- 



Military 
Council 

CMFA 

Military 
Council 

CMD 

CMFA 



Detente 



980 May 
-do- 



October 
-do- 
December 



-do- 
Moscow 

Prague 
Warsaw 
Bucharest 



PCC 

Military 
Council 

-do- 
CMFA 
CMD 



The status of detente. The War- 
saw Pact's twenty-fifth anniversary 

Detente. Summarized twenty-five 
years of work to develop the allied 
armies 



1981 April 

October 
December 
-do- 
-do- 

1982 October 
-do- 

1983 January 

-do- 
April 
-do- 
October 



Sofia 

Budapest 
Bucharest 

Moscow 
East Berlin 

Warsaw 
Moscow 

Prague 

-do- 
-do- 
Bucharest 

Sofia 



Military 
Council 

-do- 

CMFA 

CMD 

Military 
Council 

-do- 

CMFA 



PCC 

CMD 

CMFA 

Military 
Council 

CMFA 



Measures to strengthen peace and 
security in Europe 

A proposal for a non-use-of-force 
pact with NATO 3 

Detente 



The situation in Europe 



330 



Appendix C 



Table A. — Continued 





Date 


Place 


Body 


Final Communique Summary 




-do- 


East Berlin 


CMD 


The tense and dangerous situation 
in Europe 




October 


Lvov 


Military 
Council 






December 


Sofia 


CMD 




1 QR4- 
1 jot 


April 


Budapest 


CMFA 


The situation in Europe 




-do- 


Prague 


Military 
Council 






October 


Sofia 


-do- 






December 


East Berlin 


CMFA 


The international situation exacer- 
bated by the United States and 
NATO 




-do- 


Budapest 


CMD 




1985 


May 


-do- 


Military 
Council 






October 


Sofia 


PCC 






November 


East Berlin 


Military 
Council 






December 


-do- 


CMD 






March 


Warsaw 


dlvlr A 






April 


-do- 


Military 
Council 






June 


Budapest 


PCC 






October 


Bucharest 


CMFA 


The Reykjavik summit meeting 


1987 


March 


Moscow 


-do- 






April 


Minsk 


Military 
Council 






May 


East Berlin 


PCC 





1 PCC— Political Consultative Committee. 

2 J AF— Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States 

3 NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 



than the alliance's political bodies. Several different organizations 
are responsible for implementing PCC directives on defense mat- 
ters and developing the capabilities of the national armies that con- 
stitute the JAF. However, the principal task of the military 
organizations is to link the East European armies to the Soviet 
armed forces. The alliance's military agencies coordinate the train- 
ing and mobilization of East European national forces assigned to 



331 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

the Warsaw Pact. In turn, these forces can be deployed in accor- 
dance with Soviet military strategy against an NSWP country or 
NATO. 

Soviet control of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance is scarcely 
veiled. The Warsaw Pact's JAF has no command structure, logis- 
tics network, air defense system, or operations directorate separate 
from the Soviet Ministry of Defense. The 1968 invasion of Czecho- 
slovakia demonstrated how easily control of the JAF could be trans- 
ferred in wartime to the Soviet General Staff and Soviet field 
commanders. The dual roles of the Warsaw Pact commander in 
chief, who is a first deputy Soviet minister of defense, and the War- 
saw Pact chief of staff, who is a first deputy chief of the Soviet 
General Staff, facilitate the transfer of Warsaw Pact forces to Soviet 
control. The subordination of the Warsaw Pact to the Soviet General 
Staff is also shown clearly in the Soviet military hierarchy. The 
chief of the Soviet General Staff is listed above the Warsaw Pact 
commander in chief in the Soviet order of precedence, even though 
both positions are filled by first deputy Soviet ministers of defense. 

Ironically, the first innovations in the Warsaw Pact's structure 
since 1955 came after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which had 
clearly underlined Soviet control of the alliance. At the 1969 PCC 
session in Budapest, the Soviet Union agreed to cosmetic altera- 
tions in the Warsaw Pact designed to address East European com- 
plaints about Soviet domination of the alliance. These changes 
included the establishment of the formal Committee of Ministers 
of Defense (CMD) and the Military Council as well as the addi- 
tion of more non-Soviet officers to the Joint Command and the 
Joint Staff (see fig. B, this Appendix). 

The CMD is the leading military body of the Warsaw Pact. In 
addition to the ministers of defense of the Warsaw Pact member 
states, the commander in chief and the chief of staff of the JAF 
are statutory members of the CMD. With its three seats on the 
CMD, the Soviet Union can exercise a working majority in the 
nine-member body with the votes of only two of its more loyal East 
European allies. The chairmanship of the CMD supposedly rotates 
among the ministers of defense. In any event, the brief annual meet- 
ings of the CMD severely limit its work to pro forma pronounce- 
ments or narrow guidelines for the Joint Command, Military 
Council, and Joint Staff to follow. 

The Joint Command develops the overall training plan for joint 
Warsaw Pact exercises and for the national armies to promote the 
assimilation of Soviet equipment and tactics. Headed by the War- 
saw Pact's commander in chief, the Joint Command is divided into 
distinct Soviet and East European tiers. The deputy commanders 



332 



Appendix C 



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333 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

in chief include Soviet and East European officers. The Soviet 
officers serving as deputy commanders in chief are specifically 
responsible for coordinating the East European navies and air forces 
with the corresponding Soviet service branches. The East Euro- 
pean deputy commanders in chief are the deputy ministers of 
defense of the NSWP countries. While providing formal NSWP 
representation in the Joint Command, the East European deputies 
also assist in the coordination of Soviet and non-Soviet forces. The 
commander in chief, deputy commanders in chief, and chief of staff 
of the JAF gather in the Military Council on a semiannual basis 
to plan and evaluate operational and combat training. With the 
Warsaw Pact's commander in chief acting as chairman, the ses- 
sions of the Military Council rotate among the capitals of the War- 
saw Pact countries. 

The Joint Staff is the only standing Warsaw Pact military body 
and is the official executive organ of the CMD, commander in chief, 
and Military Council. As such, it performs the bulk of the Warsaw 
Pact's work in the military realm. Like the Joint Command, the 
Joint Staff has both Soviet and East European officers. These non- 
Soviet officers also serve as the principal link between the Soviet 
and East European armed forces. The Joint Staff organizes all joint 
exercises and arranges multilateral meetings and contacts of Warsaw 
Pact military personnel at all levels. 

The PCC's establishment of official CMD meetings, the Mili- 
tary Council, and the bifurcation of the Joint Command and Joint 
Staff allowed for greater formal East European representation, as 
well as more working-level positions for senior non-Soviet officers, 
in the alliance. Increased NSWP input into the alliance decision- 
making process ameliorated East European dissatisfaction with con- 
tinued Soviet dominance of the Warsaw Pact and even facilitated 
the work of the JAF. However, a larger NSWP role in the alliance 
did not reduce actual Soviet control of the Warsaw Pact command 
structure. 

The 1969 PCC meeting also approved the formation of two more 
Warsaw Pact military bodies, the Military Scientific-Technical Coun- 
cil and the Technical Committee. These innovations in the Warsaw 
Pact structure represented a Soviet attempt to harness NSWP 
weapons and military equipment production, which had greatly 
increased during the 1960s. The Military Scientific-Technical Coun- 
cil assumed responsibility for directing armaments research and 
development within the Warsaw Pact, while the Technical Com- 
mittee coordinated standardization. Comecon's Military-Industrial 
Commission supervised NSWP military production facilities (see 
Appendix B). 



334 



Appendix C 



After 1969 the Soviet Union insisted on tighter Warsaw Pact 
military integration as the price for greater NSWP participation 
in alliance decision making. Under the pretext of directing Warsaw 
Pact programs and activities aimed at integration, officers from 
the Soviet Ministry of Defense penetrated the East European armed 
forces. Meetings between senior officers from the Soviet and East 
European main political directorates allowed the Soviets to monitor 
the loyalty of the national military establishments. Joint Warsaw 
Pact exercises afforded ample opportunity for the evaluation and 
selection of reliable East European officers for promotion to com- 
mand positions in the field, the national military hierarchies, and 
the Joint Staff. Warsaw Pact military science conferences, including 
representatives from each NSWP general (main) staff, enabled the 
Soviets to check for signs that an East European ally was formulating 
a national strategy or developing military capabilities beyond Soviet 
control. In 1973 the deputy ministers of foreign affairs signed the 
"Convention on the Capacities, Privileges, and Immunities of the 
Staff and Other Administrative Organs of the Joint Armed Forces 
of the Warsaw Pact Member States," which established the prin- 
ciple of extraterritoriality for alliance agencies, legally sanctioned 
the efforts of these Soviet officers to penetrate the East European 
military establishments, and prevented any host government inter- 
ference in their work. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact commander in 
chief still retained his resident representatives in the national minis- 
tries of defense as direct sources of information on the situation 
inside the allied armies. 

The Warsaw Pact, 1970-87 

The crisis in Czechoslovakia and Romania's recalcitrance gave 
a new dimension to the challenge facing the Soviet Union in Eastern 
Europe. The Soviet Union's East European allies had learned that 
withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and achieving independence 
from Soviet control were unrealistic goals, and they aimed instead 
at establishing a greater measure of autonomy within the alliance. 
Romania had successfully carved out a more independent position 
within the bounds of the Warsaw Pact. In doing so, it provided 
an example to the other East European countries of how to use 
the Warsaw Pact councils and committees to articulate positions 
contrary to Soviet interests. Beginning in the early 1970s, the East 
European allies formed intra-alliance coalitions in Warsaw Pact 
meetings to oppose the Soviet Union, defuse its pressure on any 
one NSWP member state, and delay or obstruct Soviet policies. 
The Soviets could no longer use the alliance to transmit their 
positions to, and receive an automatic endorsement from, the 



335 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

subordinate NSWP countries. While still far from genuine con- 
sultation, Warsaw Pact policy coordination between the Soviet 
Union and the East European countries in the 1970s was a step 
away from the blatant Soviet control of the alliance that had charac- 
terized the 1950s. East European opposition forced the Soviet Union 
to treat the Warsaw Pact as a forum for managing relations with 
its allies and bidding for their support on issues like detente, the 
Third World, the Solidarity crisis in Poland, alliance burden- 
sharing, and relations with NATO. 

Detente 

In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union abandoned its earlier efforts 
to achieve the simultaneous dissolution of the two European mili- 
tary blocs and concentrated instead on legitimizing the territorial 
status quo in Europe. The Soviets asserted that the official East- 
West agreements reached during the detente era "legally secured 
the most important political-territorial results of World War II." 
Under these arrangements, the Soviet Union allowed its East 
European allies to recognize West Germany's existence as a separate 
state. In return the West, and West Germany in particular, 
explicitly accepted the inviolability of all postwar borders in Eastern 
Europe and tacitly recognized Soviet control of the eastern half of 
both Germany and Europe. The Soviets claim the 1975 Helsinki 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which 
ratified the existing political division of Europe, as a major victory 
for Soviet diplomacy and the realization of longstanding Soviet calls, 
issued through the PCC, for a general European conference on 
collective security. 

The consequences of detente, however, also posed a significant 
challenge to Soviet control of Eastern Europe. First, detente caused 
a crisis in Soviet-East German relations. East Germany's leader, 
Walter Ulbricht, opposed improved relations with West Germany 
and, following Ceau§escu's tactics, used Warsaw Pact councils to 
attack the Soviet detente policy openly. In the end, the Soviet Union 
removed Ulbricht from power, in 1971, and proceeded unhindered 
into detente with the West. Second, detente blurred the strict 
bipolarity of the cold war era, opened Eastern Europe to greater 
Western influence, and loosened Soviet control over its allies. The 
relaxation of East- West tensions in the 1970s reduced the level of 
threat perceived by the NSWP countries, along with their perceived 
need for Soviet protection, and eroded Warsaw Pact alliance 
cohesion. After the West formally accepted the territorial status 
quo in Europe, the Soviet Union was unable to point to the danger 
of "imperialist" attempts to overturn East European communist 



336 



Appendix C 



party regimes to justify its demand for strict Warsaw Pact unity 
behind its leadership, as it had in earlier years. The Soviets resorted 
to occasional propaganda offensives, accusing West Germany of 
revanche and aggressive intentions in Eastern Europe, to remind 
its allies of their ultimate dependence on Soviet protection and to 
reinforce the Warsaw Pact's cohesion against the attraction of good 
relations with the West. 

Despite these problems, the detente period witnessed relatively 
stable Soviet-East European relations within the Warsaw Pact. In 
the early 1970s, the Soviet Union greatly expanded military 
cooperation with the NSWP countries. The joint Warsaw Pact 
exercises, conducted in the 1970s, gave the Soviet allies their first 
real capability for offensive operations other than intra-bloc polic- 
ing actions. The East European countries also began to take an 
active part in Soviet strategy in the Third World. 

The Role of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries in the Third 
World 

With Eastern Europe in a relatively quiescent phase, the Soviet 
Union began to build an informal alliance system in the Third 
World during the 1970s. In this undertaking the Soviets drew on 
their experiences in developing allies in Eastern Europe after 1 945 . 
Reflecting this continuity, the Soviet Union called its new Third 
World allies "people's democracies" and their armed forces 
" national liberation armies." The Soviets also drew on their East 
European resources directly by enlisting the Warsaw Pact allies 
as proxies to "enhance the role of socialism in world affairs," that 
is, to support Soviet interests in the Middle East and Africa. Since 
the late 1970s, the NSWP countries have been active mainly in 
Soviet-allied Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique, the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), and Syria. 

The Soviet Union employed its Warsaw Pact allies as surrogates 
primarily because their activities would minimize the need for direct 
Soviet involvement and obviate possible international criticism of 
Soviet actions in the Third World. Avowedly independent East 
European actions would be unlikely to precipitate or justify a 
response by the United States. The Soviet Union also counted on 
closer East European economic ties with Third World countries 
to alleviate some of Eastern Europe's financial problems. From the 
East European perspective, involvement in the Third World offered 
an opportunity for reduced reliance on the Soviet Union and for 
semiautonomous relations with other countries. 

In the 1970s, the East European allies followed the lead of Soviet 
diplomacy and signed treaties on friendship, cooperation, and mutual 



337 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

assistance with most of the important Soviet Third World allies. 
These treaties established a "socialist division of labor" among the 
East European countries, in which each specialized in the provi- 
sion of certain aspects of military or economic assistance to differ- 
ent Soviet Third World allies. The most important part of the 
treaties concerned military cooperation; the Soviets have openly 
acknowledged the important role of the East European allies in 
providing weapons to the "national armies of countries with socialist 
orientation. " 

In the 1970s and 1980s, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Ger- 
many were the principal Soviet proxies for arms transfers to the Third 
World. These NSWP countries supplied Soviet-manufactured equip- 
ment, spare parts, and training personnel to various Third World 
armies. The Soviet Union used these countries to transship weapons 
to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) in the 
early 1970s, Soviet-backed forces in the 1975 Angolan civil war, 
and Nicaragua in the 1980s. The Soviet Union also relied on East 
German advisers to set up armed militias, paramilitary police forces, 
and internal security and intelligence organizations for selected 
Third World allies. The Soviets considered this task especially 
important because an efficient security apparatus would be essen- 
tial for suppressing opposition forces and keeping a ruling regime, 
allied to the Soviet Union, in power. In addition to on-site activi- 
ties, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and particularly East Germany 
trained Third World military and security personnel in Eastern 
Europe during the 1980s. 

During this period, the Soviet Union also relied on its East 
European allies to provide the bulk of Soviet bloc economic aid 
and credits to the countries of the Third World. Perhaps revealing 
their hesitancy about military activities outside the Warsaw Pact's 
European operational area, Hungary and Poland have confined 
their Third World involvement to commercial assistance. Both 
countries sent economic and administrative advisers to assist in the 
management of state-directed industrial enterprises in the Third 
World as part of a Soviet campaign to demonstrate the advantages 
of the "socialist path of development" to potential Third World 
allies. 

The Warsaw Pact has added no new member states in the more 
than thirty years of its existence. Even at the height of its Third 
World activities in the mid- to late 1970s, the Soviet Union did 
not offer Warsaw Pact membership to any of its important Third 
World allies. In 1986, after the United States bombed Libya in 
retaliation for its support of international terrorism, the Soviet 
Union was reported to have strongly discouraged Libyan interest in 



338 



Appendix C 



Warsaw Pact membership, expressed through one or more NSWP 
countries, and limited its support of Libya to bilateral consulta- 
tions after the raid. Having continually accused the United States 
of attempting to extend NATO's sphere of activity beyond Europe, 
the Soviets did not want to open themselves to charges of broadening 
the Warsaw Pact. In any event, the Soviet Union would be unlikely 
to accept a noncommunist, non-European state into the Warsaw 
Pact. Moreover, the Soviets have already had considerable suc- 
cess in establishing strong allies throughout the world, outside their 
formal military alliance. 

Beginning in the late 1970s, mounting economic problems 
sharply curtailed the contribution of the East European allies to 
Soviet Third World activities. In the early 1980s, when turmoil 
in Poland reminded the Soviet Union that Eastern Europe remained 
its most valuable asset, the Third World became a somewhat less 
important object of Soviet attention. 

The Solidarity Crisis 

The rise of the independent trade union Solidarity shook the foun- 
dation of communist party rule in Poland and, consequently, Soviet 
control of a country the Soviet Union considers critical to its secu- 
rity and alliance system. Given Poland's central geographic posi- 
tion, this unrest threatened to isolate East Germany, sever vital 
lines of communication to Soviet forces deployed against NATO, 
and disrupt Soviet control in the rest of Eastern Europe. 

As in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union used the Warsaw 
Pact to carry out a campaign of military coercion against the Polish 
leadership. In 1980 and 1981, the Soviet Union conducted joint 
Warsaw Pact exercises with a higher frequency than at any time 
since 1968 to exert pressure on the Polish regime to solve the Solidar- 
ity problem. Under the cover that the exercises afforded, the Soviet 
Union mobilized and deployed its reserve and regular troops in 
the Belorussian Military District as a potential invasion force. In 
the West-81 and Union-81 exercises, Soviet forces practiced 
amphibious and airborne assault landings on the Baltic Sea coast 
of Poland. These maneuvers demonstrated a ready Soviet capa- 
bility for intervention in Poland. 

In the midst of the Polish crisis, Warsaw Pact commander in 
chief Viktor Kulikov played a crucial role in intra- alliance diplomacy 
on behalf of the Soviet leadership. Kulikov maintained almost con- 
stant contact with the Polish leadership and conferred with the lead- 
ers of Bulgaria, East Germany, and Romania about a possible 
multilateral Warsaw Pact military action against Poland. In Decem- 
ber 1981, Kulikov pressed Polish United Workers Party first 



339 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski to activate his contingency plan for 
declaring martial law with the warning that the Soviet Union was 
ready to intervene in the absence of quick action by Polish authori- 
ties. As it turned out, the Polish government instituted martial law 
and suppressed Solidarity just as the Soviet press was reporting 
that these steps were necessary to ensure that Poland could meet 
its Warsaw Pact commitment to the security of the other member 
states. 

From the Soviet perspective, the imposition of martial law by 
Polish internal security forces was the best possible outcome. Martial 
law made the suppression of Solidarity a strictly domestic affair 
and spared the Soviet Union the international criticism that an 
invasion would have generated. However, the extensive use of 
Polish paramilitary police and riot troops suggested that the Soviet 
Union could not count on the Polish Army to put down Polish work- 
ers. Moreover, while the Brezhnev Doctrine of using force to main- 
tain the leading role of the communist party in society was uphc r i 
in Poland, it was not the Soviet Union that enforced it. 

Some question remains as to whether the Soviet Union could 
have used force successfully against Poland. An invasion would 
have damaged the Soviet Union's beneficial detente relationship 
with Western Europe. Intervention would also have added to the 
evidence that the internal police function of the Warsaw Pact was 
more important than the putative external collective self-defense 
mission it had never exercised. Moreover, Romania, and conceiv- 
ably Hungary, would have refused to contribute contingents to a 
multinational Warsaw Pact force intended to camouflage a Soviet 
invasion. Failure to gain the support of its allies would have 
represented a substantial embarrassment to the Soviet Union. In 
stark contrast to the unopposed intervention in Czechoslovakia, 
the Soviets probably also anticipated tenacious resistance from the 
general population and the Polish Army to any move against 
Poland. Finally, an invasion would have placed a weighty economic 
and military burden on the Soviet Union; the occupation and 
administration of Poland would have tied down at least ten Soviet 
Army divisions for an extended period of time. Nevertheless, had 
there been no other option, the Soviet Union would certainly have 
invaded Poland to eliminate Solidarity's challenge to communist 
party rule in that country. 

Although the Polish Army had previously played an important 
role in Soviet strategy for a coalition war against NATO, the Soviet 
Union had to revise its plans and estimates of Poland's reliability 
after 1981 , and it turned to East Germany as its most reliable ally. 
In the early 1980s, because of its eager promotion of Soviet 



340 



Appendix C 



interests in the Third World and its importance in Soviet military 
strategy, East Germany completed its transformation from defeated 
enemy and dependent ally into the premier junior partner of the 
Soviet Union. Ironically, East Germany's efficiency and loyalty 
have made the Soviet Union uncomfortable. Encroaching some- 
what on the leading role of the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact, 
East Germany has been the only NSWP country to institute the 
rank of marshal, matching the highest Soviet Army rank and 
implying its equality with the Soviet Union. 

The End of Detente 

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the West grew disenchanted 
with detente, which had failed to prevent Soviet advances in the 
Third World, the deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range ballis- 
tic missiles (IRBMs) aimed at West European targets, the inva- 
sion of Afghanistan, or the suppression of Solidarity. The Soviet 
Union used the renewal of East-West conflict as a justification for 
forcing its allies to close ranks within the Warsaw Pact. But restoring 
the alliance's cohesion and renewing its confrontation with Western 
Europe proved difficult after several years of good East-West rela- 
tions. The East European countries had acquired a stake in main- 
taining detente for various reasons. In the early 1980s, internal 
Warsaw Pact disputes centered on relations with the West after 
detente, NSWP contributions to alliance defense spending, and the 
alliance's reaction to IRBM deployments by NATO. The resolu- 
tion of these disputes produced significant changes in the Warsaw 
Pact as, for the first time, two or more NSWP countries simul- 
taneously challenged Soviet military and foreign policy preferences 
within the alliance. 

In the PCC meetings of the late 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet 
and East European leaders of the Warsaw Pact debated about the 
threat emanating from NATO. When the Soviet Union argued 
that a new cold war loomed over Europe, the East European coun- 
tries insisted that the improved European political climate of detente 
still prevailed. On several occasions, the Soviets had to compromise 
on the relative weight of these two alternatives in the language of 
PCC declarations. Although the Soviet Union succeeded in offi- 
cially ending detente for the Warsaw Pact, it was unable to achieve 
significantly greater alliance cohesion or integration. 

Discussions of the "NATO threat" also played a large part in 
Warsaw Pact debates about an appropriate level of NSWP mili- 
tary expenditure. The Soviet Union used the 1978 PCC meeting 
to try to force its allies to match a scheduled 3-percent, long-term 
increase in the military budgets of the NATO countries. Although 



341 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

the East European countries initially balked at this Soviet demand, 
they eventually agreed to the increase. However, only East Ger- 
many actually honored its pledge, and the Soviet Union failed to 
achieve its goal of increased NSWP military spending. 

The debate on alliance burden-sharing did not end in 1978. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Soviets carefully noted that one 
of the Warsaw Pact's most important functions was monitoring 
the "fraternal countries and the fulfillment of their duties in the 
joint defense of socialism." In 1983 Romania adopted a unilateral 
three-year freeze on its military budget at its 1982 level. In 1985 
Ceau§escu frustrated the Soviet Union by calling for a unilateral 
Warsaw Pact reduction in arms expenditures, ostensibly to put pres- 
sure on NATO to follow its example. At the same time, Hungary 
opposed Soviet demands for increased spending, arguing instead 
for more rational use of existing resources. In the mid-1980s, East 
Germany was the only Soviet ally that continued to expand its mili- 
tary spending. 

The refusal of the NSWP countries to meet their Warsaw Pact 
financial obligations in the 1980s clearly indicated diminished 
alliance cohesion. The East European leaders argued that the costs 
of joint exercises, their support for Soviet Army garrisons, and the 
drain of conscription represented sufficient contributions to the 
alliance at a time of hardship in their domestic economies. In 
addition to providing access to bases and facilities opposite NATO, 
the East European communist regimes were also obligated to abide 
by Soviet foreign policy and security interests to earn a Soviet 
guarantee against domestic challenges to their continued rule. For 
its part, the Soviet Union paid a stiff price in terms of economic 
aid and subsidized trade with the NSWP countries to maintain its 
buffer zone in Eastern Europe. 

The issue of an appropriate Warsaw Pact response to NATO's 
1983 deployment of American Pershing II and cruise missiles, 
matching the Soviet SS-20s, proved to be the most divisive one 
for the Soviet Union and its East European allies in the early and 
mid-1980s. After joining in a vociferous Soviet propaganda cam- 
paign against the deployment, the East European countries split 
with the Soviet Union over how to react when their "peace offen- 
sive" failed to forestall it. 

In 1983 East Germany, Hungary, and Romania indicated their 
intention to "limit the damage" to East- West ties that could have 
resulted from the deployment of NATO's new missiles. In doing 
so, these countries raised the possibility of an independent role for 
the smaller countries of both alliances in reducing conflicts between 
the two superpowers. In particular, East Germany sought to insulate 



342 



Appendix C 



its profitable economic ties with West Germany, established through 
detente, against the general deterioration in East- West political 
relations. While East Germany had always been the foremost propo- 
nent of "socialist internationalism," that is, strict adherence to 
Soviet foreign policy interests, its position on this issue caused a 
rift in the Warsaw Pact. In effect, East Germany asserted that the 
national interests of the East European countries did not coincide 
exactly with those of the Soviet Union. 

The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia attacked the East Ger- 
man stand, accusing the improbable intra-bloc alliance of East 
Germany, Hungary, and Romania of undermining the class basis 
of Warsaw Pact foreign policy. The Soviet Union indicated that 
it would not permit its allies to become mediators between East 
and West. The Soviet Union forced East Germany to accept its 
"counterdeployments" of SS-21 and SS-23 SRBMs and compelled 
SED general secretary Erich Honecker to cancel his impending visit 
to West Germany. The Soviets thereby reaffirmed their right to 
determine the conditions under which the Warsaw Pact member 
states would conduct relations with the NATO countries. However, 
the Soviet Union also had to forego any meeting of the PCC in 
1984 that might have allowed its recalcitrant allies to publicize their 
differences on this issue. 

As late as 1985, Soviet leaders still had not completely resolved 
the question of the proper connection between the national and 
international interests of the socialist countries. Some Soviet com- 
mentators adopted a conciliatory approach toward the East Euro- 
pean position by stating that membership in the Warsaw Pact did 
not erase a country's specific national interests, which could be com- 
bined harmoniously with the common international interests of all 
the member states. Others, however, simply repeated the Brezhnev 
Doctrine and its stricture that a socialist state's sovereignty involves 
not only the right to independence but also a responsibility to the 
"socialist commonwealth" as a whole. 

The Problem of Romania in the 1970s and 1980s 

The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was, tangentially, 
a warning to Romania about its attempts to pursue genuine national 
independence. But Ceau§escu, in addition to refusing to contrib- 
ute Romanian troops to the Warsaw Pact invasion force, openly 
declared that Romania would resist any similar Soviet interven- 
tion on its territory. Romania pronounced that henceforth the Soviet 
Union represented its most likely national security threat. After 
1968 the Romanian Army accelerated its efforts to make its inde- 
pendent defense strategy a credible deterrent to a possible Soviet 



343 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

invasion of the country. In the 1970s Romania also established 
stronger ties to the West, China, and the Third World. These diplo- 
matic, economic, and military relations were intended to increase 
Romania's independence from the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet 
Union, while guaranteeing broad international support for Romania 
in the event of a Soviet invasion. 

Throughout the 1970s, Romania continued to reject military inte- 
gration within the Warsaw Pact framework and military interven- 
tion against other member states, while insisting on the right of 
the East European countries to resolve their internal problems 
without Soviet interference. Romanian objections to the Soviet line 
within the Warsaw Pact forced the Soviet Union to acknowledge 
the "possibility of differences arising in the views of the ruling com- 
munist parties on the assessment of some international develop- 
ments." To obtain Romanian assent on several questions, the 
Soviet Union also had to substitute the milder formulation "inter- 
national solidarity" for "socialist internationalism" — the code 
phrase for the subordination of East European national interests 
to Soviet interests — in PCC declarations. Pursuing a policy opposed 
to close alliance integration, Romania resisted Soviet domination 
of Warsaw Pact weapons production as a threat to its autonomy 
and refused to participate in the work of the Military Scientific- 
Technical Council and Technical Committee (see The Military 
Organization of the Warsaw Pact, this Appendix). Nevertheless, 
the Soviets have insisted that a Romanian Army officer hold a 
position on the Technical Committee; his rank, however, is not 
appropriate to that level of responsibility. The Soviet claims are 
probably intended to obscure the fact that Romania does not 
actually engage in joint Warsaw Pact weapons production efforts. 

Despite continued Romanian defiance of Soviet policies in the 
Warsaw Pact during the 1980s, the Soviet Union successfully 
exploited Romania's severe economic problems and bribed Roma- 
nia with energy supplies on several occasions to gain its assent, 
or at least silence, in the Warsaw Pact. Although Romania raised 
the price the Soviet Union had to pay to bring it into line, Roma- 
nian dependence on Soviet economic support may foreshadow 
Romania's transformation into a more cooperative Warsaw Pact 
ally. Moreover, in 1985 Ceau§escu dismissed Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Stefan Andrei and Minister of Defense Constantin Olteanu, 
who helped establish the country's independent policies and would 
have opposed closer Romanian involvement with the Warsaw Pact. 

The Renewal of the Alliance 

In his first important task after becoming general secretary of 



344 



Appendix C 



the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, Mikhail 
Gorbachev organized a meeting of the East European leaders to 
renew the Warsaw Pact, which was due to expire that May after 
thirty years. There was little doubt that the Warsaw Pact member 
states would renew the alliance. However, there was some specu- 
lation that the Soviet Union might unilaterally dismantle its for- 
mal alliance structure to improve the Soviet image in the West and 
put pressure on NATO to disband. The Soviets could still have 
relied on the network of bilateral treaties in Eastern Europe, which 
predated the formation of the Warsaw Pact and had been renewed 
regularly. Combined with later status-of-forces agreements, these 
treaties ensured that the essence of the Soviet alliance system and 
buffer zone in Eastern Europe would remain intact, regardless of 
the Warsaw Pact's status. But despite their utility, the bilateral 
treaties could never substitute for the Warsaw Pact. Without a for- 
mal alliance, the Soviet Union would have to coordinate foreign 
policy and military integration with its East European allies through 
cumbersome bilateral arrangements. Without the Warsaw Pact, 
the Soviet Union would have no political equivalent of NATO for 
international negotiations like the CSCE and Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reduction talks, or for issuing its arms control pronounce- 
ments. The Soviet Union would also have to give up its equal status 
with the United States as an alliance leader. 

Although the Soviet and East European leaders debated the terms 
of the Warsaw Pact's renewal at their April 1985 meeting — 
Ceau§escu reportedly proposed that it be renewed for a shorter 
period — they did not change the original 1955 document, or the 
alliance's structure, in any way. The Soviets concluded that this 
outcome proved that the Warsaw Pact truly embodied the "fun- 
damental long-term interests of the fraternal countries." The 
decision to leave the Warsaw Pact unamended was probably the 
easiest alternative for the Soviet Union and its allies; the alliance 
was renewed for another twenty-year term with an automatic ten- 
year extension. 

In the mid- to late 1980s, the future of the Warsaw Pact hinged 
on Gorbachev's developing policy toward Eastern Europe. At the 
Twenty- seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union in 1986, Gorbachev acknowledged that differences existed 
among the Soviet allies and that it would be unrealistic to expect 
them to have identical views on all issues. There has been no firm 
indication, as yet, of whether Gorbachev would be willing to grant 
the Soviet allies more policy latitude or insist on tighter coordina- 
tion with the Soviet Union. However, demonstrating a greater sen- 
sitivity to East European concerns than previous Soviet leaders, 



345 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Gorbachev briefed the NSWP leaders in their own capitals after 
the 1985 Geneva and 1986 Reykjavik superpower summit meetings. 

According to many Western analysts, mounting economic 
difficulties in the late 1980s and the advanced age of trusted, long- 
time communist party leaders, like Gustav Husak in Czechoslo- 
vakia, Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria, and Janos Kadar in Hungary, 
presented the danger of domestic turmoil and internal power strug- 
gles in the NSWP countries. These problems had the potential to 
monopolize Soviet attention and constrain Soviet global activities. 
But the Soviet Union could turn these potential crises into oppor- 
tunities, using its economic leverage to pressure its East European 
allies to adhere more closely to Soviet positions or to influence the 
political succession process to ensure that a new generation of leaders 
in Eastern Europe would respect Soviet interests. Soviet insistence 
on greater NSWP military spending could fuel further economic 
deterioration, leading to political unrest and even threats to the 
integrity of the Soviet alliance system in several countries simul- 
taneously. Conversely, limited, Soviet-sanctioned deviation from 
orthodox socialism could make the East European regimes more 
secure and reduce the Soviet burden of policing the Warsaw Pact. 

Soviet Military Strategy and the Warsaw Pact 

The Soviet ground forces constitute the bulk of the Warsaw Pact's 
military power. In 1987 the Soviet Union provided 73 of the 126 
Warsaw Pact tank and motorized rifle divisions. Located in the 
Soviet Groups of Forces (SGFs) and four westernmost military dis- 
tricts of the Soviet Union, these Soviet Army divisions comprise 
the majority of the Warsaw Pact's combat-ready, full-strength units. 
Looking at the numbers of Soviet troops stationed in or near Eastern 
Europe, and the historical record, one could conclude that the 
Warsaw Pact is only a Soviet mechanism for organizing intra- 
alliance interventions or maintaining control of Eastern Europe and 
does not significantly augment Soviet offensive power vis-a-vis 
NATO. Essentially a peacetime structure for NSWP training and 
mobilization, the Warsaw Pact has no independent role in wartime 
nor a military strategy distinct from Soviet military strategy. 
However, the individual NSWP armies play important parts in 
Soviet strategy for war, outside the formal context of the Warsaw 
Pact. 

Soviet Military Strategy 

The goal of Soviet military strategy in Europe is a quick victory 
over NATO in a nonnuclear war. The Soviet Union would attempt 
to defeat NATO decisively before its political and military command 



346 



Appendix C 



structure could consult and decide how to respond to an attack. 
Under this strategy, success would hinge on inflicting a rapid suc- 
cession of defeats on NATO to break its will to fight, knock some 
of its member states out of the war, and cause the collapse of the 
Western alliance. A quick victory would also keep the United States 
from escalating the conflict to the nuclear level by making retalia- 
tion against the Soviet Union futile. A rapid defeat of NATO would 
preempt the mobilization of its superior industrial and economic 
resources, as well as reinforcement from the United States, which 
would enable NATO to prevail in a longer war. Most significant, 
in a strictly conventional war the Soviet Union could conceivably 
capture its objective, the economic potential of Western Europe, 
relatively intact. 

In the 1970s, Soviet nuclear force developments increased the 
likelihood that a European war would remain on the conventional 
level. By matching the United States in intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and adding intermediate-range SS-20s to its nuclear forces, 
the Soviet Union undercut NATO's option to employ nuclear 
weapons to avoid defeat in a conventional war. After the United 
States neutralized the Soviet SS-20 IRBM advantage by deploy- 
ing Pershing II and cruise missiles, the Soviet Union tried to use 
its so-called "counterdeployments" of SS-21 and SS-23 SRBMs 
to gain a nuclear war-fighting edge in the European theater. At 
the same time, the Soviet Union made NATO's dependence on 
nuclear weapons less tenable by issuing Warsaw Pact proposals for 
mutual no-first-use pledges and the establishment of nuclear-free 
zones. 

The Soviet plan for winning a conventional war quickly to 
preclude the possibility of a nuclear response by NATO and the 
United States was based on the deep-strike concept Soviet mili- 
tary theoreticians first proposed in the 1930s. After 1972 the Soviet 
Army put deep strike into practice in annual joint Warsaw Pact 
exercises, including "Brotherhood-in-Arms," "Union," "Friend- 
ship," "West," and "Shield." Deep strike would carry an attack 
behind the front lines of battle, far into NATO's rear areas. The 
Soviet Union would launch simultaneous missile and air strikes 
against vital NATO installations to disrupt or destroy the Western 
alliance's early warning surveillance systems, command and com- 
munications network, and nuclear delivery systems. Following this 
initial strike, the modern-day successor of the World War II-era 
Soviet mobile group formations, generated out of the SGFs in 
Eastern Europe, would break through and encircle NATO's pre- 
pared defenses in order to isolate its forward forces from reinforce- 
ment. Consisting of two or more tank and motorized rifle divisions, 



347 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

army-level mobile groups would also overrun important NATO 
objectives behind the front lines to facilitate the advance of Soviet 
follow-on forces, which would cross NSWP territory from the 
westernmost Soviet military districts. 

The Warsaw Pact countries provide forward bases, staging areas, 
and interior lines of communication for the Soviet Union against 
NATO. Peacetime access to East European territory under the 
Warsaw Pact framework has enabled the Soviet military to pre- 
position troops, equipment, and supplies and to make reinforce- 
ment plans for wartime. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union increased 
road and rail capacity and built new airfields and pipelines in 
Eastern Europe. However, a quick Soviet victory through deep 
strike could be complicated by the fact that the attacking forces 
would have to achieve almost total surprise. Past Soviet mobiliza- 
tions for relatively small actions in Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, 
and Poland took an average of ninety days, while United States 
satellites observed the entire process. Moreover, the advance notifi- 
cation of large-scale troop movements, required under agreements 
made at the CSCE, would also complicate the concealment of 
mobilization. Yet the Soviet Union could disguise its offensive 
deployments against NATO as semiannual troop rotations in the 
GSFG, field exercises, or preparations for intervention against an 
ally. 

The Role of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries in 
Soviet Military Strategy 

The Warsaw Pact has no multilateral command or decision- 
making structure independent of the Soviet Army. NSWP forces 
would fight in Soviet, rather than joint Warsaw Pact, military opera- 
tions. Soviet military writings about the alliances of World War I 
and World War II, as well as numerous recent works marking the 
thirtieth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact in 1985, reveal the cur- 
rent Soviet view of coalition warfare. The Warsaw Pact's chief of 
staff, A.I. Gribkov, has written that centralized strategic control, 
like that the Red Army exercised over the allied East European 
national units between 1943 and 1945, is valid today for the Warsaw 
Pact's J AF (see The Organization of East European National Units, 
1943-45, this Appendix). 

Soviet military historians indicate that the East European allies 
did not establish or direct operations on independent national fronts 
during World War II. The East European forces fought in units, 
at and below the army level, on Soviet fronts and under the Soviet 
command structure. The headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High 
Command exercised control over all allied units through the Soviet 



348 



Appendix C 



General Staff. At the same time, the commanders in chief of the 
allied countries were attached to and "advised" the Soviet Supreme 
High Command. There were no special coalition bodies to make 
joint decisions on operational problems. A chart adapted from a 
Soviet journal indicates that the Soviet-directed alliance in World 
War II lacked a multilateral command structure independent of 
the Red Army's chain of command, an arrangement that also 
reflects the current situation in the Warsaw Pact (see fig. C, this 
Appendix). The Warsaw Pact's lack of a wartime command struc- 
ture independent of the Soviet command structure is clear evidence 
of the subordination of the NSWP armies to the Soviet Army. 

Since the early 1960s, the Soviet Union has used the Warsaw 
Pact to prepare non- Soviet forces to take part in Soviet Army opera- 
tions in the European theater of war. In wartime the Warsaw Pact 
commander in chief and chief of staff would transfer NSWP forces, 
mobilized and deployed under the Warsaw Pact aegis, to the oper- 
ational control of the Soviet ground forces. After deployment the 
Soviet Union could employ NSWP armies, comprised of various 
East European divisions, on its fronts (see Glossary). In joint 
Warsaw Pact exercises, the Soviet Union has detached care- 
fully selected, highly reliable East European units, at and below 
the division-level, from their national command structures. These 
specific contingents are trained for offensive operations within Soviet 
ground forces divisions. NSWP units, integrated in this man- 
ner, would fight as component parts of Soviet armies on Soviet 
fronts. 

The East European countries play specific roles in Soviet strategy 
against NATO based on their particular military capabilities. 
Poland has the largest and best NSWP air force that the Soviet 
Union could employ in a theater air offensive. Both Poland and 
East Germany have substantial naval forces that, in wartime, would 
revert to the command of the Soviet Baltic Fleet to render fire sup- 
port for Soviet ground operations. These two Soviet allies also have 
amphibious forces that could carry out assault landings along the 
Baltic Sea coast into NATO's rear areas. While its mobile groups 
would penetrate deep into NATO territory, the Soviet Union would 
entrust the less reliable or capable East European armies, like those 
of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, with a basically defen- 
sive mission. The East European countries are responsible for secur- 
ing their territory, Soviet rear areas, and lines of communication. 
The air defense systems of all NSWP countries are linked directly 
into the Soviet Air Defense Forces command. This gives the Soviet 
Union an impressive early warning network against NATO air 
attacks. 



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Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

The Reliability of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Armies 

The Soviet Union counts on greater cooperation from its Warsaw 
Pact allies in a full-scale war with NATO than in intra- alliance 
policing actions. Nevertheless, the Soviets expect that a protracted 
war in Europe would strain the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. This 
view may derive from the experience of World War II, in which 
Nazi Germany's weak alliance partners, Romania, Hungary, and 
Bulgaria, left the war early and eventually joined the Soviet side. 
A stalemate in a protracted European war could lead to unrest, 
endanger communist party control in Eastern Europe, and frac- 
ture the entire Soviet alliance system. NSWP reliability would also 
decline, requiring the Soviet Army to reassign its own forces to 
carry out unfulfilled NSWP functions or even to occupy a non- 
compliant ally's territory. 

Continuing Soviet concern over the combat reliability of its East 
European allies influences, to a great extent, the employment of 
NSWP forces under Soviet strategy. Soviet military leaders believe 
that the Warsaw Pact allies would be most likely to remain loyal 
if the Soviet Army engaged in a short, successful offensive against 
NATO, while deploying NSWP forces defensively. Under this 
scenario, the NSWP allies would absorb the brunt of NATO attacks 
against Soviet forces on East European territory. Fighting in Eastern 
Europe would reinforce the impression among the NSWP coun- 
tries that their actions constituted a legitimate defense against out- 
side attack. The Soviet Union would still have to be selective in 
deploying the allied armies offensively. For example, the Soviet 
Union would probably elect to pit East German forces against non- 
German NATO troops along the central front. Other NSWP forces 
that the Soviet Union employed offensively would probably be 
interspersed with Soviet units on Soviet fronts to increase their relia- 
bility. The Soviet Union would not establish separate East Euro- 
pean national fronts against NATO. Independent NSWP fronts 
would force the Soviet Union to rely too heavily on its allies to per- 
form well in wartime. Moreover, independent East European fronts 
could serve as the basis for a territorial defense strategy and suc- 
cessful resistance to future Soviet policing actions in Eastern Europe. 

Soviet concern over the reliability of its Warsaw Pact allies is 
also reflected in the alliance's military-technical policy, which is 
controlled by the Soviets. The Soviet Union has given the East 
European allies less modern, though still effective, weapons and 
equipment to keep their armies several steps behind the Soviet 
Army. The Soviets cannot modernize the East European armies 
without concomitantly improving their capability to resist Soviet 
intervention. 



350 



Appendix C 




Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Military Technology and the Warsaw Pact 

As a result of its preponderance in the alliance, the Soviet Union 
has imposed a level of standardization in the Warsaw Pact that 
NATO cannot match. Standardization in NATO focuses primarily 
on the compatibility of ammunition and communications equip- 
ment among national armies. By contrast, the Soviet concept of 
standardization involves a broad complex of measures aimed at 
achieving "unified strategic views on the general character of a 
future war and the capabilities for conducting it. " The Soviet Union 
uses the Warsaw Pact framework to bring its allies into line with 
its view of strategy, operations, tactics, organizational structure, 
service regulations, field manuals, documents, staff procedures, and 
maintenance and supply activities. 

The Weapons and Equipment of the Non-Soviet Warsaw 
Pact Armies 

By the 1980s, the Soviet Union had achieved a degree of tech- 
nical interoperability among the allied armies that some observers 
would consider to be a significant military advantage over NATO. 
However, the Soviet allies had weapons and equipment that were 
both outdated and insufficient in number. As one Western analyst 
has pointed out, the NSWP armies remain fully one generation 
behind the Soviet Union in their inventories of modern equipment 
and weapons systems and well below Soviet norms in force struc- 
ture quantities. Although T-64 and T-72 tanks had become stan- 
dard and modern infantry combat vehicles, including the BMP-1 , 
comprised two-thirds of the armored infantry vehicles in Soviet 
Army units deployed in Eastern Europe, the NSWP armies still 
relied primarily on older T-54 and T-55 tanks and domestically 
produced versions of Soviet BTR-50 and BTR-60 armored per- 
sonnel carriers. The East European air forces did not receive the 
MiG-23, first built in 1971, until the late 1970s, and they still did 
not have the most modern Soviet ground attack fighter-bombers, 
like the MiG-27 and Su-24, in the mid- to late 1980s. These defi- 
ciencies called into question NSWP capabilities for joining in Soviet 
offensive operations against NATO and indicated primarily a rear- 
area role for the NSWP armies in Soviet strategy. 

Within the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union decides which of the 
allies receive the most up-to-date weapons. Beginning in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the Soviet Union provided the strategically 
located Northern Tier countries, East Germany and Poland espe- 
cially, with greater quantities of advanced armaments. By contrast, 
the less important Southern Tier, consisting of Hungary, Bulgaria, 



352 



The major Warsaw Pact maneuvers of 1980, called 
"Brotherhood-in-Arms 80, " took place in East Germany. 

Courtesy United Press International 



353 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

and Romania, received used equipment that was being replaced 
in Soviet or Northern Tier forces. In the mid-1970s, overall NSWP 
force development slowed suddenly as the Soviet Union became 
more interested in selling arms to earn hard currency and gain 
greater influence in the Third World, particularly in the oil-rich 
Arab states of the Middle East. At the same time, growing eco- 
nomic problems in Eastern Europe made many Third World coun- 
tries look like better customers for Soviet arms sales. Between 1974 
and 1978, the Soviet Union sent the equivalent of US$18.5 mil- 
lion of a total US$27 million in arms transfers outside the Warsaw 
Pact. Moreover, massive Soviet efforts to replace heavy Arab equip- 
ment losses in the 1973 war against Israel and the 1982 Syrian- 
Israeli air war over Lebanon came largely at the expense of modern- 
ization for the East European allies. In the late 1980s, the NSWP 
countries clearly resented the fact that some Soviet Third World 
allies, including Algeria, Libya, and Syria, had taken delivery of 
the newest Soviet weapons systems, such as the MiG-25, not yet 
in their own inventories. The Soviet Union probably looked at a 
complete modernization program for the NSWP armies as unneces- 
sary and prohibitively costly for either it or its allies to undertake. 

Coordination of Arms Production 

The Soviet Union claims the right to play the leading role in 
the Warsaw Pact on the basis of its scientific, technical, and eco- 
nomic preponderance in the alliance. The Soviet Union also 
acknowledges its duty to cooperate with the NSWP countries by 
sharing military-technical information and developing their local 
defense industries. This cooperation, however, amounts to Soviet 
control over the supply of major weapons systems and is an 
important aspect of Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact allies. 
Warsaw Pact military-technical cooperation prevents the NSWP 
countries from adopting autonomous policies or otherwise defy- 
ing Soviet interests through a national defense capability based on 
domestic arms production. In discussions of the United States and 
NATO, the Soviets acknowledge that standardization and control 
of arms purchases are effective in increasing the influence of the 
leading member of an alliance over its smaller partners. In the same 
way, Soviet arms supplies to Eastern Europe have made the NSWP 
military establishments more dependent on the Soviet Union. To 
deny its allies the military capability to successfully resist a Soviet 
invasion, the Soviet Union does not allow the NSWP countries to 
produce sufficient quantities or more than a few kinds of weapons 
for their national armies. 



354 



Appendix C 



Romania is the only Warsaw Pact country that has escaped Soviet 
military- technical domination. In the late 1960s, Romania recog- 
nized the danger of depending on the Soviet Union as its sole source 
of military equipment and weapons. As a result, Romania initiated 
heavy domestic production of relatively low-technology infantry 
weapons and began to seek non-Soviet sources for more advanced 
armaments. Romania has produced British transport aircraft, 
Chinese fast-attack boats, and French helicopters under various 
coproduction and licensing arrangements. Romania has also pro- 
duced a fighter-bomber joindy with Yugoslavia. However, Romania 
still remains backward in its military technology because both the 
Soviet Union and Western countries are reluctant to transfer their 
most modern weapons to it. Each side must assume that any tech- 
nology given to Romania could end up in enemy hands. 

Apart from Romania, the Soviet Union benefits from the limited 
military production of its East European allies. It has organized 
an efficient division of labor among the NSWP countries in this 
area. Czechoslovakia and East Germany, in particular, are heavily 
industrialized and probably surpass the Soviet Union in their high- 
technology capabilities. The Northern Tier countries produce some 
Soviet heavy weapons, including older tanks, artillery, and infan- 
try combat vehicles on license. However, the Soviet Union gener- 
ally restricts its allies to the production of a relatively narrow range 
of military equipment, including small arms, munitions, communi- 
cations, radar, optical, and other precision instruments and vari- 
ous components and parts for larger Soviet-designed weapons 
systems. 

The 1980s have witnessed a dramatic increase in the amount of 
secondary source material published about the Warsaw Pact. The 
works of Alex Alexiev, Andrzej Korbonski, and Condoleezza Rice, 
as well as various Soviet writers, provide a complete picture of the 
Soviet alliance system and the East European military establishments 
before the formation of the Warsaw Pact. William J. Lewis's The 
Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy is a very useful reference 
work with considerable information on the establishment of the 
Warsaw Pact and the armies of its member states. The works of 
Malcolm Mackintosh, a long-time observer of the Warsaw Pact, 
cover the changes in the Warsaw Pact's organizational structure 
and functions through the years. Christopher D. Jones's Soviet 
Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact and 
subsequent articles provide a coherent interpretation of the Soviet 



355 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Union's use of the Warsaw Pact to control its East European allies. 
In "The Warsaw Pact at 25," Dale R. Herspring examines intra- 
alliance politics in the PCC and East European attempts to reduce 
Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact. Soviet military journals 
are the best source for insights into the East European role in Soviet 
military strategy. Daniel N. Nelson and Ivan Volgyes analyze East 
European reliability in the Warsaw Pact. Nelson takes a quantita- 
tive approach to this ephemeral topic. By contrast, Volgyes uses 
a historical and political framework to draw his conclusions on the 
reliability issue. The works of Richard C. Martin and Daniel S. 
Papp present thorough discussions of Soviet policies on arming and 
equipping the NSWP allies. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



356 



Appendix D 



Manifesto of Charter 77 

[The following manifesto first appeared in Western Europe in early Janu- 
ary 1977. Within a few days Charter 77 — as its anonymous authors called 
the document and the movement responsible for its appearance — had been 
translated into most major languages and had received attention through- 
out the world. Charter 77 soon became well known within Czechoslovakia 
as a result of Western radiobroadcasts. Charter 77 indicts the govern- 
ment for violations of human rights provisions in the nation's 1960 Con- 
stitution and in various treaties and covenants of which Czechoslovakia 
is a signatory. The translation presented here appeared in The Times of 
London on January 7, 1977, bearing a notation that it was an " autho- 
rized" translation. The notation indicated neither who had made nor 
who had authorized the translation.] 

IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK Register of Laws No. 120 of Oc- 
tober 13, 1976, texts were published of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which were signed on 
behalf of our republic in 1968, reiterated at Helsinki in 1975 and 
came into force in our country on March 23, 1976. From that date 
our citizens have enjoyed the rights, and our state the duties, en- 
suing from them. 

The human rights and freedoms underwritten by these covenants 
constitute features of civilized life for which many progressive move- 
ments have striven throughout history and whose codification could 
greatly assist humane developments in our society. 

We accordingly welcome the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's 
accession to those agreements. 

Their publication, however, serves as a powerful reminder of 
the extent to which basic human rights in our country exist, regret- 
tably, on paper alone. 

The right to freedom of expression, for example, guaranteed by 
Article 19 of the first-mentioned covenant, is in our case purely 
illusory. Tens of thousands of our citizens are prevented from 
working in their own fields for the sole reason that they hold views 
differing from official ones, and are discriminated against and 
harassed in all kinds of ways by the authorities and public organi- 
zations. Deprived as they are of any means to defend themselves, 
they become victims of a virtual apartheid. 



357 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Hundreds of thousands of other citizens are denied that ' 4 free- 
dom from fear" mentioned in the preamble to the first covenant, 
being condemned to the constant risk of unemployment or other 
penalties if they voice their own opinions. 

In violation of Article 13 of the second-mentioned covenant, 
guaranteeing everyone the right to education, countless young peo- 
ple are prevented from studying because of their own views or even 
their parents'. Innumerable citizens live in fear of their own, or 
their children's right to education being withdrawn if they should 
ever speak up in accordance with their convictions. 

Any exercise of the right to "seek, receive and impart informa- 
tion and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, 
in writing or in print" or "in the form of art" specified in Article 
19, Clause 2 of the first covenant is followed by extra-judicial and 
even judicial sanctions, often in the form of criminal charges, as 
in the recent trial of young musicians. 

Freedom of public expression is inhibited by the centralized con- 
trol of all the communication media and of publishing and cultur- 
al institutions. No philosophical, political or scientific view or artistic 
activity that departs ever so slightly from the narrow bounds of 
official ideology or aesthetics is allowed to be published; no open 
criticism can be made of abnormal social phenomena; no public 
defense is possible against false and insulting charges made in official 
propaganda — the legal protection against "attacks on honor and 
reputation" clearly guaranteed by Article 17 of the first covenant 
is in practice non-existent: false accusations cannot be rebutted, 
and any attempt to secure compensation or correction through the 
courts is futile; no open debate is allowed in the domain of thought 
and art. 

Many scholars, writers, artists and others are penalized for having 
legally published or expressed, years ago, opinions which are con- 
demned by those who hold political power today. 

Freedom of religious confession, emphatically guaranteed by 
Article 18 of the first covenant, is continually curtailed by arbitrary 
official action; by interference with the activity of churchmen, who 
are constantly threatened by the refusal of the state to permit them 
the exercise of their functions, or by the withdrawal of such per- 
mission; by financial or other transactions against those who express 
their religious faith in word or action; by constraints on religious 
training and so forth. 

One instrument for the curtailment or in many cases complete 
elimination of many civic rights is the system by which all national 
institutions and organizations are in effect subject to political 



358 



Appendix D 



directives from the machinery of the ruling party and to decisions 
made by powerful individuals. 

The constitution of the republic, its laws and legal norms do not 
regulate the form or content, the issuing or application of such de- 
cisions; they are often only given out verbally, unknown to the pub- 
lic at large and beyond its powers to check; their originators are 
responsible to no one but themselves and their own hierarchy; yet 
they have a decisive impact on the decision-making and executive 
organs of government, justice, trade unions, interest groups and 
all other organizations, of the other political parties, enterprises, 
factories, institutions, offices and so on, for whom these instruc- 
tions have precedence even before the law. 

Where organizations or individuals, in the interpretation of their 
rights and duties, come into conflict with such directives, they can- 
not have recourse to any non-party authority, since none such exists. 
This constitutes, of course, a serious limitation of the right ensu- 
ing from Articles 21 and 22 of the first-mentioned covenant, which 
provides for freedom of association and forbids any restriction on 
its exercise, from Article 25 on the right to take part in the con- 
duct of public affairs, and from Article 26 stipulating equal pro- 
tection by the law without discrimination. 

This state of affairs likewise prevents workers and others from 
exercising the unrestricted right to establish trade unions and other 
organizations to protect their economic and social interests, and 
from freely enjoying the right to strike provided for in Clause 1 
of Article 8 in the second-mentioned covenant. 

Further civic rights, including the explicit prohibition of "arbi- 
trary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence" 
(Article 17 of the first covenant), are seriously vitiated by the vari- 
ous forms of interference in the private life of citizens exercised 
by the Ministry of the Interior, for example by bugging telephones 
and houses, opening mail, following personal movements, search- 
ing homes, setting up networks of neighborhood informers (often 
recruited by illicit threats or promises) and in other ways. 

The ministry frequently interferes in employers' decisions, in- 
stigates acts of discrimination by authorities and organizations, 
brings weight to bear on the organs of justice and even orchestrates 
propaganda campaigns in the media. This activity is governed by 
no law and, being clandestine, affords the citizen no chance to de- 
fend himself. 

In cases of prosecution on political grounds the investigative and 
judicial organs violate the rights of those charged and those defend- 
ing them, as guaranteed by Article 14 of the first covenant and 
indeed by Czechoslovak law. The prison treatment of those 



359 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

sentenced in such cases is an affront to their human dignity and 
a menace to their health, being aimed at breaking their morale. 

Clause 2, Article 12 of the first covenant, guaranteeing every 
citizen the right to leave the country, is consistently violated, or 
under the pretense of * 'defense of national security" is subjected 
to various unjustifiable conditions (Clause 3). The granting of entry 
visas to foreigners is also treated arbitrarily, and many are unable 
to visit Czechoslovakia merely because of professional or personal 
contacts with those of our citizens who are subject to discrimination. 

Some of our people — either in private, at their places of work 
or by the only feasible public channel, the foreign media — have 
drawn attention to the systematic violation of human rights and 
democratic freedoms and demanded amends in specific cases. But 
their pleas have remained largely ignored or been made grounds 
for police investigation. 

Responsibility for the maintenance of civic rights in our coun- 
try naturally devolves in the first place on the political and state 
authorities. Yet not only on them: everyone bears his share of 
responsibility for the conditions that prevail and accordingly also 
for the observance of legally enshrined agreements, binding upon 
all individuals as well as upon governments. 

It is this sense of co-responsibility, our belief in the importance 
of its conscious public acceptance and the general need to give it 
new and more effective expression that led us to the idea of creat- 
ing Charter 77, whose inception we today publicly announce. 

Charter 77 is a loose, informal and open association of people 
of various shades of opinion, faiths and professions united by the 
will to strive individually and collectively for the respecting of civic 
and human rights in our own country and throughout the world — 
rights accorded to all men by the two mentioned international 
covenants, by the Final Act of the Helsinki conference and by 
numerous other international documents opposing war, violence 
and social or spiritual oppression, and which are comprehensively 
laid down in the UN Universal Charter of Human Rights. 

Charter 77 springs from a background of friendship and solidarity 
among people who share our concern for those ideals that have 
inspired, and continue to inspire, their lives and their work. 

Charter 77 is not an organization; it has no rules, permanent 
bodies or formal membership. It embraces everyone who agrees 
with its ideas and participates in its work. It does not form the basis 
for any oppositional political activity. Like many similar citizen 
initiatives in various countries, West and East, it seeks to promote 
the general public interest. 



360 



Appendix D 



It does not aim, then, to set out its own platform of political or 
social reform or change, but within its own field of impact to con- 
duct a constructive dialogue with the political and state authori- 
ties, particularly by drawing attention to individual cases where 
human and civic rights are violated, to document such grievances 
and suggest remedies, to make proposals of a more general character 
calculated to reinforce such rights and machinery for protecting 
them, to act as an intermediary in situations of conflict which may 
lead to violations of rights, and so forth. 

By its symbolic name Charter 77 denotes that it has come into 
being at the start of a year proclaimed as Political Prisoners' Year — 
a year in which a conference in Belgrade is due to review the im- 
plementation of the obligations assumed at Helsinki. 

As signatories, we hereby authorize Professor Dr. Jan Patocka, 
Dr. Vaclav Havel and Professor Dr. Jin Hajek to act as the spokes- 
men for the Charter. These spokesmen are endowed with full 
authority to represent it vis-a-vis state and other bodies, and the 
public at home and abroad, and their signatures attest to the authen- 
ticity of documents issued by the Charter. They will have us and 
others who join us as their colleagues taking part in any needful 
negotiations, shouldering particular tasks and sharing every respon- 
sibility. 

We believe that Charter 77 will help to enable all citizens of 
Czechoslovakia to work and live as free human beings. 



361 



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view Press, 1984. 

Whetten, Lawrence L. "The Warsaw Pact as an Instrument for 
Inducing Political and Military Integration and Interdepen- 
dency." Pages 237-68 in Arlene Idol Broadhurst (ed.), The Future 
of European Alliance Systems: NA TO and the Warsaw Pact. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1982. 



390 



Bibliography 

Zhilin, P. A., et al. Stroitel 'stvo armii evropeiskikh stran sotsialistichesko- 
go sodruzhestva 1949-1980. Moscow: Nauka, 1984. 



391 



Glossary 



army — In Soviet military usage, an army has at least two divisions. 
A Soviet or non-Soviet Warsaw Pact motorized rifle division 
has between 10,000 and 14,000 troops. 

Carpatho-Ukraine (also Subcarpathian Ruthenia) — An area once 
part of Czechoslovakia but ceded to the Soviet Union after 
World War II. Populated mostly by Ukrainians, who prior to 
World War II were sometimes referred to as Ruthenians. 

Charter 77 — The human rights document around which Czech and 
Slovak dissidents have rallied since its signing in 1977. 

Comecon — Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Sometimes 
cited as CMEA or CEMA. Members in 1987 included Bul- 
garia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany), Hungary, the Mongolian People's Repub- 
lic, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. Its pur- 
pose is to further economic cooperation among members. 

Cominform — The Communist Information Bureau, made up of 
the communist parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czecho- 
slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia (expelled in 
1948), France, and Italy. It was formed on Soviet initiative 
in 1947 and dissolved on Soviet initiative in 1956. The Comin- 
form' s primary function was to publish propaganda touting in- 
ternational communist solidarity. It was regarded primarily as 
a tool of Soviet foreign policy. 

communist and communism — Czechoslovakia officially describes 
itself as " socialist" and its economic system as "socialism" 
(the preferred terms in the West are "communist" and "com- 
munism") and claims that it is working its way toward com- 
munism, which Lenin defined as a higher stage of socialism. 
Czechoslovak socialism bears scant resemblance to the demo- 
cratic socialism of, for example, Scandinavian countries. 

Dual Monarchy — The dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy estab- 
lished by the Compromise of 1867 and lasting until 1918. Aus- 
tria and Hungary were virtually separate states, each having 
its own parliament, administration, and judicial system. They 
shared a common ruler, a joint foreign policy, and finances. 

extensive economic development — Expanding production by add- 
ing resources rather than by improving the efficiency by which 
these resources are exploited. 

front — In Soviet military usage, a front consists of at least two 
armies and usually more than that number. Two or more fronts 
constitute a theater of military operations. 



393 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Hussitism — Teachings of the fifteenth-century Czech religious 
reformer Jan Hus challenging papal authority and the corrup- 
tion of the Roman Catholic Church. In asserting national 
autonomy in ecclesiastical affairs, Hussitism acquired an anti- 
German reputation and was considered a Czech national 
movement. 

koruna (pi., koruny) — National currency consisting of 100 halers 
(halefe — Cz.; haliere — SI.). Symbol is Kcs. In 1987 the official, 
or commercial, exchange rate was Kcs5.4 per US$1 ; the tourist, 
or noncommercial, rate was Kcsl0.5 per US$1. The value of 
US$1 on the black market was at least twice the tourist rate 
of exchange. 

kraj (pi. , kraje) — Primary administrative region into which both the 
Czech and the Slovak socialist republics are divided. 

kulaks — the relatively prosperous segment of peasants in the Rus- 
sian Empire disenfranchised by Soviet authorities. 

liquidity shortage — The lack of assets that can be readily converted 
to cash. 

Marshall Plan — A plan announced in June 1947 by the United 
States Secretary of State George C. Marshall, for the recon- 
struction of Europe after World War II. The plan involved a 
considerable amount of United States aid. 

Munich Agreement — An agreement in September 1938 between 
Germany, Italy, Britain, and France calling on Czechoslovakia 
to cede the Sudetenland (q. v.) to Germany and smaller parts 
of its territory to Hungary and Poland. 

"normalization" — A return to tight party control over Czecho- 
slovak life following the suppression of the Prague Spring (q. v. ) 
reform movement. 

okres (pi. , okresy) — Administrative territorial subdivision of kraj (q. v.) 
roughly equivalent to a county in the United States. 

opportunity cost — The value of a good or service in terms of what 
had to be sacrificed in order to obtain that item. 

Prague Spring — The culmination in the spring of 1968 of the late 
1960s reform movement in Czechoslovakia. Cut short by the 
Warsaw Pact (q.v.) invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. 

samizdat — Literally, self publication. Russian word for the print- 
ing and circulating of materials not permitted by the gov- 
ernment. 

Sudetenland — An area in Czechoslovakia along the German border. 
Before World War II populated primarily by Germans. After 
the war most of the Germans were forcibly resettled in 
Germany. 



394 



Glossary 



Svejk — The fictional hero ofjaroslav Hasek's The Good Soldier Svejk. 
He symbolizes characteristic Czech passive resistance. 

Treaty of Rome 1957 — Established the European Economic Com- 
munity (EEC — also known as the Common Market). 

Uniate Church — Sometimes referred to as the Greek Catholic 
Church. A branch of the Catholic Church preserving the 
Eastern rite and discipline but submitting to papal authority; 
found primarily in western Ukraine and Carpatho-Ukraine 

(<?•<•>• 

Warsaw Pact — Political-military alliance founded in 1955 as a coun- 
terweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mem- 
bers in 1987 included Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Has served 
as the Soviet Union's primary mechanism for keeping politi- 
cal and military control over Eastern Europe. 



395 



Index 



Academia Istropolitana, 126 
"acid rain," 134 

Action Program, 62, 63, 65, 176, 225, 
229 

Adamec, Ladislav, 180 

Advanced School of Politics, 186, 189 

Advanced School of the National Security 

Corps, 250 
Aeroflot, 177 

Afghanistan, 212, 277, 348 

Africa, 301-2, 337 

Agricultural Federation, 38 

agriculture, xvii, 153-57; collectivization 
of, 59, 75, 105-6, 108, 155-56; crops, 
156; in Czechoslovak Republic, 33; 
irrigation, 154-55; labor force, 106, 
154; land, 134, 154-55; levels of 
management, 156; livestock, 156-57; 
performance, 140-41, 142, 145; private 
sector, 139, 155; production, 144, 154; 
socialist sector, 155-56; wages, 106; 
women in, 106, 154 

air force (see also armed forces), 220, 238 

airports and aviation, 160, 225, 233, 238 

Albania: and Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance, 274, 275; indepen- 
dent course of, 310, 322, 323; relations 
with, 210; territorial defense, 320, 321; 
withdrawal from Warsaw Pact, 319, 
326-27 

Albert of Austria, 13 

Albrecht of Wallenstein, 18 

alcoholism, 254-55 

Algeria, 354 

All-Union Voluntary Society for the Pro- 
motion of the Army, Air Force, and 
Navy, 245 

Allied Control Commission, 310 

Allied Control Council, 54 

Allied powers, xxi, 219-20, 221; and 
Czechoslovak boundaries, 29; and 
Czechoslovak National Council, 29; 
and liberation of Slovakia, 52; and 
Munich Agreement, 43-44, 48 

alphabet: Cyrillic, 6, 7, 278; Latin, 6-7, 
100 

Alps, 76 

American Zone, 54 



Amnesty International, 129, 259, 260, 
262 

Andrei, Stefan, 344 
Angola, 337 
Anschluss, 41, 42 

Antiaircraft Defense (Protivzdusna 

obrana), 252 
Antonm Zapotocky Academy, 244 
Arabs, 213 
Archangel, 219 

armed forces (see also army, Warsaw 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Mutual Assistance), xix, xxiii, 217-47; 
air force, 220, 238; budget, 228, 229; 
and communist takeover, 223-25, 232; 
conscription, 217, 228, 235, 238, 239, 
250; control of, by Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia, 222-23, 228-32; en- 
listed personnel, 224; equipment, xix, 
235-38; and "fraternal" invasion of 
1968, 225-26; gymnasiums (secondary 
schools), 244; loyalties, 231-32; man- 
power, 239-41; and membership in 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 
230; military academies, 243-44; mili- 
tary courts, 198-250; mobilization 
plans, 241; morale, 224, 227-28; and 
Munich Agreement, 220-21; "nor- 
malization," 226-28; officer training, 
244; officers, 224; paramilitary train- 
ing, 245-46; political officers in, 230; 
premilitary training, 244-45; purges of, 
217, 223, 227-28, 233, 235; rank in- 
signia and structure, 247; recruitment, 
241; reliability, 217; reserves, 239-41; 
role of, in Soviet military strategy, 349; 
role of, in Warsaw Pact, xxiii, 224-25; 
Soviet domination of, xxvii, 231-33, 
235; specialized training, 244; Stalinist 
approach, 232; traditions, 218-19; 
training of conscripts, 241-43; uni- 
forms, 245-47; wages, 241; and War- 
saw Pact exercises, 243; women, 217, 
239, 244; and World War I, 219-20; 
and World War II, 221-23 
arms transfers: to Third World, 338 
army (see also armed forces), 173, 217, 
223, 235-38; equipment, 235-38; and 



397 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



"fraternal" invasion of 1968, 324-25; 
and Munich Agreement, 221; organi- 
zation, 235; personnel, 235; purges of, 
217, 325; under Red Army (1943-45), 
309-10; and Warsaw Pact, 224, 243 

Arnulf, 7 

Asia, 301-2 

Association for Cooperation with the 
Army (Svaz pro spolupraci s armadou — 
SVAZARM), xix, 245, 250 

atheism, 120 

Atlantic Ocean, 219 

Australia, 85 

Austria (see also Austrian Empire, Dual 
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, Haps- 
burg Empire), 28; annexation of, by 
Nazi Germany, 220; and Anschluss, 
41, 42; and emigres, 85; and Great In- 
terregnum, 9; and judenrein, 98; parlia- 
ment, 32; radio and television, 160, 
191, 262; rate of industrial growth, 59; 
relations with, 212-13; rule by, xxii, 3, 
4, 77; security at border with, 252; and 
Slovak autonomy, 37; trade with, 167; 
and World War I, 29 

Austrian Empire, 23, 24 

Austrian Penal Code, 256 

Austro-Bohemian chancellery, 19 

Austro-Hungarian Empire. See Dual 
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary 

Austro-Slavism, 24 

Avar Empire, 6 

Axis powers (see also Germany), 51 

Baltic republics, 63 

Baltic Sea, 339, 349 

banks and banking, 40, 137, 160-61; and 
Council for Mutual Economic As- 
sistance, 281, 285, 288, 293-94, 300; 
German-owned banks, 32 

Banska Bystrica, 52 

Bardejov, 124 

Battle of Lechfeld (955), 218 

Battle of White Mountain (1620), 3, 16, 

19, 81, 219 
Battle of Zborov, 219 
Bavaria, 19, 39 

Bavarian "nation": of Charles Univer- 
sity, 10 
Belgium, 76 
Belgrade, 361 
Belorussia, 63 

398 



Belorussian Military District, 339 

Benes, Eduard, xxiii-xxiv, 36; and 
Carpatho-Ukraine, 52-53; and com- 
munist takeover, 55-57; as foreign 
minister, 41-42; and government-in- 
exile, 48; and independence, 29, 32, 
219; and Munich Agreement, 42-44, 
220; as president, 5, 33, 42, 57, 247; 
and the resistance, 49, 51-52; and 
transfer of Sudeten Germans, 54; and 
World War II, 222 

Berchtesgaden, 43 

Bereitschaft, 40 

Berlin, 42, 45, 314; and Sudeten Ger- 
mans, 41 
Bernolak, Anton, 23 
bernoldkovcina (Slovak literary language), 

23 

bezne mluvend cestina, 101 
biblictina, 23 

Bil'ak, Vasil, 64, 66, 180, 185 

Bill of Rights, 60 

Blahnik, Miloslav, 231 

Board of Commissioners, 61 

Bohemia (see also Bohemian Kingdom, 
Czech lands, Czech Socialist Republic), 
xxi, 90; and Austrian Penal Code, 256; 
climate, 80; and coal mining, 148; 
Czech-German relations in, 26-27; in 
Czechoslovak Republic, 32; and the 
Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, 
25-26; early history, 5-7; and Friend- 
ship exercises, 243; German occupation 
of, 5, 45-48, 221; Golden Age, 10; 
under Hapsburg rule, 16, 17; Hussites 
in, 11; industry in, 32; Jews in, 98; 
mountain and drainage systems, 76; 
and Munich Agreement, 44; national 
revival in, 21-25; political divisions, 76; 
political parties, 36; population density, 
81; and religion, 120; and religious 
wars, 13, 16; and rural society, 106; 
and Second Republic, 45; Taborites in, 
11; during Thirty Years' War, 18; 
topography, 77 

Bohemian Basin, 77 

Bohemian estates, 3, 13, 14; and Haps- 
burg rule, 15-16, 17, 19 

Bohemian Forest. See Cesky les 

Bohemian Germans, 27 

Bohemian Jews, 98 

Bohemian Kingdom, xxi-xxii, 3, 7-14; 
after Batde of White Mountain, 17, 81; 



Index 



demand for reconstitution of, 4, 26; and 
enlightened absolutism, 19-21; and 
Hapsburg rule, 15, 18; inclusion of, in 
Czechoslovak Republic, 29, 32 

Bohemian nobles, 81 

Boleslav I, 218 

Boleslav II, 8 

Bonn, 234 

Border Guard (Pohranicm straz), xxiii, 

217, 250, 252 
Borisov, Grigoriy, 233 
Bory-Plzen, 261 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, 26 
boundaries: acceptance of, by West, 336 
boundary agreement, 29 
"bourgeois nationalism," 174, 175, 178 
"bourgeois nationalists," 92, 93 
Brandys, 13 

Bratislava, 79, 126, 187; coronation of 
Hapsburg kings in, 15; government in, 
195; population, 81; press, 122, 191; 
river port in, xviii, 159; and Slov-Air, 
160; and Slovak literary language, 23; 
Soviet "liberation" of, 99; student 
demonstrations in, 60; superhighway 
link to, 159; training in Marxism- 
Leninism, 189; "Zeta" headquarters 
in, 51 

Bratislava Declaration, 64 

Brauner, F. A., 21 

Brezhnev, Leonid, 62, 63 

Brezhnev Doctrine, 208, 326, 340, 343 

Britain, 232; arms production, 218, 355; 
exiles in, 48; and Hundred Years' War, 
218; and Marshall Plan, 56; and 
Munich Agreement, 5, 43-44, 220; and 
Potsdam Conference, 54; proposed 
treaty with, 42; and resistance move- 
ment, 221; trade with, 167, 275 

British Broadcasting Corporation, 191 

Brno, 77, 218, 244, 256; Marxist-Leninist 
training in, 189; population, 81; and 
rural-urban migration, 81; superhigh- 
way link to, 159 

Brno-Bohunice, 261 

Brody, Andrej, 38, 52 

Brotherhood-in-Arms exercise, 347 

Browne, Malcom, 98 

Bruntal, 233 

Brusilov, Aleksei, 219 

Bucharest, 301 

Bucharest formula, 293, 304 

Budapest, 54, 332 



budget, 161-62 

Bulgaria {see also Eastern Europe), 
165,166; arms transfers from, to Third 
World, 338; and Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance, 273, 274-75; and 
"fraternal" invasion of 1968, 175-76, 
225-26, 325; labor force transfers, 298; 
military equipment, 352; military train- 
ing by, of Third World personnel, 338; 
Red Army occupation of, 309-10; relia- 
bility of army, 350; role of, in Soviet 
military strategy, 349; and Solidarity 
crisis, 339; and Warsaw Pact, 307-8 

Bureau for the Conduct of Party Work in 
the Czech Lands, 186 

Byzantine Empire, xxi, 6, 7 

Canada, 85 
Capek, Karel, 109 
Carinthia, 9 

Carlsbad Decrees, 42-44 

Carniola, 9 

Carpathian Basin, 218 

Carpathian Moravia, 77 

Carpathian Mountains, xv, 29, 76, 79 

Carpatho-Ukraine {see also Subcarpathian 
Ruthenia), 97-98, 305; and Hungarian 
rule, 88; invasion of, 44, 45; proposed 
autonomy, 38; and Second Republic, 
45; Soviet annexation of, 52-53, 75, 86, 
97 

Catholic Church. See Roman Catholic 
Church 

Catholic People's Party, 55, 56 
Ceausescu, Nicolae, 322, 336, 342, 344, 

v 345 

Cechove, 7 

Celakovsky, F. L., 21 

CEMA. See Council for Mutual Economic 

Assistance 
censorship, 88, 110, 111, 112, 190-91 
Central Bank, 40 

Central Bohemia (Stfedocesky kraj), 76 
Central Committee, xxv, xxix, 180, 
182-85, 208, 229, 230, 231, 247; and 
Action Program, 176; and Communist 
takeover, 56; and economic reform, 
142; and Kaspar Report, 64-65; mem- 
bership, 183; and "normalization," 
177; and political training, 189; and 
Prague Spring of 1868, 62, 63; 
Secretariat, 185 



399 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Central Committee of the Home Re- 
sistance (Ustredm vybor odboje 
domaciho— UVOD), 49 
Central Control and Auditing Commis- 
sion, xxviii, 183, 185 
Central Council of Trade Unions, 191 
Central Customs Administration. 208 
Central Europe, 9, 42. 77. 88. 218; na- 
tional revival in. 21 ; proposed nuclear- 
free zone. 315, 324 
Central Planning Commission, 136-37 
Central Slovakia (Stredoslovensky braj), 
76 

Cernik. Oldfich. 64 
Cerny vrch, 238 

Ceska narodnf rada. See Czech National 

Council 
Ceske Budejovice. 134. 233 
Ceskoslovenska lidova armada. See army 
Ceskoslovenska tiskova kancelaf. See 

Czechoslovak Press Agency 
Ceskoslovenske letectvo. See air force 
Cesky les (Bohemian Forest). 39, 77 
Cesky Tesm. 32 
Chamber of Deputies, 33 
Chamber of the Nations. 194. 195 
Chamber of the People, 194. 195. 247 
Chamberlain. Neville. 43-44. 220 
Charlemagne. 6 
Charles Albert. 19 
Charles Bridge. 218 
Charles-Ferdinand University, 21. 26. 

109 

Charles I. Emperor, 29 
Charles IV. King. 9-10 
Charles (son of King John of Bohemia). 
218 

Charles University, 81, 243; and Czech 
estates. 16; founding of. 10. 126; and 
Kutna Hora Decree, 11; merger of, 
with Jesuit Academy, 17 

Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor. 14, 16 

Charles VI, 18 

Charter 77, xxvii. 68-70. 85. 99, 110. 
123. 248. 255. 256: and educational ad- 
missions policy, 129; Manifesto of, 
357-61: and Penal Code of 1961. 258: 
persecution of signers of, xxvii, 180-81. 
204-5, 211. 212, 261-62 

Cheb (Eger). 39 

Chernobyl. 150-51 

Chervonenko, Stepan V., 63 

China. 141; arms production, 355: and 



Council for Mutual Economic As- 
sistance, 276; dispute with Soviet Un- 
ion. 319; relations with, 210-11; 
Romanian relations with, 344; trade 
with, 167 

Chnoupek, Bohuslav, 207 

Chomutov. 134 

Christmas Agreement (1943), 52 
Cierna nad Tisou, 64 
Cieszyn, 32 

"'Circles of Creativity," 112 
Citanka, 23 

civil rights: repression of, xxiv, 60, 202-3, 
259 

climate, xvi, 79-80 

CMEA. See Council for Mutual Economic 

Assistance 
CMFA. See Committee of Ministers of 

Foreign Affairs 
collaborators, 52-53 
Colotka, Peter, 180 

Comecon. See Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance 
Comenius (Jan Amos Komensky), 22 
Cominform, 275 

Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly 
Persecuted (Vybor na obranu 
nespravedlive stihanych — VONS), 69, 
204, 262 

Committee of Ministers of Defense 
(CMD), 332 

Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
(CMFA), 327 

Committee of the Petition "We Remain 
Faithful" (Peticm vybor Verm 
zustanme— PVVZ), 49 

communications, xviii, 62, 160, 190-91 

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
(Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska — 
KSC) (see also Central Committee, 
Presidium), xviii, xxiv, 35, 113-15, 
181-91; Agriculture and Food Com- 
mission, 185; and the armed forces, 
217, 222-23, 228-31; armed forces 
membership in, 232; and Charter 77, 
68-71; and collectivization of agricul- 
ture, 106. 154: and communist take- 
over, 55-57; and Constitution of 1948, 
191; and democratic centralism, 182; 
and the economy, 136-37, 139; educa- 
tion under. 127; as elite, 114; and 
energy conservation, 150; and foreign 
policy, 206: Congress, 63, 67, 178, 182; 



400 



Index 



and "fraternal" invasion of 1968, 48; 
and industry, 151; and the intelligent- 
sia, 107-9; in interwar period, 87; and 
Kaspar Report, 56; local units, 187; 
lower-level organization, 186-87; and 
mass organizations, 112; member par- 
ticipation, 115; membership, 187-88; 
membership privileges, 114-15; Milos 
Jakes as first secretary of, xxviii-xxix; 
and minority groups, 94; and national 
committees, 200; and New Economic 
Model, 93; and "normalization," 173, 
203; organization, 182-86; party con- 
gresses, 63, 67, 110, 142, 176, 178, 
180, 182, 183-85, 194, 208; and Penal 
Code of 1961, 256, 258; and People's 
Militia, 250; percentage of workers in, 
113-14; and Prague Spring of 1968, 
xxiv-xxv, 62, 63; Presidium, 62, 63; 
purges, 57, 90, 92, 108-9, 113-14, 115; 
and reform movement, 60, 89-90; 
repression by, 174; and resistance 
movement, 49; role of party congress, 
182-83; Secretariat, xxviii, 229; and 
selection of president, 197; social com- 
position, 113-14; and Soviet reform 
program, xxviii; and Stalinization, 
57-58; "Theses," 61; and trade 
unions, 116; training, 188-89; and 
Warsaw Pact, 324; and workers, 
102-4; and youth organizations, 
116-17 

Communist Party of Romania (Partidul 
Communist Roman), 322 

Communist Party of Slovakia (Komu- 
nisticka strana Slovenska — KSS), 51, 
58, 175, 186, 229; Central Committee, 
186; Central Control and Auditing 
Commission, 186; Presidium, 186 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU), 71, 174, 345; and Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia, 182; Twen- 
tieth Congress, 60, 316; Twenty- 
seventh Congress, 345 

Communist takeover, 5, 54-57, 175, 223, 
250 

Compact of Basel (1485), 14, 16 
Compromise of 1867, 25, 27 
concentration camps, 47-48, 50-51 
Conference on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe (CSCE), xix, xxvii, 69, 204, 

214, 336, 345, 348, 360 
Congo, 337 



Congress of National Committees, 53 
Constitution of 1920, 32, 33-35, 40 
Constitution of 1948 (Ninth-of-May Con- 
stitution), 57, 58-60, 191-92 
Constitution of 1960 , xviii, xxiii, xxvii, 
191-94, 199, 228; and government 
structure, 194-97; human rights pro- 
visions, 69, 204; and political freedom, 
256; and religious freedom, 120; and 
rights and duties of citizens, 193; "The 
Social Order," 192; violations of 
human rights provisions in, 357 
Constitutional Act No. 144, 94, 95 
Constitutional Law of Federation (1968), 

93, 177, 193, 194, 200, 229 
Corps of Corrective Education, 261 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon), 64, 176, 273-305; affiliated 
agencies, 280-81; aid to developing 
countries, 301-2; Basic Principles of the 
International Socialist Division of 
Labor, 286, 288; Bureau for Integrated 
Planning, 286; Charter (1959), 273-74, 

281- 82, 285; Comprehensive Program 
(1971), 165, 274, 281, 286, 287-89, 
291-94, 295-98, 304; Comprehensive 
Program for Scientific and Technical 
Progress up to the Year 2000, 274, 
290-91; Concerted Plan for Multi- 
lateral Integration Measures, 289, 
296-97; and convertibility of currency, 
293-94; council committees, 278-79, 
295; 9th Council Session, 293; 15th 
Council Session, 286; 29th Council Ses- 
sion, 289; 30th Council Session, 289; 
32d Council Session, 289; 42d Coun- 
cil Session, 277; 23d "Special" Session, 
290; early years (1945-53), 284-85; 
and European Economic Community, 

282- 84, 288; exchange rates, 293-94; 
Executive Committee, 277, 278, 286, 
296; Extraordinary 41st Council Ses- 
sion, 290; five-year plans, 289, 291, 
292, 295; and foreign relations, 209, 
213; and foreign trade pricing, 292-93; 
founding of, 57, 273; indebtedness to 
the West, 289-90; integration, 104, 
273, 288; interstate conferences, 280; 
Joint Commission on Cooperation, 
277; joint projects, 296-97, 305; labor 
force transfers, 298-299; Long-Term 
Target Programs for Cooperation, 289; 
member cooperation in science and 



401 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



technology, 297-98; membership, xix, 
274-77; plan coordination, 294-97; 
post-Khrushchev period, 286-87; post- 
Stalin period (1953-55), 285; power 
configuration within, 299-301; prices, 

292- 93; rapid growth of (1956-63), 
285-86; rights of member countries, 
281; the 1980s, 289-91; scientific insti- 
tutes, 280; Secretariat, 277, 278, 280, 
295; Session, 277-78; Soviet domina- 
tion of, 174, 206, 208, 273-74, 
299-300; and Soviet model, 284; Spe- 
cial Council Committee for Scientific 
and Technical Cooperation, 297; stand- 
ing commissions, 280; structure, 
277-80; trade among member coun- 
tries, 147, 149, 152, 164-66, 283-84, 
291-92 

Council of Basel (1433), 13 
Council of Constance (1415), 11 
Council of Foreign Ministers, 206 
Council of the Three (R3), 49 
"counterrevolution," 87 
"counterrevolutionary" movement, 76 
courts, 198; military, 198, 250 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
69 

CPSU. See Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union 

criminal justice system, 252-62; crime, 
xxvi, 252-55; police repression, 
261-62; rights of defendants, 258-59; 
trials, 259 

Criminal Procedure Code, 258-59 

Croats, 24 

CSCE. See Conference on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe 
CSLA. See armv 

CTK. See Czechoslovak Press Agency 
Cuba, 104, 167; and Council for Mutual 

Economic Assistance, 274, 275, 284, 

291, 300-1, 305 
currency, 160; black-market money 

changing, 253-54; exchange rate, xvii, 

160, 163; hard, 253; nonconvertible, 

293- 94; reform, 103-4, 106, 108 
Cyril and Methodius Faculty of Divinity, 

122 

Cyril (monk), 6 

Czech Agrarian Party, 35 

Czech Bible, 13, 23 

Czech Council of Trade Unions, 190 

Czech estates, 16-17, 19 



Czech lands (see also Bohemia, Moravia), 
xxv, 90, 91, 92; armed forces, 220; and 
religious wars, 219; and right to form 
associations, 112; share of total 
revenue, 162; Soviet troops in, 233; 
spas, 124; urbanization, 81 

Czech language, xvi, 3, 4; biblictina, 23; 
dialects, 101; "foreignisms" in, 101; 
and German, 26; as a literary language, 
15, 21; loss of, 15; in Moravia, 27; as 
official language, xvi, 35, 100 

Czech "nation": of Charles University, 
10 

Czech National Council (Ceska narodnf 
rada), 50, 180, 189, 199, 202 

Czech nobility, 9, 10, 13, 19; after Bat- 
tle of White Mountain, 17; and reli- 
gious wars, 16 

Czech Progressive Party, 27 

Czech-Slovak relations, xxv, 88, 90, 
91-93 

Czech Socialist Party, 36 

Czech Socialist Republic (see also 
Bohemia, Czech lands, Moravia), 
xviii, xxiii, 76, 186, 193, 229; and al- 
cohol consumption, 254-55; crime in, 
253; and Czech language, 100; and 
the economy, 136; and education, 
127; executive branch, 200; govern- 
ment, 195; population, 80-81; prison 
system, 261 

Czech tribes, xxi,7 

Czech Union of Women, 190 

Czech Writers' Union, 111 

Czechia, 33 

Czechoslovak Air Force (Ceskoslovenske 

letectvo). See air force 
Czechoslovak Airlines, 160 
Czechoslovak Association of Catholic 

Clergy (Pacem in Terris), 70, 122, 205 
Czechoslovak Foreign Institute, 208 
Czechoslovak Legion, 29, 219-20, 222 
Czechoslovak Life, 97 

Czechoslovak National Council, 29, 31 
Czechoslovak National Democratic Party, 
35, 36 

Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, 

35, 36, 51, 55, 56 
Czechoslovak People's Army (Cesko- 

slovenska lidova armada — CSLA). See 

army 

Czechoslovak People's Democracy, 192 
Czechoslovak People's Party, 189, 191 



402 



Index 



Czechoslovak Physical Culture Associa- 
tion, 245 

Czechoslovak Populist Party, 35, 36 

Czechoslovak Press Agency (Cesko- 
slovenska tiskova kancelaf — CTK), 191 

Czechoslovak Republic (First Republic), 
xxi, 4-5, 27, 31-44, 55, 75, 90, 97, 
219-20; agricultural workers, 105; and 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 
181; and creative intelligentsia, 109; 
and education, 126; ethnic composi- 
tion, 31-32; foreign policy, 41-42; 
government-in-exile, 48; government 
structure, 33-35; minority groups, xxii, 
36-41, 94-95; and Munich Agreement, 
42-44; Slovak resistance movement, 
51; and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, 31; 
and Ukrainian autonomy, 98; urbani- 
zation, 81; and the Vatican, 119 

Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, 
35, 55, 64, 65-66 

Czechoslovak Socialist Party, 189, 191 

Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, xv, 75, 
192; proclamation of, 59 

Czechoslovak Socialist Union of Youth, 
190, 191, 245 

Czechoslovak Society for International 
Relations, 208 

Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship League, 
112 

Czechoslovak Union, 28 
Czechoslovak Union of Women, 190 
Czechoslovak Union of Youth, xxviii, 62, 
116 

Czechs, xvi, xxi-xxii, 86-90, 174-75; in 
armed forces, 220; in Carpatho- 
Ukraine, 53; Catholics, 16; cultural tra- 
dition, 86-87; in Dual Monarchy of 
Austria-Hungary, 26-27; and educa- 
tion, 127; and first Slavic Congress, 24; 
history, 3-7; importation of, into Ger- 
man areas, 40; importation of, into 
Slovakia, 37; national character, 88-89; 
and Prague Spring of 1968, 75; share 
of total population, 86; in Subcar- 
pathian Ruthenia, 38; and youth or- 
ganizations, 116 

Daladier, Edouard, 220 
Daluege, Kurt, 47 
Danish armies, 18 
Danube Basin, xv, 77, 79 



Danube (Dunaj) River, 29, 76, 79, 151, 
159, 252 

de-Stalinization, 60-62, 89, 232, 316-17 
Deem, xviii, 159 

Defense of the Nation (Obrana naroda — 
ON), 49 

"Demands of the Slovak Nation," 24 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea 

(North Korea), 276 
Department of International Affairs, 206 
Derer, Ivan, 36 
detente, 336-37, 340, 341-43 
Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiter- 

partei. See Sudeten Nazi Party 
dissent, 68-71; student demonstrations, 

60, 62 
Dneiper River, 6 
Dobrovsky, Josef, 21 
domestic arms production, 355 
Doupov, 243 
Drtina, Prokop, 49 

Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary 
(Austro-Hungarian Empire), 25-26, 
29, 32, 75, 87, 90; armed forces, 220; 
and industry, 151; and the intelligent- 
sia, 109; and World War II, 219 

Dubcek, Alexander, 250; and the Action 
Program, 62-63, 229; and Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia, 178, 180, 182, 
183; and foreign policy, 206; and Four- 
teenth Party Congress, 182; and 
"fraternal" invasion of 1968, 175-77, 
225, 227, 228; and Prague Spring of 
1968, xxiv, 5, 173, 323, 325; reforms, 
234, 249, 258, 261-62; and religious or- 
ganizations, 121 

Dukhnovych, Oleksander, 31 

Dukovany, 150 

Dunaj River. See Danube River 
Durcansky, Ferdinand, 50 
Dzur, Martin, 227, 231, 234 



East, 55 

East Berlin: June 1953 worker uprising 
in, 313 

East Bohemia (Vychodocesky kraj), 76 
East Germany. See German Democratic 
Republic) 

East Slovakia (Vychodoslovensky kraj), 76 
East-West conflict, 228 
Eastern Europe (see also Council for Mu- 
tual Economic Assistance, non-Soviet 



403 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Warsaw Pact countries), xvi, xxiii, 
xxvii, 75, 146, 189, 231 ; alliances with, 
206; class origin and upward mobility, 
312; and Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance, 284-85, 286, 298, 302, 305; 
credit restrictions, 147; and de- 
Stalinization, 232, 316-17; debt to 
Western countries, 133, 289-90; de- 
velopment of socialist armies in, 
310-13; foreign debt, 165; foreign pol- 
icy, 209; and Friendship (Druzhba) 
pipeline, 285; fuel imports to, from 
Soviet Union, 148-50; income distri- 
bution, 101-2; paramilitary forces, 312; 
and Soviet alliance system (1943-45), 
309; Soviet bilateral relationships with 
countries of, 299-300; Soviet control of 
armed forces of, 311-13; Soviet train- 
ing of troops of, 309-10; Soviet troops 
stationed in, 314; Sovietization of na- 
tional armies of, 312, 318-19; and Un- 
ion (Soiuz) natural-gas pipeline, 297; 
and Warsaw Pact, 313, 344, 345-46; 
weather systems, 79-80 
Eastern Slavs, 7 

Economic Commission, 142, 180 
economy {see also Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance), xvi-xvii, xxiv, 58, 
60, 133-69; "branch directorates," 
143; budget, 161-62; central planning, 
136-39, 140, 147; decentralization 
(proposed), xxix, 141-44, 147; ex- 
change rate, xvii, 160, 163; financial 
plan, 161; fiscal policy, xvii; five-year 
plans, 58, 134, 135, 140, 144-47, 157, 
167-68, 295; foreign debt, 165, 168; 
gross national product, xvi, 133; infla- 
tion, 142; "intensification," 146, 167; 
interest rates, 161 ; and interest rates in 
West, 290; investment in, 140, 142, 
143, 145; market economy, 291; na- 
tional income, 133; net material 
product, 133, 135, 144, 146; and New 
Economic Model (NEM), 142; and 
"normalization," 144; per capita in- 
come in Slovakia, 92; performance, 
140-41, 144-47; personal consump- 
tion, 145, 146, 181; petroleum prices, 
146; "planned" economy, 291; prices, 
142, 143, 161, 162; problems, 133; 
production quotas, 138-39; and profit, 
143; reforms, 139, 140-44; in Slovakia, 
90, 91; and Soviet model, 136, 138, 



140, 141-42, 161, 163, 164; standard 
of living, xxvi, 102; statistical concepts, 
133; structure of, 135-39; wage and 
salary system, 143 
Ecumenical Council of the Churches of 
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 
122 

Edice petlice (Padlock Editions), 70 

Edict of Toleration, 20 

education, xvi, 126-29; and class back- 
ground, 128-29; compulsory, 127; of 
Gypsy children, 97; kindergarten, 125; 
levels of, 127; literacy rate, xvi, 88, 127; 
and membership in Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia, 129; primary, 127, 
128; and rule of Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia, 109, 127, 129; in rural 
areas, 107; secondary, 127, 128; in 
Slovakia, 28, 91, 92; university-level, 
127-28; of women, 118 

EEC. See European Economic Com- 
munity 

Eger (Cheb), 39 

Egerland, 39 

Eighth Five-Year Plan (1986-90), 134, 
167-68 

Einstein, Albert, 109 

Elbe River. See Labe River 

electoral system, 202 

Elias, Alois, 47, 49 

emigration, 85, 204 

emigre communities, 85 

energy, xvi, 145-46, 148-51; conserva- 
tion of, 150; hydroelectric plants, 151; 
imports, 148-51, 209; natural gas, 148, 
149; nuclear power, 145, 150-51; oil, 
146, 147, 148, 149-50, 299-300 

Enlightenment, 4, 19 

environment, 134, 212 

Erben, KarelJ., 21 

Erzgebirge. See Krusne hory 

Ethiopia, 211, 277, 337 

ethnic groups. See minority groups 

European Economic Community (EEC), 
282, 288, 304 

"Extraordinary" Congress of the Com- 
munist Party of Czechoslovakia (1968), 
176 



family, 117-18; abortion, 126; divorce, 
118, 254-55; extended family house- 
holds, 118; marriage, 118 



404 



Index 



Feder, Richard, 122 

Federal Assembly, 180, 247; and civil 
rights, 69; election of, 202; establish- 
ment of, 194; and foreign relations, 
207; function of, 195-96, 197, 229; and 
political parties, 189; Presidium, 195 

Federal Price Office, 197 

Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many): alleged revanche, 234, 314, 
337; arms transfers from, to Third 
World, 338; and Charter 77 manifesto, 
204; East European recognition of, 336; 
and emigres, 85; and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, 313-14; press, 
68-69; radio and television, 160, 191; 
rate of industrial growth, 59; relations 
with, 211-12; seaports in, xviii, 159; 
security at border with, 252; trade with, 
166, 167, 212; Warsaw Pact strategy 
against, 224 

Fencik Party, 38, 52 

Ferdinand, Archduke: assassination of, 88 

Ferdinand, Archduke (Holy Roman Em- 
peror and King of Bohemia), 14, 15-16 

Ferdinand I, Emperor, 23 

Ferdinand III, 18 

Fifteenth Party Congress (1976), 182, 183 
Fifth Five- Year Plan (1971-75), 144, 145 
Final Act. See Conference on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe 
'final solution," 98 
Finland, 277 

First Czechoslovak Corps, 221 

First Five-Year Plan (1949-53), 140 

First Republic. See Czechoslovak Republic 

First Reserve, 239 

Fojtfk, Jan, 180, 185 

foreign exchange rates, xvii, 160, 163; 
members of Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance, 293 

foreign relations, xviii-xix, 41-42, 
205-14; administration, 206-8; with 
Communist nations, 208-11; East- 
West detente, 214; and human rights 
record, 211, 212; multilateral, 213-14; 
with noncommunist nations, 211-13; 
policy making, 206; Soviet domination 
of, 68; with Soviet Union, 205-6, 
208-9 

forests, 134, 154 

Four Articles of Prague, 13 

Four-Power Foreign Ministers Confer- 
ence, 314 



Fourteenth Party Congress, 63, 67, 178, 
182 

Fourth Five-Year Plan (1966-70), 144 

Fourth Plan, 42-44 

Fourth Writers' Congress, 61-62 

France, 20, 232; arms production, 355; 
and Czech resistance groups, 49; 
French revolution, 21; and Hundred 
Years' War, 218; and Marshall Plan, 
56; and Munich Agreement, 5, 43-44, 
220; rate of industrial growth, 59; trade 
with, 167; treaty with, 42, 220; and 
World War I, 219, 220 

Francis II, 20 

Francis Joseph, 25 

Frank, Karl Hermann, 47 

Franks, 6 

"fraternal" invasion of 1968, xxv, 173, 
175-77, 208, 210, 227, 228, 248, 
323-27, 332, 343; and armed forces, 
225-26; and economic reform, 286 

Frederick II, 19 

Frederick II, Pfemyslid Emperor, 9 
Frederick of the Palatinate, 17 
Freud, Sigmund, 109 
Friendship (Druzhba) oil pipeline, 285, 

298, 301 
Friendship exercises, 243, 347 
Friendship Railway, 159 
Frunze Military Academy, 243 
Fundamental Articles, 26 



Gabokovo-Nagymaros, 151 
Gabor, Prince Bethlen, 18 
Galicia, 20, 31, 219 
Gazfk, Marek, 37 
Gbely, 148 
Gdansk, xviii 
Gdynia, xviii 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
213-14 

General Council of Trade Unions, 55 
General Staff, 229 
Geneva, 346 

geography, xv-xvi, 76-79 
geopolitical factors, 173-74 
George of Podebrady, 14 
Gerlachovsky stft (Gerlachovka), 79 
German Agrarian Party, 40, 41 
German Christian Socialist Party, 40, 
41 

German Confederation, 25 



405 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany) {see also Eastern Europe), 
arms production, 355; and Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance, 274, 275; 
and East-West ties, 211, 342-43; and 
"fraternal" invasion of 1968, 175-76, 
225-26, 325; Garrisoned People's 
Police, 316; labor force transfers, 298; 
military budget, 342; military 
equipment, 352; military training by, 
of Third World personnel, 338; rela- 
tions with, 209-10; reliability of, 
340-41; reliability of army, 350; role 
of, in Soviet military strategy, 349; 
seaports, xviii, 159; security at border 
with, 252; and Solidarity crisis, 339; 
Soviet forces at border with, 325; stan- 
dard of living, 102; and Warsaw Pact, 
307-8, 316 

German immigration, 3, 9 

German language, 87, 88, 95, 101; 
dominance of, 21, 27; as official lan- 
guage, 19 

German National Party, 40, 41 

German political parties, 35 

German-Slovak agreement, 54 

German Social Democratic Party, 40, 
41 

Germanization, 219 

Germans {see also Sudeten Germans), xvi, 
xxi, xxii, in armed forces, 220; in 
Bohemia, 3, 4; Catholics, 16; at Charles 
University, 11; collaborators, 52-53; 
and Czech-German conflict, 10, 23-25; 
in Dual Monarchy of Austria- 
Hungary, 26; and education, 127; 
emigration of, 85; and industry, 32; in- 
fluence of, xxii; a.nd jus teutonicum, 9; as 
landowners, 33; and mass organiza- 
tions, 112; as new Bohemian nobility, 
17; Protestants, 16, 18 

Germany {see also Federal Republic of 
Germany, German Democratic Repub- 
lic), xxii, 6, 43, 47, 76, 350; and 
Anschluss, 41, 42; capitulation of, in 
Czechoslovakia, 50; invasion by, 45; 
invasion by, of Soviet Union, 49; and 
judenrein, 98, 99; and Munich Agree- 
ment, 5, 42-44; nationalism in, 5, 21, 
24-25; negotiations with Poland, 45; 
occupation of Czech lands, 5, 45-48, 
174; pre-World War II, 38; relations 
with, 86; and Slovakia, 50-51; and 



World War I, 28-29, 29; and World 
War II, 309, 350 
Gestapo, 47 

glasnost' (openness), xxviii, 71 

Golden Age, 9-10 

Golden Bull, 10 

Golian, Jan, 52 

Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 64, 317 

Good Soldier Svejk, The, xxv, 88, 109 

Gorbachev, Mikhail, xxix, 71, 168, 181, 

274, 305, 345-46 
"Gorbachev Charter," 304 
Gott, Karel, 110 

Gottwald, Klement, 55, 56, 57, 58, 248; 
and Marshall Plan, 205 

Gottwald Academy Memorandum, 324 

government, local, 33-35; national com- 
mittees, 200 

government, national, xviii, 33-35, 
194-99; centralization of, 33-35, 36; 
criminal justice system, 252-62; execu- 
tive branch, 196-98; federal structure 
of, xviii, 193-95; judicial system, 
198-99; legislature, 195-96; ministries, 
197 

government, republic level, 199-200; 

executive branch, 200; legislature, 199 
government-in-exile, 48 
Great Interregnum, 9 
Great Moravian Empire, xxi, 3, 6, 7 
Greater Germany, 23 
Grechko, Andrei, 320 
Greece, 59, 85 
Gribkov, A. I., 348 
Grossman, Samuel, 122 
Gruntorad, Jin, 261 

Hacha, Emil, 44, 45, 47, 49 
Hacker, Gustav, 41 
Hajek, Jin, 361 
Haldex, 281 
Haman, Josef, 185 
Hamburg, xviii 
Hampl, Antomn, 36 
Handlova, 134 

Hapsburg Empire: and Bohemian estates, 
15-16; disintegration of, 31, 37; lack 
of civil rights under, 174; and mass or- 
ganizations, 112; and minority groups, 
220; policy of centralization, 19-20; 
rule of, xxii, 3, 14-21, 45, 87 

Hasek, Jaroslav, xxv, 88 



406 



Index 



Havel, Vaclav, 205, 262, 361 
Havlicek-Borovsky, Karel, 21 
Havh'ckuv Brod, 9, 233 
health care, xvi, 123-24; abortions, 126; 

alcoholism, xxvi, 203, 254-55; birth 

rate, 97, 125-26; drug abuse, 255-56; 

infant mortality, 124; life expectancy, 

80-81, 124; spas, 124 
Helsinki, xxvii, 357, 360 
Helsinki Accords. See Conference on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Henlein, Konrad, 41, 42 
Hercynian Massif, 76, 77 
Heydrich, Reinhard, 47, 49, 98, 221 
High Tatras. See Vysoke Tatry 
Higher Military Aviation School, 245 
Himmler, Heinrich, 221 
History of the Czech People, 22 
Hitler, Adolf, xxii, xxv, 5, 37, 38, 41, 89, 

175; and Munich Agreement, 42-44, 

220-21; and Slovakia, 51 
Hlas (The Voice), 28, 36 
Hlasists, 36 
Hlinka, Andrej, 36, 37 
Hlinka Guards, 50 
Hodza, Milan, 42 
Hoffman, Karel, 180, 185 
Hohenzollern dynasty, 19 
Holy Roman Empire, xxi-xxii, 7-8, 10, 

11, 18, 81, 218; dissolution of, 20 
Honecker, Erich, 343 
"hooliganism," 254 
Hofeni, Zdenek, 191 
"Houses of Enlightenment," 112 
housing, 83-85, 118; in rural areas, 107 
hovorovd cestina, 101 
Hradcany Castle, 10, 45, 81 
Hradec Kralove, 238, 243 
human rights violations (see also Charter 

77), xviii, 204, 357-61; and foreign 

relations, 211, 212, 213 
Hundred Years' War, 218 
Hungarian army, 319 
Hungarian Diet, 24 
Hungarian estates, 15 
Hungarian language, 90, 98, 100; as 

exclusive official language, 27; manda- 
tory in Slovakia, 28; as official language 

in Hungary, 22 
Hungarian Penal Code, 256 
Hungarian Revolution, 318-19, 323, 325 
Hungarians, xvi, xxii, 43, 75; in armed 

forces, 220; collaborators, 52-53; in 



Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, 
25-26; and education, 127; and Haps- 
burg rule, 37; as landowners, 33; and 
mass organizations, 112; political par- 
ties, 35, 38, 39; relations of, with Slo- 
vaks, 94; transfer of, 54 

Hungary (see also Dual Monarchy of 
Austria-Hungary, Eastern Europe, 
Kingdom of Hungary), xxv, 6, 37, 42, 
191, 321; armed forces, 319, 350; and 
Bohemian Kingdom, 8, 9, 11; border, 
79; and Carpatho-Ukraine, 52, 88, 
97-98; convertibility of currency, 294; 
and Council for Mutual Economic As- 
sistance, 273, 274-75; and East-West 
ties, 342, 343; economic aid from, to 
Third World, 338; foreign workers 
from, 104; and "fraternal" invasion of 
1968, 175-76, 225-26, 325; and 
Friendship 86 exercises, 243; and Gott- 
wald Academy Memorandum, 324; 
and Haldex, 281; and Hapsburg rule, 
20; and Jagellonians, 13, 14; joint 
hydroelectric project with, 151; labor 
force transfers, 298; and mass organi- 
zations, 112; military budget, 342; mili- 
tary equipment, 352; and Munich 
Agreement, 44; nationalism in, 24-25; 
radio and television, 191; Red Army 
occupation of, 309-10; religion in, 22; 
role of, in Soviet military strategy, 349; 
security at border with, 252; and 
Slovakia, xxii, 3, 27-28, 81, 88, 90, 94, 
218; Soviet invasion of, 319, 320; stan- 
dard of living, 102; and Subcarpathian 
Ruthenia, 29-30; trade with, 166-67; 
and trade with members of Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance, 291; and 
Warsaw Pact, 307-8; and World War 
I, 28-29; and World War II, 45 

Hus, Jan, 3, 10-11 

Husak, Gustav, xviii, xxvii, xxix, 194, 
212, 213, 346; and alliance with Soviet 
Union, 208, 209; and the armed forces, 
227, 230, 251; and church-state rela- 
tions, 122; and federalism, 66, 175; and 
foreign policy, 206; leadership of, 173, 
178-81; and "normalization," xxvi, 5, 
67-68, 177-78; popular support of, 
203; and religious activism, 205; resig- 
nation of, xxvii; and Secretariat of the 
Central Committee, 185; and Soviet re- 
form program, xxviii 



407 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Husserl, Edmund, 109 

Hussite movement, 3, 10-14, 16, 22, 86, 

87, 119 
Hussite wars, 4, 218-19 



Iakubovskii, Ivan, 323 
Ideological Commission, 180, 185 
immigration: German, 3, 9; visa control, 
247 

independence, 29, 31 

India, 213 

Indonesia, 213 

Indra, Alois, 180, 195 

industrial revolution, 3 

industry, xvii, 32-33, 88, 139, 151-53; 
munitions, 218; nationalization of, 
58-59; in Sudetenland, 39, 40 

inland waterways, xvii, 159 

Institute for Nuclear Research, 285-86 

Institute of International Relations, 
208 

Institute of Marxism-Leninism, 186 
intelligentsia, 107-12; creative, 108, 

109- 12; professional, 107-8; profes- 
sional organizations, 110; repression of, 

110- 12; technical, 108-9 
"intensification": of economy, 146, 167 
Interatominstrument, 281 
Intermetal, 281 

internal security and public order, 229, 
247-52; Border Guard, 217, 250, 252; 
People's Militia, 217, 251-252; police, 
xix, 249-51, 261-62; police repression, 
261-62 

International Bank for Economic Cooper- 
ation, 281, 285, 293, 294 

International Covenant on Civil and Po- 
litical Rights, 357-60 

International Covenant on Economic, So- 
cial and Cultural Rights, 357-59 

International Investment Bank, 281, 288, 
293, 300 

Intertekstilmash, 281 

Ipel' River, 29 

Iraq, 213, 277 

"Iron Ring" cabinet, 26 

irrigation, 154-55 

Israel, 213, 354 

Italy, 20, 25, 85, 218; and Munich Agree- 
ment, 44; pre-World War II, 38; rate 
of industrial growth, 59; trade with, 
167; and World War I, 220 



Jagellonian line, 14 

Jakes, Milos, xxviii-xxix, 180, 185 

Japan, 59, 167 

Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 340 

Jaslovske Bohunice, 150 

Jazz Section, 70, 259 

Jesuit Academy, 16, 17 

Jesuits, 16, 17, 23 

"Jewish code," 50 

Jews, 58; in armed forces, 220; deporta- 
tion of, 47-48, 50-51, 98-99 
Jihlava, 9 

Jihocesky kraj (South Bohemia), 76 
Jihomoravsky kraj (South Moravia), 76 
Jiskra, Jan of Brandys, 13 
John, King of Bohemia, 218 
John Augusta (bishop), 16 
John of Rokycany, 14 
John Paul II, Pope, 205 
Joseph I, 18 

Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor, 1920 

judenrein, 98 

judicial system, 60, 198-99; courts, 198; 
criminal justice, 252-62; judges, 198; 
Office of the Prosecutor, 198; penal 
code, 256-58; penal system, 259-61 

Jungmann, Josef, 21 

jus teutonicum, 9 

Kabrhelova, Marie, 190 

Kadar, Janos, 346 

Kafka, Franz, 109 

Kameradschaftsbund, 40, 41 

Kapek, Antomn, 180 

Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad), 124, 134 

Karmasin, Franz, 50 

Karolyi, Count Michael, 29 

Kaspar, Jan, 65 

Kaspar Report, 64-65 

Kempny, Josef, 180 

Kerensky, Alexander, 219 

Khrushchev, Nikita: and Basic Principles, 

286; and de-Stalinization, 60, 316-17; 

and Warsaw Pact, 315, 319, 322 
Khust, 53 

Killinger, Manfred von, 50 

Kingdom of Hungary {see also Hungary), 

7, 18, 22, 23; and 1948 revolution, 24; 

rule of Slovakia, 4 
Kladno, 134 

Klement Gottwald Military Political 
Academy (formerly Klement Gottwald 



408 



Index 



Military Academy), 223, 225, 227, 243, 

324, 325 
Klfcha, Jaroslav, 230 
Klicpera, V. K., 21 
Klofac, Vaclav, 36 
Kolder, Drahomfr, 64, 65 
Kollar, Jan, 4, 21, 23 
Komarno, xviii, 79, 159 
Komensky (Comenius), Jan Amos 22 
Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska. (see 

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) 
Komunisticka strana Slovenska (KSS). See 

Communist Party of Slovakia 
Koper, xviii 
Korcak, Josef, 180 
Korean War, 140 

Kosice, 54, 134; military training in, 244, 
245; population, 81; and religious wars, 
13; as temporary capital, 50, 222, 247 

Kosice Program, 222 

Kossuth, Louis, 24 

Kosygin, Aleksei, 226 

Ata;' (political division), 76, 187, 198, 200, 
250 

Kramar, Karel, 32, 36 
Kremnica, 51 
Kriegel, Frantisek, 64 
Krivoy Rog, 305 
Krnov, 19 
Krofta, Kamil, 42 

Krusne hory (Ore Mountains), 77, 94, 
134, 151 

KSC. See Communist Party of Czecho- 
slovakia 

KSS. See Communist Party of Slovakia 
kulaks, 59, 106 
Kulikov, Viktor, 339 
Kutna Hora, 9, 134 
Kutna Hora Decree, 11 



Labe (Elbe) River, 6, 76, 159, 243 
labor code, 104 

labor force, xxvi, 134-35, 139; foreign 
workers in, 298-99; under German 
rule, 47; Gypsies in, 98; shortage, 104, 
134-35; wage scales, 135; women in, 
104-5, 134-35; and work norms, 135 

Ladislas the Posthumous, 13, 14 

Land Control Act (1919), 33, 39 

land reform, 33 

landownership, 58 

language (see also Czech language, Ger- 



man language, Hungarian language, 

Slovak language), xvi; East Slavic, 100; 

Latin, 15, 22, 100; Polish, 100; 

Russian, 100, 313; Ukrainian, 29; 

West Slavic, 100; Yiddish, 98 
Laos, 104, 277 
Latin America, 301-2 
League of Nations, 32, 42 
League of Zelena Hora, 14 
Lebanon, 354 

Legal Affairs Department, 208 

Lenart, Jozef, 60, 180, 186 

Lenin, Vladimir, 113, 182, 187 

Lennon, John, 262 

Leo XIII, Pope, 36 

Leopold I, 18 

Leopold II, 20 

Leopoldov, 261 

Ler, Leopold, 109 

Letter of Majesty, 16-17 

Levoca, 71 

Levy, Alan, xxvii 

Liberec, 256 

Libya, 211, 337; bombing of, by United 
States, 338-39; Soviet arms sales to, 
354 

Lidice, 47, 221 

Lidovd demokracie, 191 

Liptovsky Mikulas, 244 

Lis, Ladislav, 258 

Litomefice, 261 

Litomisky, Jan, 258 

Little Danube (Maly Dunaj), 79 

Little Entente, 42 

Locarno Pact, 42 

London, 48, 49, 223, 357 

Long-Term Target Programs for Cooper- 
ation, 297 

Louis, King, 14 

Ludin, Hans Elard, 51 

Ludvfk Svoboda Higher Academy of the 
Ground Forces, 244, 250 

Luftwaffe, 45 

Lusatia, 18, 32 

Luxemburg dynasty, 9 



Mach, Alexander, 50 

Mach, Ernst, 109 

Macha, Karel H., 21 

Magyars, 7, 90, 219 

Mahler, Gustav, 109 

Main Political Directorate, 230, 312 



409 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Mainz, 8, 10 

Maly Dunaj. See Little Danube 
Margaret of Babenberg, 9 
Margravate of Moravia, 14, 15 
Maria-Theresa, 19-20 
Marshall Plan, 56, 139, 205, 273, 275, 
284 

Marx, Karl, 113 

Marxism, 89, 93, 110 

Marxism-Leninism, 57, 64, 75, 113, 242, 
275; training in, 188-89 

Masaryk, Jan: and independence, 28, 29, 
32; as president, 32, 33, 42; and Slo- 
vak autonomy, 36; and Subcarpathian 
Ruthenia, 31, 38 

Masaryk, Tomas, xxiv, 4, 87, 219; as 
president, 27 

mass organizations (see also Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia), 112-17, 
189-90; cultural, 112; minority groups, 
112; trade unions, 115-16; youth or- 
ganizations, 116-17 

Matica slovenska, 28 

Matice ceska, 21 

Matthias, 16-17 

Mayer, Daniel, 122 

Melmk, 243 

mesto, 35 

Methodius, Saint, 6, 70-71, 123 
Metternich, Prince, 20 
Mexico, 277 

Michael, Emperor of Byzantium, 6 
Middle Ages, 86, 98, 126, 218 
Middle East, 213, 337, 354 
migration, 82-83 

Military Aviation Academy of the Slovak 
National Uprising, 244 

Military Council, 332 

Military Department of the Academy of 
Transport and Communications, 244 

Military Medical Research and Continu- 
ing Education Department of Jan 
Evangelist Purkyn, 243 

Military Scientific-Technical Council, 
334, 344 

Military Section of the Department of 
Physical Education and Sport, 243 

Military Technical Academy of Czecho- 
slovak-Soviet Friendship, 244 

Milovice, 233 

Miltary Council, 334 

Mimon, 238 

mining, xvi, 147-48; coal, 58, 145, 148 



Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 137 
Ministry of Education, 123 
Ministry of Finance, 137 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 206, 207-8, 
225 

Ministry of Foreign Trade, 138, 206, 208 

Ministry of Information, 56 

Ministry of Interior, xix, xxiii, 58, 66; 
and communist takeover, 56-57; and 
human rights violations, 358; and in- 
ternal security, 217, 229, 247, 250-51; 
and mass organizations, 112; and "nor- 
malization," 203 

Ministry of Justice, 199 

Ministry of National Defense, xix, xxiii, 
217, 229, 230 

Ministry of National Security, 252 

"minorities" treaty, 32 

minority groups {see also Czechs, Ger- 
mans, Hungarians, Poles, Slovaks, 
Sudeten Germans, Ukrainians), xvi, 
xxii, 32, 35, 75, 85-86, 93-99, 220; dis- 
satisfaction of, 36-41; and education, 
126-27; Gypsies, xvi, 95-96, 252-53; 
and population transfers, 54; problems, 
42-44 

Mi'rov, 261 

missiles: North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation, 212, 234, 341, 342; Soviet, 233, 
234, 321, 341, 343, 347; United States, 
347 

Mlada Boleslav, 233 
Mladd fronta, 191 
Mlade, 238 
Mlynaf, Zdenek, 69 
Mochovce, 150 
Modry Kamen, 134 
Mohacs, 14 
Mohorita, Vasil, 190 
Mojmfr, 6 

Moldau River. See Vltava River 

Molotov, Viacheslav, 314 

Mongol invasions, 9 

Mongolian People's Republic: and Coun- 
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance, 
274, 275, 284, 291, 300-1, 305; foreign 
workers from, 104; relations with, 211 

Morava River, 77 

Moravia (see also Czech lands, Czech So- 
cialist Republic), xxi, and Austrian 
Penal Code, 256; and Bohemian King- 
dom, 8, 26; climate, 80; and coal min- 
ing, 148; and Constitution of 1920, 33; 



410 



Index 



Czech-German relations, 27, 86; in 
Czechoslovak Republic, 32; and Dual 
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, 90; 
early history, 5-7; German occupation 
of, 5, 45, 45-48, 221; in Golden Age, 
10; Great Moravian Empire, 3, 5, 7; 
under Hapsburg rule, 15, 17; industry 
in, 32; and "locked" German territo- 
ry, 39; Margravate of Moravia, 14, 15; 
mountain and drainage systems, 76; 
and Munich Agreement, 44; political 
divisions, 76; political parties in, 36, 55; 
population density, 81; and religion, 
120; and rural society, 106; and Second 
Republic, 45; during Thirty Years' 
War, 18; topography, 77 

Moravia-Silesia, 13 

Moravian Kingdom, 6 

"Morning Star of the Reformation," 10 

Moscow, 62, 173, 181, 222, 225; annex- 
ation of Carpatho-Ukraine, 53; and 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 
49; and Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance, 273, 274, 278, 284, 290; 
domination by, of Czechoslovak foreign 
policy, 205-6; and reform movement, 
60, 65 Moscow Military Academy of 
the General Staff, 243 

Moscow Protocol, 177 

Most, 134 

Movement of Nonaligned Nations, xix 
Mozambique, 277, 337 
Mukachevo, 53 
Munich, 55 

Munich Agreement (1938), 5, 42-44, 48, 
49, 51, 86, 220-21; nullification of, 
211-12 

Museum of the Bohemian Kingdom, 21 
Mussolini, Benito, 38 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, 
214, 345 



Nagy, Imre, 318 
Napoleon Bonaparte, 20 
Napoleonic wars, 20 
Ndstup, 37 
Nastupists, 37 

National Assembly, 32, 33, 1 16, 192; and 
Constitution of 1948, 57; and Consti- 
tution of 1960, 59-60; and political re- 
form, 61; and Prague Spring of 1968, 
176; Presidium, 58; replacement of, by 



Federal Assembly, 66, 194; and Slovak 
autonomy, 36 

national committees, 50, 200 

National Council, 53 

National Front Act, 178 

National Front of the Czechoslovak So- 
cialist Republic, xviii, 54, 55, 202; 
nomination of candidates, 202; and 
Prague Spring of 1968, 62, 63; role of, 
182, 183, 189-90 

national revival, 21-25 

national security (see also armed forces, in- 
ternal security and public order, War- 
saw Pact), xix, xxiii, 234 

National Security Corps (Sbor narodnf 
bezpecnosti-SNB), xix, xxiii, 249-51 

National Socialist Party, 37, 56 

national unity, 4, 28, 29; and Great 
Moravian Empire, 6 

nationalism, xxii, 28 

nationalism, Czech, 15 

nationalism, Slovak, 27-28 

Nationalities Act, 27 

nationalization, 58-59, 75, 108, 139-40 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Or- 
ganization 

natural resources, xxiii, 133-34; coal, 
133-34; and Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance, 296; lignite, 133-34; 
uranium, 134, 151 

Nazi collaborators, 55 

Nazi Security Police, 54 

Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (1939), 
49, 309 

Nazi Volkssport, 40 

Nazification of Slovak society, 50 

NEM. See New Economic Model 

Nemec, Frantisek, 52 

Nemecky Brod, 9 

Nemek, Anton, 252 

Neurath, Konstantin von, 47 

New Economic Model (NEM), 60, 62, 
93, 142 

Nicaragua, 277 

Ninth-of-May Constitution. See Constitu- 
tion of 1948 
Ninth Party Congress, 110 
Nobel Prize for Literature, 67 
non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) coun- 
tries, 102, 230, 231, 316, 320-22; 
armed forces, 350, 352-54; arms 
production, 354-55; and autonomy, 
335-36; economic aid from, to Third 



411 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



World, 338; import of military equip- 
ment to, 236; intra-alliance coalitions 
of, 335; and "fraternal" invasion of 
1968, 323-27; joint exercises, 320-21; 
and Mikhail Gorbachev, 345-46; mili- 
tary budget, 341-42, 346; military 
equipment, 352-54; military training 
programs, 242-43; mobilization plans, 
241; role of, in Soviet strategy against 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
224, 346-50; role of, in Third World, 
337-39; Soviet domination of, 321-23 

"normalization," xxvi-xxvii, 5, 71, 75- 
76, 90, 173, 177-78; and the army, 
226-28; and Penal Code of 1961, 258; 
and preserving status quo, 67-68; and 
professional occupations, 108; reaction 
to, 203-4; and religion, 123; and trade 
unions, 116 

North America, 219 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO): missile deployments by, 234, 
341, 342; Soviet strategy against, 224, 
324, 340, 346-50; standardization in, 
352; and Warsaw Pact, 307, 308, 
313-15, 345 

North Bohemia (Severocesky kraj), 76 

North Korea. See Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea 

North Moravia (Severomoravsky kraj), 76 

North Sea, 76 

Northern Tier countries: armed forces, 

352-54; arms production, 355 
Nosek, Vaclav, 247-48 
Novak, Miroslav, 250 
Nove Mesto nad Vahom, 244 
Novomesky, Laco (Ladislav), 92, 109, 
110 

Novotny, Antonm, xxiv, 58, 183, 227; 
and creative intelligentsia, 110; and re- 
form movement, 60, 61-62, 175, 227; 
and Slovakia, 92; Stalinist style of, 174 

NSWP. See non-Soviet Warsaw Pact 
countries 

nuclear-free zone, 315, 324 

nuclear weapons, 224, 347 

obec, 35 

obecnd cestina, 101 

Obrana naroda (ON). See Defense of the 
Nation 

Oder River. See Odra River 



Odra (Oder) River, 76 

Office for Press and Information, 190 

oil, 146, 147, 148, 149-50, 299, 299-300 

okres, 35 

okrouhlice, 6 

Old Czechs, 26-27 

Olomouc, 122, 238 

Olteanu, Constantin, 344 

ON. See Defense of the Nation 

Ondfich, Frantisek, 185 

Opava, 19 

OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum 

Exporting Countries 
Opletal, Jan, 47 

Ore Mountains. See Krusne hory 
Orenburg, 297 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries (OPEC), 293, 299 
Ostrava, 43, 95, 261; population, 81 
Otto I, 8, 218 . 
Ottoman Empire, 7, 14, 29 

Pacem in Terris. See Czechoslovak Associ- 
ation of Catholic Clergy 
Pacific Coast, 220 
Pacific Ocean, 219 
Palacky, Frantisek, 22, 24 
Palestine Liberation Organization, 211 
paramilitary forces, 217 
"parasites," 203 
Paris, 23 

Paris Peace Conference, 32, 36, 38 

passport control, 247 

Patocka, Jan, 262, 361 

Patton, George S., 222 

PCC. See Political Consultative Com- 
mittee 

Pavlovskii, I. G., 326 

Peace Committee, 190 

Penal Code of 1950, 256 

Penal Code of 1961, 256-58; death 
penalty, 257-58; prison sentences, 
257-58; "protective supervision," 258; 
"Sedition" section, 257 

penal system, 259-61; physical abuse, 
261; political prisoners, 260-61; prison 
camps, 58; prison conditions, 260-61 

People's Control Commission, 185, 197, 
200 

"people's democracies," 57-60, 310 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(South Yemen), 211, 277, 337 



412 



Index 



People's Militia, xix, xxiii, 217, 251-52 
perestroika (restructuring), xxviii, xxix, 

71, 181 
Petka (The Five), 35 
Physical Culture Association, 190 
Pilsen. See Plzefi 
Pioneers, 116, 190, 245 
pipelines, xviii, 149, 159-60, 285, 297, 

298, 301 
Pitra, Frantisek, 185 
Pittsburgh, 36 

Plastic People of the Universe, The, 110 
Plzefi (Pilsen), 32, 134, 218, 222, 233; 

population, 81 
Podebrady, 14 

Pohranicm straz. See Border Guard 

Poland (see also Eastern Europe), xxv, 51 , 
212, 348; army of, under Red Army, 
309-10; and Bohemian Kingdom, 8, 
11; border, 32, 79; and Carpatho- 
Ukraine, 98; and Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance, 273, 274-75, 
289, 301 , 305; debt crisis of, 147, 290; 
dissent in, 71; economic aid from, to 
Third World, 338; foreign workers 
from, 104; and "fraternal" invasion of 
1968, 175-76, 225-26, 325; and 
German-Slovak agreement, 54; and 
Germany, xxii, 45; and Gottwald 
Academy Memorandum, 324; and 
Haldex, 281; Jagellonian line, 13; labor 
force transfers, 298; loyalties of armed 
forces, 319; martial law in, 340; mili- 
tary equipment, 352; and military in- 
tervention, 64; and Moravian 
Kingdom, 6; and Munich Agreement, 
44; ports in, xviii, 159; proposed alli- 
ance with, 48; radio and television, 6; 
role of, in Soviet military strategy, 349; 
security at border with, 252; Solidari- 
ty, xxvii, 234, 339-41; Soviet control 
of armed forces of, 312-13; Soviet 
forces at border of, 325; trade with, 
166; unrest in, 89, 95; and Warsaw 
Pact, 307-8 

Poles, xvi, xxii, 43, 54, 75; in armed 
forces, 220; and first Slavic Congress, 
24; policy toward, 95 

police, xix, 249-51; repression by, 
261-62; Secret Police, 248; women, 217 

Polish Army, 317 

Polish "nation": of Charles University, 
10 



"Polish October," 317-18 

Polish United Workers Party, 317-18, 

339 

Political Center (Politicke ustfedi — PU), 49 

Political Consultative Committee (PCC), 
206, 327-34, 344; and detente, 336; 
and East European role, 324; and 
"fraternal" invasion of 1968, 325-26; 
and military budget of non-Soviet War- 
saw Pact countries, 341-42; and Roma- 
nian independent course, 322, 323, 344 

political parties, xviii, 35-36, 44, 55, 56, 
62, 88; in Slovakia, 51; in Subcar- 
pathian Ruthenia, 38-39 

Political Prisoners' Year, 361 

political reform, 61-62 

political repression, 202-3 

Politicke ustfedi (PU). See Political Center 

pope, 13, 205; challenge to authority of, 
10; and Compact of Basel, 13; invita- 
tion of, to Czechoslovakia, 70 

population, xv, xvi, 80-81; birthrate, 97; 
density, 81 

ports, xvii, 159 

Potsdam Agreement, 54 

Potsdam Conference, 54 

Prdce, 191 

Prague, 26, 92, 126, 134, 244; and armed 
forces, 225, 227, 228; bishopric of, 9, 
10; Border Guard headquarters, 252; 
as capital, xv; climate, 55, 56, 80; and 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 
187; coronation of Maria-Theresa in, 
1; crime in, 253; and Czech language, 
101; and Czech national character, 75, 
89; Czech-Slovak relations, 36, 92; 
demonstration in, 262; and the econo- 
my, 144; expulsion of Jan Hus from, 
11; "fraternal" invasion of 1968, 176, 
225; and Friendship exercises, 243; and 
Friendship Railway, 159; German oc- 
cupation of, 45, 221; in Golden Age, 
10; government in, 192, 195, 199, 247; 
human rights record, 213; liberation of, 
50, 174, 222; in Middle Ages, 218; 
migration to, 81; military bases, 233, 
238; New Town, 10; political training 
in, 189; population, 81; proclamation 
of independence in, 31; and relations 
with West, 234; river port in, xviii, 159; 
and Slavs, 21; and Slovak autonomy, 
175, 193; superhighway link to, 159; 
topography, 77; urbanization, 81 



413 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 

Prague Drug Abuse Center, 256 

Prague-Pankrac, 261 

Prague-Ruzyne, 261 

Prague Spring of 1968, xxiv, 5, 62-63, 
90, 174, 203; and armed forces, 225, 
227, 228; and censorship, 190-91; and 
the economy, 144; and emigration, 85; 
and mass organizations, 112; and 
membership in Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia, 188; and Penal Code 
of 1961, 256, 258; and People's Militia, 
251; and religion, 121; and Slovak au- 
tonomy, 175, 193; and trade unions, 
104; and Warsaw Pact, 323-24 

Prague World Peace Assembly, 205 

Pravda, 91, 97, 122, 191 

Prchlfk, Vaclav, 324 

Pfemsyl Otakar II, King, 9 

Pfemysl Otakar I, King, 9 

Pfemyslid, 7, 8, 9 

Presidium, xxv, 180, 182-85, 188, 206, 
229, 230; and "fraternal" invasion of 
1968, 176; membership, 183-85; and 
"normalization," 177 

Presidium of the Government of the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 197 

press, 62, 115, 183, 234; and armed 
forces, 241, 250; attacks by, on alco- 
holism, 255; censorship of, 88, 111-12, 
190-91, 324; and Charter 77, 69; and 
church-state relations, 122; and minor- 
ity groups, 95, 97; and Slovak auto- 
nomy, 91 

Press Act, 178 

Presse, Die, 260, 261 

Pribram, 134 

prisons, 260-61; prison camps, 58 
Prochazka, D. R., 109 
"Progress" natural-gas pipeline, 149 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, 
45-48, 98 

Protivzdusna obrana (Antiaircraft 

Defense), 252 
Prussia, 19, 25 
PU. See Political Center 
Public Security (Vefejna bezpecnost-VB), 

xix, 217, 249-51 
purges: of armed forces, 217, 223, 

227-28, 233, 235; of Communist Party 

of Czechoslovakia, 90, 92, 108-9, 114, 

115; and "normalization," 76, 90, 177; 

and reform movement, 60; Stalinist 

purges, 57, 58, 175, 188 



PVVZ. See Committee of the Petition 
"We Remain Faithful" 



Radio Free Europe, 191 
railroads, xvii, 159-60, 220 
rainfall, 80 
Rasin, Alois, 36 
Rastislav, 6 

Red Army, 220; control of East European 
units, 348; and guerilla activities, 
49-50; liberation of Eastern Europe, 
309-10; liberation of Prague, 174, 222; 
occupation of Eastern Europe, 310-313 

reform movement {see also Prague Spring 
of 1968), xvi, 60-62, 89, 112-13, 139, 
140-44 

reform policies, 175-77 

Regensburg, 6 

religion (see also Hussite movement, 
Roman Catholic Church), xvi, 3, 
118-23; Calvinist Church, 119; Cal- 
vinist Reformed Creed, 16; Christi- 
anity, 6; Church of the Seventh Day 
Adventists, 120; clergy, 121; Counter- 
Reformation, 19, 20, 101; curtailment 
of freedom of, xvi, 70, 358; Czech 
Reformed Church, 3, 14, 16, 119; 
Czechoslovak Baptist Church, 120; 
Czechoslovak National Church, xvi, 

119, 120, 122; Eastern Orthodox 
Church, 7, 29, 31, 121; Evangelical 
Church of Czech Brethren, xvi, 119, 
120; Jehovah's Witnesses, 120; Juda- 
ism, 119, 120, 121, 122; Lutheran 
Church, 90, 1 19; Methodist Church of 
Czechoslovakia, 120; official policy 
toward, 120-23; Old Catholic Church, 
119; Orthodox Church, 38, 98, 119; 
persecution of religious activists, 
180-81, 205; Protestant Reformation, 
10, 15, 16, 86; Protestant sects, 119, 

120, 121; Protestantism, 22, 27; pub- 
lishing houses, 70; Reformation, 16; 
Reformed Creed, 16; religious acti- 
vism, xxvii; Russian Orthodox Church, 
121; Slovak Evangelical Church, xvi; 
Uniate Church, xvi, 29-31, 38, 98, 
119, 120, 121; Utraquism, 10-11, 14, 16 

religious wars, 11-14, 16, 218-19 
"reluctant terror," 180 
Republican Party of Farmers and 
Peasants, 35, 51, 55 



414 



Index 



resistance movement, 49-50, 51-52, 221 
Revised Ordinance of the Land (1627), 17 
Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, 

62, 115-16, 190, 245 
Reykjavik, 346 
Rhine River, 42 
Riad computer project, 305 
Rilke, Rainer Maria, 109 
roads, xvii, 159, 160 
robota, 20 
Rodobrana, 37 

Roman Catholic Church, xvi, xxi, xxii, 
xxv, 17, 71, 87, 118, 119, 120-23; 
clergy, 13; in Czech lands, 8; and 
deportation of Jews, 99; and Enlight- 
enment, 20; Germans, 11; in Hungary, 
22; and Hussite movement, 10; influ- 
ence, xxi, xxii, xxv, 6, 17; as land- 
owner, 33; political parties, 36, 189; 
purge of, 57; and religious activists, 
181, 205; and religious wars, 16-17; 
samizdat, 70, 205; and Slovak National 
Party, 27; underground movement, 
122-23; and Utraquists, 13 

Romania (see also Eastern Europe): alli- 
ance with, 42; arms production, 355; 
border with, 32, 76; and Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance, 273, 
274-75, 286, 301; Declaration of the 
Romanian Central Committee, 286; 
and East-West ties, 342, 343; electri- 
city from, 151; foreign policy, 206; and 
Gottwald Academy Memorandum, 
324; independent course, 321-23, 324, 
343-44; military budget, 342; military 
equipment, 354; nonparticipation of, in 
"fraternal" invasion of 1968, xxv, 210, 
343; Red Army occupation of, 309-10; 
relations with, 210; reliability of army, 
350; and Solidarity crisis, 339; trade 
with, 166; trade with members of 
Council for Mutual Economic As- 
sistance, 291; and Warsaw Pact, 224, 
307-8 

Romanian army, 322-23 
Romanians: in armed forces, 220 
Rome, 119 
Rostock, xviii 
Rowboat to Prague, xxvii 
Rude prdvo, 183, 191 
Rudolf, Emperor, 9 
Rudolf II, Emperor, 16 
Runciman, Walter, 42-44 



Rusov, Karel, 231 

Russia, 23; Provisional Government, 
219; and revolution of 1848, 24; and 
World War I, 28, 219-20 

Russian civil war, 220 

Russophiles, 38, 44, 231; Ruthenians, 
52-53 

Rusyn, 29 

Ruthenia. See Subcarpathian Ruthenia, 

Carpatho-Ukraine 
Ruthenian National Christian Party, 38 
Ruzyne International Airport, 225 
Rye Island. See Zitny ostrov 

Safarik, Pavol, 4, 23 
Salzburg Compromise, 50 
samizdat, 70, 191, 204, 205 
Samo, 6 

Saxon "nation": of Charles University, 
10 

Saxony, 18, 19 

Schmalkaldic League, 16 

Schutzvereine, 40 

SdP. See Sudeten German Party 

Second Five-Year Plan (1956-60), 140 

Second Republic, 44-45, 52 

Second Reserve, 241 

Second Writers' Congress, 60 

Secret Police, 248 

Seifert, Jaroslav, 67 

Sejna, Jan, 227 

Senate, 33 

Serbs, 24, 28-29 

"Set of Measures to Improve the System 
of Planned National Economic 
Management after 1980," 139, 147, 
168 

Seventeenth Party Congress (1986), 180, 

185, 188, 194, 208 
Seventh Five-Year Plan (1981-85), 135, 

146, 147, 157, 168 
Severocesky kraj (North Bohemia), 76 
Severomoravsky kraj (North Moravia), 76 
Shelest, Pyotr, 63 
Shield exercise, 347 
Siberia, 148, 219, 297, 298, 305 
Sigismund, 11, 13 
Sik, Ota, 60, 103, 142 
Silesia, 15, 19, 26; in Czechoslovak 

Republic, 32; German nationalism in, 

39; industry in, 32 
Siroky, Viliam, 60 



415 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Sixteenth Party Congress, 180, 183-85 

Sixth Five- Year Plan (1976-80), 144, 145 

Skoda, 32, 218 

Slansky, Rudolf, 58, 223 

Slavic Congress, 24, 31 

Slavic peoples, xxi, 7, 21, 70 

Slavic (Slavonic) language group, 99 

Slavic tribes, 5-7 

Slavic unity, 23, 27, 31 

Slavik, Vaclav, 69 

Sliac, 238 

Slov-Air, 160 

Slovak Agrarian Party, 35 

Slovak Council of Trade Unions, 190 

Slovak Democratic Party, 55, 56 

Slovak Diet, 45, 51 

Slovak Evangelical Church, 120 

Slovak Freedom Party, 189 

Slovak language, 99; borrowing in, 100; 
as a literary language, 23, 100; as offi- 
cial language, xvi, 35, 100; as peasant 
dialect, 27 

Slovak National Council, 24, 52, 59, 61, 
66, 189, 199; election results, 202; 
Presidium, 192 

Slovak National Party, 27, 28 

Slovak National Uprising, 52, 92, 99, 221 

Slovak Ore Mountains. See Slovenske 
rudohorie 

Slovak Populist Party, 36-37, 38, 44, 45, 

50, 51, 55 
Slovak Republic, 50-51, 91, 175 
Slovak Resistance, 51-52 
Slovak Revival Party, 189 
Slovak Revolutionary Youth, 51 
Slovak Socialist Republic, xviii, xxiii, 76, 
193; and alcohol consumption, 254-55; 
and Communist Party of Czecho- 
slovakia, 186, 229; diminished power 
of, 175; and the economy, 136; and 
education, 127-28; government, 195; 
population, 80-81; prison system, 261; 
share of total revenue, 162 
Slovak tribes, xxi, 7 
Slovak Union of Women, 190 
Slovakia (Slovensko) (see also Slovak So- 
cialist Republic), xxi, xxv, 64, 77; and 
anti-Semitism, 98; army, 51; and au- 
tonomy, xxv, 36, 37, 58, 91-93, 
174-75, 192, 193; "bourgeois nation- 
alists," 58; and creative intelligentsia, 
112; crime in, 252; in Czechoslovak 
Republic, 32; economy, 91, 92; edu- 



cation, 91, 92; and federalism, 93; Ger- 
man occupation of, 52; Germanization 
of, 221; Gypsies in, 95-96; under 
Hapsburg rule, 14, 15; health care. 92, 
124; Hungarian minority in, 94; and 
Hungarian Penal Code, 256; Hungar- 
ian rule of, 88, 218; independence, 5; 
and industrialization, 59, 91-92; indus- 
try in, 32; local government, 33-35; 
and mass organizations, 112; mountain 
and drainage system, 76; and Munich 
Agreement, 44; national identity, 4; na- 
tional revival, 22-25; per capita in- 
come, 92; political divisions, 76; and 
political reform, 61; population density, 
81; and religion, 23, 37, 91, 120; and 
rural society, 106; Ruthenians in, 38; 
and Second Republic, 45; Soviet troops 
in, 233; Taborites in, 13; during Thirty 
Years' War, 18; topography, 76, 77, 
79; Ukrainians in, 98; urbanization, 
xxii, 81; and World War II, 221 

Slovaks, xvi, xxi-xxii, 75, 90-93; in 
armed forces, 220; in Carpatho- 
Ukraine, 53; in Dual Monarchy of 
Austria-Hungary, 26-27; early history, 
5-7; and education, 127; and first 
Slavic Congress, 24; history of, 3-4; 
share of total population, 86; transfer 
of, from Hungary, 54; and youth or- 
ganizations, 116 

Slovenes, 24 

Slovenske rudohorie (Slovak Ore Moun- 
tains), 79, 134 

Slovensko. See Slovakia 

Smrkovsky, Josef, 64 

SNB. See National Security Corps 

Social Democratic Party, 36, 44, 51, 62 

"social democraticism," 87 

social welfare, 123, 124-26; child care, 
118, 124-25; family allowances, 124; 
maternity leave, 124; pensions, 124; 
pronatalist policies, 126 

Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak 
Citizens, 202 

Socialist Realism, 109-10 

society, xvi, xxii, 4, 102-18; class distinc- 
tions, 102; elite, xxii, 98, 114; family, 
117-18; intellectual elite, 20, 22; in- 
tellectuals, 4; intelligentsia, xxii, 
107-12; interwar period, 75; middle 
class, 4, 102; nobility, 20, 21; peasants, 
20, 58, 59, 106; post- World War II, 75; 



416 



Index 



rural, 105-7; serfs, 15, 20; social mo- 
bility, 113-14; structure, xxii, 101-2; 
upward mobility, 312; women in the 
labor force, 104-5; workers, xxii, 102-5 

Sokol clubs, 112 

Sokolov, 134 

Solidarity, xxvii, 339-41 

South Africa, 213 

South Bohemia Qihocesky kraj), 76 

South Moravia (Jihomoravsky kraj), 76 

South Yemen. See People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen 

Southern Tier forces, 352 

Soviet Air Defense Forces, 349 

Soviet Baltic Fleet, 349 

Soviet General Forces, 347 

Soviet General Staff, 310, 322, 325, 326, 
332, 348-49 

Soviet model, 136, 138, 140, 141-42, 161, 
163, 164, 284-84 

"Soviet Slovakia," 51 

Soviet Supreme High Command, 310, 
348-49 

Soviet Ukraine, 39 

Soviet Union (see also Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance, Red Army, War- 
saw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, 
and Mutual Assistance), xvi, xviii-xix, 
xxvii; and Action Program, 62; airfields 
in Czechoslovakia, 238; and Albanian 
departure from Warsaw Pact, 319; al- 
liance system (1943-55), 308; alliance 
with, 42, 44, 48, 55; annexation by, of 
Carpatho-Ukraine, 52-53; armies of 
"liberation," 50, 55; arms sales by, to 
Third World, 354; attack on, by Ger- 
many, 49; bilateral defense treaty with, 
xix, 208; bilateral treaties with East Eu- 
ropean countries, 310; and Bratislava 
Declaration, 64; and Carpatho- 
Ukraine, 75, 97; Central Group of 
Forces, xxiii, 233-34, 243, 325; and 
Christmas Agreement of 1943, 52; and 
coalition government, 5; and Com- 
munist Party of Czechoslovakia, 182; 
and Constitution of 1960, 192; and 
Council for Mutual Economic As- 
sistance, 273-74, 274-75, 284-85, 
302-5; and creative intelligentsia, 109; 
and Czech guerilla activities, 49; and 
Czechslovak armed forces, 223-25, 
231-32; dispute with China, 319; domi- 
nation by, 103, 93, 173-74; domination 



by, of foreign policy, 205-6, 208-9, 
213; and East European arms produc- 
tion, 354-55; and East-West ties, 211, 
343; and the economy, 139, 168; for- 
eign aid, 300-1; and foreign trade 
prices, 293; formation of Warsaw Pact, 
313-15; and Friendship (Druzhba) 
pipeline, 285; and Friendship Railway, 
159; Group of Soviet Forces in Ger- 
many, 233, 310, 313; and the Hungar- 
ian Revolution, 318-19; invasion of 
1968, xxv, 175-77, 208, 225-26, 
323-27, 325, 332; labor force transfers, 
298; "liberation" by, of Bratislava, 99; 
Long-Range Air Force, 238; and 
Marxism-Leninism, 113; military aid 
from, 235, 236; military aid to Eastern 
Europe, 352-54; and military interven- 
tion, 63-66, 89, 340; military strategy, 
346-49; military training, 242-43, 245; 
Ministry of Defense, 307, 322, 332, 
335; missile deployment, 234; and 
Munich Agreement, 220; natural 
resources, 296; navy, 301; Northern 
Group of Forces, 233, 310; oil and gas 
exports, 146, 147, 148-51; and Poland, 
89; and "Polish October," 317-18; and 
political repression, 258; and Potsdam 
Conference, 54; press, 340; Progress 
pipeline, 149; reform program, xxviii; 
relationship with East European mem- 
bers of Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance, 299-300; and resistance 
movement, 51; and Romanian in- 
dependent course, 343-44; satellite 
countries, 57, 58; security at border 
with, 252; Sino-Soviet dispute, 141; 
and Solidarity crisis, 339-41; Southern 
Group of Forces, 233, 318; Soviet 
Groups of Forces, 346; and Soviet 
model, 136, 138, 141; sphere of in- 
fluence, 55; takeover of Czechoslo- 
vakia, 56; and technology within 
Council for Mutual Economic As- 
sistance, 298; and Third World alli- 
ances, 337-39; trade with, 165, 166, 
209; trade with members of Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance, 291; 
troops based in Czechoslovakia, xix, 
xxiii, 209, 226, 233; and turnover tax, 
162; Union (Soiuz) natural-gas pipe- 
line, 297; and youth organizations, 116 
Soviet Zone, 54 



417 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



Spanish Civil War, 58 

spisovnd cestina (literary language), 101 

Sramek, Jan, 36 

Stalin, Joseph, 58, 139, 164, 273, 284, 

285, 316-17 
Stalinist era, xxvi, 89 
Stalinist purges, 57, 58, 175, 188 
Stalinist trials, 92, 121 
Stalinists, 62, 92 
Stalinization, xxiv, 5, 57-60 
standard of living, xxvi, 102 
State Bank of Czechoslovakia, 137, 

160-61 

State Commission for Research and De- 
velopment and Investment Planning, 
197 

State Defense Council (Rada obrany 

statu), 228, 229, 230 
State Planning Commission, 197, 200 
State Security (Statnf bezpecnost-StB), 

xix, xxiii, 217, 249-51, 262 
Statm bezpecnost. See State Security 
StB. See State Security 
Stefanik, Milan, 29 
Stevens, John, 137 

Stredocesky kraj (Central Bohemia), 76 
Stredoslovensky kraj (Central Slovakia), 
76 

Stresemann, Gustav, 40 
Stnbro, 9 

Strougal, Lubomfr, xxix, 180 
student demonstrations, 60, 62 
Stur, L'udovit, 4, 23, 24 
sturovcina, 23 
Styria, 9 

Subcarpathian Ruthenia {see also 
Carpatho-Ukraine), 29-31, 33; and au- 
tonomy, 38-39; communists in, 38, 39; 
in Czechoslovak Republic, 32; and first 
Slavic Congress, 24; industry in, 33; 
and Munich Agreement, 44; political 
parties in, 38-39 

Subcarpathian Ruthenians: in armed 
forces, 220 

Sudeten German Emigre Organization, 
234 

Sudeten German Home Front (Sudeten- 
deutsche Heimatfront), 41 

Sudeten German Party (Sudetendeutsche 
Partei), 41, 42-43, 54 

Sudeten Germans, 32, 48, 75, 94-95; de- 
mand for autonomy, 42-43; expulsion 
of, 54, 95; and German nationalism, 



39-41; political parties, 40-41 

Sudeten Mountains, 94 

Sudeten Nazi Party (Deutsche National- 
sozialistische Arbeiterpartei), 40, 41, 54 

Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront. Sudet- 
en German Home Front 

Sudetendeutsche Partei. See Sudeten Ger- 
man Party 

Sudetenland, 5, 29, 86; industry in, 32, 
39; and Munich Agreement, 221; na- 
tionality problems in, 39-41 

Sumava Mountains (Sumavske podhun), 
77 

Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia, 198 
Supreme Court of the Czech Socialist 

Republic, 198 
Supreme Court of the Slovak Socialist 

Republic, 198 
Susice, 233 
Svatopluk, 6 

Svaz pro spolupraci s armadou 
(SVAZARM). See Association for 
Cooperation with the Army 

SVAZARM. See Association for Cooper- 
ation with the Army 

Svehla, Antonm, 35 

Svejkian, 88-89, 115 

Svestka, Oldfich, 64 

Svoboda, Ludvfk, 62, 65, 194, 221, 222, 
223, 226, 232 

Svobodne slovo, 191 

Swedish armies, 18 

Syria, 337; relations with, 211; Soviet 

arms sales to, 354; trade with, 167 
Syrovy, Jan, 43 
Szczecin, xviii 



Taafe, Count Edward, 26 

Tabor, 233 

Taborites, 11, 13 

taxes: income, 162; turnover, 162 

Technical Committee, 334, 344 

Temelm, 150 

Temporary Stationing of Soviet Forces on 

Czechoslovak Territory, 234 
Teplice, 134 
Terezm, 47, 48 
Tesm, 19, 32, 44 
"Theses," 61 

Third Czechoslovak Republic, xxii, 

xxiii-xxiv, 54-55 
Third Five- Year Plan (1961-65), 141 



418 



Index 



Third Reich. See Germany 

Third World, 218, 224; and Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance, 301-2, 
303; economic aid to, 201-2, 338; im- 
ports of military equipment by, 236; 
military training by non-Soviet War- 
saw Pact countries, 338; relations with, 
211; role of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact 
countries in, 337-39; Romanian rela- 
tions with, 344; Soviet arms sales to, 
354 

Thirteenth Party Congress, 142 

Thirty Years' War, 18, 32 

Tiso, Jozef, 37, 44, 50-51, 91, 99, 175 

Tisza River, 29 

Tito, 58 

Tomasek, Frantisek Cardinal, 70, 121, 

123, 205 
Topol'cany, 233 

trade, xvii, 138, 139, 140, 163-67; among 
members of Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance, 291-92, 299-300; 
"Bucharest formula," 293; dependence 
on, 136, 141, 163-64; East-West, 293; 
exports, 166-67; imports, 166-67; part- 
ners, 166; price system, 292-93; 
problems, 145-46; with Soviet Union, 
209; and state-owned foreign trade en- 
terprises, 163-64; terms of, 164-65; 
with Western countries, 140, 164, 165, 
166 

trade unions, 55, 104, 115-16, 135, 190; 

right to form, 359 
Trans-Siberian Railroad, 220 
Transcarpathian Ruthenia. See Carpatho- 

Ukraine, Subcarpathian Ruthenia 
transportation, xvii-xviii, 157-60; civil 

aviation, 160, 238; inland waterways, 

xvii, 159; pipelines, xviii, 149, 159-60, 

285, 297, 298, 301; ports, xviii, 159; 

railroads, xvii, 159-60, 220; roads, 

xvii, 159, 160 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and 

Mutual Assistance (1970), 208 
Treaty of Rome (1957), 285 
Treaty of Saint-Germain (1919), 31, 38 
Treaty of Versailles, 88 
Treaty of Westphalia (1648), 18 
Trnava, 122 
Trutnov, 134 
Tuka, Vojtech, 37-38, 50 
Turkey, 14, 18 
Turnverband, 40 



"Two Thousand Words," xxv, 63, 69, 
116 

Tyl, J. K., 21 

Ukraine. See Carpatho-Ukraine 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 53 
Ukrainians, xvi, xxii, 29, 75, 97-98; in 

Czechoslovakia, 53; and education, 

127; and first Slavic Congress, 24; in 

Soviet Union, 64 
Ukrainophiles, 38, 44 
Ulbricht, Walter, 64, 336 
UN. See United Nations 
Uniate Church. See religion 
Unified Agricultural Cooperatives Act, 

59, 106 
Unified Magyar Party, 39 
Union exercise, 339, 347 
Union for Cooperation with the Army, 

190 

Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, 190 
Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters, 190 
Union of High School Students and Ap- 
prentices, 117 
Union of University Students, 117 
Union of Working Youth, 117 
Union (Soiuz) natural-gas pipeline, 297, 
298 

United Nations, xix, 139, 213; Confer- 
ence on Trade and Development, 213; 
and Council for Mutual Economic As- 
sistance, 304; Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, 69; Educa- 
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organi- 
zation, 213; Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 213; International Labor 
Organization, 213; Security Council, 
213; Universal Charter of Human 
Rights, 315, 360; World Health Or- 
ganization, 213 

United States, 31, 33, 36, 76, 139, 232, 
275, 315; bombing of Libya, 338-39; 
Czech and Slovak immigrants in, 
213; and Czech guerilla activities, 49; 
and Czechoslovak Republic, xxi; 
declaration of Czechoslovak indepen- 
dence in, 29; and emigres, 85; and 
Potsdam Conference, 54; relations 
with, xix, 213, 214, 234; and Slovak 
National Uprising, 52; and Soviet 
strategy in Europe, 347, 348; trade 
with, 167, 213; value of dollar, 290; 



419 



Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 



and Warsaw Pact alliances with the 

Third World, 337 
United States Third Army, 222 
Unity of Czech Brethren, 16, 21 
universal male suffrage, 26 
urbanization, 81; and commuting, 82-83 
USSR. See Soviet Union 
Ust' Ilim, 297 

Ustfedm vybor odboje domaciho. See 
Central Committee of the Home 
Resistance 

UVOD. See Central Committee of the 
Home Resistance 



Vaclavik, Milan, 231, 243 

Vaculfk, Ludvfk, xxv, 63, 69 

Vah River, 79, 151 

Vajnar, Vratislav, 247 

Vatican See also Roman Catholic Church, 

119, 122 
VB. See Public Security 
Velehrad, 71 

Vefejna bezpecnost. See Public Security 

Vienna, 18, 31, 77, 260 

Vietnam, 104; and Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance, 274, 275, 276, 
284, 300-1; labor force transfers, 298 

Vladislav II, King, 14 

Vladivostok, 219 

Vltava Basin, 77 

Vltava (Moldau) River, 76, 151, 159, 218 

Voice of America, 191 

Volosin, Augustin, 38, 44 

VONS. See Committee for the Defense of 
the Unjustly Persecuted 

Vybor na obranu nespravedlive stihanych 
(VONS). See Committee for the De- 
fense of the Unjustly Persecuted 

Vychodocesky kraj (East Bohemia), 76 

Vychodoslovensky kraj (East Slovakia), 76 

Vyskov, 244, 250 

Vysoke My to, 233 

Vysoke Tatry (High Tatras), 77, 80 

wages, 103-4, 144; agricultural workers, 
106; armed forces, 241; women, 105 
Wallenstein, 18 

"War of the Entire People," 322 
Warsaw Pact. See Warsaw Treaty of 

Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 

Assistance 



Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Coopera- 
tion, and Mutual Economic Assistance 
(1955), xix, xxi, xxiii, xxv, 57, 85, 174, 
275, 285, 307-55; Albanian departure 
from, 319; Czechoslovak exports to 
member countries, 218; and Czecho- 
slovak foreign relations, 208, 209, 210, 
213, 214; and Czechoslovak military 
equipment, 235-36; and East Europe- 
an autonomy, 335-36; "fraternal" in- 
vasion of 1968, xxv, 5, 94, 144, 173, 
175, 176, 210, 217, 225-26, 227, 228, 
248, 323-27; independent course of 
Romania, 321-23; Joint Armed Forces, 
320, 331-35; Joint Command, 315, 
316, 332-34; joint exercises, 63, 243, 
316, 321, 322, 335, 337, 339, 347; Joint 
Secretariat, 327; Joint Staff, 315, 316, 
332-34; military equipment, 321; and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
313-15; organizational structure, 
307-8, 315-16, 327-35; prevention of 
member defections, 319-21 ; renewal of, 
344-46; and right of military interven- 
tion, 209; role of Czechoslovak armed 
forces in, xxiii, 224-25; Romanian ob- 
jections to, 343-44; standardization in, 
35; Svejkian strategy against, 89 

Washington, 234 

Washington, George, 33 

Wehrmacht, 309, 310 

Wenceslas IV, King, 10, 11 

West Bohemia (Zapadocesky kraj), 76 

West exercise, 339, 347 

West Germany. See Federal Republic of 
Germany 

West Slovakia (Zapadoslovensky kraj), 76 

Western Europe, xvi, xxi, 86, 275, 282, 
284; East European relations with, 214, 
341, 342-43; East- West conflict, 86, 
228; standard of living, 133, 146; trade 
with, 167; weather systems, 79-80 

Western world, 55, 62; banks, 147; and 
Council for Mutual Economic As- 
sistance, 304; and credit to East Euro- 
pean countries, 290-91; embargoes, 
299; emigration to, 85; and human 
rights, 262; popular music, 70; Roma- 
nian relations with, 344; and trade un- 
ions, 115 

Wilson, Woodrow, xxi 

Wolf, Jin, 261 

women: in agriculture, 106; in armed 



420 



Index 



forces, 217; and education, 118, 128; 
in the labor force, 104-5; and military 
training, 244 

workers, 4, 102-5; and Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia, 113-14; partici- 
pation of, in management, 143; as 
percentage of population, 103; under- 
employment of, 103 

World War I, 4, 28-29, 38, 88, 348; 
Czechoslovak Legion in, 222; peace set- 
tlements, 309; and Ruthenian auton- 
omy, 31 

World War II, xxii, 5, 45-48, 54, 75, 81 , 
86, 88, 95, 234, 247; and the Com- 
munist Party of Czechoslovakia, 182; 
as safe topic for writers, 110, 111; 
Soviet-directed alliance in, 348, 349, 
350; and Soviet Union, 174, 309; ter- 
ritorial defense, 320-21 

Writers' Union, 116 

Wyclif, John, 10, 11 

Yamburg, 149 
Yamburg Peninsula, 305 
Yermakov, Viktor, 233 
Young Czech Party, 27, 36 



youth: and crime, 253; organizations, 
116-17; and religious activism, 205 

Youth Commission, 185 

Yugoslavia, 85, 275, 310; arms produc- 
tion, 355; and Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance, 276, 277; emigration 
through, 85; foreign policy, 206; in- 
dependent course of, 274, 322, 323; 
ports, xviii, 159; relations with, 42, 
210; territorial defense, 320, 321; trade 
with, 167 

Zapadocesky kraj (West Bohemia), 76 

Zapadoslovensky kraj (West Slovakia), 76 

Zapotocky, Antonm, 58 

Zatkovic, Gregory, 31 

Zavadil, Miroslav, 185, 190 

Zbynek, Archbishop of Prague, 11 

zeme (lands), 33 

"Zeta" headquarters, 51 

Zhivkov, Todor, 346 

Zilina, 44, 244 

Zitny ostrov (Rye Island), 79 

Zivnostenska banka. See Central Bank 

Zizka, Jan, 11-12, 218 

zupa (administrative division), 35 

Zvolen, 13, 233 



421 



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